Bellamy v. State , 295 Ga. 119 ( 2014 )


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  • 295 Ga. 119
    
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    S14A0542. BELLAMY v. THE STATE.
    MELTON, Justice.
    In 1998, George Bellamy was convicted on one count of murder and two
    counts relating to possession of a firearm. With respect to the murder count,
    Bellamy was sentenced as a recidivist to life without the possibility of parole.
    His convictions were affirmed on appeal. Bellamy v. State, 
    272 Ga. 157
    (527
    SE2d 867) (2000). In 2013, Bellamy filed a motion to vacate his murder
    sentence, arguing that the sentence was void. See von Thomas v. State, 
    293 Ga. 569
    , 571 (2) (748 SE2d 446) (2013) (Although a “sentencing court generally
    has jurisdiction to modify or vacate . . . a sentence [of imprisonment] only for
    one year following the imposition of the sentence . . . a sentencing court has
    jurisdiction to vacate a void sentence at any time”) (emphasis in original). The
    trial court denied the motion on October 23, 2013, prompting this appeal.1 For
    the reasons that follow, we vacate Bellamy’s sentence for murder and remand
    1
    We note that Bellamy has not asserted on appeal that his convictions
    relating to the possession of a firearm are somehow void.
    this case to the trial court for resentencing on that count.
    1. As the State properly concedes, although it did file a notice of its intent
    to seek recidivist sentencing pursuant to the version of OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) that
    was in effect at the time of Bellamy’s sentencing, that version of the statute
    specifically excluded its provisions from applying to a capital felony such as
    malice murder. See OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) (2009). Because of this, under the
    circumstances presented here, the trial court was not legally authorized to
    impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, making Bellamy’s
    sentence for malice murder void. See von 
    Thomas, supra
    , 293 Ga. at 571 (2)
    (“[A] sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not
    allow.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, we must vacate
    Bellamy’s sentence for malice murder and remand this case for resentencing.
    See, e.g., Miller v. State, 
    283 Ga. 412
    (5) (658 SE2d 765) (2008).
    2. In light of our holding in Division 
    1, supra
    , we need not address
    Bellamy’s additional arguments wherein he further attacks his malice murder
    sentence as void.2
    2
    We also do not reach any argument that Bellamy attempts to raise to
    challenge his underlying convictions, because, “[i]n order to challenge a
    2
    Sentence vacated and case remanded for resentencing. All the Justices
    concur.
    conviction after it ha[s] been affirmed on direct appeal, criminal defendants
    [are] required to file an extraordinary motion for new trial, OCGA § 5-5-41, a
    motion in arrest of judgment, OCGA § 17-9-61, or a petition for habeas
    corpus. OCGA § 9-14-40.” Harper v. State, 
    286 Ga. 216
    , 217 (1) (686 SE2d
    786) (2009). Bellamy has provided no basis for this Court to review his
    additional arguments.
    3
    Decided April 22, 2014.
    Murder, etc. Muscogee Superior Court. Before Judge Rumer.
    George Bellamy, pro se.
    Julia Fessenden Slater, District Attorney, Robert B. Bickerstaff II,
    Assistant District Attorney, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Patricia B.
    Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S14A0542

Citation Numbers: 295 Ga. 119, 757 S.E.2d 864, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 1187, 2014 WL 1588640, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 300

Judges: Melton

Filed Date: 4/22/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024