PHILLIPS v. JACKSON, JUDGE ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 9, 2022
S22A0503. PHILLIPS v. JACKSON, Judge et al.
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
A judge of the Municipal Court of Atlanta believed that Carey
Phillips’s traffic citation gave rise to “quasi-bond” conditions that it
could — and did — modify in order to restrict Phillips’s driving
privileges. Phillips disagreed, but instead of appealing the
municipal court judge’s order, he sought pretrial habeas relief
against the municipal court judge and the City of Atlanta Solicitor.
Counsel for the respondents did not attempt to defend the judge’s
order on the merits, arguing only that Phillips’s habeas petition was
procedurally improper on several grounds. The habeas court denied
relief, partly on the ground that Phillips had an adequate remedy at
law and so could not seek habeas. We agree and affirm, albeit
identifying a different legal remedy than did the habeas court.
According to undisputed allegations in his habeas petition and
record evidence, Phillips was issued a speeding citation under
OCGA § 40-6-181. As provided in OCGA § 17-6-11 (a), he displayed
his driver’s license in lieu of being arrested, incarcerated, or ordered
to post a bond.1 He tried to enter a negotiated plea to a reduced
speeding charge, but the municipal court rejected this. Over
1 OCGA § 17-6-11 (a) provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) When an individual is apprehended by an officer for the
violation of the laws of this state or ordinances relating to the
offenses listed in paragraph (2) of this subsection, he or she may
display his or her driver’s license and be issued a uniform traffic
citation in lieu of being:
(A) Brought before the proper magistrate or other judicial
officer;
(B) Incarcerated;
(C) Ordered to post a bond; or
(D) Ordered a recognizance for his or her appearance for
trial.
(2) This subsection shall apply to any violation:
(A) Of Title 40 except any offense:
(i) For which a driver’s license may be suspended for a
first offense by the commissioner of driver services;
(ii) Covered under Code Section 40-5-54 . . . .
(3) The apprehending officer shall include the individual’s driver’s
license number on the uniform traffic citation. The uniform traffic
citation, duly served as provided in this Code section, shall give
the judicial officer jurisdiction to dispose of the matter.
(4) Upon display of the driver’s license, the apprehending officer
shall release the individual so charged for his or her further
appearance before the proper judicial officer as required by the
uniform traffic citation.
2
Phillips’s objection, that court set a bond hearing to determine
whether to restrict or suspend Phillips’s driving privileges as a
purported bond condition. In a written order issued after the
hearing, the municipal court cited its statutory authority to set bail
for misdemeanors. 2 It observed that Phillips had “never been
ordered to post a bond for this charge” and that his duty to appear
for hearings was “a ‘quasi’ bond” under the citation. The municipal
court decided to “amend[]” the so-called quasi-bond, applying the
analysis that it would for a bond revocation. It ordered that Phillips
could drive only for work, medical and schooling appointments,
religious activities, and essential shopping until further judicial
order. Notwithstanding these permissible driving purposes, the
court also ordered him to surrender his license.
2 The court cited three statutes: OCGA §§ 15-10-2 (a) (3) (“Each
magistrate court and each magistrate thereof shall have jurisdiction and power
over the following matters: . . . . The holding of courts of inquiry . . . .”); 17-6-1
(b) (1) (deeming misdemeanors and certain felonies “bailable by a court of
inquiry” and stating that for misdemeanor bonds, courts “shall impose only the
conditions reasonably necessary to ensure such person attends court
appearances and to protect the safety of any person or the public given the
circumstances of the alleged offense and the totality of circumstances”); and
36-32-3 (giving municipal court judges criminal powers equal to magistrates).
3
Phillips filed a habeas petition naming the municipal court
judge and city solicitor as respondents. He contended that the
municipal court lacked the authority to set bond conditions because
there was no bond on which to set conditions, “[t]here was no
hearing,” and “[t]here was no evidence proffered or accepted.” The
habeas court denied relief in a written order. It held, among other
things, that Phillips could not seek habeas relief because he had an
adequate remedy at law. We agree, although the remedy we see
available to Phillips is not the remedy identified by the habeas
court. 3
3 The habeas court relied on the interlocutory appeals process set out in
OCGA § 5-6-34. But this process was not available to Phillips; the statute only
applies to certain classes of courts, not including municipal courts. The statute
does apply to constitutional city courts, but the Atlanta municipal court is not
a constitutional city court. See Wickham v. State, 273 Ga. 563, 567-568 (544
SE2d 439) (2001) (observing that the City Court of Atlanta existed under direct
constitutional authority, not as a statutorily established municipal court);
Nickerson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 617, 618-620 (1) (652 SE2d 208) (2007) (noting
General Assembly’s 2005 abolition of Georgia’s city courts, including the City
Court of Atlanta, and transfer of all cases from the City Court of Atlanta to the
Municipal Court of Atlanta).
Separately, the parties dispute whether the habeas court correctly held
that the named respondents were not the proper parties to the action, and that
the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over Phillips’s case once it was bound
over to state court such that the habeas court could not have granted any relief.
Our resolution of this case makes deciding these issues unnecessary.
4
Georgia’s habeas corpus statute has two articles. The second
article “provides the exclusive procedure for seeking a writ of habeas
corpus for persons whose liberty is being restrained by virtue of a
sentence imposed against them by a state court of record.” OCGA §
9-14-41. Phillips cannot pursue relief under this article because his
liberty is not being restrained by virtue of a sentence; his
prosecution is still pending.
Under the first article of Georgia’s habeas corpus statute, by
contrast, “[a]ny person restrained of his liberty under any pretext
whatsoever, except under a sentence of a state court of record, may
seek a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of the
restraint.” OCGA § 9-14-1 (a). This article applies to pretrial habeas
petitions like Phillips’s, but the ability to seek relief under it is
subject to an important limitation. As we have explained, habeas
corpus under this article is unavailable “[w]here the proceedings
under which the petitioner[’s liberty is restrained] are still pending
undisposed of, and the ordinary established procedure is still
available to him,” as long as there is “another adequate remedy” and
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so “no necessity for issuance of this high extraordinary writ.” See
Williams v. Reece, 288 Ga. 46, 47 (701 SE2d 188) (2010) (punctuation
and citation omitted). Phillips’s prosecution was still pending at the
time of his habeas petition, and he had an adequate remedy at law
in that pending proceeding. Phillips’s case was bound over to state
court on August 3, 2021, and he could have sought relief there. “All
bonds taken under requisition of law in the course of a judicial
proceeding may be amended and new security given if necessary.”
OCGA § 17-6-18. The state court, then, had authority to modify
Phillips’s bond, including by removing all conditions other than his
appearance in court. This would have restored Phillips to the
position he was in before the municipal court acted and so
adequately remedied any deficiency in the municipal court’s order.
See OCGA § 17-6-11 (a) (4) (“Upon display of the driver’s license, the
apprehending officer shall release the individual so charged for his
or her further appearance before the proper judicial officer as
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required by the uniform traffic citation.”).4
Had the state court declined to modify the order, Phillips could
have then sought a certificate of immediate review in order to
pursue an interlocutory appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a)-(b)
(authorizing interlocutory appeals from certain judgments and
rulings of superior courts and “other courts or tribunals from which
appeals are authorized by the Constitution and laws of this state”);
OCGA § 15-7-43 (a) (“The general laws and rules of appellate
practice and procedure which are applicable to cases appealed from
the superior courts of this state shall be applicable to and govern
appeals from the state courts.”); Tumlinson v. Dix, 309 Ga. 184, 185
4 Respondents argue that Phillips’s remedy was a writ of certiorari in the
superior court. But it is unclear whether Phillips could have sought certiorari
review, given that certiorari to a superior court is generally available only from
a final judgment. See OCGA § 5-4-6 (a) (“All writs of certiorari shall be applied
for within 30 days after the final determination of the case in which the error
is alleged to have been committed.”); Hayes v. Brown, 205 Ga. 234, 237 (52
SE2d 862) (1949) (interpreting this statutory language to mean that a “writ of
certiorari will lie only after the rendition of a final judgment” (citing Singer
Mfg. Co. v. McNeal Paint & Glass Co., 117 Ga. 1005, 1006-1007 (44 SE 801)
(1903))). In observing this, we do not mean to express any opinion on how
superior court review of inferior courts’ decisions may be affected by the
recently enacted statute establishing uniform review procedures for such
cases, which becomes effective on July 1, 2023. See 2022 Ga. L. 875 (HB 916).
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(844 SE2d 765) (2020) (“An order denying bond is interlocutory and
may be reviewed by an appellate court following the grant of a
certificate of immediate review.”). If the state court declined to issue
the certificate, only then could Phillips have sought habeas relief.
See Tumlinson, 309 Ga. at 185-186 (“[I]n those cases where the
petitioner lacks an adequate remedy in the trial court or appellate
court, as when he is unable to seek an interlocutory appeal from an
order denying bond because the trial court has denied a request for
a certificate of immediate review, a habeas court has the authority
to review the merits of a habeas petition in which the petitioner
claims that he is being unlawfully detained based on the alleged
illegal denial of bond.”). And at least on the record before us, it
appears that all these potential remedies remain available to
Phillips today.
Phillips additionally argues that he can pursue habeas relief
because “there was no evidence tendered to the municipal court
and . . . the court itself acted to both prosecute and determine the
issue of bond, creating a due process issue that leaves the resulting
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order of the court a void order reachable by habeas.” But the habeas
court’s conclusion that Phillips had an adequate remedy at law does
not depend on a conclusion that the municipal court’s proceedings
were themselves proper. Indeed, although we do not decide any
merits-related questions, we have serious concerns about the
municipal court’s actions, and note that counsel for the respondents
does not attempt to defend the order of the municipal court on its
merits.
Phillips’s ability to seek modification of his bond by the state
court — an adequate remedy at law — precluded his filing a habeas
petition. For this reason, pretrial habeas relief is not available to
him at this time. See Kearse v. Paulk, 264 Ga. 509, 510 (448 SE2d
369) (1994). Accordingly, we affirm. 5
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
5 While the habeas court’s order is cast as “denying” Phillips’s petition,
rather than dismissing it, a “denial” is not necessarily a denial, and therefore
does not require remand unless the habeas court “decided the merits of a
motion it lacked jurisdiction to decide.” Brooks v. State, 301 Ga. 748, 752 (2)
(804 SE2d 1) (2017). None of the three bases given by the habeas court in its
order were merits-related: the court ruled that habeas was not the proper
vehicle, the named respondents were not proper parties, and the matter was
moot. Because the habeas court did not rule on the merits of Phillips’s suit, the
denial was a constructive dismissal under Brooks that we can, and do, affirm.
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