Edvalson v. State , 298 Ga. 626 ( 2016 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 7, 2016
S15A1869. EDVALSON v. THE STATE.
HINES, Presiding Justice.
This is an appeal by criminal defendant Thomas Scot Edvalson of the
denial of his pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The gravamen of the
appeal is a challenge to the imposition of additional conditions of bond for
Edvalson.1 For the reasons which follow, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus
relief.
On September 20, 2012, an arrest warrant for possession of child
pornography, see former OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) (8),2 was obtained against
Edvalson. Counsel for Edvalson filed a motion for bond in superior court on
1
As of the time of the filing of the present appeal, Edvalson had not been tried on the
underlying criminal case and was free on bond.
2
Former OCGA §16-12-100 (b) (8) in effect at the time of the warrant provided:
It is unlawful for any person knowingly to possess or control any material which
depicts a minor or a portion of a minor's body engaged in any sexually explicit
conduct.
November 19, 2012. On November 26, 2012, the State consented to a pretrial
aggregate bond in the amount of $12,000. The bond order contained two
express special conditions:
1. No computers / smart phones/ internet enabled appliances
(Smart TV’s, etc.) in [Edvalson’s] house.
2. No unsupervised contact with children under 16 years of
age.
On April 24, 2013, Edvalson was indicted on four counts of sexual
exploitation of children for, on September 18, 2012, knowingly possessing
digital images depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. See
former OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) (8), supra. On November 5, 2014, the State filed
in superior court an emergency motion to revoke bond, contending that
Edvalson had violated the conditions of his bond. During the hearing in the
matter on November 7, 2014, at which both Edvalson and his counsel were
present, a police detective, who was a certified forensic computer examiner,
testified that 161 images of confirmed child pornography were found on
Edvalson’s computer; that there was evidence that he had been online since
November 26, 2012, the date of the bond; that two years prior to the date of the
hearing, Edvalson hosted a discussion thread on which he set up child modeling
2
posts, considered in the context of forensics to be child erotica; that he was
subsequently banned from the website for posting child pornography; and that
Edvalson altered his online username and began to post comments about child
pornography, including sarcastic comments about certain child pornography
laws posted 29 days before the revocation hearing. However, on cross-
examination, the detective acknowledged that he had not been inside Edvalson’s
house or applied for a search warrant for it; that he had no evidence that
Edvalson had a computer, smartphone, or internet-enabled appliance in his
house; and that he was not alleging that Edvalson had unsupervised contact with
anyone under the age of 16 since he posted bond.
The superior court stated that it accepted that Edvalson was the author of
the internet posts in question but despite the disturbing nature of the
circumstances and the court’s concern, it was going to deny the motion to
revoke bond because there was no evidence that Edvalson used, or possessed in
his home, any of the devices prohibited in the bond or that he violated the terms
and conditions as set forth in the bond order. However, the superior court
detailed additional conditions of the bond which would then be in force, and
stated that the special conditions of the original bond order would also remain
3
in effect. The court warned Edvalson that although it was not revoking his
bond, it wanted to “be very clear” that the court did not “intend for [him] to be
on the internet at all or using any computer or electronic devices as [the court
had] just described.” The court then asked Edvalson if he understood, and
Edvalson stated that he did. Neither Edvalson nor his counsel lodged any
objection to the bond conditions as then detailed by the court.
On November 13, 2014, the superior court entered its order denying the
State’s motion to revoke bond and imposed the special conditions to the existing
bond, as it had indicated at the hearing:
1. The Defendant shall not use or otherwise access the internet by
any means nor shall he access any online service of any nature.
2. The Defendant shall not possess, either directly or indirectly,
images in any form depicting a child under 18 years of age.
3. The Defendant shall not use or possess a computer, tablet, smart
phone, or any other device capable of accessing the internet.
On November 20, 2014, Edvalson moved for reconsideration of the order
imposing the additional conditions of bond, asserting that the superior court
failed to provide him with adequate due process regarding such bond conditions,
that the court lacked the power to sua sponte impose them, and that the
4
conditions were overly broad. The motion for reconsideration was denied on
November 25, 2014. Thereafter, on February 20, 2015, Edvalson filed his
present petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the additional bond
conditions were overbroad, unduly restrictive, and imposed in violation of due
process. Following a hearing on April 22, 2015, the habeas court,3 on May 26,
2015, denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus after finding that the bond
conditions at issue were consistent with the intent of the original consent bond
order, that they were an appropriate response to Edvalson’s “conduct which led
to the filing of the bond revocation motion,” and that they were not retaliatory
in any manner or motivated by any animus toward Edvalson.
Edvalson now contends that the habeas court erred in denying his petition
because he was not provided with the basic due process of notice and the
opportunity to be heard; because the superior court lacked the power to sua
sponte impose additional conditions of bond in the absence of a violation of the
existing bond conditions or the allegation and proof that he committed a new
crime; and because the additional bond conditions were overbroad, unduly
3
A judge different from the one who denied the State’s motion to revoke Edvalson’s bond
and imposed the bond conditions at issue heard and ruled on Edvalson’s habeas petition.
5
restrictive of his liberty, punitive in nature, and without any articulated
legitimate government objective or public safety interest which they advanced.
But, such contentions are unavailing.
Edvalson raised his complaints about the additional bond conditions in
the motion for reconsideration, and pretermitting the question of whether the
conditions in the pretrial bond may be challenged in a separate proceeding after
the time for interlocutory appeal has expired, see Camphor v. State, 272 Ga.
408, 410 (2) (529 SE2d 121) (2000),4 Edvalson is not aided in his quest for
habeas corpus relief. Certainly,
[b]oth the Georgia and United States Constitutions prohibit the state
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. The fundamental idea of due process is notice and
an opportunity to be heard. [However], due process [does not
guarantee] a particular form or method of state procedure. Rather,
. . .[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances. [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.
Hood v. Carsten, 267 Ga. 579, 580 (481 SE2d 525) (1997). (Internal citations
omitted.) Here, Edvalson had clear notice that the originally-imposed bond
4
Compare Banks v. Waldrop, 272 Ga. 475 (531 SE2d 708) (2000) (habeas court had authority
to review the denial of bond).
6
conditions, and his alleged violation of those conditions, were at issue with the
possible sanction of the complete revocation of his bond. Even in the situation
of a complete revocation of bond, only minimal due process is required prior to
the revocation. Camphor v. State, supra at 410 (2) (b). Edvalson’s bond was
not revoked and he was not deprived of his freedom by incarceration; indeed,
he prevailed in the State’s attempt to revoke his bond. Furthermore, he had a
full and fair opportunity to be heard before his bond was modified. In the
revocation proceeding, the superior court had the authority to impose additional
reasonable restrictions on Edvalson’s behavior as conditions of his pretrial
release on bond. Id.As the habeas court noted, the conditions of bond detailed by the superior
court at the revocation hearing merely reflected and clarified the preventive
nature of the special conditions of the original bond order in light of the new
evidence regarding Edvalson’s conduct. Indeed, the additional conditions did
not constitute unanticipated restrictions at all; they merely helped to effectuate
the goal of the special conditions as stated in the original bond order. The plain
purpose of the special conditions, from inception, was to prevent Edvalson from
having access to children, images of children, and the internet for the purpose
7
of creating, obtaining, promoting, or disseminating child pornography. This
reflects the State’s compelling interest ,
in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of minor
children by protecting them from being subjects of pornography,
which is obviously harmful to [their] psychological, emotional, and
mental health.
(Quotation marks omitted.) Bennett v. State, 292 Ga. App. 382, 384 (1) (665
SE2d 365) (2008), quoting Aman v. State, 261 Ga. 669, 670 (1) (b) (409 SE2d
645) (1991). The special conditions of bond as summarily set forth in the initial
bond order would ill-serve this compelling public safety interest if Edvalson
could engage in the criminal conduct sought to be prohibited by merely doing
so outside of the confines of his home. Thus, the special conditions imposed in
this case were appropriate and reasonable under the facts, and therefore, do not
constitute an abuse of the superior court's discretion.5 Camphor v. State, supra
5
Of course, all of the special conditions of Edvalson’s bond must be construed by Edvalson
and the State in a manner consistent with the superior court’s reasons for imposing them, i.e., to
prevent the troubling conduct by Edvalson which was in evidence at the bond revocation hearing.
As noted, bond conditions must be appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances. Camphor
v. State, supra at 410-411(2)(b); Morgan v. State, 285 Ga. App. 254, 261 (3) (645 SE2d 745) (2007).
Furthermore, such conditions may be modified to deal with particular situations (e.g., seeking the
court’s approval, notwithstanding a bond condition prohibiting travel outside the circuit or state, to
travel to a particular place for a particular event, like a relative’s funeral). The reasonable reading
of the additional bond conditions is that they restrict Edvalson from using any device which would
allow him some measure of control or direction of the device’s connection to the internet. And, if
Edvalson feels the need to possess particular images of minors that do not pose the risks that
8
at 410-411 (2) (b).
There was no error in denying Edvalson’s pretrial petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
concerned the trial court, he may seek permission from the court, which we presume would be given
where reasonable.
9