Grullon v. State ( 2021 )


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  • In the Supreme Court of Georgia
    Decided: December 14, 2021
    S21G0485. GRULLON v. THE STATE
    LAGRUA, Justice.
    In September 2017, a jury found Victor Grullon guilty of
    trafficking heroin, and the trial court sentenced him to serve 30
    years in prison. Grullon appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the
    evidence and arguing that the trial court gave an erroneous jury
    charge on deliberate ignorance.    The Court of Appeals affirmed
    Grullon’s   conviction,   concluding   that    the   evidence    was
    constitutionally sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U. S. 307
    (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and that Grullon did not show
    “reversible error because he affirmatively stated to the trial court
    that he had no objection after the jury was charged.” Grullon v.
    State, 
    357 Ga. App. 695
    , 695 (849 SE2d 291) (2020). We granted
    certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that
    Grullon affirmatively waived his claim that the trial court gave an
    erroneous jury instruction on deliberate ignorance.     Because we
    answer this question in the negative, we reverse that portion of the
    judgment of the Court of Appeals.
    1. Pertinent Facts and Procedural History
    (a)   Factual Background
    The underlying facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals,
    see Grullon, 357 Ga. App. at 696-697 (1), show that in early 2016,
    the federal Drug Enforcement Administration, together with
    various local law enforcement agencies, conducted an investigation
    into Marcelo Enciso-Rodriguez. Law enforcement officers believed
    Enciso-Rodriguez was acting as a middleman in a heroin trafficking
    operation that involved a supplier in Mexico, known as “Mariachi,”
    and buyers from New York and Philadelphia. The buyers would
    drive to the metro Atlanta area and meet Enciso-Rodriguez at a
    QuikTrip convenience store, where he would give them a car battery
    in which heroin was concealed.       As part of their investigation,
    officers conducted surveillance on Enciso-Rodriguez through
    2
    telephone wiretaps, a video camera mounted on a pole in the
    QuikTrip parking lot, and a stake-out across the street from the
    QuikTrip.
    In January 2016, officers observed a transaction between
    Enciso-Rodriguez and a man later determined to be Tomas
    Hernandez, in which Enciso-Rodriguez gave Hernandez a car
    battery. Before and after the meeting with Hernandez, Enciso-
    Rodriguez spoke with Mariachi, using coded phrases referring to
    Hernandez and to the amount of money involved in the transaction.
    On February 5, 2016, Mariachi and Enciso-Rodriguez spoke on
    the phone about another transaction. Apparently referring to a new
    buyer, Mariachi told Enciso-Rodriguez that “he left today” and
    would arrive to meet with Enciso-Rodriguez at some point the
    following day, possibly in the morning.
    On the morning of February 6, Enciso-Rodriguez had a series
    of telephone conversations with a man, later identified as Grullon,
    who asked for directions to the QuikTrip. Grullon and Hernandez,
    the buyer from the January transaction, arrived at the QuikTrip in
    3
    a vehicle with New York plates registered to Grullon. Enciso-
    Rodriguez gave Hernandez a car battery, which Hernandez placed
    in the vehicle, and Hernandez and Grullon drove away. Officers
    followed the vehicle and stopped it shortly thereafter for a tag
    violation.      When officers stopped the vehicle, Hernandez was
    driving, and Grullon was seated in the front passenger seat.
    Hernandez consented to a search of the vehicle. He told the officers
    that he and Grullon had been in Atlanta for two days visiting a
    friend and that the battery in the back of the vehicle belonged to
    him. When the officers began asking questions about the car battery,
    Grullon appeared as though he might “pass out.” The officers cut
    apart the battery and found six bricks of a substance inside, which
    were later tested and found to be a mixture containing heroin,
    weighing 465 grams.
    (b)   Trial court proceedings
    In January 2017, Grullon was indicted by a Gwinnett County
    grand jury, together with Encisco-Rodriguez and Hernandez, 1 on
    1   Encisco-Rodriguez and Hernandez were also indicted for one count of
    4
    one count of trafficking in morphine, opium, or heroin under OCGA
    § 16-13-31 (b). 2 Grullon’s case proceeded to trial in September 2017.
    During the charge conference, the State requested that the trial
    court give the following jury instruction on deliberate ignorance, 3
    citing Perez-Castillo v. State, 
    257 Ga. App. 633
    , 635 (572 SE2d 657)
    (2002):
    The element of knowledge, intent, may be satisfied by
    inferences drawn from proof that a defendant deliberately
    closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been
    obvious to him. A finding beyond a reasonable doubt of
    conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment would permit
    an inference of knowledge. Stated another way, a
    defendant’s knowledge of a fact may be inferred from
    willful blindness to the existence of the fact. Again,
    whether or not you draw such an inference is a matter
    conspiracy to commit trafficking heroin.
    2 Under OCGA § 16-13-31 (b), a “person who sells, manufactures,
    delivers, brings into this state, or has possession of four grams or more of any
    [of a list of specified] substance[s], . . . including heroin, . . . or four grams or
    more of any mixture containing any such substance . . . commits the felony
    offense of trafficking in illegal drugs[.]”
    3 The State had previously informed the trial court during a hearing on
    Grullon’s motion for directed verdict that it would be asking for a jury
    instruction on deliberate ignorance. The State argued that such a charge was
    appropriate in this case because, even if Grullon was not “fully apprised of
    what [wa]s in that battery,” he at least knew something was “amiss.” Grullon
    objected, contending that, for this charge to be proper, the State would have
    been required to “show that there were signs that [Grullon] should have
    known” what was in the battery, but the State failed to make this showing or
    otherwise show “a sufficient factual basis” for this charge.
    5
    solely within your discretion.
    Grullon objected to the State’s requested charge, asserting that this
    charge should not be given in circumstances where the evidence
    “points to either actual knowledge or no knowledge on the part of
    the defendant,” and the State had argued that Grullon had a basis
    for actual knowledge in this case. The trial court overruled Grullon’s
    objection and gave the State’s requested charge on deliberate
    ignorance.
    When the trial court completed the final instructions to the
    jury, the trial court asked the parties whether there were any
    exceptions, and Grullon’s trial counsel replied, “No, sir, Judge.”
    Grullon was convicted by the jury of trafficking in 28 or more grams
    of a mixture containing heroin under OCGA § 16-13-31 (b) (3) and
    sentenced to 30 years in prison.
    Grullon subsequently filed a motion for new trial, asserting
    that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find he was in
    constructive possession of the drugs and that the trial court gave an
    erroneous jury charge on the issue of deliberate ignorance. With
    6
    respect to the jury charge, Grullon argued that the trial court erred
    in giving this instruction because it unconstitutionally reduced the
    State’s burden of proof by conflating the “knowledge” and “intent”
    elements of the offense – a different argument than the one he raised
    when he objected to the instruction at the charge conference. The
    trial court denied Grullon’s motion for new trial, and Grullon
    appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.
    (c)   Grullon’s appeal to the Court of Appeals
    On appeal, Grullon challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
    and asserted that the trial court erred in giving the deliberate
    ignorance charge “because the charge equated intent with
    knowledge.” Grullon, 357 Ga. App. at 700 (2). The State conceded
    on appeal that this charge was erroneous, but argued that the error
    was harmless. See id. See also Matos-Bautista v. State, 
    353 Ga. App. 773
    , 778 (1) (839 SE2d 260) (2020) (“[A] charge on deliberate
    ignorance that equates intent with knowledge, or which tends to
    confuse those concepts, is erroneous.”). Without addressing whether
    the trial court committed an obvious error in giving this charge or if
    7
    any error was harmful, the Court of Appeals concluded that
    Grullon did not preserve this claim of error for regular
    appellate review. Although he objected to the charge at
    the charge conference (albeit on different grounds),
    Grullon did not object to the charge at the time it was
    given. For that reason, his claim that the trial court erred
    by giving the charge is subject to review only for plain
    error.
    And Grullon cannot show plain error, which among other
    things requires a showing that the error has not been
    intentionally     relinquished    or    abandoned,       i.e.,
    affirmatively waived, by the appellant. State v. Kelly, 
    290 Ga. 29
    , 33 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011) (citation omitted).
    After giving the charge to the jury, the trial court asked if
    Grullon had any objection to it, and his trial counsel
    responded “no.” By affirmatively stating that he had no
    objection to the charge to the jury, Grullon waived any
    claim that the charge was improper, meaning that he
    cannot show plain error. See Lee v. State, 
    347 Ga. App. 508
    , 512 (2) (b) (820 SE2d 147) (2018).
    Grullon, 357 Ga. App. at 700 (2) (punctuation omitted). The Court
    of Appeals accordingly affirmed the trial court. See id.
    For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Court of
    Appeals erred in identifying affirmative waiver under the facts of
    this case, and, thus, we reverse this division of the Court of Appeals’
    decision and remand the case for reconsideration of other elements
    8
    of plain error review. 4
    2. Analysis
    (a) Grullon did not affirmatively waive his claim that the
    trial court erred in giving an erroneous jury instruction.
    Under OCGA § 17-8-58,
    (a) Any party who objects to any portion of the charge to
    the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the
    court of the specific objection and the grounds for such
    objection before the jury retires to deliberate. Such
    objections shall be done outside of the jury’s hearing and
    presence.
    (b) Failure to object in accordance with subsection (a) of
    this Code section shall preclude appellate review of such
    portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury
    charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial
    rights of the parties. Such plain error may be considered
    on appeal even if it was not brought to the court’s
    attention as provided in subsection (a) of this Code
    section.
    In accordance with subsection (a), a party who objects to any of
    the charges given to the jury is obligated to raise that objection
    before the jury retires to deliberate. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). See
    4Grullon did not seek certiorari review of the Court of Appeals’ holding
    that the evidence was sufficient, see Grullon, 357 Ga. App. at 696-700 (1), and
    that part of the Court of Appeals’ judgment stands.
    9
    also Cheddersingh v. State, 
    290 Ga. 680
    , 682 (2) (724 SE2d 366)
    (2012) (holding that it was the appellant’s “duty to inform the court
    of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the
    jury retired to deliberate” (punctuation omitted)). Here, Grullon did
    not reiterate his objection to the deliberate ignorance charge after
    the trial court gave the final instructions to the jury in accordance
    with OCGA § 17-8-58 (a); additionally, the ground for his objection
    at trial was different than the ground he asserted on appeal. See
    Nalls v. State, 
    304 Ga. 168
    , 172 (2) (a) (815 SE2d 38) (2018) (noting
    that at the charge conference, the appellant’s counsel stated that she
    did not want a certain charge to be given, but “she did not object to
    the charge at the time that it was given[;] [f]or that reason,
    [Appellant’s] claim that the trial court erred by failing to limit the
    charge is subject to review only for plain error.”). Grullon therefore
    failed to preserve this claim for ordinary appellate review. However,
    the alleged error is still reviewed for plain error on appeal. See
    OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). See also Cheddersingh, 
    290 Ga. at 683
     (2).
    “[U]nder OCGA § 17-8-58 (b), appellate review for plain error is
    10
    required whenever an appealing party properly asserts an error in
    jury instructions.” Kelly, 
    290 Ga. at 32-33
     (1)-(2) (a). In other words,
    when an error in the jury instruction is enumerated and argued on
    appeal, the appellate court is required to conduct a plain error
    analysis. See 
    id. at 32-33
     (2) (a). See also King v. State, 
    300 Ga. 180
    ,
    182 (1) (794 SE2d 110) (2016) (holding that when the appellant
    raises trial court instructional error for the first time on appeal, the
    purported “failure to give these charges is reviewed for plain error”).
    For purposes of undertaking the plain error analysis, this
    Court established the following test for determining whether there
    is plain error in jury instructions under OCGA § 17-8-58 (b):
    First, there must be an error or defect – some sort of
    deviation from a legal rule – that has not been
    intentionally    relinquished      or    abandoned,      i.e.,
    affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal
    error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
    reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
    the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
    case means he must demonstrate that it affected the
    outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally,
    if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court
    has the discretion to remedy the error – discretion which
    ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the
    fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
    11
    proceedings.
    Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted;
    emphasis in original).
    In this case, the Court of Appeals did not consider any other
    elements of the plain error test delineated in Kelly because the court
    concluded that the first requirement was not met: Grullon had
    “waived any claim that the charge was improper” by “affirmatively
    stating that he had no objection to the charge” after it was given to
    the jury. Grullon, 357 Ga. App. at 700 (2). On certiorari review,
    Grullon contends and the State concedes that the Court of Appeals
    erred in making this ruling. We agree.
    The parties do not dispute that the trial court’s jury instruction
    on deliberate ignorance was clearly erroneous.         And, although
    Grullon stated no objection to the charge after it was given – thereby
    forfeiting ordinary appellate review – this does not necessarily
    establish “affirmative waiver” of the error on appeal.             See
    Cheddersingh, 
    290 Ga. at 684
     (2).      To constitute an affirmative
    waiver, the appellant’s argument that the trial court “deviat[ed]
    12
    from a legal rule must have been intentionally relinquished or
    abandoned” by the appellant. 
    Id.
     (punctuation omitted).
    Under the plain error analysis articulated in Kelly, an
    objection is intentionally relinquished or abandoned if it
    is “affirmatively waived.” Applying the standard
    articulated in United States v. Olano, 
    507 U. S. 725
     (113
    SCt 1770, 123 LE2d 508) (1993), we have contrasted such
    a waiver – the intentional relinquishment of a known
    right – with “forfeiture,” which is the mere “failure to
    make the timely assertion of the right.” An affirmative
    waiver may occur, for example, when a defendant
    requests a specific jury instruction but later withdraws
    such request; explicitly requests a jury instruction that he
    later argues on appeal should not have been given; or
    objects to a charge that he later argues on appeal should
    have been given. In such circumstances, the defendant
    has invited the alleged error, and it therefore provides no
    basis for reversal.
    Vasquez v. State, 
    306 Ga. 216
    , 229 (2) (c) (830 SE2d 143) (2019)
    (citations and punctuation omitted).
    Grullon objected to the deliberate ignorance charge at two
    points during trial before the trial court charged the jury. And,
    while he did not object again after the final instructions were given,
    that “does not show that [Grullon] intentionally relinquished” his
    known rights with regard to the deliberate ignorance instruction.
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    Cheddersingh, 290 Ga. at 684 (2) (holding that “the failure to object
    is more appropriately described as a forfeiture of the right”).
    “Generally, counsel’s silence at a juncture when a request for – or
    objection to – a jury instruction might have been made will be
    considered merely a forfeiture for which plain error review remains
    available.” Vasquez, 306 Ga. at 229 (2) (c). While Grullon’s counsel
    did not remain silent, there was also no specific waiver of any
    objections to the deliberate ignorance instruction in particular. See,
    e.g., Collins v. State, 
    308 Ga. 515
    , 519 (2) (842 SE2d 275) (2020)
    (reviewing claim for plain error, but not relying on affirmative
    waiver, where “[a]t the conclusion of the jury charge, the trial court
    asked, ‘Are there any objections to the charge . . . on behalf of the
    defense?’ Appellant’s counsel replied, ‘No, your honor’”); Guajardo v.
    State, 
    290 Ga. 172
    , 175-176 (3) (718 SE2d 292) (2011) (reviewing
    claim for plain error, but not relying on affirmative waiver, where
    “after the trial court recharged the jury, the trial court specifically
    asked counsel if there were ‘any exceptions to the Court’s answer to
    the questions.’    Appellants’ trial counsel answered, ‘No, Your
    14
    Honor’”); Mike v. State, 
    358 Ga. App. 113
    , 114 (1) (853 SE2d 887)
    (2021) (reviewing claim for plain error, but not relying on
    affirmative waiver, where, “[f]ollowing the trial court’s instructions
    to the jury, defense counsel stated she had no objections to the
    charge”).
    Moreover, we discern no tactical reason for Grullon’s trial
    counsel not to object to the deliberate ignorance charge after it was
    given in the final instructions to the jury, particularly because he
    had previously objected to the instruction during trial and been
    informed by the trial court that the charge would be given. See
    Vasquez, 306 Ga. at 230 (2) (c) (“[T]he appellate court can conclude
    that the defendant’s right – or objection – to a particular instruction
    was intentionally relinquished if the appellate court can discern a
    tactical reason on the part of the defense for failing to request (or
    object to, as the case may be) a specific jury instruction.” (Citation
    and punctuation omitted)).
    Additionally, while the Court of Appeals relied on Lee in
    concluding that Grullon waived any claim that the deliberate
    15
    ignorance charge was improper in this case, Lee is distinguishable.
    See Lee, 347 Ga. App. at 512 (2) (b). In Lee, the Court of Appeals
    concluded that the defendant “waived any claim that the trial court
    improperly referenced [a] stipulation in its jury charge” because the
    defendant had previously stipulated that he did not challenge the
    chain of custody with respect to certain evidence presented by the
    State and “affirmatively stated that he had no objection to a
    stipulation charge as to the chain of custody.” Id. Here, Grullon
    never affirmatively stated that he had no objection to the specific
    deliberate ignorance charge he now challenges, and indeed he raised
    an objection to that charge earlier at trial.
    Because Grullon’s claim of error was not affirmatively waived
    and survives the first step of plain error review, the Court of Appeals
    must now consider other parts of the plain error analysis, in
    particular whether the error that the State has conceded probably
    affected the outcome of the proceedings. See Kelly, 
    290 Ga. at 33
     (2)
    (a) (holding that “the error must have affected the appellant’s
    substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must
    16
    demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court
    proceedings”). Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment
    of the Court of Appeals concluding that there was affirmative waiver
    and remand the case for the court to consider other elements of plain
    error review. See 
    id.
    Judgment reversed in part and case remanded. All the Justices
    concur.
    17