Jackson v. State ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 1, 2022
S22A0399. JACKSON v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
A Richmond County jury found Andre Jackson guilty of the
armed robbery of Joseph Williams. A different Richmond County
jury found Jackson guilty of felony murder predicated on the armed
robbery of L. V. Wilson and of the murder of Jquanda Johnson by
stabbing her with a knife. 1 On appeal, Jackson contends that, in the
1Williams was robbed on June 21, 2010. L. V. Wilson was killed on June
28, 2010, and Johnson was killed on or about June 30, 2010. On October 26,
2010, a Richmond County grand jury returned a 13-count indictment including
the Williams robbery, the Wilson and Johnson murders, and an armed robbery
of a fourth victim. Jackson filed a motion to sever counts concerning each of
the four victims from all the other counts for trial. On September 22, 2013, the
trial court granted Jackson’s motion to sever in part, as to the counts arising
from the Williams robbery; the trial court reserved ruling as to the severance
of the remaining counts. At a trial that ended on September 25, 2013, a jury
heard Count 1 (armed robbery of Williams), Count 2 (burglary of Williams’s
home), and Count 3 (possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime).
That jury found Jackson guilty on Counts 1, 2, and 3. On September 25, 2013,
the trial court sentenced Jackson to life in prison without parole on Count 1,
20 years in prison on Count 2, and five years in prison on Count 3. At the
State’s request, the trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi as to Count
12 (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon on the date of the Williams
robbery). Jackson filed a motion for new trial on October 3, 2013.
On April 13, 2015, Jackson filed a second motion to sever the trials of the
Wilson murder, the Johnson murder, and the armed robbery against the fourth
victim, an issue on which the trial court reserved ruling in its September 22,
2013 order. On November 21, 2016, the trial court entered an order on several
pending pretrial motions, ruling that Jackson’s motion to sever “was, in effect,
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, in that the State indicated its
intention to proceed to trial only on Counts 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, with Counts
1, 2, 3, and 12 [the Williams robbery counts] having already been tried and
Counts 4, 5, and 13 to be offered for dismissal prior to trial.” On June 19, 2017,
the trial court granted the State’s request for an order of nolle prosequi as to
the counts concerning the fourth victim (Counts 4 and 5), on the basis that the
alleged victim, Rodney Tucker, gave a false name (Chris Allen Tucker) when
he reported the incident to the sheriff’s office. The trial court granted Jackson’s
motion to proceed pro se.
At a trial that ended on August 4, 2017, a jury heard Count 6 (malice
murder of Wilson), Count 7 (felony murder of Wilson predicated on armed
robbery), Count 8 (possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime),
Count 9 (malice murder of Johnson), Count 10 (felony murder predicated on
aggravated assault of Johnson), and Count 11 (possession of a knife during the
commission of a crime). The State did not submit Count 13, possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon on the date of the Johnson murder, to the jury.
The jury found Jackson guilty on Counts 7, 9, 10, and 11 and not guilty on
Counts 6 and 8. Count 10 was vacated by operation of law, and the trial court
entered an order of nolle prosequi as to Count 13. On August 4, 2017, the trial
court sentenced Jackson to life in prison without parole on Count 9 and five
years in prison on Count 11, for an aggregate sentence from both trials of life
without parole plus 25 years in prison. Jackson filed a timely motion for new
trial. On July 18 and August 19, 2019, Jackson filed amended motions for new
trial, which included matters pertaining to both trials.
Following a combined hearing on the 2013 motion for new trial from the
first trial, the 2017 motion for new trial from the second trial, and the
amendments, the trial court denied the motions for new trial in a single order
on June 24, 2021. Jackson filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was
docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2021 and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.
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Williams robbery trial, the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion in limine to exclude an out-of-court statement
made by Johnson in the days between the robbery and her death. In
addition, Jackson contends that, in the murder trial, the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever the offenses
charged for the Wilson murder from the offenses charged for the
Johnson murder. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
The evidence in the robbery trial showed the following. In June
2010, Jackson and Johnson were in a romantic relationship.
Williams, who was known as “Little Joe,” agreed to repair the
transmission of Johnson’s car for $300; she paid him $100 in
advance. After Williams removed the transmission, he developed
cardiovascular problems that required a stent; he was instructed not
to lift anything heavy. On June 20, Johnson went to Williams’s
house to ask about the car, and he told her he would not be able to
put the car back together. Williams asked her to leave and called the
police when she refused.
Williams testified that, the next day, Jackson knocked on his
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door and asked for “Joe.” Williams answered the door and told
Jackson, whom he did not know, that he was not able to repair
Johnson’s car at that time. As Williams attempted to close the door,
Jackson kicked the door, splitting the wood around the strike plate;
forced his way inside; “flash[ed]” a handgun; told Williams to get on
the floor; put the gun to Williams’s head; and demanded his money.
Williams’s mother, Mildred Burns, entered the room, and Jackson,
still brandishing the gun, told her, “I know you [have] some money;
give me $150 to let [Williams] live.” Jackson took a bag containing
Williams’s money and identification. Williams asked for his
identification back, and Jackson returned it. Then Jackson ran
outside and drove away. Williams saw a woman in the car. He
testified that he got a good look at Jackson’s face during the robbery,
and he identified Jackson as the robber. Burns also testified about
the robbery and about Johnson’s previous visit to ask about her car.
Burns identified Jackson in court, stating that she had gotten a good
look at the man who broke into their home and took Williams’s
money at gunpoint and was “sure” that Jackson was that man.
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Porchia Littleton testified that she and Johnson had been close
friends since childhood. In May 2010, Johnson’s car was not running
and “Joe” was going to repair it. Littleton went with Johnson once
to ask Williams about the car. Johnson and Jackson visited
Littleton’s home on June 21. Shortly after they left, police officers
arrived and wanted to search the house. The officers refused to say
who they were looking for, so Littleton did not admit them. Later
that week, Johnson and Jackson visited again. During that visit,
while Jackson was in another room, Littleton told Johnson about the
police visit, and Johnson said she probably knew why the police went
to the house: because she and Jackson “went over to Joe’s house to
talk about the car” and to “shake Joe up” and “scare him,” and
“[Jackson] stuck [Williams] up. . . . [Johnson] said she was in the
car, and the next thing she knew, she looked up and [Jackson] had
a gun to [Williams].” Littleton testified that Johnson “was freaked
out a little bit when she explained it” to Littleton, and whispered it
so Jackson could not hear, and that robbing Williams “was not what
the plan was.” Littleton testified that, before Johnson’s death, she
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had seen Jackson with a black handgun “pretty often.” Littleton
identified Jackson at trial.
In the murder trial, the evidence showed the following. Several
witnesses testified that, in June 2010, Jackson was a drug dealer.
Rodney Tucker testified that, on June 25, he traveled to Augusta to
visit Nekea Johnson, Johnson’s younger sister. That day, Tucker
gave Jackson some cocaine to sell over the weekend, and Jackson
agreed to pay him on Monday, June 28. On the morning of June 28,
Tucker and Nekea drove to Johnson’s residence to meet with
Jackson and get the money. Tucker testified that, when he got out
of the car, Jackson abruptly pulled a gun on him and demanded,
“give me my money.” Tucker argued that he did not owe Jackson
money – rather, Jackson owed him money. From the look in
Jackson’s eyes, Tucker believed that Jackson was going to shoot
him. Just then, Tucker testified, Johnson put her arm around
Tucker’s shoulder. He testified, “I believe that’s when she saved my
life.” Nekea also testified that Jackson pulled a gun on Tucker as
soon as they arrived. Nekea testified that Tucker pulled money from
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his pocket and dropped it, saying, “you can have the money, just
don’t kill me.” Nekea testified that her sister ran toward Jackson,
“trying to stop it,” and “he kicked her, and she fell back.” Tucker and
Nekea fled and went to the sheriff’s office and reported the robbery.
Tucker gave his brother’s name, Chris Allen Tucker, rather than his
own when reporting the incident to the sheriff’s office.
Marcus Tyler testified that he and Jackson sometimes pooled
their money and bought drugs from Wilson to resell. Tyler testified
that he and Jackson bought drugs to resell from Wilson on June 23
or 24. Tyler testified that the drugs were not of acceptable quality,
and Jackson was going to get his and Tyler’s money back. Jackson
called Tyler on June 28 and asked him to meet him at Wilson’s
house. When Tyler arrived, he walked over to a shed where Wilson
conducted drug business, and he found Jackson standing over
Wilson and hitting him in the head. Tyler testified that he asked
what was going on. Jackson turned around, pointed a gun at Tyler,
and asked him, “are you with me or against me?” And then Jackson
cut Wilson’s throat with a knife. Tyler fled. At approximately noon
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on June 28, a neighbor found Wilson on her front porch, with his
throat slashed, bleeding and unconscious. She called 911. An
autopsy showed that Wilson died from multiple sharp-force injuries
that severed the major arteries in his neck.
Tyler testified that, later on the day that Jackson cut Wilson’s
throat, Tyler answered a cell phone on Jackson’s porch. Tyler
testified that it was Johnson calling, and she said, “you[’re] go[ing]
to jail; you robbed my brother-in-law.” After Tyler informed Johnson
that she was speaking to him, not to Jackson, she told him that the
police were coming. That evening or the next, Jackson asked Tyler
to drop him off at Johnson’s place. Jackson said he was going to “fix
that b**ch.” Tyler testified that Jackson returned home about an
hour later, took a shower, and then went out to the backyard and
burned some clothes.
Reginald Hudson, Johnson’s estranged husband, testified that,
on the morning of June 28, Johnson told him and Nekea that
Jackson had robbed Nekea’s boyfriend the previous evening. Hudson
testified that Johnson felt like she needed protection, because
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Jackson had a key to her apartment, and that Johnson called
someone she knew who had an “assault rifle” and tried to get that
gun. Nekea testified that, on the evening of June 28, Johnson went
to Nekea’s house and told her that she did not have “anything to do
with” the robbery of Tucker and that she was going to “get” Jackson.
Mariah Federick testified that she often drove Jackson and Tyler
around for drug sales. On June 29, Federick heard Jackson arguing
with Johnson on a phone call, after which he said that he was going
to “have to kill this b**ch.”
Littleton testified that Johnson told her about witnessing the
robbery of Tucker on the day it happened, June 28, and Johnson said
that she was worried about Jackson, who she thought was “on
something” and acting “crazy.” Littleton testified that Jackson sent
Johnson threatening messages that day, saying that he knew where
she was and calling her a “sitting duck.” In the days following,
Littleton called and texted Johnson repeatedly to check on her, but
Johnson did not answer. On the morning of June 30, Littleton drove
by Johnson’s residence and saw Jackson walking in the yard and
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circling the building.
On July 2, after several days without Johnson answering her
phone, Nekea and her mother, Patrice Knox, drove to Johnson’s
apartment and knocked on the door without response. Knox called
the rental office and asked that they send someone over to open the
door. The police came, found no sign of forced entry, entered the
apartment, and found Johnson lying dead in a bedroom. The broken-
off blade of a knife was embedded in her chest. An autopsy
performed on July 3 indicated that Johnson died from multiple stab
wounds to her chest, face, left arm, and left shoulder that penetrated
her heart and lungs and caused massive bleeding. Johnson died,
according to the medical examiner, a least “a couple of days” before
the autopsy, but the time of death could not be further specified.
Crime scene investigators found a belt with an unusual “metal skull”
buckle lying in a pool of blood beside Johnson’s body. No blood was
on top of the buckle, indicating that the belt was dropped there after
the pool of blood had formed. Nekea testified that she had previously
seen Jackson wearing that belt buckle.
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1. Jackson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion in limine during the robbery trial to exclude
testimony by Littlejohn that Johnson told her that she and Jackson
went to Williams’s house to talk about her car and “shake [Williams]
up” and “[Jackson] stuck [Williams] up.” The State characterized
Johnson’s out-of-court statement as implicating herself in the armed
robbery and therefore as a “statement against interest” by an
unavailable declarant under OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (3) and argued
that it was sufficiently corroborated to be admissible under that
Code provision.
Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting Johnson’s out-of-court statement under
OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (3), any such error was harmless. “[T]he
erroneous admission of hearsay is harmless where substantial,
cumulative, legally admissible evidence of the same fact is
introduced.” Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 336 (2) (806 SE2d 573)
(2017). See also Lopez v. State, 311 Ga. 269, 276 (2) (b) (857 SE2d
467) (2021) (same). Because Johnson’s statement was cumulative of
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other legally admissible and substantial evidence that Jackson
robbed Williams, principally Williams’s and Burns’s eyewitness
testimony and definite in-court identifications, any error in the trial
court’s ruling was harmless. See Lopez, 311 Ga. at 276 (2) (b);
Anglin, 302 Ga. at 335-336 (2).
2. Jackson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion in the murder trial to sever the offenses in the
stabbing death of Wilson from the offenses in the stabbing death of
Johnson, which, he argues, were joined solely because they were of
a similar nature and were all committed in the last week of June
2010.2
2 The State contends that Jackson waived appellate review of this issue,
noting that, in the September 22, 2013 order entered prior to the trial on the
Williams robbery counts, the trial court reserved ruling as to the severance of
the remaining counts, and averring that, prior to the second trial, Jackson “did
not renew this motion or seek a final order from the trial court on the severance
of the murder counts.” The record shows otherwise. As recited in footnote 1,
supra, Jackson filed a second motion to sever on April 13, 2015, again asking
that the counts involving Wilson as a victim be tried separately from all other
counts and that the counts involving Johnson as a victim be tried separately
from all other counts. On November 21, 2016, the trial court entered an order
on several pretrial motions, ruling that Jackson’s motion to sever “was, in
effect, GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, in that the State
indicated its intention to proceed to trial only on Counts 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11,
12
“Where offenses are joined in a single indictment, a defendant
has a right to severance where the offenses are joined solely on the
ground that they are of the same or similar character because of the
great risk of prejudice from a joint disposition of unrelated charges.”
Moon v. State, 312 Ga. 31, 59 (5) (860 SE2d 519) (2021) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
If severance is not mandatory, it is nevertheless
incumbent upon the trial court to determine whether
severance was necessary to achieve a fair determination
of the defendant’s guilt or innocence as to each offense. To
make that determination, the court should consider
whether in view of the number of offenses charged and
the complexity of the evidence to be offered, the trier of
fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the
law intelligently as to each offense.
Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). “Severance is generally not
warranted where the crimes charged occurred over the same period
of time and stem from a course of continuing conduct.” Carson v.
State, 308 Ga. 761, 765 (2) (a) (843 SE2d 421) (2020) (citation
omitted). Where joinder “is based upon the same conduct or on a
with Counts 1, 2, 3, and 12 [the Williams robbery counts] having already been
tried and Counts 4, 5, and 13 to be offered for dismissal prior to trial.”
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series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single
scheme or plan, severance lies within the sound discretion of the
trial judge since the facts in each case are likely to be unique.” Id. at
764-765 (2) (a) (citation omitted).
In this case, the evidence authorized the trial court to hold
that, beginning on the morning of June 28 and continuing for
another few days, Jackson engaged in a continuing course of
criminal violence relating to his involvement in the drug trade: he
robbed Tucker, Johnson’s sister’s boyfriend, who had supplied
Jackson with drugs two days earlier, and he beat Wilson, who had
recently supplied Jackson with poor quality drugs, and slashed his
throat. Jackson also threatened Johnson, who witnessed the robbery
of Tucker and even tried to intervene, and told Johnson she was “a
sitting duck.” Then he killed her by stabbing her repeatedly. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson’s motion
to sever the offenses for trial. See Moon, 312 Ga. at 59-60 (5) (Count
for attempting to obtain a firearm by a convicted felon and murder
counts related to shooting death of victims were based on a series of
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connected acts and occurred closely in time with each other, and the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s
motion to sever the offenses for trial.); Carson, 308 Ga. at 765-766
(2) (a) (The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
defendant’s motion to sever, where the robbery and battery of one
victim and the murder of a second victim occurred only a few blocks
apart and within a short period of time, and the defendant’s arrest
for the robbery led to DNA testing of his clothes and the
identification of the defendant as the second victim’s assailant.);
Doleman v. State, 304 Ga. 740, 744-745 (3) (822 SE2d 223) (2018)
(The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
defendant’s motion to sever offenses for trial where the offenses
arose from a crime spree consisting of an eight-week period during
which the defendant and his co-defendants committed a series of
robberies and assaults using the same weapons and stolen vehicles
from previous offenses.); Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 844 (15) (691
SE2d 854) (2010) (The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the defendant’s motion to sever offenses for trial arising out
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of a crime spree committed on a single night in the same
neighborhood.).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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