Gooch v. Gooch , 297 Ga. 189 ( 2015 )


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  • In the Supreme Court of Georgia
    Decided: June 1, 2015
    S15A0202. GOOCH v. GOOCH.
    HINES, Presiding Justice.
    This Court granted the application for discretionary appeal of Nancy
    Gooch (“Nancy”) from the trial court’s order in her contempt action against
    appellant Terry J. Gooch (“Terry”). For the reasons that follow, we reverse and
    remand for further proceedings.
    Under the couple’s 2012 divorce decree and incorporated settlement
    agreement, Terry was required to select a certain option for his retirement
    benefits, and to designate Nancy as the survivor beneficiary; under that option,
    Terry would receive life-time benefits, with a guarantee of ten years of
    payments, such that should he die within that period, payments would continue
    to his designated survivor beneficiary for the remainder of the guarantee period,
    referred to as “Life with 10-year guarantee.” However, Terry did not comply
    with this directive of the decree, instead selecting an entirely different retirement
    option, and naming his new wife as the survivor beneficiary thereunder; this
    designation was irrevocable. In December 2013, Nancy filed in the trial court
    a petition for Terry to be held in contempt for his failure to comply with this
    portion of the decree. After a hearing, on May 29, 2014, the trial court entered
    an order finding Terry in willful contempt of his obligations under the divorce
    decree, but determined that no available remedy existed; the court’s order also
    awarded Nancy $5,600 in attorney fees, which it struck in response to a motion
    for reconsideration by Terry. This Court granted Nancy’s application for
    discretionary appeal to determine whether the trial court was correct in ruling
    that there was, at this time, no available remedy for Terry’s contempt.
    As this Court has noted,
    “[i]n cases of contempt the trial judge is vested with a discretion in
    determining whether his orders have been violated and how such
    infringements should be treated; and it has been said that this court
    will not disturb his judgment, unless it appears that he has abused
    his discretion. [Cits.]” [Cit.]
    Burke v. Burke, 
    263 Ga. 141
    , 142 (2) ( 429 SE2d 85) (1993). The trial court’s
    order states that the court
    concludes that there is no available remedy for [Terry’s] actions.
    The [decree’s] provision . . . for the survivor’s benefits applies in
    the event of [Terry] predeceasing [ Nancy]. Unless and until
    2
    [Terry] predeceases [Nancy], it is too speculative to determine the
    appropriate remedy.
    However, during the contempt hearing, the testimony of a financial planning
    expert was that there were remedies currently available, including an annuity to
    provide payments for a certain period of time, such as the ten years specified in
    the decree, or a life insurance policy.
    Although Terry contends that the trial court was correct in finding that
    there was no need for any remedy unless and until Terry dies within the
    guarantee period of the mandated retirement plan, this ignores the fact that, had
    Terry met the obligation placed upon him by the trial court’s decree, Nancy’s
    potential receipt of survivor benefits would not be dependent on Terry’s control
    of his own assets - with the hope that he would leave an estate sufficient to meet
    the remaining obligation - but on the assets and management of the retirement
    plan.
    Terry asserts that, were the trial court to order him to purchase an annuity
    to serve the same function as the obligation he ignored, i.e., to pay to himself for
    ten years the sum that selection of the Life with 10-year guarantee plan would
    have produced with Nancy as the surviving beneficiary, such would constitute
    3
    a modification of the decree, as no such annuity was set forth therein. Certainly,
    the trial court could not modify the decree in a contempt action. See Roquemore
    v. Burgess, 
    281 Ga. 593
    , 594 (642 SE2d 41) (2007). But, the trial court
    certainly could “exercise its discretion to craft a remedy for contempt, including
    remedying harm caused to an innocent party by [Terry’s] contemptuous
    conduct.” Smith v. Smith, 
    293 Ga. 563
    , 564 (1) (748 SE2d 456) (2013)
    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) And, in doing so, the trial court can
    enforce its order by requiring the contemnor to secure something of the same
    monetary value as that which was set forth in the violated order. 
    Id.
    Terry asserts that the evidence regarding an annuity or insurance policy
    to replace the obligation set forth in the decree was insufficient, as it did not
    include the specific purchase amount of the annuity or insurance policy, “the
    term for either instrument,” or “detail as to how these instruments would be put
    in place.”   However, Terry cites no authority for the contention that it was
    Nancy’s obligation to provide all details regarding the remedy for his willful
    contempt, nor do we find any. The evidence presented was sufficient to
    authorize the trial court to order Terry to acquire an annuity or insurance policy
    that would conform to his original court-ordered obligation.
    4
    The trial court abused its discretion in failing to devise a remedy for
    Terry’s willful contempt. Burke, supra. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
    court must be reversed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the Justices
    concur.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S15A0202

Citation Numbers: 297 Ga. 189, 773 S.E.2d 247, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 347

Judges: Hines

Filed Date: 6/1/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/7/2024