Logan v. State ( 2021 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 8, 2021
S21A0811. LOGAN v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Presiding Justice.
Appellant Carl Garland Logan challenges his 2017 convictions
for malice murder and possession of a knife during the commission
of a crime in connection with the stabbing and beating death of
Anthony Glenn Olivet. Appellant’s sole enumeration of error is that
the trial court violated his constitutional rights to confront his
accusers by preventing him from playing for the jury certain audio-
recorded statements that a prosecution witness made to law
enforcement officers to impeach the witness on cross-examination.
However, the record does not support this claim. Accordingly, we
affirm. 1
1Olivet was killed sometime on the night of March 18 or early morning
of March 19, 2012. On October 8, 2013, a Richmond County grand jury indicted
1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following.
Appellant is from Danville, Virginia. On February 26, 2012, he went
to a house in Danville to exchange drugs for sex. When the woman
he started to have sex with said that she could not continue, he got
Appellant for malice murder, felony murder, and possession of a knife during
the commission of a crime. On August 21, 2017, at the outset of trial, Appellant
waived his right to counsel, instead electing to represent himself. The trial
court directed attorney Kelly Williamson, Appellant’s appointed counsel, to
serve as Appellant’s standby counsel throughout the trial. On August 24, the
jury found Appellant guilty of all charges, and the court sentenced him to serve
life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and a
consecutive term of five years for the knife possession charge; the felony
murder count was vacated by operation of law. On September 7, Appellant filed
a pro se motion for new trial. On September 20, Williamson filed both an entry
of appearance as post-sentencing counsel for Appellant and another motion for
new trial. On April 4, 2018, attorney Robert Beckwith filed a notice of
substitution of counsel. On March 21, 2019, Beckwith filed an amended motion
for new trial, and on April 2, Beckwith filed another amended motion for new
trial. Appellant was incarcerated in Texas on unrelated charges, and the trial
court held a hearing on the motion by videoconference. See Uniform Superior
Court Rule 9.2 (A) (12) (authorizing superior courts to conduct “[p]ost-
sentencing proceedings in criminal cases” by videoconference). On May 23, the
court entered an order denying the new trial motion.
Beckwith filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was initially
docketed in this Court for the term beginning in December 2019. See Case No.
S20A0389. However, Beckwith then filed a motion to remand the case to the
trial court for a hearing on Appellant’s request that Beckwith be removed as
counsel and that Appellant be permitted to pursue his appeal pro se. On
November 18, 2019, this Court entered an order granting the remand motion.
On July 14, 2020, the trial court held a hearing by videoconference on
Appellant’s request to represent himself on appeal. On July 16, the court
entered an order finding that Appellant had not waived his right to counsel on
appeal and directing Beckwith to continue representing Appellant. Beckwith
then filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was re-docketed in this Court
for the April 2021 term and submitted for decision on the briefs.
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angry, retrieved a knife from the kitchen, and stabbed her in the
back. He also threatened to kill the woman, and she fled. Appellant
then attacked the woman’s roommate with a steak knife, stabbing
her twice in the abdomen before plunging the knife so hard into her
temple that the handle broke off and the blade had to be surgically
removed from her face.
Two weeks later, Appellant’s brother told him that Appellant’s
name had come up in connection with the stabbings, and Appellant
decided to flee to Augusta, Georgia, where his older cousin Alvin
Coleman lived. Soon after Appellant arrived in Augusta, he went to
a convenience store with Coleman and met Coleman’s friend Olivet,
who was panhandling outside. Olivet was known in the community
as a peaceful and likeable person who was beset by both physical
and mental disabilities. A local pastor and school superintendent,
Joseph Boulineau, had previously helped Olivet get an apartment,
and Appellant began staying there with Olivet.
On Sunday evening, March 18, Coleman took Olivet to get
something to eat, and Olivet said that he was not getting along with
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Appellant, because Appellant was “trying to take over his
household” and overcharging him for cocaine. Appellant was still at
Olivet’s apartment when Coleman took Olivet home. Coleman was
disturbed by his conversation with Olivet and discussed it with his
wife, and later that same night, Coleman drove back to Olivet’s
apartment. On the way to Olivet’s apartment, Coleman saw
Appellant walking down the road in the opposite direction.
At Olivet’s apartment, Coleman knocked on the door and the
window, but there was no response. Coleman drove back the way he
came, picked up Appellant, and asked him what had happened with
Olivet. Appellant said that nothing had happened with Olivet but
that he had decided to leave Augusta. Coleman thought that was a
good idea and drove Appellant to the bus station downtown, where
Appellant bought a ticket back to Danville using a fake name.
On Monday, March 19, Boulineau went to Olivet’s apartment
in the late morning to check on him and found Olivet lying dead on
the floor underneath a quilt with an 11-inch kitchen knife sticking
out of his throat. Boulineau immediately left the apartment, called
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911, and waited for the authorities. In addition to the knife sticking
out of Olivet’s throat, responding officers recovered a bloody wooden
two-by-four lying on the floor near Olivet’s body. Coleman drove up
as officers were processing the scene. After interviewing Coleman
and confirming aspects of his account, law enforcement officers
identified Appellant as a possible suspect but were unable to locate
him.
The medical examiner found multiple stab wounds to Olivet’s
neck and chest, as well as several injuries to the back of Olivet’s
head and neck that were consistent with his having been repeatedly
bludgeoned with a two-by-four. A fingerprint in the blood on the two-
by-four was later matched to Appellant.
When Appellant left Augusta, he made his way to Texas, where
he was arrested within weeks on unrelated charges and imprisoned.
Following Appellant’s indictment in October 2013, a warrant was
issued for Appellant’s arrest, and Georgia initiated the process of
extradition. In October 2015, Appellant sent a letter to the District
Attorney’s office stating that he “stab[bed] a man to death in
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Augusta.” In February 2016, Appellant sent another letter to the
District Attorney’s office, this time writing, “I am let[t]ing you know
I . . . stab[b]ed to death Anthony Glenn Olivet.”
2. Appellant’s sole enumeration of error is that the trial
court violated his constitutional right to confront his accusers by
preventing him from impeaching Coleman on cross-examination
with certain statements from Coleman’s audio-recorded interviews
with law enforcement officers that Appellant asserts were
inconsistent with Coleman’s trial testimony. Specifically, Appellant
contends that the court prevented him from playing for the jury the
following two statements that Coleman made, referring to
Appellant: (1) “That’s my cousin. . . . His dad’s name is Carl Logan,
from Virginia”; and (2) “He went in [a convenience store] and got
something. He don’t drink, he don’t smoke or nothing, so he went in
there and got him[self] something to eat.”
On the first day of trial, Appellant informed the court that he
wanted to represent himself instead of having his appointed counsel,
Kelly Williamson, represent him. The court warned Appellant of the
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dangers of self-representation, including that if Appellant
represented himself, he would be “expected to follow all the rules of
law, all the rules of criminal procedure, rules of evidence, [and] rules
related to the presentation of evidence,” even if Appellant did not
know those rules. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46
(95 SCt 2525, 45 LE2d 562) (1975) (“The right of self-representation
is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a
license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.”). At the end of an extensive colloquy, the court
found that Appellant had made a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of his right to counsel and had instead chosen to
represent himself at trial. The court then appointed Williamson to
serve as standby counsel for Appellant, to which Appellant said that
he had no objection. See id. (“Of course, a State may – even over
objection by the accused – appoint a ‘standby counsel’ to aid the
accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available
to represent the accused in the event that termination of the
defendant’s self-representation is necessary.”).
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During Appellant’s cross-examination of Coleman, the
following exchange occurred:
Q. So when you was investigated by the investigator,
you don’t remember saying to the investigator that,
“Carl Logan don’t smoke or drink or do drugs”?
A. No, sir, I don’t quite remember. I don’t remember
saying that.
Q. That’s what you said. I’m just asking you do you
remember.
A. I said I don’t remember.
The lead prosecutor interjected, “Your Honor, if he’s going to
impeach the witness, he needs to show some proof of it.” The court
told Appellant:
If you want to present him with a copy of that statement
that you’re referencing, you can. But right now, I think
this question has been asked and answered unless you
want to go there and show him a copy of what he said,
whatever you allege he said; okay?
Appellant replied, “It’s on . . . the CD that the investigator had.” The
court asked if it was an “audio-recorded statement,” and when
Appellant said that it was, the court excused the jury.
The court asked Appellant if he was alleging that a recording
existed of a statement that Coleman made to law enforcement
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officers, and Appellant said, “Yeah.” The court then asked Appellant
if he was alleging that in that statement, Coleman said “that he had
never seen you [i.e., Appellant] drink or smoke or use drugs;
something like that?” Appellant replied, “Yes. He [i.e., Coleman]
said he knows I didn’t smoke or drink. He says that he knows I was
his cousin. He says a lot of different things he’s not saying now . . . .”
The court asked Williamson if she had a copy of the statements
that Appellant was talking about. Williamson said that there were
two disks of interviews of Coleman, which she handed up to the court
at the court’s request. The court asked Appellant which of the CDs
contained the statements that he wanted to play for the jury or
whether he wanted to play statements from both disks, and
Appellant answered, “I don’t know.” The court asked Appellant if he
knew which officer was conducting the interview or interviews in
which Coleman made the statements, and Appellant replied, “No, I
don’t know which one it was.” The court tried unsuccessfully to get
assistance from the lead prosecutor, but he was not aware of the
statements that Appellant referenced, although he could not say
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that the statements did not exist. The court confirmed with
Appellant that he recalled hearing the statements on the CDs. The
court then said that it did not mind asking Williamson “as stand-by
counsel and basically as an officer of the court” to make copies of the
specific statements that Appellant wanted to play for the jury, but
that the court did not know “where to start looking.”
At that point, the discussion veered off onto other topics until
the court brought it back to the CDs by asking Appellant, “So what
is it that you are wanting off of these disks that you think is an
inconsistent statement with what he [i.e., Coleman] testified to here
today?” Appellant said, among other things, that Coleman told
officers that he knew that Appellant was his cousin before Appellant
came to Augusta. The court then called a brief recess.
When the recess ended, the court said to Appellant:
[Y]ou may recall that when you elected to proceed without
counsel today, I told you that you were going to be held to
the same standard as counsel would be held to. What I
would hold your lawyer to, your – your stand-by lawyer
who was preparing for your trial, was if she believed there
was an inconsistent statement that she wanted to
impeach a witness with, it would be expected of her that
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she would know where that statement is, which disk,
which witness, approximately what time. Those are the
kind of things that lawyers do. I have no problem if you
want to consult with her to see if she knows where it is, if
it is. If you do not want to, that’s 100 percent your choice,
but you can ask him [i.e., Coleman], “Isn’t it true you told
the officer this and that,” but at some point you have to
accept his answer and not tell him in response, “Well, you
told investigator whatever these words.” At some point,
you’ve got to accept his answer unless you’re going to
impeach him with extrinsic evidence, which means like
playing a tape or confronting him with a statement that
he made.
Appellant said, “That’s my intentions because it’s on those CDs,” and
the court replied, “Okay. Well, where? I mean I’ve asked you twice
and you said you don’t know which statement. You don’t know which
investigator, you don’t know what time stamp, you don’t know even
approximately where in the statement it is.” Appellant complained
that he “only heard those disks one time” while he was “doing [his]
work to prepare for trial.”
The court told Appellant that he could consult with Williamson
if he wanted to, but that otherwise the court was going to sustain
the State’s objection in the jury’s presence. The court reiterated that
for Appellant not to accept Coleman’s answer to his question,
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Appellant would “have to do something to impeach him,” and in
order to do that with the CDs, Appellant would have to “know at
least which disk we need to talk about and . . . approximately where
. . . the comment” is.
The court asked Appellant if he had consulted with Williamson
on this issue and asked her where on the disks the statements he
wanted to play were, and Appellant said that he had but did not get
a response. The court said:
All right. Well, I am going to return these [CDs] to . . .
stand-by counsel. I will sustain the objection. If you want
– again, if you wanted to ask anything of your stand-by
counsel, I would allow it. But at some point, you’re going
to be held to the same standard as – as lawyers would be.
The court asked Appellant if he wanted to talk to Williamson to see
if she knew where the statements were, and Appellant said to
Williamson, “Do you know where it’s at?” Appellant then conferred
with Williamson, after which the court had the jury brought back
into the courtroom.
The court announced to the jury, “I’m going to sustain that
objection made by the State.” Appellant then asked Coleman several
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additional questions but did not attempt to introduce into evidence
any part of Coleman’s recorded interviews. After redirect
examination by the State, Appellant again questioned Coleman.
Again, he made no attempt to introduce any recorded statements to
impeach Coleman’s testimony. Notably, on direct examination,
Coleman referred to Appellant as his “cousin” and as “part of my
family,” and on redirect examination, after noting that Appellant
“made a big point about you saying that you never saw him do drugs
around the time of the murder,” the lead prosecutor asked Coleman
directly if he saw Appellant do drugs around the time of the murder.
Coleman answered, “No.”
As the recitation above shows, it is not true that the trial court
prevented Appellant from using Coleman’s audio-recorded
statements to law enforcement officers to impeach Coleman’s trial
testimony on cross-examination. To the contrary, the court patiently
explained to Appellant more than once what he needed to do in order
to properly introduce Coleman’s prior statements so that Appellant
could play them for the jury. The court then encouraged Appellant
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to consult with his standby counsel, and after doing so, Appellant
made no further attempt to introduce Coleman’s prior statements
for impeachment. Thus, the factual premise of Appellant’s sole
enumeration of error is contradicted by the record.
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
requiring Appellant to follow the proper procedure to introduce
Coleman’s prior statements. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. See
also Funes v. State, 289 Ga. 793, 797-798 (716 SE2d 183) (2011)
(finding no abuse of the trial court’s broad discretion to determine
the scope of cross-examination where the court admonished defense
counsel that he was not using a prior statement properly and invited
counsel to proceed by the rules but counsel then moved on to other
questions); Nicely v. State, 291 Ga. 788, 796 (733 SE2d 715) (2012)
(noting that trial courts have “‘wide latitude . . . to impose
reasonable limits on cross-examination’” about matters that are
“‘only marginally relevant’” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, this
claim lacks merit.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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