Rayton v. State ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 22, 2022
S22A0441. RAYTON v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
A Fulton County jury found Joe Rayton guilty of murder in the
shooting death of Antonio Ladson.1 Rayton contends that the trial
court erred by refusing his request for a jury instruction on
voluntary manslaughter. Additionally, Rayton contends that he was
The shooting occurred on May 20, 2016. On March 31, 2017, a Fulton
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County grand jury indicted Rayton, charging him with malice murder (Count
1); felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2); felony murder
predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Counts 3 and 4);
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 5); possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (Count 6); possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon (Count 7); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
during the commission of a felony (Count 8). At a trial that ended on May 1,
2019, the jury found Rayton guilty on all counts. On May 22, 2019, the trial
court sentenced Rayton to serve life in prison without parole on Count 1, and
15 years in prison on Count 8. Counts 2, 3, and 4 were vacated by operation of
law, and the remaining counts merged for purposes of sentencing. Rayton filed
a timely motion for new trial, which he amended on December 1, 2020, and on
August 30, 2021. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on October
19, 2021. Rayton filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in
this Court to the April 2022 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel’s objection
to a jury instruction requested by the State regarding accomplice
corroboration and by counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s
statement during closing argument that Rayton’s own testimony
admitting that he shot Ladson during an attempted drug deal
precluded a self-defense verdict. For the reasons explained below,
we affirm.
Pertinent to Rayton’s arguments on appeal, the evidence
presented at trial showed the following. Joe Adams, Rayton’s son,
testified as follows. In early May 2016, Ladson accused Adams of
stealing about $100 to $125 worth of drugs from a house where
Ladson and his partner, Sacarri Dodson, sold drugs. Ladson
repeatedly called Adams and left voice messages and sent text
messages threatening to kill his family. In those messages, Ladson
said that he knew where Adams, Rayton, Adams’s aunt, and his
grandmother lived and where Rayton’s wife, Wendy, worked.
Ladson also told Adams that he had “shot up” Rayton’s house.
Adams showed the texts to Rayton and to Wendy. On May 19,
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Ladson encountered Rayton and beat him up. At about 1:00 a.m. on
May 20, Adams, Rayton, and Darrius Winfield travelled from
Rayton’s home in Ellenwood to Elmwood Road in Atlanta, where
Rayton intended to buy cocaine as he had done there before. Winfield
drove Rayton’s car; Rayton sat in the front and directed Winfield
where to go; Adams sat behind Rayton. Rayton told Adams he
wanted to “stop and go see Corey [Smith].” When they reached
Elmwood Road, Rayton told Winfield to stop behind a red car parked
on the side of the road that Rayton said was Smith’s car. Rayton
walked from his car to the driver’s window of the red car, taking a
jar of marijuana, and called out, “Corey, I got something for you.”
When Rayton looked in the window, he frowned. Rayton leaned on
the car and started talking to Ladson, whom he addressed as “Tony”
and who was sitting in the driver’s seat. After some conversation,
they started to argue. Rayton then opened the jar and showed
Ladson the marijuana. Ladson reached down in his car “like he was
grabbing something.” Rayton jumped back, threw the jar of
marijuana into Ladson’s car, and pulled a gun out of his pocket.
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Rayton fired five or six times in Ladson’s direction. Rayton started
crying, looked to the sky, and said, “I’m sorry. I f***ed up.” Winfield,
Rayton, and Adams left in Rayton’s car. Later that morning, Adams
gave the gun Rayton used to shoot Ladson to Wendy and told her to
throw it away.
Rayton testified as follows. He read the May 2016 text
messages from Ladson to Adams about Adams’s supposed debt for
stealing drugs from Ladson, messages that Rayton took as
threatening to him and his family. In the following days, Rayton
encountered Ladson, who told him, “I shot your house up.” On May
19, Rayton again encountered Ladson, who handed Rayton a phone,
made him dial his mother’s number, took the phone when she was
on the line, and threatened to kill her or Rayton if he did not get the
money Adams owed him. Before these events, Ladson had
threatened Rayton with a gun two times. Once, Ladson drove
Rayton’s car without permission, and, after Rayton threatened to
call the police if he did not return it, Ladson pointed a gun at Rayton
and said he would kill Rayton if Rayton turned him in to the police.
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The second time, Rayton witnessed an incident when Ladson
claimed a woman had his drugs, shot at her foot, hit her repeatedly
with his pistol, and put the pistol in her mouth. Rayton testified that
he tried to intervene, and Ladson told Rayton to stay out of his
business and pointed his gun at him.
Rayton testified about shooting Ladson as follows. At about
1:00 a.m. on May 20, 2016, he asked Adams and Winfield to go with
him to Elmwood Road, where he had been purchasing drugs for
several years, so he could purchase cocaine from Ladson’s cousin,
Corey Smith. On Elmwood Road, they parked behind a red and black
car he believed to be Smith’s “red and black Monte Carlo Impala.”
While Winfield and Adams stayed in the car, Rayton walked up to
the driver’s side of the Impala calling out “Corey” and “Nephew;” he
had Wendy’s pistol in his pocket and was holding a jar of marijuana
that he intended to exchange for cocaine. He also had money in his
pocket. The driver of the Impala lowered the window, and, when
Rayton saw that it was Ladson and not Smith, his “heart . . .
dropped,” and he froze in fear. Ladson, who was having a
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conversation on his cell phone, told the other person to hold on and
put the phone in his lap. Ladson said to Rayton, “You got my
motherf***ing money? Didn’t I tell you earlier, if you ain’t got my
motherf***ing money, I’m going to kill you?” Ladson snatched the
jar of marijuana out of Rayton’s hand, and repeated his demand for
money and his threat. After Rayton told Ladson he had no money,
Ladson “reached up under the seat.” Because Ladson had just
threatened to kill Rayton and had threatened his family in the
previous weeks, because he had seen Ladson “do bodily harm to
people,” and because he knew that Ladson “carr[ied] a gun on him
at all times,” Rayton was so afraid for his life that he urinated on
himself. Rayton reached into his pocket for his pistol, just as Ladson
“came up” with “an object in his hand,” “something black,” and
Rayton “blanked” and “just started shooting.” In his testimony,
Rayton repeated many times that his life was in danger and that he
was scared when he started shooting Ladson. After the shooting,
Rayton left with Adams and Winfield, and returned to Rayton’s
house. Rayton decided to spend the night in a hotel, because he was
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afraid Ladson’s cousin and other fellow gang members “were going
to come and kill [him].”
Winfield testified that he drove Rayton’s car that night; he
stopped, as instructed, behind a red car; Rayton got out, holding a
jar half full of loose marijuana, exchanged a few words with the man
sitting in the red car, reached into the car with the jar of marijuana
in what looked to be part of a drug transaction, “and then [Rayton]
shot the man.” Shandra Atkins testified that, in May 2016, she was
occasionally staying at Winfield’s home, along with Adams and his
sister. Before the shooting, Atkins was aware that Ladson was
making threats to Rayton’s family “because [Rayton] owed [Ladson]
some money for some powder” after Adams robbed the “trap spot”
where Ladson sold drugs and where Rayton sometimes bought
drugs. Adams told Atkins that Rayton told him that “[Rayton] was
going to have to end up killing [Ladson] . . . because “[Rayton] was
in fear [for] his family and his livelihood [from] the threats that were
being made.” In the weeks after the shooting, Adams told her what
happened to Ladson. Adams said that, on the night of the shooting,
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Winfield drove Rayton and Adams, and Rayton had a jar of
marijuana that he was supposed to give Ladson. According to
Adams, Rayton “basically threw the jar to [Ladson] . . . to distract
him” and “that is when he shot and killed him” using a gun that
belonged to Wendy.
Wendy testified that Adams handed her gun to her on the
morning of the shooting and told her to get rid of it. She testified
that she gave the gun to a friend, who gave it to the lead detective
in the Ladson murder investigation. A firearms examiner testified
that Wendy’s gun, a Taurus .40-caliber pistol, had fired three .40-
caliber cartridge cases and two .40-caliber bullets that investigators
had collected from in and around the car in which Ladson was shot.
The detective testified that other evidence collected from that car, a
red Impala, included a glass jar, loose marijuana scattered over the
back seat, cocaine packaged for sale, and a quantity of cash. A
medical examiner testified that Ladson died from gunshot wounds
to the torso.
1. Rayton contends that the trial court erred by refusing his
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request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser
offense of murder. His contention fails because the evidence did not
warrant such an instruction.
Voluntary manslaughter is the killing of another person under
circumstances that would otherwise be murder when the killer
acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and
irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation
sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person;
however, if there should have been an interval between
the provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of
reason and humanity to be heard, of which the jury in all
cases shall be the judge, the killing shall be attributed to
deliberate revenge and be punished as murder.
OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). “A trial court is required to give a requested
charge on voluntary manslaughter if there is slight evidence of the
elements of OCGA § 16-5-2 (a).” Hatney v. State, 308 Ga. 438, 441
(2) (841 SE2d 702) (2020). “A charge on voluntary manslaughter is
not available to a defendant whose own statement unequivocally
shows” that he used force against the victim “simply in an attempt
to defend himself” and when no other evidence shows that, when the
killing occurred, the defendant was “angered or impassioned” by
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provocative conduct by the victim. Tarpley v. State, 298 Ga. 442, 445
(3) (a) (782 SE2d 642) (2016) (citations omitted). See also Collins v.
State, 312 Ga. 727, 739 (6) (864 SE2d 85) (2021) (“To warrant a jury
charge on voluntary manslaughter, there must be at least slight
evidence that the accused was so influenced and excited that he
reacted passionately rather than simply in an attempt to defend
himself.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Smith v. State, 296
Ga. 731, 737 (3) (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (“[N]either fear that someone
is going to pull a gun nor fighting are the types of provocation which
demand a voluntary manslaughter charge.”). “Whether the
defendant presented any evidence of provocation sufficient to excite
the passions of a reasonable person is a question of law.” Davenport
v. State, 311 Ga. 667, 672 (3) (859 SE2d 52) (2021).
Here, Rayton argues that his trial testimony supported not
only a self-defense theory but, alternatively, the theory that
Ladson’s threatening words just before the shooting, combined with
his previous violent conduct that Rayton had witnessed and
Ladson’s terror campaign against Rayton and Rayton’s family,
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amounted to a serious provocation that caused Rayton to react
passionately. To that end, Rayton points to his testimony that
Ladson had previously stolen his car, shot at his home, pointed a
gun at him, threatened to kill him, threatened to kill his close family
members, physically assaulted him the previous day, and, when he
unexpectedly encountered Ladson in the middle of the night,
continued to threaten to kill him and his family. But Rayton never
testified that he was angry or inflamed by Ladson’s conduct just
before the shooting — only that he was scared and was defending
himself (as well as his family). And there was no other evidence that
the shooting was the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible
passion. Rayton has failed to point to even slight evidence that he
reacted passionately to Ladson’s conduct rather than simply in an
attempt to defend himself. Consequently, the trial court did not err
in refusing to give a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter. See
Collins, 312 Ga. at 739-740 (6) (There was not even slight evidence
to support a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter where the
defendant testified that the victim called him a “motherf***er” to his
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face, threatened to kill him, and pulled a handgun on him, but the
defendant “never testified that he was angry or mad or that he had
any other response showing he might have reacted passionately —
only that he was scared and was defending himself (as well as [his
companion]).”); Beck v. State, 310 Ga. 491, 496-497 (2) (852 SE2d
535) (2020) (There was not even slight evidence to support a jury
instruction on voluntary manslaughter where the defendant
testified that he was “just scared” and acting in defense of himself,
his girlfriend, and her family when he shot the victim, even where
there was evidence that the defendant knew the victim to carry a
gun, that the victim had threatened the defendant days prior to the
shooting, and that the defendant believed the victim was about to
shoot or strike the defendant’s girlfriend just before the defendant
shot him.); Tarpley, 298 Ga. at 444-445 (3) (a) (There was not even
slight evidence to support a jury instruction on voluntary
manslaughter where the defendant’s statements and testimony did
“not indicate that he killed [the victim] out of some irresistible
passion — whatever the source of that passion — but, instead, that
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the killing occurred because [the defendant] was ‘very afraid’ of [the
victim] that night.”).
2. Rayton contends that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel because his attorney objected to the State’s requested jury
instruction that an accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated and
failed to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, which
“requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687
(III) (B) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). The defendant must
also show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,
which requires showing that “there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. at 694 (III) (B). “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. If an appellant fails to show either deficiency or
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prejudice, this Court need not examine the other prong of the
Strickland test. See Hooper v. State, 313 Ga. 451, 455 (1) (870 SE2d
391, 396) (2022).
(a) Rayton contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by objecting to the State’s requested jury instruction that
an accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated.2 At the hearing on
Rayton’s motion for a new trial, his trial counsel testified that he did
not want that instruction given because, in the defense’s framing of
the evidence, there was no intent to travel to Atlanta to kill Ladson
and no plan or conspiracy, and, therefore, there were no accomplices.
“Decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the
basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently
unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such
a course.” Thomas v. State, 311 Ga. 706, 714 (2) (a) (859 SE2d 14)
2 See OCGA § 24-14-8 (In “felony cases where the only witness is an
accomplice, the testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient.
Nevertheless, corroborating circumstances may dispense with the necessity for
the testimony of a second witness[.]”). The State requested the pattern
instruction. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases,
§ 1.31.92 (4th ed., 2022).
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(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). In particular, the decision
about “which jury charges to request [is a] classic matter[ ] of trial
strategy[.]” Id. (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, defense
counsel’s decision to object to the accomplice charge was consistent
with an objectively reasonable defense strategy of avoiding labeling
Adams, who was not charged with any crime in connection with the
shooting, as an accomplice, because identifying Adams as an
accomplice would have undermined Rayton’s claim that he was
surprised to encounter Ladson that night. Because Rayton has not
shown that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient,
as required by Strickland, the trial court did not err in denying
Rayton’s motion for a new trial on this ineffective assistance of
counsel ground. See Thomas, 311 Ga. at 714 (2) (a); Walker v. State,
296 Ga. 161, 171 (3) (b) (766 SE2d 28) (2014).
(b) Rayton also contends that he was denied effective
assistance by his trial counsel’s failure to object when the prosecutor
told the jury during closing argument that Rayton’s own testimony
precluded a self-defense verdict.
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During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor argued
that the jurors could
only think about this case in two ways. . . . Either . . .
Rayton was going down there to buy drugs, or he went
down there knowing that he [was] going to murder . . .
Ladson. . . . [Either] way you think about it, it’s still
murder. And this is why – and this is the law: a person is
not justified in using self-defense if that person is
attempting to commit [or] is committing . . . a felony. The
purchase and sale of cocaine is a violation of Georgia’s
Controlled Substances Act, and that is a felony here. . . .
You don’t get to go commit felonies or attempt to commit
felonies and then claim self-defense. . . . So if you believe
that . . . Rayton went down there to buy drugs, this
analysis is over because you do not get self-defense.
Rayton’s trial counsel did not object to this line of argument. At the
motion for new trial hearing, counsel testified that he did not object
to the prosecutor’s statement because he saw no basis for objecting
and felt there was evidence to support the argument.
The first view of the evidence suggested by the prosecutor, that
Rayton traveled to Atlanta for the purpose of killing Ladson, was a
reasonable inference based on the evidence, including evidence that
Rayton had recently said that he was going to have to kill Ladson
because he was in fear for his family and his livelihood due to the
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threats Ladson had been making and evidence that, armed with
Wendy’s gun, he went to an area on Elmwood Road where Ladson
was regularly known to be found selling drugs. Where, as in this
case,
a prosecutor’s closing argument was based on permissible
inferences and legitimately supported by the facts in
evidence, an objection to the argument on the ground that
the prosecutor was mischaracterizing the evidence would
have been meritless, and counsel’s failure to make such
an objection therefore is not evidence of ineffective
assistance.
Fisher v. State, 309 Ga. 814, 822 (4) (848 SE2d 434) (2020) (citation
and punctuation omitted).
The alternative view suggested by the prosecutor, that Georgia
law precluded Rayton from claiming self defense because he traveled
to Atlanta for the purpose of buying cocaine, was a fair paraphrase
of applicable law that the trial court charged the jury and was
supported by Rayton’s own testimony and by other evidence at trial.
The purchase of cocaine is a felony. See OCGA §§ 16-13-26 (1) (D);
16-13-30 (a), (c). Under applicable law, a defendant may not claim
self defense when his use of force admittedly occurs during the
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attempted commission of a felony. Under OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) and
(b),
a person is justified in using force which is intended or
likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he or she
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to
prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or herself
or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible
felony. . . . A person is not justified in using force under
[such] circumstances . . . if he . . . [i]s attempting to
commit . . . a felony[. 3]
“[C]ounsel have every right to refer to applicable law in argument;
it is law that the court will not charge the jury that counsel is
prohibited from presenting.” Perez v. State, 309 Ga. 687, 695-696
(848 SE2d 395) (2020) (citation omitted; emphasis in original).
We are unpersuaded by Rayton’s argument that the evidence
3In this regard, the trial court instructed the jury:
The State has the burden of [proving] beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defense was not justified. A person is not just [sic] in using
force if this person, (a) initially provokes the use of force against
himself or herself with the intent to use such force as an excuse to
inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or (b) is attempting to
commit, is committing, or is fleeing after . . . the commission or
attempted commission of a felony, to wit, an alleged attempt to
purchase cocaine, a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances
Act, said alleged act being a felony.
See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, § 3.10.10
(4th ed., 2022).
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established that he was not attempting to buy cocaine when he shot
Ladson. Rayton argues that “[a]ttempt requires a subjective belief
that a crime is factually possible,” citing to OCGA § 16-4-4, which
provides that it is no defense to a charge of a criminal attempt that
the crime was impossible under the attendant circumstances if the
crime would have been possible under circumstances “as the accused
believed them to be.”4 Based on this reading of OCGA § 16-4-4,
Rayton contends that “any ‘attempt’ to purchase crack-cocaine
ended as a matter of law . . . when [he] saw Ladson [in the car],”
instead of Smith, because he then “became subjectively aware that
he could not purchase crack-cocaine in the manner he intended[,]”
that is, from Smith. The jury was not required, however, to believe
Rayton’s testimony that he did not attempt to buy drugs from
Ladson. The evidence, including Rayton’s own testimony, showed
4 In full, OCGA § 16-4-4 provides:
It is no defense to a charge of criminal attempt that the crime the
accused is charged with attempting was, under the attendant
circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission if
such crime could have been committed had the attendant
circumstances been as the accused believed them to be.
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that he went to Elmwood Road to buy cocaine and that he
approached Ladson’s car with money in his pocket and with a jar of
marijuana that he intended to exchange for cocaine. Both Winfield
and Adams testified that it looked like Rayton was commencing a
drug deal with Ladson before Rayton shot him. Rayton has failed to
show that his attempt to purchase cocaine before he shot Ladson fell
within the statutory definition of impossibility. Cf. Guzman v. State,
206 Ga. App. 170, 172 (2) (424 SE2d 849) (1992) (holding that the
appellant’s actual inability to complete a drug purchase because she
had no money with her fell within the definition of impossibility set
forth in OCGA § 16-4-4).
Accordingly, the evidence warranted the court’s charge that a
person is not justified in using force if the person is attempting to
commit a felony and that attempting to purchase cocaine is a felony
under Georgia law; the prosecutor’s argument referred to applicable
law that the court did include in its jury charge; and an objection to
the argument on the ground that the prosecutor was
mischaracterizing the law would have been meritless. Counsel’s
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failure to make such an objection therefore was neither
professionally deficient nor prejudicial. See Perez, 309 Ga. at 695-
696; Varner v. State, 306 Ga. 726, 734-735 (3) (c) (832 SE2d 792)
(2019).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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