Brown v. State ( 2014 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 22, 2014
S14A0901. BROWN v. THE STATE.
HUNSTEIN, Justice.
Appellant Tyrone Vincent Brown was convicted by a jury of murder and
related offenses for the March 20, 2006 shooting deaths of Stanley Brown and
Norris Degree. Appellant appeals the denial of his amended motion for new
trial, contending that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress.
Finding no error, we affirm.1
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On March 28, 2007, a Clayton County grand jury indicted Appellant, along
with co-defendants Kevin Michael Brewington and Gary Hakeem Brown, each with
two counts of malice murder, four counts of felony murder, armed robbery, two
counts of aggravated assault, two counts of possession of a weapon during the
commission of a crime, discharge of a firearm near a highway, and discharge of a
firearm on the property of another. The grand jury also charged Appellant with
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Brewington and Gary Brown were
initially tried before a jury from November 16-24, 2009, and Appellant's trial was
severed from that of his co-defendants. The trial of Brewington and Gary Brown
resulted in mistrial due to a hung jury. Thereafter, during June 13-22, 2011,
Appellant and his co-defendants were tried before a jury. On June 22, 2011, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts as to Appellant, except that for possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, which was nolle prossed. The court declared a
mistrial on all counts as to co-defendants Brewington and Gary Brown. On June 24,
2011, the court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for the malice murder of
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence
adduced at trial established as follows. On March 20, 2006, victim Norris
Degree told his wife he was leaving their apartment to pick up victim Stanley
Brown from work. Later that evening, Degree's wife, who was waiting for him
at their apartment, heard gunshots in the distance. Moments later, Degree
abruptly entered his apartment and told his wife to call for an ambulance
because he and Stanley Brown had been shot. Through his wife, Degree relayed
to the 911 operator that he and Stanley Brown had been shot by three black men
wearing all black clothing and that he did not know the identities of the men.
A Clayton County police officer responded to the 911 call and found Stanley
Brown dead on the ground outside an apartment. The officer found Degree lying
in the doorway of an apartment surrounded by his wife and three children and
Stanley Brown; a consecutive life term for the malice murder of Norris Degree; a
concurrent 20-year term for armed robbery; two consecutive five-year terms, to be
served concurrently with each other, for the weapons possession counts; and a 12-
month term, suspended based on time served, for each count of discharge of a weapon
near a highway and discharge of a weapon on the property of another. The remaining
counts merged or were vacated as a matter of law. Appellant filed a motion for new
trial on June 28, 2011, which was amended on October 9, 2012. The trial court held
a hearing on Appellant’s motion for new trial on October 31, 2012, and denied the
motion in an order entered November 2, 2012. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on
November 19, 2012. The appeal was docketed to the April 2014 term of this Court
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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struggling to breathe. Degree died moments later.
Shannon Dean, who lived in same apartment complex as Degree, testified
at trial that she knew Appellant, and on the evening of the shooting, all three
co-defendants came to her apartment looking for marijuana, with Appellant
carrying a gun. Shortly after the three men left her apartment, she heard six or
seven gunshots in succession. Dean testified that she went outside to a balcony
and saw all three co-defendants shooting the two victims, who were on their
knees and unarmed. Dean made direct eye contact with Appellant and then ran
into her apartment, where she stayed until police arrived. Dean later identified
all three co-defendants in photographic lineups as well as at trial.
On March 23, 2006, local and federal law enforcement officials converged
on apartment Z1 at the same apartment complex where the shootings had
occurred to serve a fugitive arrest warrant on Brewington. Officers found
Brewington, Appellant, and a female in apartment Z1 and placed Brewington
and Appellant in custody. Officers conducted a security sweep of apartment Z1,
and based on their observations, officers applied for both a federal and state
search warrant. Pursuant to these search warrants, officers discovered several
firearms and ammunition.
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A forensic pathologist determined that Stanley Brown died of multiple
gunshot wounds, including wounds to his chest and heart, and Degree died of
a gunshot wound to his back, which pierced his lung. Bullet fragments
recovered from each of the victims were fired from a Taurus nine millimeter
pistol, and other bullet fragments recovered solely from victim Stanley Brown
were fired from a Smith and Wesson .38 caliber revolver and a Rossi .38 special
revolver. Among the firearms found in apartment Z1 on March 23 were a
Taurus nine millimeter pistol, a Smith and Wesson .38 caliber revolver, and a
Rossi .38 special revolver.
1. Though Appellant has not enumerated the general grounds, we find
that the evidence as summarized above was sufficient to enable a rational trier
of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of the
crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); see also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (1) (673
SE2d 223) (2009) (“‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the
witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.’”)
(citation omitted).
2. Prior to trial, the court denied Appellant’s motions to suppress all
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evidence allegedly illegally obtained by law enforcement agents during the
search of apartment Z1 on March 23. On appeal, Appellant argues the court
erroneously denied his motions to suppress because the State failed to prove that
the arrest warrant for Brewington existed and failed to show that the protective
sweep of apartment Z1, which led to the search warrants, was legally
permissible. As a result, Appellant contends that all of the evidence obtained
through the execution of the search warrants should have been excluded.
“On appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, ‘the trial court's
findings on disputed facts will be upheld unless clearly erroneous, and its
application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review.’”
Registe v. State, 292 Ga. 154, 155-156 (734 SE2d 19) (2012). Upon review, we
consider both the transcript of the hearing on Appellant’s motions to suppress
as well as the trial transcript. See White v. State, 263 Ga. 94 (5) (428 SE2d 789)
(1993).
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV; see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII.
“In order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment [against
unreasonable search and seizure], a defendant must demonstrate that
he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched,
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and that his expectation is reasonable . . . .” A person has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her home and may have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in a house in which the person
is an overnight guest; however, “one who is merely present with the
consent of the householder may not [claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment].”
Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 17, 21 (3) (663 SE2d 142) (2008) (citations omitted)
(brackets in original) (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 89-90 (119
SCt 469, 142 LE2d 373) (1998)). “A person who is aggrieved by an illegal
search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured
by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth
Amendment rights infringed.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (II) (A) (99
SCt 421, 58 LE2d 387 (1978)). “‘The burden is on the defendant to show that
he has standing to contest the alleged violation, i.e., that he has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the premises searched.’” State v. Carter, 299 Ga. App.
3, 4 (681 SE2d 688) (2009).
The evidence shows that apartment Z1 was leased to a third party, and
there was no evidence of how long Appellant had been in the apartment or
whether he was an overnight guest.2 There was also no evidence of any of
2
The affidavit prepared by one of the officers in support of his application for
a search warrant states that the female found in apartment Z1 told the officer that
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Appellant’s personal belongings in the apartment. The only possible exception
is that one officer testified that he found “paperwork” in the apartment with
Appellant’s name on it, but the officer did not elaborate further. There was no
evidence presented to show what this paperwork consisted of and why it was at
the apartment. The mere presence of miscellaneous papers bearing Appellant’s
name, without any further evidence connecting Appellant to the apartment, is
insufficient to create a legitimate expectation of privacy for Appellant to contest
the search. Cf. Moses v. State, ___ Ga. App. ___, 760 SE2d 217 (2) (a) (2014)
(the defendant had an expectation of privacy in the house which he owned,
where he received mail, and where he kept personal property including
identification and personal papers). We find that Appellant has not met his
burden to demonstrate that he had any legitimate expectation of privacy in
apartment Z1, and therefore, he may not claim the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to challenge the search. See State v. Carter, 305 Ga. App. 814 (1)
(701 SE2d 209) (2010) (no legitimate expectation of privacy to contest a search
where there was no evidence of how long the defendants had been at the house,
Appellant lived in the apartment. This is inadmissible hearsay. See former OCGA
§ 24-3-1, now codified at OCGA § 24-8-801 under the new Georgia Evidence Code.
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that the renter had authorized defendants to be there, or that they were overnight
guests); Todd v. State, 275 Ga. App. 459 (1) (620 SE2d 666) (2005) (no
legitimate expectation of privacy where the defendant conceded that the mobile
home was owned by a friend and he failed to come forward with any evidence
to suggest that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the mobile home).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motions to
suppress.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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