Freeman v. State , 297 Ga. 146 ( 2015 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: April 20, 2015
S15A0316. FREEMAN v. STATE.
BENHAM, Justice.
Appellant Anthony Lamar Freeman was convicted of felony murder and
other related crimes based upon a guilty plea entered in 1995. He now appeals
the trial court’s denial of his motion for leave to file an out-of-time appeal. For
the reasons set forth below we affirm.
The criminal charges against appellant included a charge of malice murder
and other crimes related to the rape and shooting death of Alicia Lynn
Yarbrough. At the time of the crimes, appellant was fifteen years of age. In
1995, at the age of sixteen, appellant entered a plea of guilty to felony murder,
armed robbery, and burglary, and he was sentenced to two life sentences to be
served concurrently, plus twenty years. The factual basis presented by the
prosecuting attorney at the plea hearing showed that appellant joined his co-
indictees, two men who were older than appellant, in traveling to Spalding
County for the purpose of killing Charles Puckett, who was then living with Ms.
Yarbrough. One of the co-indictees had dated Ms. Yarbrough in the past. The
three men donned masks and broke into the residence where the couple was
living. Puckett was not there, but the men took various items, and also
transported Ms. Yarbrough to a hotel room where they took turns sexually
assaulting her. They then drove the victim to a secluded spot where the two co-
indictees got out of the car and shot her three times, killing her. The State
informed the trial court at the plea hearing that appellant cooperated with
authorities in finding the murder weapon and other evidence which may
otherwise have never been found, and that appellant agreed to testify truthfully
at the trials of the co-indictees, against whom the State was seeking the death
penalty. Appellant’s counsel represented to the trial court that appellant did not
know about the planned enterprise at the time he traveled with the others to
Spalding County, and that, although appellant was present during the robbery,
he tried to get away a couple of times. The prosecutor stated at the hearing that
because of appellant’s age at the time the crimes were committed, the State
could not seek the death penalty. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815(108 SCt 2687, 101 LE2d 702) (1988).
The trial judge set out, for the appellant, each of the crimes for which he
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was charged along with the maximum sentence each crime carried. In response
to being asked, appellant answered that he understood the charges and the
maximum possible sentences. Appellant responded that he understood when the
prosecutor informed him that, had he gone to trial and been convicted, he “could
have been found guilty of either malice or felony murder, which would carry a
life sentence; kidnapping with bodily injury, which carries a life sentence; armed
robbery, which carries a life sentence; burglary, which carries a sentence of up
to 20 years; rape, which carries a sentence of up to life imprisonment; and
aggravated sodomy, which carries a sentence of up to life imprisonment.” The
hearing transcript further shows appellant acknowledged he understood the
rights he would be waiving by entering a guilty plea, and the record also
contains appellant’s written acknowledgment of waiver of rights form. The trial
court accepted the factual basis presented by the prosecutor and found that
appellant was freely and voluntarily entering his plea. The judge accepted the
guilty plea and advised appellant that he had the right to appeal. No direct
appeal was filed.
In 2013, over eighteen years after entering his guilty plea, appellant,
acting pro se, filed a motion for leave to file an out-of-time appeal. The trial
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court conducted a hearing on appellant’s motion and denied it. This appeal
followed.
1. Appellant asserts his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for
failing to file a direct appeal. In fact, appellant asserts he repeatedly asked his
trial counsel to seek an appeal of his guilty plea convictions. Ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to file an appeal may provide a ground for
granting an out-of-time appeal. See Stephens v. State, 291 Ga. 837, 838 (1) (733
SE2d 266) (2012). This Court, however, has held that a criminal defendant is
not entitled to an out-of-time appeal on this ground unless he can show from the
existing record that the claims of error he could have raised in a timely direct
appeal would have been meritorious. Henderson v. State, 293 Ga. 6, 9 (2) (743
SE2d 19) (2013). Each of appellant’s various claims of error can be resolved
on the existing record. Accordingly, we review each claim of error, below, and
conclude with respect to each that appellant has failed to show he would have
prevailed in a direct appeal.
In an out-of-time motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective
assistance of counsel, just as in any other case asserting ineffective assistance,
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the appellant must meet the familiar Strickland1 standard and demonstrate both
deficient performance of counsel and that the deficient performance prejudiced
the appellant. See Stephens, supra, 291 Ga. at 838-839. Because, as set forth
below, appellant has failed to demonstrate he would have prevailed on appeal
with respect to any of the alleged errors he has raised, he has failed to meet the
required prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and his assertion that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal lacks merit. See Coulter
v. State, 295 Ga. 699, 702 (2) (c) (763 SE2d 713) (2014); Henderson, supra,293 Ga. at 9; Stephens, supra, 291 Ga. at 840.
2. Appellant asserts he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel at
the plea hearing. In particular, appellant asserts counsel inadequately
investigated the case, failed to file any pre-trial motions, and coerced the
defendant to plead guilty to crimes he did not commit by telling him the State
would seek the death penalty against him, just as it was seeking the death
penalty against the co-indictees. These claims are belied, however, by the
transcript of the plea hearing, which shows that in response to questioning,
appellant denied he had been coerced by anyone into taking the plea. Appellant
1
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
5
confirmed he was satisfied with the representation his counsel had provided
him, and further confirmed he understood the maximum possible sentences that
could be imposed on the crimes charged. In fact, both the trial judge and the
prosecutor stated at the plea hearing that appellant could face life sentences for
the crimes charged, and appellant responded that he understood. At no time
during the plea hearing was any representation made that appellant could face
the death penalty if tried and convicted. Instead, the transcript shows that prior
to the trial judge’s pronouncement that he would accept the guilty plea, the
prosecutor reminded the judge the State could not seek the death penalty against
appellant due to his age at the time of the crimes. Thus, appellant inaccurately
states he was not informed that the prosecutor could not seek the death penalty
because of his age until after the guilty plea had been accepted.
Pretermitting the issue of whether counsel’s assistance at the plea hearing
was deficient, appellant has failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the
alleged deficient performance, as required by the second prong of the Strickland
standard. Appellant responded at the plea hearing that he understood the nature
of his plea, that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation, and that he
understood the rights he was waiving by entering the plea. Consequently, even
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if appellate counsel had been appointed to represent appellant in a direct appeal
with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea hearing,
a timely appeal on this issue would have been unsuccessful because this claim
lacks merit. Other than the bare assertion that he was only sixteen years old at
the time of the plea hearing, appellant presented no evidence that he did not
fully understand the questions posed to him, even though he answered that he
did understand. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s
motion for out-of-time appeal on this ground. See Coulter, supra, 295 Ga. at
702; Henderson, supra, 293 Ga. at 9; Stephens, 291 Ga. at 840.
3. Appellant asserts his guilty plea was not supported by a factual basis
as required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9, but the transcript of the plea
hearing shows otherwise. Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9 establishes a
mandatory requirement that a trial judge may enter a judgment upon a guilty
plea only after “such inquiry on the record as may satisfy the judge that there is
a factual basis for the plea.” “[T]he rule requires nothing more than that the trial
court make itself aware of the factual basis of the plea.” See State v. Evans, 265
Ga. 332, 334 (2) (454 SE2d 468) (1995). Here, both the prosecutor and
appellant’s counsel made a recitation at the plea hearing setting forth sufficient
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facts of the case to support the guilty plea. The recited facts showed that
sufficient factual basis existed to support appellant’s conviction either as a direct
participant or as a party to the crimes with respect to each crime charged. By
accepting a plea, the judge is deemed to have made a factual finding that there
is an adequate factual basis for the plea. Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744 (4) (a)
(683 SE2d 586) (2009). We find no error in that finding in this case.
4. The underlying felony alleged in the felony murder charge against
appellant was aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Appellant asserts that
because he did not plead guilty to aggravated assault, and because the State
failed to produce evidence that appellant committed either aggravated assault or
felony murder, the record shows appellant did not understand the elements of
the crime to which he pleaded guilty. But Georgia’s felony murder statute does
“‘not require that the defendant be charged and convicted of the underlying
felony. The jury must simply find that the defendant committed or attempted
to commit it.’ [Citation.] See also OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) . . . .” State v. Jones, 274
Ga. 287, 288 (1) (553 SE2d 612) (2001). Here, the statement of facts presented
to the trial court sufficiently supported appellant’s guilty plea to the felony
murder charge by demonstrating he was a party to the crimes of aggravated
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assault and felony murder predicated upon the assault. Accordingly, this
argument lacks merit.
5. We also reject appellant’s assertion that the trial court abused its
discretion by accepting the plea of guilty to armed robbery and burglary since
appellant did not plead guilty to a weapons charge or a theft charge, and
because, according to appellant, the State failed to demonstrate appellant had
possession of a gun or other weapon. In support of this argument, appellant
claims the evidence showed only that he was present at the scene of the crimes,
and therefore, under the Jackson v. Virginia2 standard, the evidence did not
support a conviction on these charges. “Presence, companionship, and conduct
before and after an offense is committed are circumstances from which
participation in the criminal act may be inferred.” (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Thorton v. State, 292 Ga. 87, 88 (2) (734 SE2d 393) (2012). The
factual statements presented by the prosecutor were sufficient to support the
acceptance of the guilty plea to these offenses as they demonstrated appellant
was a party to these crimes.
6. Likewise, we reject appellant’s assertion that because he did not plead
2
443 U.S. 307 (99SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
9
guilty to theft, and because, according to appellant, the State failed to show he
entered Yarbrough’s residence with intent to commit theft, as alleged in the
burglary count of the indictment, then the conviction for burglary should be
reversed. As the factual basis for the plea, the State represented that the three
conspirators went to Yarbrough’s home for the purpose of robbing and killing
Charles Puckett who resided at Yarbrough’s residence. Despite the fact that
appellant’s counsel stressed to the court appellant’s youth and represented that
appellant tried to get away from his co-indictees, we reject the argument that the
trial court was not authorized to accept the plea. Under these facts, we find the
trial court did not err in accepting the guilty plea on the burglary charge because
appellant’s convictions for burglary, along with the other charges to which he
pleaded guilty, are supported by the showing that appellant was a party to these
crimes.
7. Appellant further urges that he is entitled to an out-of-time appeal of
his guilty plea convictions because the elements of those crimes to which he
entered a guilty plea were not explained to him on the record. But the cases
appellant cites in support of this assertion are materially distinguishable. In
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Breland v. Smith3, involving the appeal of a ruling by the habeas court, the
defendant was charged with burglary but entered a guilty plea to theft by
receiving stolen goods, a crime for which he was not indicted and which is not
a lesser included offense of burglary. The record contained no transcript of the
guilty plea hearing and was silent concerning the facts relied on to support the
guilty plea. The reason the conviction and sentence were set aside was because
it was impossible to find the defendant had notice of the crime to which he
pleaded guilty due to the total absence of a record.4 Here, the record supports
the acceptance of the guilty plea.
Henderson v. Morgan5 also involved a case in which the defendant entered
a guilty plea to an offense for which he had not been indicted. The defendant
was charged with first-degree murder but pleaded guilty to and was sentenced
for second-degree murder, a crime involving intent to cause the death of the
victim. The defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus and, after a hearing, the
habeas court found the defendant was not advised by either his counsel or the
3
247 Ga. 690 (279 SE2d 204) (1981).
4
Id. at 691.
5
426 U.S. 637 (96 SCt 2253, 49 LE2d 108) (1976).
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trial court that intent was an essential element of the crime to which he was
pleading guilty. The United States Supreme Court noted that the charge of
second-degree murder was never formally made, which would have included a
charge that the victim’s assault “was ‘committed with a design to effect the
death of the person killed,’” as that crime was defined by the applicable state
statute.6 As in the case now before us, a description of the acts committed by the
defendant was presented to the judge hearing the guilty plea. But the Supreme
Court noted that an admission that the defendant attacked and killed the victim
did not necessarily involve an admission that defendant was guilty of second-
degree murder in that it did not include an admission of the element of intent to
kill. Finding that the defendant did not receive adequate notice of the offense
to which he pleaded guilty, the Supreme Court concluded his plea was
involuntary and affirmed the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.
Finally, Harned v. Henderson 7, also relied upon by appellant, involved
a guilty plea to a crime involving an element that was not admitted at the plea
hearing. Among other things, the appellant was charged with rape and burglary
6
Id. at 645.
7
588 F2d 12 (2d Cir. 1978)
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in the first degree as defined by the applicable state law. According to the
applicable statute, burglary in the first degree required the person charged to be
found guilty of causing physical injury to another as a result of the illegal entry
into a dwelling.8 The plea hearing transcript showed that while the appellant
admitted he illegally entered the house in question, he repeatedly denied he
committed rape or attempted rape while there. Accordingly, the habeas court
found that appellant did not admit the physical injury element of the burglary
charge, and its finding that the plea was accepted without due process of law
was affirmed on appeal.
In contrast to the facts involved in the cases relied upon by appellant, the
charges to which appellant pleaded guilty were among those set forth in the
indictment. On appeal of a decision involving a challenge to a guilty plea
conviction, “we accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations unless they are clearly erroneous and independently apply the
legal principles to the facts.” Wright v. State, 292 Ga. 825, 827 (2) (742 SE2d
468) (2013). The evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that
appellant freely and voluntarily entered his guilty plea.
8
Id. at 13.
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8. We reject appellant’s assertion that his plea was not knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently entered. The record in this case shows appellant
was advised of his Boykin9 rights and, upon questioning, appellant responded
that his plea was freely and voluntarily made without coercion. Appellant was
duly informed of the nature of the charges against him and the maximum
sentences he faced on each charge if convicted. The trial court did not commit
reversible error in denying appellant’s motion for out-of-time appeal.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
9
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (89 SCt 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969).
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