Copeland v. State ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 22, 2022
S22A0591. COPELAND v. THE STATE.
WARREN, Justice.
Ladarrwin Davion Copeland was convicted of malice murder
and other crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of Timothy
Rodgers and Ricky Johnson. 1 On appeal, Copeland contends that
1Rodgers and Johnson were killed on January 28, 2017. On May 10,
2017, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Copeland for two counts each of
malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault, and one count each of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. At a trial from September 9 to 13, 2019, a jury
found Copeland guilty on all counts. On September 20, 2019, the trial court
imposed concurrent sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole
for the malice murder counts, a concurrent term of five years for possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony, and a consecutive term of five
years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The remaining counts
were merged or vacated by operation of law. Copeland timely filed a motion
for new trial on October 1, 2019, which he amended through new counsel on
September 7, 2021. The trial court denied the amended motion on November
12, 2021. Copeland timely filed a notice of appeal on December 7, 2021. The
trial court amended the sentence on December 13, 2021, nunc pro tunc to
September 13, 2019. The only change from the September 20, 2019 sentence
was to make the five-year term for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony consecutive rather than concurrent. See OCGA § 16-
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try his case, that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence related to the
search of his cell phone records. Seeing no error, we affirm.
1. Copeland first contends that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to try his case because he had filed a pro se notice of
appeal before his trial, and the remittitur from this Court was not
filed in the trial court until after the conclusion of the trial. We
disagree.
A criminal defendant’s “pretrial notice of appeal, if effective,
. . . deprive[s] the trial court of jurisdiction to try [him] until his
appeal [i]s resolved and the trial court receive[s] and file[s] the
remittitur from the appellate court.” Tolbert v. Toole, 296 Ga. 357,
11-106 (b) (requiring the five-year sentence for that crime “to run consecutively
to any other sentence which the person has received”); Parrott v. State, 312 Ga.
580, 582 (864 SE2d 80) (2021) (“A trial judge has the authority to correct a void
sentence at any time, and a sentence is void if the court imposes punishment
that the law does not allow.”) (citations and punctuation omitted); Hartman v.
State, 266 Ga. 613, 615 (469 SE2d 163) (1996) (approving trial court’s
amendment of void concurrent sentence that was contrary to OCGA § 16-11-
106 (b), so that it would conform to the law and run consecutively instead). The
case was docketed in this Court to the April 2022 term and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
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360 (767 SE2d 24) (2014). However, “[a] criminal defendant in
Georgia does not have the right to represent himself and also be
represented by an attorney, and pro se filings by represented parties
are therefore unauthorized and without effect.” Id. at 363 (citation
and punctuation omitted).
That is what happened here when Copeland filed a pro se
notice of appeal when he was still represented by counsel. Indeed,
this Court dismissed Copeland’s pro se pre-trial appeal on the
ground that, “because he was represented by legal counsel at the
time his notice of appeal was filed, his notice of appeal [was] a legal
nullity.” Copeland’s pro se notice of appeal therefore had no legal
effect and did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to try his case.
See Tolbert, 296 Ga. at 363 (“Tolbert’s pro se notice of appeal, filed
when the record indicates that he was represented by counsel, had
no legal effect and thus did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction
to try him.”).2
2 Copeland argues that Tolbert is distinguishable because the record in
that case was never prepared and transmitted to the appellate court. But the
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2. Having resolved the threshold jurisdictional question
Copeland raised, we now turn to his enumerations of error about the
merits of his case and first examine the sufficiency of the evidence.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
presented at Copeland’s trial showed the following. In the early
morning hours of January 28, 2017, both Rodgers and Johnson were
killed with a .32-caliber handgun at a motel in Gwinnett County.
The only eyewitness, Nikita Riley, was Copeland’s girlfriend and
Rodgers’s ex-girlfriend. She testified as follows: Although Riley and
Rodgers were no longer in a romantic relationship, Riley would
receive mail for Rodgers and stayed in contact with him. Rodgers
was often verbally abusive towards Riley, and when Copeland would
answer Rodgers’s calls to Riley, Copeland and Rodgers would argue.
On the night of the shootings, Rodgers repeatedly called Riley
because she had received his medication in the mail and he wanted
her to bring it to him. At one point, Copeland answered Riley’s
effectiveness of a notice of appeal does not depend on whether it has been
docketed in this Court or whether the record has been transmitted to this
Court.
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phone and argued with Rodgers. After the phone call, Copeland told
Riley: “Don’t ever let nobody get comfortable disrespecting you.”
Later, Copeland drove Riley in his blue van to the motel where
Rodgers was staying.
After arriving at the motel, Riley knocked on Rodgers’s door,
not realizing that Copeland had followed her to the door. Johnson,
who was an employee of Rodgers, opened the door. Copeland shot
Johnson once and then pushed Riley into the motel room. Johnson
stumbled out to the parking lot, where he fell face down and died
from the gunshot wound. Once inside the motel room, Copeland shot
Rodgers four times, killing him.
From about 1:45 to 2:00 a.m. on January 28, 2017, the motel
resident in the room above Rodgers heard a man and a woman
arguing outside of the motel, and then heard a “thud” followed by a
woman’s scream. Around the same time, some people in a car
driving through the parking lot of the motel saw Johnson’s body
lying in the parking lot. After dropping someone off and
approaching the body, they were cut off by a blue vehicle with
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unusual headlights that was exiting the parking lot.
According to Riley, she did not know that Copeland was going
to shoot the victims. As she and Copeland fled the scene in
Copeland’s blue van, Riley asked Copeland if he was going to kill
her, and he said he was not. Riley was scared but did not call the
police because she was under the influence of drugs at the time and
both she and Copeland had been drinking. The two drove to Riley’s
cousin’s home. Riley began crying and became very upset and told
her cousin that Copeland and Rodgers “got into a fight.”
The cell phones of both victims were recovered at the scene of
the crimes. Investigators later extracted data from the cell phones
of Riley, Rodgers, Johnson, and Copeland, and obtained related
phone records and cell-site location data from cellular providers.
That information demonstrated that Riley’s and Copeland’s phones
were in the same area before the crimes occurred, were in the area
of the crimes around the time they occurred, and were also near one
another afterwards; that the last phone call to Rodgers’s phone was
from Riley’s phone; and that prior to the murders, Riley and Rodgers
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were exchanging messages about Riley bringing Rodgers his
medicine and mail.
Copeland was taken into custody, told police that he drove a
blue van, and admitted that he knew who Rodgers was. However,
Copeland denied any involvement in or knowledge of the murders.
Copeland’s argument regarding evidentiary sufficiency is
confusing because he appears to conflate the test for constitutional
sufficiency of the evidence with the statutory requirement that
accomplice testimony must be corroborated to sustain a conviction.
Specifically, Copeland asserts that “the evidence adduced at trial
was insufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Appellant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” of the murders and related
offenses. But the primary thrust of his argument appears to be that
the testimony of Riley, as an alleged co-conspirator or party to the
crimes, lacked the “necessary corroboration.”
When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
as a matter of federal constitutional due process under Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979),
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we view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable
to the verdicts and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes
for which he was convicted. See Butler v. State, ___ Ga. ___, ___
(Case No. S22A0317, 2022 WL 1309048, at *3, May 3, 2022). In so
doing, “[w]e leave to the trier of fact the resolution of conflicts or
inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and
reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts, and we do not
reweigh the evidence.” Id. (citations and punctuation omitted).
“When we consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence under
Jackson v. Virginia, we consider all the evidence presented at trial,
without regard to whether some of that evidence might have been
improperly admitted.” Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 733-734 (864
SE2d 85) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Under Georgia statutory law, “[t]he testimony of an accomplice
must be corroborated to sustain a felony conviction.” Yarn v. State,
305 Ga. 421, 423 (826 SE2d 1) (2019) (citing OCGA § 24-14-8). Just
as with our evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter
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of constitutional due process, “in considering sufficiency of the
corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony, we must consider all the
evidence admitted by the trial court, regardless of whether that
evidence was admitted erroneously.” State v. Thomas, 311 Ga. 407,
420 (858 SE2d 52) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted).
“[A]lthough Georgia law requires independent corroboration of
an accomplice’s testimony to secure a conviction, federal law does
not require such corroboration and, thus, a failure to corroborate
accomplice testimony does not offend constitutional due process.”
Goodman v. State, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (Case No. S22A0306, 2022 WL
1547714, at *4, May 17, 2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Moreover, if the evidence “would have authorized a properly
instructed jury to find that a witness was not an accomplice, that
finding would eliminate the need for corroboration under OCGA
§ 24-14-8, and the witness’ testimony alone could be sufficient to
convict.” Johnson v. State, 311 Ga. 221, 223 (857 SE2d 463) (2021)
(emphasis in original). In deciding the issue of whether a witness is
an accomplice, it is “for the jury to determine the credibility of the
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witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the
evidence.” Id. at 224.
With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, we reject
Copeland’s arguments. Although he argues that no physical
evidence connected him to the murders other than the evidence of
his cell phone data that is the subject of his remaining enumeration
of error, we need not exclude that evidence from our sufficiency
analysis even if he is correct that it was improperly admitted. See
Collins, 312 Ga. at 733-734. Copeland also attacks Riley’s
credibility, arguing that she was a party to the crimes, was subjected
to lengthy police questioning, and gave equivocal testimony as to
whether the State had promised her anything in exchange for her
testimony. But questions about Riley’s credibility were for the jury
to decide. See Butler, ___ Ga. at ___ (2022 WL 1309048, at *3). We
conclude that the evidence presented at trial and summarized
above, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, was
sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to authorize a
rational jury to find Copeland guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
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the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
With respect to Georgia’s statutory requirement that the
testimony of an accomplice be corroborated to sustain a felony
conviction, even assuming (without deciding) that the evidence
could have supported a finding that Riley was an accomplice, the
evidence also authorized the jury to find that she was not an
accomplice. Any issues about Riley’s credibility that might have
affected the finding of whether she was an accomplice were for the
jury to decide. See Johnson, 311 Ga. at 224. The jury—having been
given the pattern jury instructions on accomplice corroboration,
including the charge that “[w]hether or not any witness in this case
was an accomplice is a question for you to determine from the
evidence in this case”—was authorized to credit Riley’s own
testimony that she did not know Copeland would shoot the victims
and that she was afraid he might shoot her, too. That testimony was
sufficient to authorize the jury to find that Riley was not an
accomplice and that her testimony did not need to be corroborated
under OCGA § 24-14-8. See Fisher v. State, 309 Ga. 814, 819 (848
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SE2d 434) (2020) (“The properly charged jury was authorized to
credit [the] testimony [of the only witness to identify Appellant as
the shooter] that [the witness] had no prior knowledge that
Appellant would shoot or kill [the victim] and that [the witness]
drove Appellant away from the shooting out of fear that Appellant
might shoot him too. The jury could thus determine that [the
witness] was not an accomplice and that his testimony did not need
to be corroborated.”) (emphasis in original). Copeland’s
enumeration therefore fails.
3. Copeland contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his cell phone
records, including “cell-site location information” and “geolocation
information.” The affidavit supporting the application for the
warrant that authorized the search, Copeland argues, lacked a
sufficient factual basis to constitute probable cause. We disagree.
In determining whether probable cause exists to issue a search
warrant, the magistrate’s task “is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
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forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.” Johnson v. State, 310 Ga. 685, 694 (853 SE2d 635) (2021)
(citation and punctuation omitted). “The test for probable cause is
not a hypertechnical one to be employed by legal technicians, but is
based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life.”
Young v. State, 309 Ga. 529, 540 (847 SE2d 347) (2020) (citation and
punctuation omitted). “On appellate review, our duty is to
determine if the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding
that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant.” Johnson,
310 Ga. at 694 (citation and punctuation omitted). The decision of a
magistrate “to issue a search warrant based on a finding of probable
cause is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing court[,] and
even doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of upholding a
magistrate’s determination that a warrant is proper.” Young, 309
Ga. at 541 (citation and punctuation omitted). “The probable cause
test requires only a fair probability—less than a certainty but more
than a mere suspicion of possibility—which by no means is to be
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equated with proof by even so much as a preponderance of the
evidence.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
In the affidavit at issue here, Detective Justin Hipps attested
as follows: cell phones belonging to both victims were recovered at
the scene of the shooting. Detective Hipps called the last outgoing
number from Rodgers’s phone and reached Riley, whom Rodgers’s
family identified as Rodgers’s ex-girlfriend. After Riley agreed to an
interview with Detective Hipps but failed to show up or answer her
phone again, and after Detective Hipps received a tip that Riley’s
boyfriend committed the homicides, another detective analyzed
Riley’s phone records. That detective determined, through social
media and a records check, that the most-called number (370 times
in one month) belonged to Copeland, and that Riley had called
Copeland before and after the shootings. An investigation of
Copeland revealed that he was on probation and had an active
warrant for his arrest. A location check of Riley’s phone showed that
it “pinged” during and after the homicides at the same location as
the homicides, and it later became stationary in the same area as
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Copeland’s address. When Detective Hipps would attempt to call
Riley following the scheduled interview that she missed, the call
would go straight to voicemail, and he was unable to locate her “in
the two known locations where she live[d].” Believing that Riley was
“on the run” and had discontinued use of her cell phone, Detective
Hipps requested Copeland’s phone records because he believed that
Riley, in the likely circumstance that she had obtained a new phone,
would still be in contact with Copeland based on their frequent
cellular communications and Detective Hipps would be able to
identify Riley’s new number from Copeland’s phone records.
Copeland argues that the affidavit supporting the application
for a search warrant showed nothing more than a call to Riley from
Rodgers within an hour before his death, an anonymous tip that an
unknown boyfriend of Riley’s was involved in the murders, and a
high volume of calls between Riley and Copeland. Based on the
totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, however, the
magistrate was authorized to conclude that the facts stated in the
affidavit linked Riley to one of the murder victims both before and
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around the time of the shootings, showed that she likely was evading
the detective investigating the murders, closely linked Copeland’s
cell phone to Riley’s cell phone through frequent contacts that
included calls before and after the murders, and placed Riley and
Copeland in the same area as Copeland’s house after the murders.
The magistrate could infer from all of these circumstances a fair
probability that Copeland’s cell phone records contained updated
contact information for Riley, as well as additional information
about Copeland’s contacts with her around the time of the crimes,
which would lead to evidence relevant to the murders. See Prince v.
State, 295 Ga. 788, 792-793 (764 SE2d 362) (2014) (holding that
probable cause to search the defendant’s house was established by
information in affidavit that items belonging to the defendant’s
girlfriend were found near the murder victim’s body, that a minivan
matching the description of the girlfriend’s minivan was near the
crime scene before the body was discovered, that she left the state
with the defendant after learning that investigators wanted to
question her, and that she was at the defendant’s house on the night
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of the murder and let him use her van). The “magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause” therefore
existed to issue the search warrant for Copeland’s cell phone
records. Johnson, 310 Ga. at 694 (citation and punctuation omitted).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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