Hughes v. State ( 2021 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: July 7, 2021
S21A0730. HUGHES v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Presiding Justice.
Appellant Re’Dayon Hughes challenges his 2019 convictions
for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting
death of Dre’Landon Brown. 1 Appellant contends that the trial court
erred by admitting evidence that he vandalized Marjorie Reed’s car,
1 Brown was killed on November 23, 2017. On February 12, 2018, a
Forsyth County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault of Dre’Landon,
and aggravated assault of Jaymareion Brown. On July 10, 2018, Appellant
filed a pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution. A hearing on the motion
was held on October 12, 2018, and the trial court denied the motion in an order
entered on October 25, 2018. At a trial from January 7 to 11 and 14, 2019, the
jury found Appellant not guilty of malice murder but guilty of the remaining
counts. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison for felony
murder and 20 years concurrently for the aggravated assault of Jaymareion.
The aggravated assault of Dre’Landon merged with the felony murder count.
On January 28, 2019, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which he amended
through new counsel on September 17, 2019 and October 14, 2019. After a
hearing on November 18, 2019, the trial court denied the motion for new trial
as amended in an order filed on December 14, 2020. Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal, the case was docketed in this Court for the April 2021 term,
and oral argument was heard May 18, 2021.
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to question Appellant
about alleged prior difficulties with Dre’Landon and for failing to
object to the admission of other prior difficulties evidence, that the
cumulative prejudice of these errors requires a new trial, and that
the trial court erroneously considered Appellant’s failure to retreat
in denying his pretrial motion for immunity. We affirm.
The evidence presented at trial showed the following. On
November 23, 2017, Appellant shot and killed Dre’Landon as
Appellant fled the Brown family home. Appellant admitted to
shooting Dre’Landon but claimed that it was done in self-defense
because Dre’Landon was chasing him down the stairs of the Brown
family home with a gun.
Earlier that evening, Appellant sneaked into the home of Reed
and her teenage grandchildren — Marjorie Brown, Absolom Brown,
Dre’Landon, and Jaymareion Brown — to meet with Marjorie, who
had recently given birth to Appellant’s child. Appellant was carrying
a loaded gun and a backpack with a few rounds of loose ammunition.
Reed had banned Appellant from her home and from contact with
2
Marjorie, who was herself barred from contact with Appellant under
court order.
After Jaymareion and Dre’Landon saw a photo on social media
of Appellant, Marjorie, and their child in what looked like Marjorie’s
bedroom, the two brothers confronted Marjorie at her bedroom door.
When she denied that Appellant was in the room, Jaymareion
pushed into the room with Dre’Landon following behind. Not seeing
Appellant in the room, Jaymareion opened the closet door to find
Appellant hiding inside. Appellant then pointed a gun at
Jaymareion, who exclaimed, “So you’re going to bring a gun into our
house.” When Appellant did not respond, Jaymareion said, “Bro, just
leave.” Appellant pointed his gun at both brothers, who remained
still, as he first exited the closet and then the room.
Seconds later, as Appellant proceeded downstairs, Dre’Landon
left Marjorie’s room and followed Appellant down the stairs. When
Appellant reached the bottom of the stairs, rather than go out the
nearby front door, Appellant stopped, turned around, and shot
Dre’Landon twice in the chest and once more as he fell. Meanwhile,
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Jaymareion left the bedroom and went straight down the stairs.
When he reached the final step, he heard gunshots and ran back up
the stairs. Appellant fled out the back door and hid in some nearby
bushes.
Jaymareion ran back down the stairs to find Dre’Landon
bleeding on the floor. Jaymareion attempted to stop the bleeding and
called the police. Jaymareion saw no gun near his brother.
While Jaymareion tended to his brother’s wounds, Marjorie
went out the front door to look for Appellant. Upon finding him, she
agreed to grab their child, get the keys to the family car, and leave
with him. She went back inside, took the child, and brought him to
Appellant. She then returned to the house to pack her things, but
Reed stopped her from leaving until the police arrived.
By the time the police arrived, Dre’Landon was dead. The
police found and arrested Appellant one block from the house. In
searching the home for Appellant’s firearm, the police found a few
rounds of loose ammunition in the backpack Appellant had left
inside Marjorie’s closet. A specialized canine unit also searched the
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premises for the missing firearm and located it near an air
conditioning unit at an adjoining house. No other working gun was
ever found. 2 According to the autopsy, there was no soot on
Dre’Landon’s skin, indicating that he was shot from a distance of at
least three feet away.
A series of confrontations had occurred between Appellant and
various members of Dre’Landon’s family in the months leading up
to the shooting death of Dre’Landon. Initially, Dre’Landon’s family
had lived in Roswell, where Appellant and Marjorie met at school
and started dating. According to Reed, Marjorie’s behavior started
to change when she began dating Appellant. She began running
away with Appellant and started drinking, using drugs, and
breaking into and sleeping in abandoned places. Reed also heard
that Appellant had “beat up” Marjorie. These events led Reed to
prohibit the two teenagers from seeing each other, including barring
Appellant from her home.
2 Upon searching the house, the police found a revolver in the first floor
front hall closet. It looked like it had been pieced together, was missing the
trigger and half of its frame, and was incapable of firing.
5
Appellant’s relationship with Marjorie continued, however,
generating rumors at school that the two were engaging in sexual
activity. Absolom and Jaymareion each confronted Appellant
separately at school over the rumors and his derogatory sexual
comments about Marjorie. During the interaction with Jaymareion
at school, Appellant became angry and the two boys began
threatening each other. A teacher separated them before a fight
broke out.
Sometime later, while walking down a trail behind the family
home, Absolom saw Appellant with another unidentified person.
Absolom told Appellant to wait, went home, and returned with
Jaymareion and Dre’Landon. Absolom noticed that Appellant
appeared to be holding an AR-15-style rifle. Absolom, scared, began
to move away before realizing the rifle was only a BB gun. The
unknown person with Appellant then approached the three brothers
and asked whether Absolom wanted to fight. Jaymareion interjected
that no one would fight his brother without also fighting him.
Appellant then threatened to kill the brothers.
6
During yet another incident, Jaymareion and Dre’Landon
caught Appellant inside of their home and punched him. They then
ushered Appellant outside and reminded him that he was not
allowed in the family home.
At some point, Reed invited Appellant to talk with her. Reed
made it clear to Appellant that he was not allowed in the family
home. Immediately following this discussion, Reed found her car
vandalized: all four tires had been slashed and the windshield
broken. Appellant admitted to Marjorie that he had vandalized
Reed’s car; Marjorie told the rest of the family.
Finally, in the summer of 2017, to give Marjorie “a clean break
away from all that badness” in Roswell, Reed moved the family to a
new home in Forsyth County. In November 2017, Marjorie gave
birth to Appellant’s child. After the move to Forsyth County, Reed
once again prohibited Appellant from being in the family home and
told Marjorie not to tell Appellant their new address. Marjorie,
however, told Appellant the new address and continued her
relationship with him.
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1. Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his
motion in limine and admitting testimony that Appellant vandalized
Reed’s car. In denying the motion in limine, the trial court explained
that the testimony was appropriate prior difficulties evidence and
that it explained the relationships and circumstances leading to the
charges in this case. Appellant argues that the evidence was
inadmissible because it was neither intrinsic to the charged offenses
nor evidence of prior difficulties between Appellant and the victims
under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). We disagree.
Evidence is intrinsic when it pertains “to the chain of events
explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime,” and is
admissible so long as it is “linked in time and circumstances with
the charged crime, . . . forms an integral and natural part of an
account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the
crime for the jury[.]” Heade v. State, Case No. S21A0409, 2021 WL
2518631, at *4 (decided June 21, 2021) (citation and punctuation
omitted). “There is no bright-line rule regarding how close in time
evidence must be to the charged offenses, or requiring evidence to
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pertain directly to the victims of the charged offenses, for that
evidence to be admitted properly as intrinsic evidence.” Id. (citation
and punctuation omitted). “We review a trial court’s ruling
admitting evidence as intrinsic for an abuse of discretion.” Id.(citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, the evidence that Appellant vandalized Reed’s car was a
part of the chain of events leading to the charged crimes. Occurring
amidst a series of escalating threats and acts of violence by
Appellant and members of Dre’Landon’s family, it showed the
tension in the relationship between the persons involved in this
case, was a precipitating cause for the family’s relocation from
Roswell to Forsyth County, and explained, in part, why Appellant
was not permitted in Reed’s home the night of the shooting. When
considered in light of the other evidence in this case, we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that
the evidence that Appellant vandalized Reed’s car was reasonably
necessary to complete the story for the jury and was therefore
intrinsic evidence. See Clark v. State, 306 Ga. 367, 374 (829 SE2d
9
306) (2019) (concluding that evidence was intrinsic in part because
it explained why appellant was not welcome in the victim’s home).
Of course, intrinsic evidence may be “excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”). “In reviewing issues under
Rule 403, we look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its
admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its
undue prejudicial impact.” Heade, 2021 WL 2518631, at *5 (citation
and punctuation omitted).
As explained above, Appellant’s vandalism of Reed’s car was
probative in explaining the context of the charged crimes and the
increasingly hostile relationship between Appellant and Reed and
members of her family. The trial court was within its discretion to
determine that the prejudicial impact of this act was not unfair and
did not substantially outweigh its probative value. Appellant,
therefore, has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion
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in admitting the evidence.
2. Appellant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance for failing to elicit testimony at trial that Dre’Landon had
a gun during a prior incident involving Appellant and for failing to
object to several pieces of testimony regarding the numerous prior
conflicts between Appellant and members of Dre’Landon’s family.
We disagree.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Appellant must show both that his trial counsel’s performance was
deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)
(1984). An appellant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test,
and if he fails as to one prong, “it is not incumbent upon this Court
to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (770
SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). To establish
deficient performance, an appellant “must overcome the strong
presumption that his . . . counsel’s conduct falls within the broad
range of reasonable professional conduct and show that his counsel
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performed in an objectively unreasonable way” in light of all the
circumstances and prevailing norms. Id. (citation and punctuation
omitted). To establish prejudice, an appellant must show that “there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In reviewing either component of the
inquiry, all factual findings by the trial court will be affirmed unless
clearly erroneous. See Smith, 296 Ga. at 733.
(a) Appellant asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to introduce evidence at trial that Appellant
was assaulted by Dre’Landon with a gun in a prior incident. At the
pretrial hearing on Appellant’s motion for immunity, Appellant
testified that eight months prior to the shooting of Dre’Landon,
Dre’Landon drove past Appellant and pointed a gun at him, placing
him in fear of being shot. Trial counsel, however, did not elicit this
same testimony at trial. Appellant argues that this failure was not
only constitutionally deficient but also was prejudicial because the
critical issue in the case was whether Dre’Landon had a gun, putting
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Appellant in reasonable fear for his life when he shot Dre’Landon.
Even assuming trial counsel’s failure to elicit this testimony at
trial was deficient, Appellant has failed to show prejudice. Although
the testimony, had it been elicited at trial, may have shown that
Dre’Landon had access to a gun eight months earlier, the evidence
was very strong that only Appellant had a gun on the night
Dre’Landon was shot: no one ever saw Dre’Landon with a gun, and
Appellant’s gun was the only useable one found at the scene, which
was searched by the police with a canine unit trained to detect guns.
See Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708, 714 (854 SE2d 523) (2021)
(concluding that exclusion of testimony was harmless where
evidence of guilt was “very strong”). Further, the testimony would
have shown merely another in a long list of incidents of prior threats
or violent acts between Appellant and members of Dre’Landon’s
family leading up to the shooting. See Byers v. State, __ Ga. __ (857
SE2d 447, 451) (2021) (concluding that exclusion of testimony was
harmless where it was essentially cumulative of other evidence).
Appellant has therefore failed to show that the outcome of the trial
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probably would have been different absent trial counsel’s failure to
elicit testimony regarding this prior incident. See, e.g., Swann v.
State, 310 Ga. 175, 178 (850 SE2d 137) (2020) (denying an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim for failure to offer evidence because
appellant failed to show prejudice).
(b) Appellant further claims that his trial counsel was
constitutionally deficient for failing to object to several pieces of
testimony regarding the numerous prior incidents of conflict
between Appellant and members of Dre’Landon’s family.
Specifically, Appellant argues that trial counsel should have
objected to the following: (1) Reed’s testimony regarding why her
family left Roswell; (2) her testimony that Appellant beat Marjorie;
(3) Absolom’s and Jaymareion’s testimony regarding Appellant’s
sexually derogatory comments about Marjorie; (4) and Absolom’s
and Jaymareion’s testimony about the incident on the trail involving
Appellant and a BB gun.
Appellant has failed to prove that his trial counsel acted
deficiently in choosing not to object to this testimony. “Reasonable
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trial strategy and tactics do not amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel.” Griffin v. State, 309 Ga. 860, 866 (849 SE2d 191) (2020)
(citation and punctuation omitted). “[M]erely arguing that there is
another, or even a better, way for counsel to have performed” is not
enough. Id. at 867 (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, at the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel
explained his trial strategy. He sought to show that Appellant was
a loving and interested father who was at Reed’s home for peaceful
purposes and that the shooting would never have occurred but for
the aggression of Dre’Landon. The prior confrontations and
incidences of violence between Appellant and members of
Dre’Landon’s family supported the defense’s theory that the bad
blood between the parties contributed to Appellant’s reasonable fear
of them, which in turn supported his claim of self-defense. Given
trial counsel’s “founded, reasonable belief that [Appellant] was best
served by using this evidence to his advantage instead of objecting
to it, counsel’s decision amounted to reasonable trial strategy that
does not constitute deficient performance.” Griffin, 309 Ga. at 867.
15
Further, as to Reed’s comment that Appellant had beaten
Marjorie, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that trial
counsel’s failure to object was reasonable trial strategy. When asked
at trial whether Reed moved her family out of Roswell because of
Appellant, Reed explained:
Well, it was mainly because of her being involved with
him because she was running off, she was staying with
him. They were at a hotel there in Roswell. And I even
went to that person and asked them to let me know if they
find her. Then I was informed that she had been beat up
by him.
The prosecutor immediately stopped Reed saying, “I don’t want to
go into any of that, okay,” redirecting her to identify whether
Appellant was the person she had just explained Marjorie was
running off with.
At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel explained
that he did not object to Reed’s comment because Reed had been
promptly stopped and redirected by the prosecutor and that he
believed it best not to object to this off-hand comment so as to not
draw further attention to it. Appellant has failed to show that this
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was an unreasonable strategic decision that constituted deficient
performance. See Durham v. State, 292 Ga. 239, 242 (734 SE2d 377)
(2012) (concluding that trial counsel was not deficient for
intentionally failing to object to brief, harmful testimony so as not
to draw attention to it). Accordingly, Appellant has failed to
demonstrate that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
3. Appellant claims that the harm of the alleged cumulative
errors by the trial court and trial counsel must be assessed under
State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17-18 (838 SE2d 808) (2020). As explained
above, however, there are not multiple errors from which to assess
cumulative harm. See Cox v. State, 306 Ga. 736, 743 (832 SE2d 354)
(2019) (“[W]e evaluate only the effects of matters determined to be
error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)).
4. Finally, Appellant argues that the case must be remanded
for reconsideration of his motion for immunity because the trial
court wrongly considered his duty and failure to retreat as a ground
for denying him immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. We disagree.
17
“A person is justified in threatening or using force against
another when and to the extent that he . . . reasonably believes that
such threat or force is necessary to defend himself . . . against such
other’s imminent use of unlawful force[.]” OCGA § 16-3-21 (a).
Likewise, a person is justified in using deadly force only if he
“reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or
great bodily injury to himself[.]” Id. In defending himself, he “has no
duty to retreat and has the right to stand his . . . ground and use
force as provided in [OCGA § 16-3-21], including deadly force.”
OCGA § 16-3-23.1. If his use of force falls within these parameters,
he “shall be immune from criminal prosecution.” OCGA § 16-3-24.2.
To avoid trial, a defendant bears the burden of proof to show
that he is entitled to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 413 (667 SE2d 605) (2008). On
appeal, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling, and the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations are accepted if there is any evidence to support
them. See Hipp v. State, 293 Ga. 415, 418 (746 SE2d 95) (2013).
18
Here, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion for
immunity, weighed two competing versions of events, and
determined that Appellant was not entitled to immunity. At the
hearing, Appellant testified that after the Brown brothers became
suspicious that Appellant was in the house, the Brown brothers
loudly threatened Appellant as they stormed down the hall and
forced their way into Marjorie’s room before discovering Appellant
in the closet. When Appellant pointed his gun at the Brown brothers,
Jaymareion told Appellant to put down the gun and fight. Then
Dre’Landon informed Appellant that he was not the only one with a
gun and left the room. Appellant then ran down the stairs and tried
to go out the front door but could not get it unlocked. He heard
Dre’Landon running down the stairs and saw him raise a gun
toward him so Appellant shot him in self-defense before fleeing out
the back door.
Jaymareion and Reed testified and denied Appellant’s version
of events. They explained that the brothers had not been loud and
threatening, that Dre’Landon did not leave the room, mention a gun,
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or have one, and that Appellant never attempted to flee through the
front door and also could have exited out the back door without
shooting Dre’Landon.
In its order, the trial court laid out this testimony and
explained that although “prior difficulties” between Appellant and
members of Dre’Landon’s family could have given Appellant “a
reasonable fear of further violence . . . in general[,]” Appellant based
“his need to shoot Dre’Landon on the fact that he could not get out
of the front door, which gave Dre’Landon, armed with a gun, time to
get downstairs and confront him.” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial
court then explained that Appellant was able to leave Marjorie’s
room, that “[n]o gun was found” near Dre’Landon, and that it found
Jaymareion’s and Reed’s testimony that Dre’Landon did not have a
gun more credible than Appellant’s version of events. This led the
trial court to conclude:
[Appellant] has not proved to the [c]ourt by a
preponderance of the evidence that he could not open the
front door and that he shot to defend himself from an
armed person. The [c]ourt does not discount all of the
testimony presented by [Appellant] in this case, but finds
20
that [Appellant] had placed himself in a position to exit []
Reed’s home without further violence and elected to shoot
the unarmed victim anyway. Thus, while there is evidence
supporting [Appellant’s] claim for self-defense, the [c]ourt
finds that [Appellant] has not carried his burden of proof
for the purpose of obtaining immunity.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In summary, the trial court concluded that Appellant’s claim
of self-defense was founded on his testimony that he was unable to
escape the armed, pursuing Dre’Landon. However, given that
Appellant was able to leave Marjorie’s room unharmed and that the
trial court did not credit Appellant’s testimony that Dre’Landon had
a gun, the trial court concluded that Appellant failed to prove that
he was in reasonable apprehension of fear of imminent death or
great bodily injury from Dre’Landon in order to justify his use of
deadly force. Given these findings, the trial court was authorized to
find that Appellant failed to carry his burden to prove that he was
entitled to immunity. See, e.g., Arnold v. State, 302 Ga. 129, 132 n.6
(805 SE2d 94) (2017) (concluding that the trial court’s decision to
deny motion for immunity was “wholly supported by [the court’s]
21
findings”).
Appellant argues, however, that the trial court’s repeated
references to his failure to retreat undermine its denial of his motion
for immunity by showing that the court improperly relied on
Appellant’s failure to retreat. Although OCGA § 16-3-23.1 “clearly
provides that a person who is authorized to use force to defend
himself is under no obligation to retreat, regardless of whether
retreating may have been a more reasonable option,” Arnold, 302
Ga. at 132 n.6, as we have concluded above, the evidence supported
the trial court’s determination that Dre’Landon was unarmed and
that Appellant was not authorized to use force to defend himself
under the circumstances. See id. Therefore, the trial court’s
references to Appellant’s failure to retreat did not prejudice him and
provide no basis for reversing the denial of immunity. See id.Judgment affirmed. Nahmias, C. J., and Peterson, Warren,
Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, and LaGrua, JJ., concur.
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