Hansen v. Dekalb County Board of Tax Assessors ( 2014 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 30, 2014
S14A0187. HANSEN v. DEKALB COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
ASSESSORS et al.
HUNSTEIN, Justice.
By means of an action seeking mandamus and other relief, James Hansen
and 30 other DeKalb County residents (hereinafter, “Plaintiffs”) sought to
obtain certain information from the DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors in
connection with their 2012 property tax assessments. The trial court denied
Plaintiffs’ request for a mandamus nisi, prompting this appeal.1 We find no
error and affirm.
As alleged in the complaint, in January 2013, Hansen and the other
taxpayers filed with the Board so-called Requests for Information, each seeking
1
Finding that the 30 additional residents were not properly named as parties to
the mandamus action, the trial court deemed Hansen to be the sole plaintiff in the
case. Accordingly, the appeal has been pursued by Hansen only. Hansen directed his
appeal to the Court of Appeals, which properly transferred the case to this Court. See
Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III (5); OCGA § 9-6-28 (a).
information regarding the appraisal and assessment of his or her property for the
2012 tax year. Specifically, the requests sought the identification of all
documents reviewed in making initial and revised assessments of each property,
all properties used as “qualified comparable properties” in such assessments, all
appraisers who made such assessments and their qualifications, and all factors
used in determining the assessed values of the properties. The requests also
sought a description of the “geographic area . . . within which comparable
properties may be selected” and the identification of “all bank sales, other
financial institution owned sales, or distressed sales” within such geographic
area. In addition, the requests asked that the Board confirm “the fair market
value assessment . . . that will be pursued” for tax year 2012 and identify the
documents and other information used to determine such value.
The requests were ostensibly made pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-306 (d),
which provides in pertinent part:
The taxpayer may request, and the county board of tax assessors
shall provide within ten business days, copies of such public
records and information, including, but not limited to, all
documents reviewed in making the assessment, the address and
parcel identification number of all real property utilized as qualified
2
comparable properties, and all factors considered in establishing the
new assessment, at a uniform copying fee not to exceed 25¢ per
page.
Id. at (d) (1). The Board responded to these requests with certain “sales ratio
reports,” which identify sales of real property within a given area. Finding the
responses to be insufficiently specific, Plaintiffs requested further, more specific
responses, to which the Board responded with more documents. According to
Hansen, these additional documents did not provide the precise information
Plaintiffs sought. Plaintiffs then sent a letter requesting a meeting with Calvin
Hicks, the Board’s Secretary and Chief Appraiser, to review the requests for
information and the documents the Board had provided in response. Such
meeting, the letter stated, was to be recorded, pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-311
(h).2 Hicks declined this request.
Thereafter, Hansen filed his complaint, styled as a “Petition for Mandamus
and/or For an Order and Judgment under OCGA § 50-18-71 et seq.3” In the
petition, Hansen sought an order directing the Board (1) “to directly, fully, and
2
This provision authorizes taxpayers to record, at their own expense, “any
interview with any officer or employee of the taxing authority relating to the
valuation of the taxpayer’s property.”
3
OCGA § 50-18-71 et seq. is the Georgia Open Records Act.
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truthfully respond to each item/request contained in each Request for
Information” within five business days; and (2) “to meet with Plaintiffs . . . for
the purpose of discussing [the Board’s] answers . . . and explaining to Plaintiff’s
[sic] [the] relevance, if any, [of such] documentation.” Further, Hansen sought
to have the requested meeting “recorded by Plaintiffs, as provided by OCGA §
48-5-311 (h).” Hansen also sought penalties under the Open Records Act and
attorney fees.
After the petition was filed and served, the trial court denied the
mandamus nisi, finding that Hansen’s claims were not cognizable under the
Open Records Act or in mandamus. We agree with the trial court’s analysis.
1. The Open Records Act does not apply to information sought under
OCGA § 48-5-306 (d). This conclusion is readily apparent from the
introductory clause of § 48-5-306 (d), which states that the rights afforded
thereunder are “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Code Section 50-18-71.”
In enacting OCGA § 48-5-306 (d), the legislature clearly intended that county
tax assessment records be handled differently than other forms of public records
and thus carved them out of the Open Records Act for specific treatment. See
Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 364 (1) (729 SE2d 378) (2012)
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(construing “notwithstanding” clause as indicative of “intent to displace” other
law). The Open Records Act is equally clear that its enforcement provisions
apply only to records requests made in compliance with the Act’s own specific
requirements. See OCGA § 50-18-71 (b) (3) (“[t]he [Act’s] enforcement
provisions . . . shall be available only to enforce compliance and punish
noncompliance when a written request is made consistent with this subsection”
(emphasis added)). Given that Plaintiffs’ requests for information were made
pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-306 (d) and not OCGA § 50-18-71 (b) (3), the Open
Records Act is not available to enforce compliance with such requests.
2. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only where a litigant
seeks to compel a public official to perform an act or fulfill a duty that is
required by law. See OCGA § 9-6-20. A prerequisite to one’s entitlement to a
writ of mandamus is a “clear legal right” to the relief being sought. Bibb
County v. Monroe County, 294 Ga. 730, 734 (2) (755 SE2d 760) (2014);
Humphrey v. Owens, 289 Ga. 721, 722 (715 SE2d 119) (2011). Whether a
litigant has a clear legal right to the relief sought depends on the law governing
the subject matter at issue. Bibb County, 294 Ga. at 735-736.
Here, the particular law Hansen seeks to enforce, OCGA § 48-5-306 (d),
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requires a county board of tax assessors to furnish copies of specified documents
and other information to a requesting taxpayer within ten business days of the
request. It is undisputed that the Board has provided various documents in
response to Plaintiffs’ information requests. In his mandamus petition, Hansen
seeks supplementation and an explanation of these responses in a recorded
meeting session. These demands stray far beyond what the statute requires.4
The trial court thus properly held that Hansen’s request for mandamus was
unsupportable as a matter of law.
Furthermore, Hansen’s failure to avail himself of the administrative
appeals process as set forth in OCGA § 48-5-311 prior to resorting to the courts
for relief is in itself a sufficient ground for denying the mandamus nisi. See We,
the Taxpayers v. Bd. of Tax Assessors of Effingham County, 292 Ga. 31, 33 (1)
(734 SE2d 373) (2012) (“failure to pursue the administrative remedy [in OCGA
§ 48-5-311] precludes the issuance of a writ of mandamus”); see also Chatham
County Bd. of Assessors v. Jepson, 261 Ga. App. 771 (1) (584 SE2d 22) (2003)
(holding that even procedural issues regarding sufficiency of the notice of
4
Contrary to Hansen’s contention, OCGA § 48-5-311 (h) does not establish a
clear legal right in a taxpayer to demand a recorded meeting with Board
representatives at his pleasure.
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reassessment must be adjudicated first though the administrative appeals process
in OCGA § 48-5-311).
3. We reject Hansen’s contention that the trial court erred by denying the
request for a mandamus nisi without first holding a hearing, as our mandamus
statute clearly authorizes the trial court to do just that where the petition is
meritless. See OCGA § 9-6-27 (a) (providing for hearing only “if the
mandamus nisi is granted” (emphasis added)); Kappelmeier v. Iannazzone, 279
Ga. 131 (610 SE2d 60) (2005) (affirming denial of mandamus nisi).
4. Given the above, Hansen’s contention that the trial court erred in
holding that the additional 30 taxpayers were not properly named as plaintiffs
is moot.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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