MORRIS v. State ( 2021 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: April 5, 2021
S21A0191. MORRIS v. THE STATE.
S21A0192. MORRIS v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
In 2009, a jury found Mims Michael Morris, Sr. (“Mims”), Mims
Michael Morris, Jr. (“Michael”), and Roy Bradshaw (“Roy”) guilty of
malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and robbery in
the fatal beating of Earl Gill. 1 In Case No. S21A0191, Mims appeals,
1 The attack occurred on March 15, 2008. A Putnam County grand jury
returned a joint indictment against Mims, Michael, Roy, and Teresa Bradshaw
for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault
(Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), kidnapping with bodily injury (Count
4), and robbery (Count 5). Following a joint trial of Mims, Michael, and Roy
that ended on October 2, 2009, a jury found all three defendants guilty on all
counts, except Count 4, which was withdrawn by the State at the close of its
case-in-chief. The trial court sentenced Mims and Michael to life in prison for
Count 1, 20 years in prison for Count 3, and 20 years in prison for Count 5,
with Counts 3 and 5 to run consecutively to the life sentence; Count 2 was
vacated by operation of law. Mims and Michael filed timely motions for new
trial. Mims amended his motion on January 7, 2020; Michael amended his
motion on May 27, 2014, and June 5, 2020. The trial court conducted hearings
on the motions on June 12, 2020, and entered an order on Mims’s motion on
July 13, 2020 and on Michael’s motion on August 3, 2020. In the orders, the
trial court determined that Count 3 merged with Count 1 as to both Mims and
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions. In Case No. S21A0192, Michael appeals, also
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and contending that the
trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury not to
consider Roy’s statement against him and that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 For the reasons explained below,
we affirm in both cases.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
record shows the following. Josh Morris (“Josh”) testified as follows.
On March 15, 2008, Josh and his brother, Michael, were staying at
an EconoLodge in Milledgeville, where they had traveled to do
landscaping work with Mims (their father) and Roy. At the time,
Mims was staying with Roy and his wife, Teresa Bradshaw
(“Teresa”), at the Bradshaws’ camp house at the lake. That
Michael, corrected the sentences to so reflect, and otherwise denied the
motions. Mims and Michael filed timely notices of appeal. The cases were
docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2020, consolidated,
and submitted for decision on the briefs.
2 We have already affirmed Roy’s convictions. See Bradshaw v. State, 300
Ga. 1 (792 SE2d 672) (2016).
2
afternoon, Michael and Josh met Gill, who lived and worked at the
EconoLodge. The three of them discussed sharing some marijuana,
and Michael gave Gill money to purchase some. About 20 minutes
after Gill left to get the marijuana, he returned on foot to Josh’s room
at the EconoLodge; Josh, Josh’s wife, Michael, Michael’s girlfriend,
Mims, Roy, Teresa, and Gill’s friend and co-worker, Chris Vukovich,
were all in the room. Gill did not have any marijuana or Michael’s
money, and he told his new friends, “I’ve been got,” meaning that he
had been scammed. Gill said that he would go to his sister’s house
to get money to pay them back. Roy told Gill to “get in the van,” and
Michael said, “I’m going to ride with y’all” and got into the van. Gill
left the EconoLodge in the Bradshaws’ van with Roy, Teresa, Mims,
and Michael. Later that evening, Roy called Josh and told Josh to
“meet him at the store.” Josh drove with his wife to the store,
Michael got into his truck, and they followed Teresa, Roy, and Mims
in the Bradshaws’ van to their camp house at the lake.
The chief deputy sheriff, who interviewed Josh after Josh was
taken into custody, testified that Josh told him that Josh heard
3
Mims tell Gill “get in the car or I’ll kill you.” At trial, however, Josh
denied hearing Mims tell Gill to get in the van or threatening to kill
him.
Michael Robins, a friend of Gill’s, testified as follows. He
encountered Gill at the EconoLodge that day. Gill, who was with two
“young dudes” whom Robins did not know, asked if Robins could get
them some marijuana. Robins said that he could, intending to con
them, and the two young strangers gave him $25, Gill gave him $10,
and Gill and the other two men chipped in a few dollars for gas. Gill
rode with Robins and two of Robins’s friends to a nearby WalMart,
supposedly so that Robins could meet someone who would supply
the marijuana. Robins went into WalMart alone, Robins’s friends
ordered Gill out of the car, and they left Gill at the WalMart.
Teresa was the only witness to testify at trial regarding what
transpired after she, Roy, Mims, Michael, and Gill left the
EconoLodge in the van.3 She testified as follows. Teresa drove, Roy
3 Teresa pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter prior to the trial and
was sentenced to 15 years with 6 to serve in prison on the condition that she
testify.
4
sat in the front passenger seat, Gill and Mims sat in the middle
passenger seats, and Michael sat on the bench seat in the back. Gill
directed them to an apartment to try to find Robins, but Robins was
not there. As they continued driving around, Roy got out of his seat
in the front, confronted Gill about the missing money, and hit Gill.
Then Gill directed Teresa to Possum Point Drive, the street where
his sister lived. Gill was unable to find his sister’s house, however,
and Michael stood up and his “fists went to flying.” Michael hit Gill
“and kept hitting him and kept hitting him and kept hitting him.”
While this was happening, Teresa heard Mims say that Michael was
hitting Gill so hard that his feet were coming off the floor. Mims said
that Michael hit Gill about 15 times, so fast that he could not see the
blows and he could feel the wind coming off Michael’s fist. Then
Teresa heard one of the men say that they should throw Gill out of
the van. Roy had Teresa pull to the side of the road. Roy opened the
door and told the other men to get out. Either Mims or Michael, or
both, dragged Gill from the vehicle by his feet as he grabbed the back
of Teresa’s seat and begged them to stop.
5
Teresa testified further as follows. When Mims and Michael
had Gill on the ground, they started kicking him. Teresa yelled that
she was leaving, and Mims and Michael got back into the van.
Michael was holding Gill’s sneakers, and Roy told Teresa to drive
away. In the rear-view mirror, Teresa saw Gill get up and walk down
the road as she drove away. Mims said that he had been kicking Gill,
Gill grabbed his foot, and Mims fell, got back up, and kicked Gill
even harder. Michael commented that Gill might have $25 of his but
he had something of Gill’s – the shoes. Michael tried on the shoes,
and they did not fit, so he gave them to Mims, who was wearing
“dark beige Hush Puppy-type shoes” at the time. Teresa stopped to
buy gas, and Mims and Michael went into the store to buy
refreshments. Either Roy or Mims called Josh and told Josh to meet
them at the store. After Josh and his wife arrived at the store, they
all went to the Bradshaws’ lake house for the night.
Joanne Jenkins and Roger Kent, who lived on Possum Point
Drive, testified that Gill knocked on their door that night and
identified himself as “Earl.” His head was bloody, and he seemed
6
disoriented. He asked to be taken to the hospital and told the couple
“two men beat me up and threw me out.” Kent took Gill to the
hospital; hospital personnel alerted law enforcement of the apparent
crime.
After arresting Roy, Mims, and Michael four days after the
attack, an investigator took photos of Mims’s and Roy’s hands
because they appeared swollen, although Michael’s did not. The
Putnam County sheriff testified that, after being arrested, Roy
admitted that he “popped the man upside the head in the truck” and
hit Gill “probably about three times.” Roy also told the sheriff,
“Yeah, I swung on this guy a couple of times, but I didn’t do nothing
like that right there. Because, like I said, I didn’t have any money
involved in this.” Although Roy admitted that he hit Gill in the van,
Roy claimed that his participation in the attack “didn’t happen out
of the truck” and that his “feet never hit the ground” when Teresa
stopped the van.
The Bradshaws’ niece, Brittany Bradshaw, testified that, in
the days after the attack, she had conversations with Teresa, Roy,
7
and Mims about what happened when they went to Milledgeville.
Brittany testified: “The first thing that [Teresa] had ever said to me
was that she didn’t realize how good her husband could fight until
she seen him fighting with this other guy.” Teresa told Brittany that
they had given a man money to buy marijuana, the money was taken
from him, and they left in the van so the man could get the money
back. Teresa told Brittany that the man could not get the money and
that, while Teresa was driving the van, Roy started “beating [the
man’s] head up against the van and stomping him in the head.”
Teresa also told Brittany that either Roy or Mims had taken the
man’s shoes off, “put them on their feet and stomped his head with
them.” Roy told Brittany that they had jumped on the man, beaten
him, and thrown him out of the van. Mims told Brittany that “they
had beat the hell out of someone.”
Amy Warnock, who considered Teresa her best friend, testified
that Teresa told her about the assault on Gill for which Teresa had
pleaded guilty. Warnock testified:
[Teresa] told me that she knew her husband could fight,
8
but she didn’t know how well until that weekend. And she
said that they went to Milledgeville and they had given a
man – no name, just a man – $25 to get them marijuana.
The man came back with no money and no marijuana.
[The man] and Roy Lee Bradshaw got in [an] argument
and began to fight . . . until there was blood in the van
everywhere. . . . And they dropped [the man] off.
Gill’s blood was found in multiple places inside the Bradshaws’
van, along with a bloody baseball bat. Investigators obtained a
recording from the security system at the gas station where Teresa
stopped after the attack. The security video was played at trial. The
security video depicted Mims wearing bright white sneakers when
he went into the store to buy beer. Gill’s friend Vukovich testified
that Gill had bleached and washed his sneakers that morning and
that they were “snow white.” In the security video, Michael can be
seen looking down at the back of both of his own fists, removing a
drink from the cooler and rubbing it against the knuckles of his right
hand, looking again at the back of his right hand, and then shaking
his hand as if in pain. In the security video, as Michael waits to pay
for his drink, Teresa is seen opening the door and is heard telling
Michael that they needed to leave.
9
Gill died ten days after the attack from multiple, blunt-force
injuries of the head, which included surface bruising and
lacerations, facial bone fractures, a large subdural hemorrhage, and
catastrophic swelling of the brain. He also had a broken rib, which
the medical examiner testified would not have been fatal.
Case No. S21A0191
1. Mims contends that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to warrant his convictions for malice murder and
robbery.4 We disagree.
(a) As to his murder conviction, Mims argues that the evidence
established that either Michael or Roy or both caused Gill’s fatal
head injuries and that there was no evidence that he aided or
encouraged them in beating Gill. And, Mims argues, even if there
was evidence that he kicked Gill, there was no evidence that the
4 In another enumerated error, Mims also contends that the trial court
erred by failing to merge the aggravated assault conviction into the malice
murder conviction, but the sentencing error was corrected in the order denying
his motion for new trial. Accordingly, this claim of error is moot. See Williams
v. State, 305 Ga. 776, 784 (4) (827 SE2d 849) (2019).
10
kicking was a cause of Gill’s death.
Mims, Michael, and Roy were jointly charged, “acting together
and as parties to the crime,” in beating Gill to death. See OCGA §
16-2-20 (b) (A person is a party to a crime if that person “[d]irectly
commits the crime; . . . [i]ntentionally aids or abets in the
commission of the crime; or . . . [i]ntentionally advises, encourages,
hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the crime.”). Properly
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, see Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979), the evidence showed that, after learning about Michael’s lost
or stolen money, Mims demanded that Gill get into the van; he
verbally encouraged the attack on Gill in the van; and he kicked Gill
while Gill lay on the ground. In the days before Mims and the others
were arrested, Mims acknowledged his involvement in the brutal
attack to the Bradshaws’ niece. And when Mims was arrested a few
days after the attack on Gill, Mims’s hands appeared swollen. The
evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mims was a party to Gill’s murder, and a
11
conviction for murder was therefore authorized. See id.(b) As to his robbery conviction, Mims argues that there was no
evidence that he took Gill’s shoes from Gill’s person by use of force,
as alleged in the indictment. Rather, he argues, Teresa’s testimony
shows that Michael took the shoes from Gill: Michael had the shoes
when he and Mims got back into the van; Michael tried the shoes on
first; and then Michael gave them to Mims. Mims argues that the
gas station security video could not support a finding that the white
shoes Mims was wearing were Gill’s shoes, which were never
recovered.
But Mims, Michael, and Roy were charged jointly with robbery,
“acting together and as parties to the crime,” by stealing Gill’s shoes.
The evidence shows that, before the attack, Gill was wearing his
bright white sneakers and that, after the attack, he was shoeless
when he made his way to a house to ask for help. Before being
arrested, Teresa told her niece that either Roy or Mims had taken
Gill’s shoes off, put the shoes on, and stomped Gill’s head with them.
And at trial, Teresa testified that, after the attack, Michael gave
12
Gill’s shoes to Mims, who was depicted wearing white sneakers in
the security video, rather than the dark beige Hush Puppy-type
shoes he had been wearing earlier. Irrespective of which person took
Gill’s shoes from his feet, the evidence was sufficient for a rational
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mims was a party to the
taking of Gill’s shoes by force. See Jackson, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B).
Case No. S21A0192
2. Michael contends that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his convictions because the only evidence that
he was more than merely present for the charged crimes was
accomplice testimony that was not corroborated by independent
evidence, as required by former OCGA § 24-4-8. 5 Specifically, he
argues that Teresa was an accomplice and that the only evidence
that he participated in the attack on Gill was introduced through
her trial testimony and her prior statements that she saw Michael
5 Under former OCGA § 24-4-8, which applied to the trial of the case in
2009, “[in] felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony
of a single witness is not sufficient [to establish a fact]. Nevertheless,
corroborating circumstances may dispense with the necessity for the testimony
of a second witness[.]”
13
hit Gill and saw Michael return to the van with Gill’s shoes after the
beating. Michael also argues that Teresa’s testimony that she heard
Mims make statements about Michael hitting Gill could not
corroborate her testimony, because Mims’s statements only came
into evidence through Teresa herself and are not independent of her
testimony as an accomplice.
Corroborating evidence that satisfies the requirements of
former OCGA § 24-4-8
may be circumstantial, it may be slight, and it need not of
itself be sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime
charged. It must, however, be independent of the
accomplice testimony and must directly connect the
defendant with the crime, or lead to the inference that he
is guilty. Slight evidence from an extraneous source
identifying the accused as a participant in the criminal act
is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice to support a
verdict.
Styles v. State, 309 Ga. 463, 466-467 (1) (847 SE2d 325) (2020)
(citation and punctuation omitted) (applying former OCGA § 24-4-
8). Teresa’s testimony and statements about Michael’s involvement
in the attack were corroborated, including by the testimony and
pretrial statement of his brother, Josh, that Michael was angry at
14
the loss of his money and, after Mims told Gill “get in the car or I’ll
kill you,” Michael opted to join in the excursion in the van to go to
Gill’s sister’s house to get money from her. Teresa’s statement was
also corroborated by the security video showing Mims, Michael, and
Teresa together, minutes after the beating, with Mims wearing
bright white shoes like Gill had been wearing that day and Michael
looking at his knuckles and shaking his right hand. This
circumstantial evidence might not be sufficient on its own to
authorize a conviction for murder and robbery, but it provided the
corroboration of Teresa’s testimony necessary for the jury to find
Michael guilty of those offenses. See Styles, 309 Ga. at 467 (1);
Taylor v. State, 297 Ga. 132, 135 (772 SE2d 630) (2015) (applying
former OCGA § 24-4-8). The record also shows that the evidence was
sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Michael guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crimes for which he was
convicted. See Jackson, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B).
3. Michael contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the admission of Roy’s custodial
15
statement. The statement at issue was introduced through the
sheriff, who testified that Roy admitted that he “popped [Gill] upside
the head,” hit him “probably about three times,” and “swung on
[him] a couple of times,” but claimed, “I didn’t do nothing like that
right there. Because, like I said, I didn’t have any money involved in
this.” 6 Although, as summarized by the sheriff, Roy did not refer to
Michael, Michael argues that, taken in context, Roy’s statement
obviously leads to the inference that Michael participated in the
attack. That context includes the evidence presented at trial that
Michael was the person who gave Gill the money that he lost and
that Michael was particularly interested in recouping his loss.
Because Roy’s statement implicated Michael, he argues,
introduction of the statement at trial violated his right to confront
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
6 During the hearing on Roy’s motion to exclude his custodial statement
the sheriff explained that Roy’s reference to something “like that right there”
was to a photograph of Gill after the attack that the sheriff showed to Roy
during the interview. The trial court denied Roy’s motion to exclude the
statement. The State opted to question the sheriff about the limited portions
of the statement set out above, however, and not to play the recording of the
interrogation for the jury, so the reference to something “like that right there”
was not explained to the jury.
16
Constitution and Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (88 SCt
1620, 20 LE2d 476) (1968), and failure to object on that ground was
deficient performance by trial counsel. Michael contends that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object because, without Roy’s
statement, the jury would have found that Teresa’s testimony about
Michael’s participation was not corroborated.
To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Michael “must prove both that his lawyer’s performance was
professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result.”
Styles, 309 Ga. at 471 (5) (citation and punctuation omitted). See
also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80
LE2d 674) (1984).
A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by the
witnesses against him is violated under Bruton
when co-defendants are tried jointly and the testimonial
statement of a co-defendant who does not testify at trial
is used to implicate another co-defendant in the crime.
However, Bruton excludes only the statement of a non-
testifying co-defendant that standing alone directly
inculpates the defendant. Bruton is not violated if a co-
defendant’s statement does not incriminate the defendant
17
on its face and only becomes incriminating when linked
with other evidence introduced at trial.
Pender v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (2) (a) (Case No. S20A1505, decided
Mar. 15, 2021) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Ardis v.
State, 290 Ga. 58, 60 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 526) (2011).
As Michael’s argument reveals, Roy’s statement only
incriminates Michael when combined with other evidence presented
at trial from which the jury could conclude that Michael participated
in beating Gill and taking his shoes. Consequently, admitting Roy’s
statement did not violate Michael’s right to confront witnesses
under the Sixth Amendment and Bruton. See Taylor v. State, 304
Ga. 41, 45-46 (2) (816 SE2d 17) (2018); McLean v. State, 291 Ga. 873,
876 (3) (738 SE2d 267) (2012). Any objection therefore would have
been futile, and “[t]he failure to make a meritless motion or objection
does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of
counsel.” White v. State, 307 Ga. 882, 889 (3) (c) (838 SE2d 828)
(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).
4. Michael contends that, even if Roy’s custodial statement did
18
not expressly implicate him, he was entitled under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution to have the jury instructed that it could consider Roy’s
statement only against Roy. Without such a limiting instruction,
Michael argues, the jury may have believed, wrongfully, that it could
consider Roy’s statement as corroboration of Teresa’s testimony
about Michael’s participation. As with his related claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, Michael contends that he was prejudiced
because, if the jury had been instructed to consider Roy’s statement
only against Roy, the jury would have found that Teresa’s testimony
about Michael’s participation was not corroborated. Consequently,
Michael contends, the trial court committed plain error by not
instructing the jury sua sponte that it could not consider Roy’s
statement as evidence of Michael’s guilt.
To establish plain error, the appellant
must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived,
the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable
dispute, the error must have affected his substantial
rights, and the error must have seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
19
proceedings. To show that his substantial rights were
affected, [the appellant] must make an affirmative
showing that the error probably did affect the outcome
below. If [the appellant] fails to meet any one of the
elements of the plain error test, his claim fails.
Armstrong v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (4) (852 SE2d 824) (2020) (citations
and punctuation omitted). Assuming without deciding that it was an
obvious error not to instruct the jury to limit its use of Roy’s
statement to the case against Roy,7 we conclude that Michael fails
to show that the error probably affected the outcome below.
Although Roy’s statement conveyed that he did not inflict Gill’s more
7 See Colton v. State, 292 Ga. 509, 511 (2) (739 SE2d 380) (2013) (“[A] co-
defendant’s statement meets the Confrontation Clause’s standard for
admissibility when it does not refer to the existence of the defendant and is
accompanied by instructions limiting its use to the case against the confessing
co-defendant.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); see also Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 211 (II) (107 SCt 1702, 95 LE2d 176) (1987) (“[T]he
Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying
codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when . . . the
confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any
reference to his or her existence.” (footnote omitted)); Suggested Pattern Jury
Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, § 1.31.93 (B) (4th ed., 2007, updated
January 2020) (“Any out-of-court statement made by one of the defendants on
trial in this case after the alleged criminal act has ended may be considered
only against the person who made the statement and only if you find that such
statement was freely and voluntarily made. If you find that an out-of-court
statement was made to the police freely and voluntarily by a defendant on trial
in this case, then you are to consider the statement only as against the
particular defendant who made it.”).
20
severe injuries, Roy did not directly identify Michael as a participant
in the attack, and there was other substantial evidence that
corroborated Teresa’s testimony about Michael’s participation, as
discussed above in Division 2. See White v. State, 270 Ga. 804, 810
(4) (b) (514 SE2d 14) (1999). Because Michael failed to show that the
trial court’s instructional error, if any, probably affected the outcome
of the trial, his plain error argument fails.
5. Michael contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object to prior consistent statements used to
bolster the State’s key witness. Specifically, Michael argues that
Teresa’s testimony that she saw Michael hit Gill and that she heard
Mims make statements about Michael’s involvement in the attack
were repeated multiple times through the sheriff and a detective,
who testified that Teresa said the same in her custodial statements. 8
8 On direct examination, the sheriff testified that Teresa told him that
Michael “was back there [in the van] beating [Gill’s] tail” and that “Mims
bragged on his son about his son’s skill beating the man” and about “the
prowess of his son’s fighting.” On cross-examination by Roy’s attorney, the
sheriff testified that Teresa stated that Michael “was back there hitting on Mr.
Gill.” On direct examination, the detective testified that Teresa “mentioned
21
The court instructed the jury to consider prior consistent statements
as substantive evidence. Michael argues that, even if Teresa’s prior
statements were introduced to show that, in her trial testimony, she
was trying to minimize Roy’s involvement, the statements relating
to Michael would not be admissible to rebut a claim of fabrication or
motive relating to Roy. And, Michael argues, even if the defendants
attacked Teresa’s credibility generally, impeachment does not open
the door for bolstering the witness’s credibility with prior consistent
statements.
At the hearing on Michael’s motion for a new trial, his trial
counsel was not asked, and did not volunteer, his rationale in not
objecting to testimony about Teresa’s prior consistent statements.
Even assuming that Teresa’s prior consistent statements were
objectionable under then-prevailing law, 9 without trial counsel’s
that Mims, Sr. was bragging about his son hitting [Gill] inside of the van, that
he could feel the breeze off of his son’s fists as he came around to strike Mr.
Gill.”
9 At the time of Michael’s trial in 2009, Georgia case law established that
a witness’s prior consistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence at
trial but
22
testimony or some other evidence explaining the basis for his
decisions, Michael cannot overcome the presumption that those
decisions were strategic. See Hill v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (10) (850
SE2d 110) (2020). Teresa’s pretrial custodial statements, like her
trial testimony, tended to minimize the role of her husband Roy and
to focus blame on Michael and Mims for the fatal injuries inflicted
on Gill. But those custodial statements, like Teresa’s trial testimony,
contrasted with her pretrial confidences to her niece and best friend
when Teresa spoke about being surprised by Roy’s prowess as a
fighter and did not mention Michael throwing even a single punch.
In light of this contrast, opting not to object to testimony about
Teresa’s custodial statements was within the realm of objectively
reasonable trial strategy, as the trial court found. See Gardner v.
only where (1) the veracity of a witness’s trial testimony has been
placed in issue at trial; (2) the witness is present at trial; and (3)
the witness is available for cross-examination. A witness’s veracity
is placed in issue so as to permit the introduction of a prior
consistent statement only if affirmative charges of recent
fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive are raised
during cross-examination.
Broner v. State, 284 Ga. 402, 403 (2) (667 SE2d 613) (2008) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
23
State, __ Ga. __, __ (2) (852 SE2d 574) (2020) (“[D]ecisions regarding
trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness
claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent
attorney would have followed such a course.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). Consequently, Michael’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel fails. See Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140, 148 (3)
(g) (829 SE2d 321) (2019).
Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.
24