Norred v. State ( 2015 )

297 Ga. 234FINAL COPY
S15A0405. NORRED v. THE STATE.
BENHAM, Justice.
A jury found appellant Richard P. Norred guilty but mentally ill for the
shooting death of his sister Leigh Pope, the attempted murders of his sister Amy
Norred Lefebvre and of his mother Carol Norred, and related crimes.1 Appellant
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The crimes occurred on April 20, 2010. On July 10, 2010, an Athens-Clarke County grand
jury returned a true bill of indictment charging appellant with malice murder, felony murder, criminal
attempt to commit murder (two counts), aggravated assault (four counts), possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime (nine counts), and cruelty to children in the first degree. Appellant
was tried before a jury from July 9, 2012, to July 16, 2012, at which time the jury returned a verdict
of guilty but mentally ill as to all counts in the indictment. On August 17, 2012, the trial court
sentenced appellant to life in prison for malice murder (Count 1), thirty years to serve for the
criminal attempt to commit murder (Count 4) to run concurrently to the sentence for Count 1, thirty
years to serve for the criminal attempt to commit murder (Count 6) to run consecutively to the
sentence for Count 4, twenty years to serve for aggravated assault (Count 8) to run concurrently with
the sentences for Counts 1 and 4, twenty years to serve for cruelty to children in the first degree
(Count 9) to run consecutively to the sentence for Count 8, five years to serve for possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 10) to run consecutively to the sentence for Count
1, five years to serve for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 13) to run
consecutively to the sentence for Count 4, five years to serve for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime (Count 15) to run consecutively to the sentence for Count 6, five years to
serve for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 17) to run consecutively
to the sentence for count 8, and five years to serve for possession of a firearm during the commission
of a crime (Count 18) to run consecutively to the sentence for Count 9. The felony murder count was
vacated as a matter of law, and the remaining counts merged for sentencing purposes. Appellant
moved for a new trial on August 27, 2012. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on
November 6, 2013, and denied the motion on November 6, 2013. Appellant filed his notice of
appeal on November 8, 2012, and the case was docketed to the January 2015 term of this Court for
a decision to be made on the briefs.
alleges on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s
verdicts. For reasons set forth below, we affirm.
The facts, which are undisputed, showed that on the afternoon in question,
appellant’s mother and sisters were having lunch at their parents’ house when
appellant walked into the room and shot his sister Leigh in the head killing her,
and shot at and injured his mother and his sister Amy. Amy called 911, but
dropped the telephone. Appellant pointed the gun at his infant niece Haley
Pope. When Amy begged him not to shoot the child, appellant stated,
“problem’s not with you anyway,” and then appellant walked away toward his
mother. Amy ran with Haley and the telephone, locked herself in a nearby
bathroom along with her son who was already in there, and again contacted
authorities. While his mother was lying injured on the floor, appellant had a
conversation with her indicating he was upset about some incidents that
occurred during his childhood. Appellant then locked all the doors to the house
and retreated to an upstairs bathroom where he shot himself, but was not fatally
wounded. That is where police found him.
The evidence also showed that appellant had a history of mental
difficulties and was diagnosed over the course of his life as having various
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disorders including attention deficit disorder, childhood schizophrenia, and
Asperger’s disorder. After graduating from high school, appellant did not move
out of his parents’ house and he refused to learn to drive or to work. Appellant
was twenty-seven at the time of the incident. In the months leading up to the
shooting, he became more withdrawn from his family members. He spent his
nights playing video games on the computer2 and his days sleeping or watching
television. The gun appellant used during the incident was a gun owned by his
father. Appellant’s father testified that he never told appellant about the gun,
never showed appellant the gun, and had the gun hidden in a drawer in the
bedroom he shared with appellant’s mother. Appellant’s mother testified that
appellant had been eavesdropping on recent conversations and that his sisters
were fearful that he was becoming more aggressive.
At trial, appellant raised an insanity defense and proffered expert
testimony in that regard. Appellant’s sole enumeration of error on appeal is that
the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty but mentally
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Appellant’s favorite game was World of Warcraft and he was highly skilled at it, playing
for hours and interacting with other players over the Internet.
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ill. Rather, appellant contends that the only verdict supported by the evidence
was that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. We disagree.
Under Georgia law, a person is insane, and shall not be guilty
of a crime, if at the time of the act, omission, or negligence
constituting the crime, the person did not have mental capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong in relation to the criminal act
or acted because of a delusional compulsion which overmastered
his will to resist committing the crime. OCGA §§ 16-3-2, 16-3-3;
[cit.]. A defendant claiming insanity has the burden of proving the
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Because Georgia
law presumes every person is of sound mind and discretion,
criminal trials begin with the rebuttable presumption that the
defendant is sane and this presumption is evidence. OCGA § 16-2-
3; [cit.].
Durrence v. State, 287 Ga. 213 (1) (a) (695 SE2d 227) (2010). Where the
defense presents evidence in support of a defense of insanity, a jury is
authorized to reject such evidence. See Choisnet v. State, 295 Ga. 568 (1) (761
SE2d 322) (2014). On appeal, we determine
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdicts, a rational trier of fact could have found that [appellant]
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was
insane at the time of the crimes, and whether the State met its
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burden of proving he was guilty, but mentally ill, beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Hudson v. State, 273 Ga. 124 (1) (538 SE2d 751) (2000).
Here, appellant’s expert witness, Dr. Matt Butryn, conducted a forensic
psychological examination of appellant and diagnosed appellant as having major
depressive disorder, Asperger’s disorder, and schizoid personality disorder. Dr.
Butryn opined that, at the time of the shooting, appellant had a diminished
capacity for distinguishing between right and wrong and that he was delusional
insofar as he believed that his family members were hiding things from him and
that “the world” was out to “get” him. Dr. Butryn also stated, however, that
appellant was not under any delusion that his mother or sisters were doing
anything that placed him in fear for his life.
The court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Deborah Gunnin, also testified at
trial during the State’s presentation of rebuttal evidence. Like Dr. Butryn, Dr.
Gunnin concluded that appellant had Asperger’s disorder. She opined, however,
that, despite having Asperger’s disorder, appellant knew right from wrong and
was not suffering from any delusional compulsion that overmastered his will to
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resist committing the crime against his family members. As an example of
appellant’s knowing right from wrong, Dr. Gunnin noted that appellant told her
he locked the house doors in the aftermath of the incident because he believed
the police would be coming, indicating he understood the wrongfulness of his
actions. She also opined that the fact that appellant resisted shooting the infant
indicated he was not suffering from any delusion that overmastered his will.
The evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was sufficient to
authorize a rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, appellant
guilty but mentally ill of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Foster v. State, 283
Ga. 47 (1) (656 SE2d 838) (2008). Dr. Gunnin testified that appellant knew
right from wrong and that his Asperger’s disorder did not impact his ability to
discern right from wrong. Although Dr. Butryn opined that appellant was
delusional, appellant presented no evidence that he was suffering from a
delusion that “if it had been true, would have justified [his] actions.” (Citations
and punctuation omitted.) Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609 (3) (724 SE2d 377)
(2012). See also Hudson v. State, supra, 273 Ga. at 125. The trial court did not
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err when it entered judgment on the jury’s verdicts. Alvelo v. State, supra, 290
Ga. at 613.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided June 1, 2015.
Murder. Clarke Superior Court. Before Judge Sweat.
John W. Donnelly, for appellant.
Kenneth W. Mauldin, District Attorney, Jon R. Forwood, Assistant
District Attorney; Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway
Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Matthew B. Crowder, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
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