Williams v. State ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 7, 2023
S23A0144. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
A Toombs County jury found Israel Timothy Williams guilty of
malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony in connection with the shooting death of Brandon Colson. 1
Williams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, contends his
trial counsel was ineffective, and argues that the trial court erred in
1 On November 14, 2019, a Toombs County grand jury indicted Williams
and co-defendant Hollis Bryant for felony murder (Count 1), possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime (Counts 2 and 4), malice murder
(Count 3), and aggravated assault (Count 5). Bryant pled guilty to felony
murder prior to trial. During a trial that began March 29, 2021, the jury found
Williams guilty of malice murder, possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime, and aggravated assault and not guilty of felony murder.
The court sentenced Williams to life in prison without parole for malice murder
and to a consecutive five-year sentence for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime. The trial court merged the aggravated assault count
into the malice murder count at sentencing. Williams filed a motion for a new
trial on April 5, 2021. New counsel entered an appearance on April 19, 2021,
and filed an amended motion for a new trial on March 31, 2022. After a hearing
held on April 21, 2022, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial on July
21, 2022. On August 4, 2022, Williams filed a notice of appeal. The appeal was
docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2022 and was
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
denying his request for a jury instruction on coercion. Because
Williams failed to carry his burden of showing reversible error, we
affirm his convictions as well as the trial court’s order denying his
motion for a new trial.
1. Williams contends that, because his co-defendant, Hollis
Bryant, gave trial testimony exculpating Williams of the crimes, the
evidence was constitutionally and statutorily insufficient to support
his convictions by proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Bryant testified at trial that he shot and killed Colson and that
Williams was merely present when he committed the crime. Bryant,
who pleaded guilty to murder prior to Williams’s trial, also testified
that the murder weapon belonged to him, not Williams. Further,
Williams, who testified in his own defense, claimed that he only
helped Bryant conceal the murder because Bryant had coerced him
into doing so. However, as explained below, the jury was authorized
to reject this testimony and find, based upon other direct and
circumstantial evidence, that both Williams and Bryant were
parties to Colson’s murder, and that Williams killed Colson because
2
Colson had quit his job while owing Williams thousands of dollars.
When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
as a matter of federal constitutional due process under Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979),
we view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable
to the verdicts and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes
for which he was convicted. See Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 679 (2)
(872 SE2d 722) (2022). In so doing, “[w]e leave to the trier of fact the
resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility
of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts,
and we do not reweigh the evidence.” (Citations and punctuation
omitted.) Id. Pursuant to Georgia statutory law, “[t]he testimony of
an accomplice must be corroborated to sustain a felony conviction.”
Yarn v. State, 305 Ga. 421, 423 (826 SE2d 1) (2019) (citing OCGA §
24-14-8). Additionally, the jury may find a defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt if the evidence shows either that he directly
committed the crime or that he was a “party thereto.” See OCGA §
3
16-2-20 (a). A person is a party to the crime if he aids or abets in its
commission or if he “advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or
procures another” to commit it. Id. at (b) (4). See also Carter v. State,
314 Ga. 317, 319 (2) (a) (877 SE2d 170) (2022). And although the
defendant’s mere presence at the scene is not enough to convict him
as a party to the crime, the jury may infer his criminal intent from
his “presence, companionship, and conduct before, during, and after
the offense.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 314
Ga. 214, 231-232 (3) (875 SE2d 737) (2022).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed the following. At the time of his
October 4, 2019 death, Colson lived in CKT Mobile Home Park in
Lyons, Georgia, which was located behind Truax Veneer Company,
where he, Williams, and Bryant worked. The three men knew each
other from work and lived near each other. Also, Bryant’s cousin was
married to Colson. Bryant’s wife, Kaleigh Dowd, testified that she
and Bryant lived on a large, wooded property in Toombs County a
few miles from Colson. Dowd testified that she knew Colson because
4
he had been to their home a few times. She said that Williams and
Bryant were much closer to each other than they were to Colson.
She testified that Williams and Bryant had matching “GDB” tattoos
that meant “Gorillas Don’t Bend.”
About four weeks before his death, Colson and his stepfather,
Shane Powell, went to CKT Mobile Home Park to rent Colson’s
home. Colson, who had separated from his wife, borrowed the money
to rent his home from Williams. Williams, who met them there,
engaged Colson in a conversation about hunting. Powell testified
that he heard Williams say that he wanted to shoot somebody just
to see what it would be like. Powell also heard Williams tell Colson
that if they just shot Colson’s wife all of his problems would be over.
Colson then looked at Williams as if to say “how do you come up with
that?” Williams made similar comments to Gabriel Kersey, who
worked with him at Truax Veneer and was Colson’s next-door
neighbor. Kersey testified that Williams asked him and Colson if
they had ever seen anyone who had been shot in the head, and when
they said “no,” Williams replied: “They lay on the ground for a little
5
while and twitch.” On another occasion, Williams told Kersey that
he was going to put Colson’s “head on a stick and sight [his rifle
scope] in on his f***ing head.”
Dowd testified that, at about 2:30 p.m. on October 4, as she was
getting ready to leave her home to pick up her children from school,
Bryant gave her $200. When Dowd asked Bryant where he had
gotten the money, he told her not to worry about it and then went
back outside. Later that day, as it was getting dark, Dowd saw
Bryant walking around outside with Williams. At one point,
Williams came inside and asked for water bottles for Bryant and
himself, but said nothing else. When Bryant went inside, Dowd
noticed that he was dirty, as if he had been doing yardwork. He was
also sweaty, pale, clammy, and had a “weird smell” about him. Dowd
later came to believe that Bryant and Williams had murdered
Colson that day and buried him on the property.
Colson’s daughter’s birthday was on October 4. When he
missed her birthday celebration, Colson’s wife called Bryant to ask
if he had seen Colson, and Bryant said he had not. On Sunday,
6
October 6, Colson’s neighbor, Kersey, sent a text message to Colson’s
mother, Beverly Powell, stating he believed something was wrong
because Colson failed to appear for a planned dinner at his home.
After receiving the text, Powell went to her son’s home but found it
locked. She drove to Williams’s home, but no one was there. Powell
drove to the Toombs County Sheriff’s Department and reported her
son missing. Shortly thereafter, an officer with the Lyons Police
Department met with Powell, and she gave him the names of some
of Colson’s friends. After speaking with Powell and doing some
preliminary investigation, the officer turned the case over to
Detective Andrew Britton.
Detective Britton went to Truax Veneer, where he learned that
the last time anyone had seen Colson was on Friday, October 4,
when he picked up his paycheck. Colson cashed his paycheck that
day around lunchtime. After the detective searched Colson’s trailer
and saw that the windows were all intact and that nothing appeared
broken or out of place, he went to see Williams, who, according to
Colson’s mother, was likely the last person to have seen her son.
7
Williams told the detective that Colson was having marital
problems, was depressed, and quit his job on September 30.
Williams said that he last saw Colson between noon and 1:15 p.m.
on Friday, October 4. Detective Britton testified that, based on
Williams’s hesitation and stuttering when answering questions, he
suspected that Williams was not being entirely truthful with him,
so he asked Williams to come to his office and give him an official
statement.
On October 11, Williams gave a recorded statement to
Detective Britton. Williams said that he drove Colson on Friday,
October 4, to pick up his final check from Truax Veneer and then to
the bank to cash it. Thereafter, he and Colson went to get something
to eat and “hung out” at Williams’s home for a while. Williams said
he dropped off Colson at his mobile home at 1:15 p.m. and then he
drove back home after seeing Colson go inside. The detective
testified that, during the interview, Williams appeared calm.
Colson’s neighbor, Kersey, testified that after Colson
disappeared, Williams appeared to grow increasingly paranoid and
8
stressed. Williams confronted Kersey about talking to law
enforcement, telling him that he had “better quit running [his]
mouth because the streets are talking[.]” Kersey testified that
Williams also talked about missing persons reports and wondered
how long it takes to find missing people.
After ten days of searching for Colson without success, the
Lyons Police Department asked the GBI for help. GBI Agents Craig
Pittman and Jason Shoudel assisted in the investigation. Agent
Pittman and Detective Britton interviewed Dowd and her friend and
co-worker, Miyata Dixon, both of whom later testified at trial. Dowd
testified that it was Dixon who first informed her that Colson was
missing. Dixon also told Dowd that Williams and Bryant had
bragged about “taking care of somebody.” Dowd confided in Dixon
that she suspected that Williams and Bryant may have buried
Colson on her property, based on the way Bryant was acting and
how he smelled on the evening of October 4. Dowd later told Dixon
that Bryant admitted to her that he and Williams had killed Colson
and burned his body. Dixon shared this information with a friend of
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hers in law enforcement in a neighboring county, and ultimately
with the law enforcement officials investigating Colson’s death.
Agents Pittman and Shoudel arrested Bryant and interviewed
him at the Toombs County Jail. In his recorded interview, which was
played for the jury, Bryant initially claimed that someone named
“Low-key” had killed Colson when a drug deal went bad on Dowd’s
property. However, Bryant eventually admitted that the drug-deal
story was a “back-up story” that he and Williams had concocted in
the event that they were arrested. Bryant told the agents that
Williams had loaned Colson money to rent a mobile home and was
upset that Colson had quit his job before paying him back. Bryant
admitted that Williams told him that it was “time to do something
with [Colson]” and that he went along with it.
Bryant told the agents that Williams’s plan was to lure Colson
out to the sandpit behind Bryant and Dowd’s home and to shoot
Colson with Bryant’s shotgun, which is what they did. Bryant
admitted that, after Colson “got hit in the head,” he helped Williams
“do whatever” needed to be done. At Williams’s direction, Bryant
10
used his lawnmower to cut the grass, obscuring blood and brain
matter spattered on the grass, while Williams dug a hole for Colson’s
body. Bryant said that he owed Williams over $800, and that
Williams said he would forgive the debt if Bryant helped him with
the clean-up. Williams also took cash from Colson’s body and gave
$200 of it to Bryant, which Bryant gave to Dowd after they buried
the body. Bryant said their first attempt at digging a grave was
thwarted by tree roots. So they dug a second grave in another area
and dragged Colson there by his feet. It was Williams’s idea to start
a fire over the grave to burn the body. Later, after concealing the
body, Williams went to Bryant’s home to smoke cigarettes. They did
not talk about the murder.
After interviewing Bryant, the agents arrested Williams.
Agents Pittman and Shoudel interviewed Williams after he waived
his rights under Miranda 2 and agreed to speak with them. According
to the agents, Williams appeared relaxed during the interview. In
his recorded interview, which was played for the jury, Williams
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
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admitted that he had loaned Colson over $1000 during the previous
six months, but claimed that Colson always paid him back and that
he and Colson had no disagreements. Williams said that Bryant had
asked him and Colson to “hang out” at his house on October 4, and
they played video games for a couple hours before they went into the
woods. Williams said he walked ahead of Bryant and Colson, who
were walking beside each other. He said he heard a gunshot, turned
around, saw Colson on the ground, and then witnessed Bryant shoot
Colson “in the face a second time.”
Williams maintained that it was Bryant, not him, who had shot
and killed Colson, and that all he did was help Bryant bury the body.
He further claimed that he did not know if Bryant had a plan to kill
Colson, insisting he had just gotten “caught up” in what Bryant had
done. He said he helped Bryant and did not call the police because
he worried that Bryant would “come for” him or his family. Williams
stated that, in the days after the shooting, he returned to Bryant’s
house and used the murder weapon to do some target practice. When
the agents asked Williams if that bothered him, he replied that he
12
just tried to forget about the shooting. Williams claimed that he
returned to Bryant’s property because he did not want Bryant to
think anything was amiss.
On October 24, agents searched Bryant and Dowd’s property
for Colson’s body. As they searched the wooded area behind the
house, they saw a 20-foot-wide area where trees had been felled in a
circle, as well as a pile of fallen limbs and trees piled about six feet
high. It appeared that some of the trees were cut with a chainsaw,
while others were cut with an axe. They also observed what
appeared to be freshly disturbed soil and a sandy area where it
looked like something had been burned. After removing the trees,
the police found a water bottle containing suspected gasoline along
with burned tree limbs. When cadaver dogs alerted to the presence
of a body, the agents called Agent Matthew Bryan, a GBI forensic
expert, to excavate the grave.
Agent Bryan testified that, as he made his way to the victim’s
grave, he saw a lawnmower in the path as well as an area that
looked as if it had been mowed recently. Further down the path he
13
saw a long, shallow hole where it appeared someone had tried to dig,
but there were too many tree roots to dig deeply. Upon locating the
suspected grave-site, the agent began his forensic excavation. After
removing burned logs, the agent found Colson’s body about two and
a half feet beneath the surface. Agent Bryan processed the
lawnmower blades on November 5, and they tested positive for
human blood. Also, during a search of Bryant’s home, agents found
the shotgun used to shoot Colson, a Remington R70 Express
Magnum pump-action shotgun.
A GBI medical examiner performed an autopsy on Colson’s
body on October 25, 2019. He testified that the front of the skull was
collapsed, with “a massive fragmentation” in the center of the face.
The medical examiner found birdshot in the head and the hull of a
shotgun shell inside the mouth. A second shot cup was found
attached to Colson’s clothing. The medical examiner opined that the
trajectory of the shot was slightly upward and that Colson was shot
at close range. Colson’s shirt and body were both partially burned.
While incarcerated at the Toombs County Jail, Williams called
14
his mother and spoke to her about his case. During this recorded
call, which was played for the jury, Williams told his mother that he
asked his attorney to send “a paper” to Bryant instructing Bryant to
say that Williams had nothing to do with the shooting, that Williams
had just been in the wrong place at the wrong time, and that Bryant
was “in charge.” Williams’s mother told him to listen to his lawyer
and “keep [his] story straight.”
At trial, Bryant testified that he alone killed Colson. He said
that he told the GBI agents that Williams was responsible because
he was afraid and because he and his wife were expecting a child.
Bryant testified that, after Williams and Colson got off work, they
came over to his house. He said they walked around for a few
minutes on his property and that he shot Colson. He testified that
Williams did not participate in the shooting, but “was just kind of
caught up in the moment.”
Williams testified in his own defense. He denied making a
comment about shooting Colson’s wife, denied saying he wanted to
know what it was like to kill someone, denied saying he wanted to
15
sight his rifle on Colson’s head, denied bragging about having killed
someone, and denied making a statement about someone getting
shot in the head and watching them twitch. He also denied shooting
Colson or having anything to do with his death, and further denied
that he knew Bryant was going to shoot Colson. Williams testified
that, although he was present when Bryant shot and killed Colson,
his participation was limited to helping conceal the body. He said he
did so because he “felt like [he] was part of it” and was afraid Bryant
would “do something” to him or his family. He claimed that they
went out to the sandpit area behind Bryant’s house to shoot at
targets and that he was leading the way. He testified that, as they
were walking, he heard a gunshot, turned around and saw the victim
on the ground, and then saw Bryant shoot the victim a second time.
Williams claimed that when Bryant told him to help him dispose of
the body, he was “in shock” and did not know what to do, so he just
walked over and helped him move the body. Williams said that after
he did that, he did not “feel right,” so he left.
Williams testified that, later that night, he agreed to return to
16
Bryant’s house to help bury the body to show that he was not going
to the police. He said that Bryant told him the body was already
burned and that all Williams needed to do was help cover up the
grave. Williams said he helped push dirt in the grave. After they
were done, Williams said he stayed at Bryant’s house for about 30
more minutes and then went home. Williams admitted that, at the
time he was interviewed by Detective Britton on October 11, he
knew Colson was dead, but did not tell the truth. He admitted that
he did not tell law enforcement in his interviews that he was afraid
of Bryant or that Bryant had threatened him. He further admitted
that he had loaned Colson about $1000, but claimed he had forgiven
the debt the same day Colson died. Williams testified that he and
Bryant both had “GDB” tattoos because they belonged to the same
“clique.” Colson was not a member of that clique. Finally, Williams
admitted going out with Bryant after the shooting and using the
murder weapon to shoot at metal barrels, which Williams described
as “playing around.”
Williams argues that this evidence was both constitutionally
17
and statutorily insufficient to support his convictions for malice
murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime
because it shows that he did not intend to kill Colson and was not a
party to the crimes. He relies on Bryant’s trial testimony as well as
his own testimony to prove that his involvement was limited to
helping conceal the murder and that he did so under duress.
However, Bryant gave a recorded statement in which he described
in detail Williams’s involvement in the murder immediately prior to,
during, and after the murder, and further testified that the attack
on Colson was Williams’s idea and motivated by Colson’s failure to
repay a debt he owed Williams. To the extent Bryant’s statement
conflicts with his and Williams’s trial testimony, any conflicts or
inconsistencies were for the jury to resolve, and the jury was entitled
to disbelieve Williams’s testimony and to reject his defense theory.
See Graves v. State, 298 Ga. 551, 553 (1) (783 SE2d 891) (2016) (“[I]t
is axiomatic that resolving evidentiary conflicts and assessing
witness credibility are within the exclusive province of the jury.”
(citing Hampton v. State, 272 Ga. 284, 285 (1) (527 SE2d 872)
18
(2000)).
Further, Bryant’s statement to the police was sufficiently
corroborated. When the only witness to testify at trial on the issue
of the defendant’s participation is an accomplice, corroborating
evidence is required to support a guilty verdict. See Edwards v.
State, 299 Ga. 20, 22 (1) (785 SE2d 869) (2016). Whether accomplice
testimony has been sufficiently corroborated is a question for the
jury, and even slight corroborating evidence of a defendant’s
participation in a crime is sufficient. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 313
Ga. 325, 329 (1) (869 SE2d 389) (2022); Raines v. State, 304 Ga. 582,
588 (2) (a) (820 SE2d 679) (2018); Parks v. State, 302 Ga. 345, 348
(806 SE2d 529) (2017).
Here, the forensic evidence and the testimony of other
witnesses both corroborate Bryant’s custodial statement and show
that Williams participated in the murder. Dixon testified that
Williams and Bryant both bragged about “taking care of somebody.”
Dowd testified that she saw Williams and Bryant walking around in
her yard together on the night Colson disappeared, that Bryant gave
19
her $200, and that Bryant later admitted to her that he and
Williams had killed Colson and buried his body on the property.
Witnesses testified about Williams’s desire to shoot someone in the
head, about Williams’s desire to shoot Colson’s head specifically, and
about Williams’s paranoia after Colson disappeared. Williams also
admitted being present during the murder and acknowledged that
Colson had owed him money. The State presented evidence that
Williams and Bryant were close friends and that Williams had sent
Bryant instructions to testify that Williams was not involved in the
killing. And the forensic evidence, including the location of the grave
sites and the blood evidence on the lawnmower, was consistent with
details from Bryant’s custodial statement. Finally, even though
Williams testified that the extent of his involvement was to help
Bryant conceal the murder because he felt coerced to do so, Williams
never told law enforcement that he had been threatened by Bryant
to participate in the crimes. Moreover, the jury could infer from
testimony about Williams and Bryant spending time together after
the murder, “playing around” and doing target practice with the
20
murder weapon, that Williams did not feel coerced.
Thus, despite conflicts in the evidence regarding Williams’s
particular role in Colson’s murder, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the evidence was both
constitutionally and statutorily sufficient for the jury to find
Williams guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crimes
of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony. See Jackson, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B); Eckman v. State,
274 Ga. 63, 65 (1) (548 SE2d 310) (2001) (concluding that the
evidence was sufficient to find that defendant was a party to the
crimes where, inter alia, she was present when the crimes were
committed, fled the crime scene with her companions, and “used the
fruits” of the crimes). See also Sams v. State, 314 Ga. 306, 312 (2) (b)
(875 SE2d 757) (2022) (holding that testimony of an accomplice, in
addition to non-accomplice evidence, was sufficient to corroborate
accomplice testimony); Floyd v. State, 272 Ga. 65, 66 (1) (525 SE2d
683) (2000) (defendant’s own statements served to corroborate
accomplice testimony).
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2. Williams contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to move for a directed verdict. To prevail on his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, Williams must show that his
counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and that the
deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable
likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial
would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If Williams fails to meet
his burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the
reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong. See id. at
697 (IV); Nelson v. State, 285 Ga. 838, 839 (2) (684 SE2d 613) (2009).
In reviewing the trial court’s decision, “we accept the trial court’s
factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly
erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the
facts.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Nelson, 285 Ga. at 839(2).
As stated in Division 1, supra, the evidence presented was
sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts beyond a reasonable
22
doubt. Had counsel made a motion for a directed verdict, it would
have been meritless, and failing to file a meritless motion is not
deficient performance. See Keller v. State, 308 Ga. 492, 499 (2) (c)
(842 SE2d 22) (2020) (failing to file a meritless motion to suppress
is not deficient performance); Nelson, 285 Ga. at 839 (2) (“[C]ounsel’s
failure to move for a directed verdict presents an insufficient ground
as a matter of law for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.”);
Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 880 (608 SE2d 229) (2005) (“In light of this
Court’s holding . . . that the evidence adduced at trial satisfied the
requirements of Jackson v. Virginia, counsel’s failure to move for a
directed verdict presents an insufficient ground as a matter of law
for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.”(citations and
punctuation omitted)). Id. Having failed to show that counsel’s
performance was deficient in this respect, Williams has not carried
his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (IV);
Nelson, 285 Ga. at 839 (2).
3. Williams contends that the evidence warranted a jury
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instruction on the defense of coercion, given that he testified that he
was scared, in shock, and worried about what Bryant would do to
him or his family if he did not “go along with” Bryant’s crime and
help him conceal the body. Given this evidence, Williams contends
the trial court committed reversible error in denying his request for
a charge on coercion. Pretermitting whether the trial court erred in
failing to give the coercion charge, we conclude that any error was
harmless.
During trial, the trial court and the parties discussed whether
a jury instruction on the defense of coercion should be given. The
trial court stated that coercion cannot be a defense to malice murder;
indeed, OCGA § 16-3-26 explicitly provides that coercion is not a
defense to the crime of murder. 3 See Frazier v. State, 309 Ga. 219,
229 (3) (845 SE2d 579) (2020). Williams’s counsel agreed, but argued
that the defense of coercion could apply to Williams’s aggravated
3“A person is not guilty of a crime, except murder, if the act upon which
the supposed criminal liability is based is performed under such coercion that
the person reasonably believes that performing the act is the only way to
prevent his imminent death or great bodily injury.” OCGA § 16-3-26.
24
assault charge. The trial court reserved ruling until the charge
conference, where it revisited the issue. After hearing counsel’s
arguments, the trial court found that there was no evidence
supporting a charge on coercion:
There’s no evidence here of coercion. There’s no evidence
of a threat. There’s no evidence of any violence. There’s
no evidence that [Bryant] threatened him and made him
do it. There’s just no evidence of coercion . . . . [“]I thought
he might get mad if I didn’t help him,[”] is not coercion.
Williams then renewed his request for the charge, and the trial court
denied it.
As Williams states in his appellate brief, a jury instruction on
the defense of coercion, though inapplicable to malice murder, could
apply to the “other felonies” for which he was charged. 4 See Frazier,
4In his appellate brief, Williams does not specifically argue that the trial
court should have instructed the jury that coercion could be a defense to his
felony murder, aggravated assault, or firearms possession charges. Rather, he
states that there was “clear evidence that [Williams] was coerced into
cooperating, to the extent that he did, with [Bryant].” Williams testified that
the extent of his participation in the charged crimes was in helping Bryant
conceal Colson’s body. Williams, however, was not charged with concealing
Colson’s death. Also, Williams was acquitted of felony murder and his
aggravated assault count merged with his malice murder conviction. This
Court generally treats as moot a claim of instructional error that only affects
a count that has not resulted in a conviction because of acquittal or merger.
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309 Ga. at 229 (3). But, in order to be entitled to the instruction,
there must be at least slight evidence supporting a charge on
coercion. See Daly v. Berryhill, 308 Ga. 831, 833-834 (843 SE2d 870)
(2020) (“There need be only slight evidence supporting the theory of
the charge to authorize a requested jury instruction.”).
Pretermitting whether such slight evidence existed warranting an
instruction on the defense of coercion, the trial court’s failure to give
the requested charge was harmless error given that the evidence of
Williams’s guilt for the crimes of which he was convicted was
substantial, and it is therefore highly probable that the failure to
See Williams v. State, 313 Ga. 325, 332 (4) (869 SE2d 389) (2022) (“Because
the jury found [the defendant] guilty of malice murder, the felony murder count
was vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated assault that formed the
predicate for the felony murder count was merged into the malice murder
conviction. Any enumerated error with regard to jury instructions on felony
murder or the underlying aggravated assault is therefore moot.” (citations
omitted)); Solomon v. State, 304 Ga. 846, 849 (823 SE2d 265) (2019) (“[T]he
aggravated assault merged with the murder, and [the defendant] was not
convicted of aggravated assault. Accordingly, his claim of error with respect to
the instruction on aggravated assault is moot.” (citations omitted)). Further,
this Court has expressly reserved the question of whether coercion can be a
defense to felony murder. See Frazier, 309 Ga. at 229 n.11; Brooks v. State, 305
Ga. 600, 605 n.4 (826 SE2d 45) (2019). Thus, the only remaining offense to
which the coercion defense arguably might have applied is possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime.
26
instruct the jury on the defense of coercion did not contribute to the
jury’s verdicts. See, e.g., Shah v. State, 300 Ga. 14, 21 (2) (b) (793
SE2d 81) (2016) (“The test for determining nonconstitutional
harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not
contribute to the verdict.” (citation and punctuation omitted));
Hamm v. State, 294 Ga. 791, 797 (2) (756 SE2d 507) (2014) (“The
fact that the failure to give the instruction where warranted is error
does not, of course, necessarily demand reversal. A conviction in a
criminal case will not be reversed when it is highly probable that an
erroneous jury instruction did not contribute to the verdict.”
(citations, punctuation, and footnote omitted)).
Here, the evidence of Williams’s guilt, as summarized above,
was substantial and compelling. It showed that Williams was, at a
minimum, a party to the crimes of murder and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime. But the State also
presented evidence from which the jury could infer that Williams
was the shooter. As discussed more fully in Division 1, the forensic
evidence and the testimony of a number of other witnesses
27
corroborated Bryant’s custodial statement concerning the
circumstances of the murder. The evidence showed that Williams
was angry with Colson for quitting his job before paying him back
and that Williams had expressed his desire to shoot Colson in the
head. The evidence also shows that Williams was in control: He paid
Bryant to help him clean up the crime scene and dispose of Colson’s
body and he instructed Bryant to testify that Williams was not
involved in the killing. Also, the jury was properly instructed, among
other things, on the presumption of innocence, circumstantial
evidence, credibility of witnesses, mere presence, parties to a crime,
the elements of the crimes charged, and the State’s burden to prove
every essential element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Accordingly, we conclude that it is highly probable that the
trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on coercion did not contribute
to the verdicts. Error, if any, in the trial court’s failure to give a
charge on coercion was harmless and does not require a new trial.
See Hodges v. State, 302 Ga. 564, 568 (3) (807 SE2d 856) (2017) (It
28
was highly probable that the trial court’s refusal to charge on
coercion did not contribute to the felony murder verdict given the
compelling evidence of the defendant’s participation in the
underlying armed robbery.). See also Rogers v. State, 289 Ga. 675,
677-78 (2) (715 SE2d 68) (2011) (no reversible error in failing to give
involuntary manslaughter charge where there was overwhelming
evidence inconsistent with appellant’s version of events but
supportive of the jury’s finding him guilty of malice murder).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
29