STANLEY v. PATTERSON ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 20, 2022
S21G0405. STANLEY v. PATTERSON et al.
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the Court
of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s grant of a directed
verdict in favor of Appellees, a court administrator and two
municipal court case managers, based on quasi-judicial immunity.
Appellees failed to remove a bind-over order from a stack of case files
bound for the state court solicitor’s office, catalyzing a chain reaction
that eventually led to the improper arrest and jailing of Appellant.
We hold that Appellees were not protected by quasi-judicial
immunity because their alleged negligence was not committed
during the performance of a “function normally performed by a
judge.” Heiskell v. Roberts, 295 Ga. 795, 801 (3) (a) (764 SE2d 368)
(2014) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U. S. 9, 12-13 (112 SCt 286, 116
LE2d 9) (1991)). We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
We also clarify our opinion in Withers v. Schroeder, 304 Ga. 394(819 SE2d 49) (2018). In that case, we held that a court
administrator was protected by quasi-judicial immunity when
completing a judicial function specifically assigned to the court by
statute. Although we noted that the court administrator was acting
as an “extension of the court” “[t]o the extent” that he acted at the
judge’s discretion, the decision turned on our conclusion that, under
the particular circumstances of that case, the court administrator
was exercising a judicial function. This remains the touchstone for
judicial immunity.
Finally, because the question of whether Appellees’ actions
were protected by official immunity was raised in their motion for a
directed verdict but not resolved by the trial court, we direct the
Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court for further
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proceedings. 1
1. The largely undisputed record shows that Appellant was
arrested in December 2013 for driving under the influence and
summoned to appear in Atlanta Municipal Court. Although
Appellant pled guilty to lesser charges in that court in July 2014 and
was sentenced, the matter was forwarded in error to the State Court
of Fulton County. Appellant did not receive notice that his case had
been sent to the state court for prosecution.
Appellant’s DUI case had been forwarded to the state court due
to an error by two of the appellees, case managers employed by the
Atlanta Municipal Court. Appellant’s file, consisting of the bind-over
order and related materials, was originally placed in a stack of case
files bound over to the state court and intended to be walked over to
the state court solicitor’s office. After Appellant pled guilty, the
judge rescinded the bind-over order, but the case managers failed to
physically remove Appellant’s file from the stack. One of the case
1The Court thanks amicus curiae Georgia Trial Lawyers Association for its
brief.
3
managers sent an email to the municipal court clerk’s office in an
effort to stop the file from being forwarded, asking the clerk’s office
to “[p]lease pull it, and I will be down to retrieve it.” But she did not
retrieve Appellant’s file, and it was forwarded to the state court
solicitor for prosecution.
Because he was unaware proceedings against him had
commenced in state court, Appellant failed to appear for an
arraignment hearing in the State Court of Fulton County. A bench
warrant was issued for his arrest in March 2016. In May 2016,
during a routine traffic stop, he was arrested and spent the night in
the Fulton County Jail. Appellant was later released, and the state
court granted the solicitor’s request for an order of nolle prosequi
with respect to the charges against him. Appellant then brought suit
against the Atlanta Municipal Court employees who had allowed his
case file to be forwarded in error to the state court, alleging
negligence and false arrest,2 and that case proceeded to trial.
2Appellant withdrew the claim for false arrest during trial, leaving only the
negligence claim.
4
At the conclusion of Appellant’s presentation of evidence, the
trial court granted Appellees’ motion for directed verdict on the
ground that they were protected by quasi-judicial immunity, basing
its decision on our opinion in Withers. In an unpublished opinion,
the Court of Appeals agreed, holding that “the trial court correctly
concluded that Appellees were acting as [an] ‘extension of the court’
or ‘arm of the judge’ such that they are immune from suit based on
quasi-judicial immunity.” (Punctuation omitted.) Stanley v.
Patterson, 357 Ga. App. XXVI (Case No. A20A0987) (Oct. 21, 2020)
(unpublished). We granted Appellant’s petition for certiorari.
2. Appellant contends that Appellees were not protected by
quasi-judicial immunity in failing to remove the bind-over order
from the stack of case files to be walked over to the state court
solicitor’s office. We agree.
Absolute judicial immunity has protected judicial actions from
suit since medieval times. See Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 225
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(108 SCt 538, 98 LE2d 555) (1988).3 Indeed, “[f]ew doctrines were
more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges
from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 553-554 (87 SCt 1213,
18 LE2d 288) (1967). Georgia similarly has recognized judicial
immunity from state law claims for many years. See Withers, 304
Ga. at 396-397 (2). See also Heiskell, 295 Ga. at 801 (3) (a)
(“[J]udicial immunity, which the Supreme Court of the United
States has said ‘is as old as the law,’ is essential to the impartial
administration of justice.”); Calhoun v. Little, 106 Ga. 336 (32 SE
86) (1898); Maddox v. Prescott, 214 Ga. App. 810 (449 SE2d 163)
(1994); and Upshaw v. Oliver, 1 Dud. 241 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1832).
3 The scope and nature of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity under
Georgia law is a question of state law, not federal law. Accordingly, United
States Supreme Court precedent on this point is persuasive only, not binding.
But we view that precedent as quite persuasive, given its thorough assessment
of the common-law basis of federal judicial immunity that also formed the basis
for Georgia’s judicial immunity doctrine. Cf. Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 188
(824 SE2d 265) (2019) (“But decisions of the United States Supreme Court
interpreting similar provisions [of the United States Constitution] generally
will prove persuasive [to our interpretation of the Georgia Constitution] only
to the extent that the Court’s decisions actually were guided by th[e] same
language, history, and context.”).
6
Because the historical rationale for judicial immunity was
protecting judges in the impartial exercise of their independent
judgment, the scope of judicial immunity has usually been limited
to acts requiring the exercise of such judgment. See Antoine v. Byers
& Anderson, Inc., 508 U. S. 429, 435-436 (II) (113 SCt 2167, 124
LE2d 391) (1993). This Court has further specified that, in
determining whether judicial immunity applies, the relevant
inquiry is whether the actor was performing “a function normally
performed by a judge.” Heiskell, 295 Ga. at 801 (3) (a) (citing Mireles,
502 U. S. at 12-13). Accord Withers, 304 Ga. at 397-398 (2) (holding
that whether an act is judicial or nonjudicial depends on “the
‘nature’ and ‘function’ of the act”). Thus, ministerial or routine acts
that do not require the exercise of judgment typically have not been
afforded judicial immunity. See, e.g., Heiskell, 295 Ga. at 801 (3) (a)
(declining to apply judicial immunity to a judge’s receipt of alleged
overpayments in salary).
In general, judicial functions are those “involved in resolving
disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of a
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court.” Forrester, 484 U. S. at 227 (III). Accord Burns v. Reed, 500
U. S. 478, 500 (II) (111 SCt 1934, 114 LE2d 547) (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that judicial
immunity attaches to “performance of the function of resolving
disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private
rights”). Judicial functions are distinguished from “administrative,
legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be
assigned by law to perform.” Forrester, 484 U. S. at 227 (III).
Although these other functions may be essential to the operation of
the courts or the judicial system, nonjudicial functions have not
traditionally been protected by judicial immunity. See Withers, 304
Ga. at 397 (2) (explaining that judges are not protected by judicial
immunity for acts that are “nonjudicial” or taken in the complete
absence of all judicial authority).
Because judicial immunity protects judicial actions, not merely
judges, nonjudges may be protected by judicial immunity as well.
Officials other than judges are sometimes authorized to make
“discretionary judgment[s]” that are “‘functionally comparable’ to
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those [made by] judges.” (Punctuation and citation omitted.)
Antoine, 508 U. S. at 436 (II). When nonjudges perform these kinds
of acts, we have concluded that they are protected by “quasi-judicial
immunity.” 4 Withers, 304 Ga. at 394. See also Housing Authority of
City of Augusta v. Gould, 305 Ga. 545, 550 (826 SE2d 107) (2019)
(explaining that quasi-judicial immunity extends to “the
performance of judicial acts under authority conferred upon other
persons, boards, or tribunals”). In this context, “quasi” refers to the
identity of the actor, not to a different kind of immunity or action.
In other words, quasi-judicial immunity applies when judicial
immunity is extended to actions by nonjudges, so the same test, and
limits, apply. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Wilson, 256 Ga.
849, 850 (353 SE2d 466) (1987) (auditor appointed by trial court was
“cloaked in judicial immunity”). Cf. Antoine, 508 U. S. at 435-436 (II)
(court reporters required to record verbatim court proceedings were
not protected by judicial immunity).
4 Quasi-judicial immunity has been extended “not only to public officials but
also to private citizens (in particular jurors and arbitrators).” Burns, 500 U. S.
at 500 (II) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Applying these principles here, Appellees’ actions were not
protected by quasi-judicial immunity. As discussed above, the
lodestar of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity is whether the
actions constitute “a function normally performed by a judge.”
Heiskell, 295 Ga. at 801 (3) (a) (citing Mireles, 502 U. S. at 12-13).
The task at issue here – removing or failing to remove an order from
a stack of case files – is a mere physical task requiring no
“discretionary judgment” that is “‘functionally comparable’ to those
[made by] judges.” (Punctuation and citation omitted.) Antoine, 508
U. S. at 436 (II). The judicial action occurred much earlier in the
chain of events, when the guilty plea was accepted and entered and
the judge’s responsibilities concluded. Subsequent steps, such as the
removal of the bind-over order, were “administrative . . . functions
that judges may on occasion be assigned to perform,” which were not
judicial in nature. Forrester, 484 U. S. at 227 (III). Thus, Appellees
were not protected by quasi-judicial immunity.
Appellees resist this conclusion. In their view, this case is
controlled by our recent decision in Withers, where we held that a
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court administrator was protected by quasi-judicial immunity when
he reported – pursuant to a statutory duty 5 – a driver’s license
number to the Department of Driver Services. Appellees seize on our
observation that, “[t]o the extent [the court administrator] acted at
the direction of [the judge]” in fulfilling that duty, he was acting as
an “extension of the court,” and they argue that they were in the
same position.
But, properly understood, Withers – which admittedly pushes
the outermost boundary of our judicial-function cases – does not
support the conclusion that Appellees’ acts in this case are protected
by judicial immunity. As an initial matter, the court administrator
in Withers was carrying out a duty specifically assigned to the court
by statute. Moreover, Withers made no distinction between the
actions of the judge and court administrator in deciding to report the
5 OCGA § 17-6-11 (b) (2011) required that “[t]he court . . . shall immediately
forward to [DDS] . . . the driver’s license number if the person fails to appear
and answer the charge against him or her.” OCGA § 17-6-11 (b) (1) was
subsequently amended in 2017 to require that “[i]f . . . the accused fails to
dispose of his or her charges or waive arraignment and plead not guilty, the
clerk of court . . . shall . . . forward to the [DDS] the accused’s driver’s license
number.” See also Withers, 304 Ga. at 398 n.5.
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driver’s license number, a decision involving some measure of
discretion. Specifically, the court’s obligation to report the driver’s
license number only arose if the accused did not “appear and answer
the charge” against them, OCGA § 17-6-11 (b) (2011), and whether
the accused did so was a matter for judicial determination. Cf. Davis
v. State, 310 Ga. 547, 548 n.3 (852 SE2d 517) (2020) (court could
conclude defendant intended to appeal despite filing a pleading
styled as a “motion to remand”). If the court was unsatisfied with
the accused’s answer or appearance, the driver’s license number
would be reported; if the court was satisfied, it would not be. Thus,
the relevant actions in Withers were part of a judicial function
assigned to the court by statute. This conclusion, not the court
administrator’s relationship to the judge, was the basis for our
determination that quasi-judicial immunity applied.
In short, Withers does not support applying quasi-judicial
immunity to the routine, purely administrative acts by the
Appellees in this case.
3. Appellees also moved for a directed verdict based on official
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immunity. The doctrine of official immunity “provides that while a
public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent
ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts
unless such acts are willful, wanton, or outside the scope of his
authority.” (Citations omitted.) Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744,
752 (6) (452 SE2d 476) (1994). A ministerial act is an action that is
“simple, absolute, and definite . . . , requiring merely the execution
of a specific duty.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hicks v.
McGee, 289 Ga. 573, 575 (1) (713 SE2d 841) (2011). A discretionary
act, on the other hand, requires “personal deliberation and
judgment” and acting in a way that is “not specifically directed.”
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.Appellant argues vigorously that Appellees’ acts were
ministerial and involved no discretion. Appellant points to the
testimony of one of the appellees that case managers were supposed
to follow the instructions they were given, did not have discretion to
do other than what they were told, and “are doing what [they] are
told in the courtroom[;] that’s it.” But whether a public official’s acts
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are ministerial or discretionary is “determined by the facts of each
individual case.” (Citation omitted.) Hicks, 289 Ga. at 576. Here, the
trial court granted a directed verdict solely on the ground of quasi-
judicial immunity and did not reach the question of official
immunity. The trial court therefore must rule in the first instance
on the question of whether official immunity applies.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
with direction to remand to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and case remanded. All the Justices concur.
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PINSON, Justice, concurring.
Absolute immunity from suit is “strong medicine, justified only
when the danger of officials’ being deflected from the effective
performance of their duties is very great.” Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219, 230 (108 SCt 538, 98 LEd 2d 555) (1988) (cleaned up). This
point is reflected in the narrow scope of judicial immunity as
traditionally understood. In my view, Withers v. Schroeder, 304 Ga.
394 (819 SE2d 49) (2018), could be read to expand the scope of that
immunity to cover routine and ministerial acts merely associated
with the judicial function, if a judge directs an employee to
undertake those acts. The Court’s opinion in this case correctly
rejects that broad reading and cabins Withers to its facts. With that
understanding, I join the Court’s opinion in full.
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