Hinton v. State ( 2021 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 10, 2021
S21A0865. HINTON v. THE STATE.
NAHMIAS, Chief Justice.
Appellant Lamontez Hinton was convicted of malice murder
and other crimes related to the shooting death of Kilon Williams and
the armed robbery of Williams’s friend Nicholas Gibson. Appellant
contends that the evidence presented at his trial was legally
insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court should
have granted him a new trial under the “thirteenth juror” standard.
Those contentions have no merit, so we affirm Appellant’s
convictions except for his conviction for the aggravated assault of
Gibson, which we vacate because it should have been merged into
Appellant’s conviction for the armed robbery of Gibson. 1
1 Williams was killed on July 3, 2014. On January 2, 2015, a Fulton
County grand jury indicted Appellant and Fernando Hogan for malice murder,
1. (a) In the unsuccessful appeal of Appellant’s co-defendant,
Fernando Hogan, we summarized the evidence presented at their
joint trial as follows:
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s
verdicts, the evidence presented at [the] trial showed
that, in the early morning hours of July 3, 2014, Williams
and Gibson, who were going to a bar, parked their car on
a side street near Ponce de Leon Avenue in Atlanta.
Gibson began to walk to the bar, while Williams remained
in the car to text someone. After Gibson had walked for
about two minutes, he saw a man standing on the street
apparently directing someone who was trying to park his
car. But the parking job was a ruse, and the man who
appeared to be directing the car pulled a gun on Gibson
two counts of felony murder (based on possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon and aggravated assault), armed robbery of Gibson, aggravated assault of
Williams, aggravated assault of Gibson, conspiracy to commit armed robbery
of Gibson, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony. Appellant and Hogan’s joint trial
began on September 26, 2016, and on October 4, the jury found Appellant
guilty of all counts and Hogan not guilty of malice murder but guilty of the
remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison
for malice murder; 20 consecutive years for armed robbery; 20 years for the
aggravated assault of Gibson and five years for firearm possession by a
convicted felon, both concurrent with the armed robbery sentence; and five
years for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
consecutive to the armed robbery sentence. The remaining counts were vacated
or merged. As discussed in Division 2 below, the aggravated assault count
related to Gibson also should have been merged. Appellant filed a timely
motion for new trial, which the trial court denied in August 2018. He then filed
a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court for the April
2021 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2
and told him to strip down to his underwear. Gibson did
so, leaving his wallet, watch, glasses, cell phone, and
clothes on the ground. The driver then got out of the car
and picked up the items. The armed man told Gibson to
run, and Gibson began to walk away quickly. The armed
man then got into the car, and the occupants of the car
drove to where Williams was parked. The armed man
jumped out of the car, shot Williams several times,
[killing him], and got back into the car. The occupants of
the car then sped off.
At trial, Gibson identified the driver as Hogan and
the armed man as . . . [Appellant]. Evidence was
introduced that, after Gibson’s phone was stolen, multiple
calls were placed to a phone number belonging to Hogan’s
cousin, Lanquesha Washington. The evidence showed
that on the morning of July 3, Hogan called Washington
from a phone number that Washington did not recognize.
Hogan, sounding scared, told her that he and [Appellant]
had been in an altercation, saying that they had robbed
someone or had been the victims of a robbery. According
to Washington, Hogan added that a shooting had occurred
and that he thought someone might have died. Later in
the day on July 3, Washington went to her mother’s
house, where Hogan lived, and talked with Hogan there.
Washington saw Hogan with a black wallet that did not
belong to him and overheard Hogan on the phone
sounding as though he was trying to transfer money from
different cards or accounts. Hogan later texted
Washington, saying that he thought someone might have
died, and later told her that he was watching the news
and saw reports of the incident.
Hogan v. State, 308 Ga. 155, 155-156 (839 SE2d 651) (2020).
3
The following trial evidence is also pertinent to this appeal.
After seeing Appellant shoot Williams, Gibson unsuccessfully tried
to flag down a passing driver to help Williams; the driver testified
about being stopped by a man wearing only underwear and socks.
Gibson, who had recently been released on parole related to his
conviction for a bank robbery, then got scared and fled on foot to his
aunt’s house a few miles away; he told her that Williams had been
shot. Gibson did not call 911, but the following day, he met with a
detective to discuss the incident. Gibson told the detective that the
two assailants were driving a blue Dodge Avenger. The detective
showed Gibson a photographic lineup containing 22 photos (none of
Appellant or Hogan), and Gibson identified a man named DeShawn
Willis as the gunman. Gibson testified at trial that he was not sure
about the identification, however, because Willis had a similar facial
shape to the gunman, but a different hairstyle.
After reviewing records for Gibson’s stolen cell phone,
discovering that it had been used in the area where Hogan had met
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Washington at her mother’s house – which was next door to
Appellant’s grandmother’s house – and speaking with Washington
and with Appellant’s girlfriend Tiffany Combs, the detective
suspected Appellant and Hogan of committing the crimes. On
October 8, 2014, the detective showed Gibson two photographic
lineups, one including Appellant’s photo and the other including
Hogan’s photo. Gibson identified Appellant as the person who
robbed him and shot Williams and identified Hogan as the driver.
Gibson testified at trial that he was “positive” about those
identifications.
In a redacted version of Combs’s audio-recorded statement to
the detective that was played at trial, Combs acknowledged that she
owned a blue Dodge Avenger and said that Appellant had taken the
car on the night of the shooting, after telling her that he and Hogan
were “going to be getting into something.” Combs also said that
Appellant had previously told her that he robs people by acting like
he is going to shoot them and making them strip out of their clothes.
5
The State presented evidence that Appellant was previously
convicted of burglary. Neither Appellant nor Hogan testified at trial.
(b) Appellant contends that the evidence presented at his trial
was legally insufficient to support his convictions because Gibson’s
identification of him as the gunman was not credible. Appellant
points to evidence that Gibson was a paroled bank robber who fled
the scene of the shooting, did not immediately call 911, and initially
identified someone other than Appellant as the gunman. All of that
is true, but in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence under the
constitutional due process standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), “‘[w]e do not
determine the credibility of eyewitness identification testimony.
Rather[,] the determination of a witness’[s] credibility, including the
accuracy of eyewitness identification, is within the exclusive
province of the jury.’” Reeves v. State, 288 Ga. 545, 546 (705 SE2d
159) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted). And “[t]he testimony
of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact.” OCGA
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§ 24-14-8.
Gibson explained to the jury at trial that he was unsure about
his initial pretrial identification but “positive” about his
identification of Appellant as the gunman and Hogan as the driver
in the subsequent photo lineups. Gibson also identified Appellant in
court as the gunman, and his testimony was corroborated by, among
other things, Combs’s statement to the detective and Hogan’s
statement to his cousin Washington. The jury was entitled to credit
Gibson’s identification of Appellant and to rely on that testimony as
well as the other evidence of Appellant’s guilt. See Vega v. State, 285
Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“‘It was for the jury to determine
the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or
inconsistencies in the evidence.’” (citation omitted)). When properly
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find
Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which
he was convicted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
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(c) Appellant also argues that the trial court should have
granted a new trial under the “thirteenth juror” standard. We have
explained that
[e]ven when the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a
conviction, a trial judge may grant a new trial if the
verdict of the jury is “contrary to . . . the principles of
justice and equity,” OCGA § 5-5-20, or if the verdict is
“decidedly and strongly against the weight of the
evidence.” OCGA § 5-5-21. When properly raised in a
timely motion, these grounds for a new trial – commonly
known as the “general grounds” – require the trial judge
to exercise a “broad discretion to sit as a ‘thirteenth
juror.’” In exercising that discretion, the trial judge must
consider some of the things that [he] cannot when
assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, including
any conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of witnesses,
and the weight of the evidence.
White v. State, 293 Ga. 523, 524-525 (753 SE2d 115) (2013) (citation
omitted). “‘[T]he decision to grant or refuse to grant a new trial on
the general grounds is vested solely in the trial court.’” Thrift v.
State, 310 Ga. 499, 503 (852 SE2d 560) (2020) (citation omitted).
Thus,
“[w]hen a defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of a
motion for new trial, an appellate court does not review
the merits of the general grounds.” Instead, this Court’s
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review of [the] trial court’s ruling on the general grounds
is limited to sufficiency of the evidence under Jackson v.
Virginia.
Thrift, 310 Ga. at 503 (emphasis in original; citation omitted).
As Appellant acknowledges, the trial court applied the correct
“thirteenth juror” standard. Compare White, 293 Ga. at 525. And as
discussed in the previous subdivision, the evidence was sufficient to
support Appellant’s convictions under Jackson v. Virginia.
Accordingly, this enumeration of error is meritless.
2. Although Appellant’s claims have no merit, the State
forthrightly points out that the record shows a sentencing error.
Because the aggravated assault of Gibson by pointing a gun at him
(Count 6) was part of the same transaction as the armed robbery of
Gibson (Count 4), the trial court should have merged Count 6 into
Count 4. See Thomas v. State, 289 Ga. 877, 880 (717 SE2d 187)
(2011) (“Because aggravated assault [with a deadly weapon] does
not require proof of any element that armed robbery does not,
convictions for both offenses will merge . . . if the crimes are part of
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the same ‘act or transaction.’” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we
vacate Appellant’s conviction and 20-year concurrent sentence for
Count 6 as we did in Hogan’s case. See Hogan, 308 Ga. at 155 n.1.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices
concur, except Colvin, J., not participating.
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