State v. Britton ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 16, 2023
S23A0102. THE STATE v. BRITTON.
MCMILLIAN, Justice.
Manvel Britton was charged with murder and other offenses in
connection with the fatal shooting of Eddy Leonardo. 1 The State
appeals the trial court’s grant of Britton’s motion to suppress
evidence from his cell phone records obtained pursuant to a search
warrant (the “Warrant”) during the police investigation into that
death. 2 The trial court found that the affidavit for the Warrant (the
“Affidavit”) contained a material misrepresentation which tainted
the entire document, and, with that misrepresentation excluded, the
1Britton is charged with murder, felony murder (4 counts), criminal
attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon (2 counts). The case was orally argued on March
29, 2023.
2 See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4).
Affidavit failed to establish the requisite probable cause to issue the
Warrant. The trial court further found a “discrepancy” in the
Affidavit that it determined affected the validity of the Warrant. The
State argues on appeal that in reaching these conclusions, the trial
court did not properly apply the law and failed to give proper
deference to the magistrate judge who issued the Warrant. We agree
and reverse for the reasons set forth below.
The Affidavit recites the following. On February 1, 2020,
officers from the Roswell Police Department responded to a report
of a shooting at a supermarket. When the officers arrived on the
scene, they discovered Leonardo lying on the pavement in the
parking lot with a gunshot wound to his torso. The officers also
located a plastic bag containing a large sum of U.S. currency.
Leonardo was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced
dead.
Witnesses at the scene told the police officers that they had
earlier seen an “unknown black male” exit the passenger side of a
black Dodge Charger and approach Leonardo. The man got into a
2
physical altercation with Leonardo, then pulled a gun out of his
waistband, and fired one shot. Leonardo fell to the ground. The
unknown man got back into the Charger on the passenger side, and
the car sped northbound on Alpharetta Highway. Based on this
information, the officers consulted a nearby stationary license plate
reader (“LPR”) to search for any vehicles matching the witnesses’
description and determined that a matching car had passed the
LPR’s location a few minutes prior to the incident. A search of other
LPRs in the area revealed that the same black Dodge Charger had
been in the vicinity of a bank where Leonardo made a stop earlier in
the day, and video footage from a fast food restaurant showed that,
approximately 15 minutes before the shooting, a black Dodge
Charger was there at the same time Leonardo purchased food from
the restaurant.3 The Charger followed Leonardo’s truck out of the
restaurant’s parking lot and onto the roadway.
Video footage from a location across the street from the
3 Police discovered a receipt for this purchase in Leonardo’s truck,
leading them to obtain the video footage.
3
supermarket showed Leonardo arriving there in his truck, followed
by a black Dodge Charger, which pulled in behind the truck. An
unknown person then exited the Charger and appeared to head
toward the truck. That same camera recorded the Charger exiting
the supermarket’s parking lot “at a high rate of speed” and heading
northbound on Alpharetta Highway.
The Roswell officers obtained the license plate number for the
black Dodge Charger from the LPRs and used that information to
identify the vehicle’s owner as James Travious English, Britton’s co-
defendant. The police later obtained a search warrant to obtain “call
detail records with historical cell tower and geographical location
data” for English’s cell phone number. The search warrant also
authorized the phone company to release “real time geographic
location pinging of the phone number.” From this information,
officers discovered that the movements of the phone mirrored the
movements of the Dodge Charger on the day of the shooting. Police
arrested English, and, after impounding the Charger, obtained a
warrant to search the vehicle. Britton’s fingerprints were discovered
4
inside the Charger, and English’s phone records showed that his
phone and Britton’s phone “had been communicating around the
time of Leonardo’s murder.”
On February 3, 2020, Roswell police applied for a search
warrant to T-Mobile for Britton’s phone records. The Affidavit stated
that one of the fingerprints in the Dodge Charger belonged to
Britton, who was found to have a criminal history including armed
robbery, thefts, and carrying a weapon in the commission of a felony.
The Affidavit also stated that from a review of English’s “historical
phone records, it was discovered that he was in extensive
communication with Britton around the time of the reported
crimes.” A Fulton County magistrate judge issued the Warrant to T-
Mobile for “[s]ubscriber information[,] call detail records,” “historical
GPS/cell tower location” records, and “real time GPS location
(pinging)” information for Britton’s cell phone.
Britton was arrested for Leonardo’s murder on February 11,
2020, and, on November 9, 2021, he filed a motion to suppress his
cell phone location records seized pursuant to the Warrant (the “cell
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phone location records”).
Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting
the motion to suppress based on its findings that the Affidavit
contained both a material misrepresentation and a discrepancy that
undercut the Warrant’s validity. Specifically, the trial court found
that the Affidavit materially misrepresented that English was in
“extensive communication with Britton around the time of the
reported crimes” because cell phone records showed that on the day
of Leonardo’s shooting English’s phone and Britton’s phone
exchanged only thirteen calls, six of those calls were missed calls,
and the remaining seven only lasted a total of two minutes and forty-
two seconds. (Emphasis in original.) The trial court further found
that this “material falsehood” tainted the entire Affidavit, and that
without this “material falsehood,” the Affidavit lacked sufficient
evidence to support probable cause because the existence of Britton’s
fingerprint in English’s car that was seized two days after the
shooting did not place him in the car at the time of the shooting and
the only description of the alleged assailant was that he was an
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“unknown black male,” and “Britton was not identified as being on
the scene or being the assailant or even being a black male.”
The trial court also questioned the veracity of the affiant due
to a discrepancy on the face of the Affidavit. The body of the Affidavit
began with the sentence: “The undersigned Charles Jackson being
duly sworn, deposes and says: I am a Georgia certified peace officer
charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal laws . . . .” but then
further in the Affidavit, it states: “I Detective Irving am a sworn
police in State of Georgia [sic] and am POST certified . . . . I attest
the facts and circumstances below are true and accurate to the best
of my knowledge.” (Emphases in original.) However, the Affidavit
was then signed by “Charles Jackson.” Although the State claimed
that the change from Charles Jackson to Detective Irving was a
scrivener’s error, the trial court rejected that argument, pointing out
that the State put on no evidence to support the claim. The trial
court concluded that “[d]ue to each of these deficiencies, either one
of which would independently support this Court’s finding [that the
affiant lacked veracity], it is clear that the State has not met its
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burden” to support the Warrant and ordered that all evidence of
Britton’s cell phone location information be excluded at trial. This
appeal followed.
1. At the outset, we recount the applicable standard of review
for analyzing a magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant.
A search warrant will issue only based upon an oath or
affirmation stating “facts sufficient to show probable cause that a
crime is being committed or has been committed.” OCGA § 17-5-21
(a). The magistrate’s task in determining if probable cause exists to
issue a search warrant
is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of
knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular place.
Moon v. State, 312 Ga. 31, 57 (4) (860 SE2d 519) (2021) (citation
omitted). See also Copeland v. State, 314 Ga. 44, 49 (3) (875 SE2d
636) (2022) (“The probable cause test requires only a fair
probability—less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion of
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possibility—which by no means is to be equated with proof by even
so much as a preponderance of the evidence.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). And in analyzing probable cause, “a
magistrate may draw ‘reasonable inferences from the material
supplied to him by applicants for a warrant.’” Taylor v. State, 303
Ga. 57, 61 (2) (810 SE2d 113) (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 240 (III) (103 SCt 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983) (punctuation
omitted). Therefore, “[t]he test for probable cause is not a
hypertechnical one to be employed by legal technicians, but is based
on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men act.” Id. at 60-61 (2) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
If a magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant is
challenged, the trial court provides “a first level of review, guided by
the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted
pursuant to a warrant, and the principle that substantial deference
must be accorded a magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant
based on a finding of probable cause.” Palmer v. State, 310 Ga. 668,
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672 (2) (853 SE2d 650) (2021) (citation omitted).
A deferential standard of review is appropriate to further
the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant. Although in a
particular case it may not be easy to determine when an
affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause,
the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area
should be largely determined by the preference to be
accorded to warrants.
State v. Palmer, 285 Ga. 75, 77-78 (673 SE2d 237) (2009) (citation
omitted). See also Taylor, 303 Ga. at 61 (2) (“even doubtful cases
should be resolved in favor of upholding a warrant”) (citation
omitted)).
On appeal, we review the grant of a search warrant by
considering the totality of the circumstances “to determine if the
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed to issue the search warrant.” Moon, 312 Ga. at 57 (4)
(citation omitted). See also Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (III) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment requires no more.”). And in reviewing the trial
court’s grant of Britton’s motion to suppress in this case, because the
State elected at the hearing on the motion to suppress to stand on
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the facts as averred on the face of the Affidavit and neither party
produced any witnesses to supplement the Affidavit, we apply a de
novo review to the trial court’s application of the law to those facts,
bearing in mind the substantial deference owed to the magistrate’s
decision to issue the search warrant based on a finding of probable
cause. See Moon, 312 Ga. at 57-58 (4).
2. Turning to the trial court’s first ground for granting the
motion to suppress – its finding that the Affidavit’s averment that
English “was in extensive communication with Britton around the
time of the reported crimes” was “a material and false
representation” – we are guided by the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (98 SCt 2674,
57 LE2d 667) (1978). Franks explains that
where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary
showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a
hearing be held at the defendant’s request.
Id. at 155-56. See also Palmer, 310 Ga. at 673-74 (2) (b). Franks
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further provides that if a preponderance of the evidence at the
hearing supports a finding of intentional or knowing falsehood or
reckless disregard for the truth, the trial court must then view the
affidavit with its “false material set to one side,” and if
the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to
establish probable cause, the search warrant must be
voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same
extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the
affidavit.
438 U.S. at 155-56. Under Franks, therefore, the trial court excludes
the alleged falsehood from its probable cause analysis only if the
preponderance of the evidence establishes an intentional or knowing
falsehood or a reckless disregard for the truth. See also Palmer, 310
Ga. at 674 (2) (b) (applying the preponderance of the evidence test
set out in Franks).
Here, Britton moved to suppress his cell phone location records
under Franks, asserting that the Affidavit’s reference to “extensive
communication” between English and Britton “was false and was
known to be false and presented in reckless disregard for the truth.”
In support of his motion, Britton produced copies of English’s cell
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phone records, but he did not argue to the trial court at the motion
hearing that the alleged misrepresentation was intentional,
knowing, or reckless. No witnesses testified at the hearing, and no
other evidence was presented addressing Britton’s allegation that
the representation was “known to be false” or “presented in reckless
disregard for the truth.” The trial court determined that the
representation of “extensive communication” between English and
Britton was “a material falsehood” that “taints the entire warrant”
and showed that “the affiant in this case lacks veracity” but did not
make a determination as to whether this “falsehood” was made
knowingly, intentionally, or in reckless disregard for the truth.
Pretermitting whether the trial court erred in finding a Franks
violation without considering whether the representation was made
knowingly, intentionally, or in reckless disregard for the truth, 4 we
4As we conclude below, the phrase “extensive communication” does not
equate to a quantifiable number of contacts and is a subjective description of
the contacts such that under Franks, it is that much harder to show that the
representation was made intentionally and knowing that it was false or in
reckless disregard for the truth. However, we need not further parse this issue
because we determine that the trial court erred in finding that a
misrepresentation was made at all.
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conclude, after applying our de novo review of the Affidavit and the
evidence presented at the hearing, that the trial court erred in
finding that the statement that English “was in extensive
communication with Britton around the time of the reported crimes”
was a misrepresentation or falsehood.
The only evidence presented at the hearing on this issue was
the Affidavit and a copy of English’s cell phone records. The trial
court found that there was no “extensive communication” because
there were “only” thirteen calls between English’s and Britton’s
phones on the day of the shooting; six of those thirteen were missed
calls; of the remaining seven calls, most lasted “only” three or four
seconds; all the calls combined amounted to a total of “only” two
minutes and forty-two seconds; and “only” one of the phone calls
lasted more than one minute. (Emphasis in original.)
But the term “extensive communication” can encompass a
range of contacts during an unspecified period of time. See Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
(defining “extensive” as “having wide or considerable extent” and
14
defining “extent” as “the range over which something extends”)
(website last accessed May 2, 2023). Although the truth or falsity of
an objective statement concerning the date, time, number, and
duration of the cell phone calls between English and Britton might
have been discernible from the evidence presented, the truth or
falsity of the Affidavit’s statement that the communication was
“extensive” is not discernible from the evidence here, because it
reflects a subjective description of what English’s cell phone records
show. 5
Also, nothing in the Affidavit expressly limited the use of the
phrase “extensive communication” to the day Leonardo was shot.
Rather, the Affidavit referred to “extensive communication around
the time of the reported crimes.” (Emphasis supplied.) The cell phone
records show that English and Britton exchanged fourteen phone
5 We acknowledge that under different circumstances, such as if the
records had shown only a single brief call or text message between English and
Britton, the truth or falsity of the statement may have been more easily
discernible from the evidence at the hearing. But because the cell phone
records in this case reflect a number of communications between the two,
whether that communication was “extensive” was a matter of perception and
thus a subjective determination.
15
calls in an approximately seven-hour period, from 5:00 p.m. until
shortly before midnight, on the day before Leonardo’s death,
January 31, 2020. Thus, the cell phone records show a total of 27
attempted and completed phone calls in an approximately 31-hour
period surrounding the shooting. Fifteen of the calls took place
before the shooting occurred, and those calls had a total duration of
over 44 minutes. Given the number of contacts between Britton and
English on the day before and the day of Leonardo’s shooting, we
cannot say based on the evidence presented that the phrase
“extensive communication” as used in the Affidavit was false.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in determining that the
statement was a misrepresentation and a falsehood and further
erred by setting aside the statement concerning extensive
communications in conducting its probable cause analysis. 6
6 The trial court further erred in conducting its probable cause analysis
to exclude not only the descriptive phrase “extensive communication,” with
which it disagreed, but also to exclude consideration of any communications
between English and Britton where the Affidavit also referenced their
communications without the modifier “extensive” and the cell phone records
clearly show that they were communicating both before and after the shooting.
16
3. Our analysis on appeal does not end here because we must
also determine whether probable cause exists to support the
Warrant if the trial court had properly considered the averment
about the communications between Britton and English. The
Affidavit stated that eyewitnesses told police, and security footage
showed, that Leonardo was shot by someone in a black Dodge
Charger and that the shooter exited the passenger side of the car,
which supported that two people were in the car at the time
Leonardo was killed. After the black Dodge Charger was identified
by its license plate number, additional LPR data and security
footage showed that the Charger followed Leonardo’s vehicle as he
went to the bank and ordered food before proceeding to the
supermarket where the shooting occurred. English was then
identified as the car’s owner, and his cell phone records were
obtained pursuant to a search warrant. English’s cell phone records
showed that the movement of his phone mirrored the movements of
the Dodge Charger on the day of the shooting and further showed
multiple calls with Britton around the time of Leonardo’s shooting.
17
After police seized the Dodge Charger pursuant to a warrant,
Britton’s fingerprints were found in the car.
Considering the totality of the circumstances as presented in
the Affidavit and applying substantial deference to the magistrate’s
decision, as we must, we conclude that the magistrate had a
substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed to
issue the Warrant, and the trial court erred in granting the motion
to suppress on this ground. See Copeland, 314 Ga. at 50 (3)
(sufficient probable cause to authorize search warrant for cell phone
records based in part on volume of calls between defendant and his
girlfriend, who was an ex-girlfriend of the victim); Moon, 312 Ga. at
58 (4) (magistrate had substantial basis for finding probable cause
based on affidavit citing, in part, video recordings of the rental car
used in the shooting, phone records showing one of the phones
purchased by individual using the rental car had been used in close
proximity to the scene of the crime around the time of the shooting,
and defendant’s fingerprints were found on the hood of rental car).
4. The trial court also cited a second ground for granting the
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motion to dismiss, relying on what it termed “a discrepancy” in the
Affidavit.
Britton asserted in his motion to suppress that “the affiant’s
identity is unclear” 7 and argued on appeal that, as a result, the
Affidavit is invalid on its face. At the hearing on the motion,
Britton’s attorney noted that the first page of the Affidavit begins
with the sentence, “The undersigned Charles Jackson being duly
sworn, deposes and says: I am a Georgia certified peace officer
charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal laws. . .” and that
“[t]he facts tending to establish probable cause that a crime has been
. . . committed are as follows.” But the Affidavit then states:
I, Detective Irving, am a sworn police [sic] in State of
Georgia and am POST certified. I am employed by the
Roswell Police Department and currently assigned the
criminal investigations division. Obtaining and executing
arrest and search warrants are a routine part of my daily
job. I have been employed in law enforcement for almost
7 Britton’s motion also asserted that the affiant “was not a Georgia-
certified peace officer,” but he does not press this assertion on appeal. And, in
fact, Britton notes in his supplemental brief that in two other search warrant
affidavits in the record, Charles Jackson stated, “I am a POST certified
Detective in the State of Georgia. I have been a police Detective for over 6 years
and currently work for the Roswell Police Department and I am assigned to
investigate fraud.”
19
10 years and a sworn police officer/ detective for 9 years.
I attest the facts and circumstances below are true and
accurate to the best of my knowledge. The information
was obtained through an investigation and from
information relayed to me through other law enforcement
personnel.
(Emphasis in original.) Based on this language, Britton argued that
Detective Irving actually was the affiant, and because he did not
sign the Affidavit, it is invalid.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State elected to
defend the viability of the Affidavit but countered that the reference
to Detective Irving on the second page of the Affidavit was a
scrivener’s error. However, neither Detective Jackson, nor Detective
Irving testified at the motion hearing, and no other evidence was
presented in this regard, which the trial court noted in rejecting the
State’s argument. The trial court ultimately concluded that the
veracity of the affiant was in question because it was unclear
whether Detective Jackson or Detective Irving was the affiant, and
also granted the motion to suppress on this alternate basis.
We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the inclusion
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of Detective Irving’s statement renders the Affidavit invalid on its
face.8 Pretermitting whether the inclusion of Detective Irving’s
name in the Affidavit was the result of a scrivener’s error, the
Affidavit makes clear that Detective Jackson was its maker and that
he was averring to the information included in that document.
On the first page of the Affidavit, Detective Jackson states
that, “being duly sworn,” he “deposes and says.” The word “depose”
in this context means “[t]o testify; to bear witness,” see Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (second definition of “depose”), and the
recitation that Detective Jackson has been sworn indicates that he
was providing the information in the Affidavit under oath. See id.
8 However, we agree with the trial court that the State’s assertion of a
“scrivener’s error” required the State to produce evidence of that fact to prevail
on that theory. The State asserted at the hearing that it was standing on the
Affidavit as presented. See State v. Slaughter, 252 Ga. 435, 437 (315 SE2d 865)
(1984) (“On the other hand, a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant,
regular and proper on its face, is presumed to be valid and the burden is on the
person who moves to suppress the items found to show that the search warrant
was invalid.”). But the State cannot at the same time rely on the Affidavit
alone as proof of the Warrant’s validity and also contend that the Court should
substitute “Detective Jackson” in place of “Detective Irving,” which can be
construed as an acknowledgement that the Affidavit is not correct on its face.
This issue does not affect our analysis, however, because we conclude that the
Affidavit is valid on its face.
21
(defining “sworn statement” as “[a] statement given under oath; an
affidavit”). In addition, the signature page of the Affidavit expressly
identifies the affiant as Charles Jackson under the language, “I
swear or affirm that all of the information contained in this Affidavit
and all other testimony given by me under oath is true to the best of
my knowledge and belief.” A signature appears on that line, and the
magistrate judge’s signature appears below the language identifying
the affiant as “Charles Jackson.” The magistrate’s signature is
under additional language indicating that the Affidavit was “[s]worn
to and subscribed to” before her.
Britton argues, however, that the Affidavit has not, in fact,
been signed by the affiant because the contested language appears
to indicate that Detective Irving is attesting to certain facts, the
signature is illegible, and there is no proof that Detective Irving
signed the Affidavit. But this argument ignores the magistrate’s
attestation that Detective Jackson, not Detective Irving, was the
affiant and that Detective Jackson signed the document in her
presence, which negates any ambiguity in the affiant’s signature
22
itself. Moreover, the Affidavit shows that Detective Jackson swore
or affirmed that all of the information contained in the Affidavit,
which includes Detective Irving’s statement, was true to the best of
his knowledge and belief. Accordingly, the trial court erred to the
extent that it found that the Affidavit was invalid based on the
failure to identify the affiant when the face of the Affidavit showed
that the affiant was Detective Jackson. See Post v. State, 298 Ga.
241, 243 (1) (779 SE2d 624) (2015) (addressing motion to recuse in a
criminal case and providing that to be legally sufficient, an affidavit
“must contain the three elements essential to a complete affidavit:
(a) a written oath embodying the facts as sworn by the affiant; (b)
the signature of the affiant; and (c) the attestation by an officer
authorized to administer the oath that the affidavit was actually
sworn by the affiant before the officer” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).
Moreover, it is well settled that an application for a search
warrant may be supported by hearsay. See Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 271 (80 SCt 725, 4 LE2d 697) (1960) (fact that affidavit
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submitted in support of search warrant relied on hearsay was not
alone sufficient to render affidavit invalid), overruled on other
grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (100 SCt 2547, 65
LE2d 619) (1980); State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 183 (311 SE2d
823) (1984) (“Probable cause does not demand the certainty we
associate with formal trials.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Cf.
Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 224 Ga. 859, 864-65 (165 SE2d 302) (1968)
(finding it well settled that probable cause to arrest may be
established by hearsay evidence). Therefore, a warrant would be
valid, even if an attesting officer swears to things in the affidavit he
heard from another officer and even if he repeats the other officer’s
statements verbatim. And such hearsay information properly may
be provided by other police officers participating in the
investigation. See Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 754-55 (2) (b) (279
SE2d 678) (1981) (“Local law enforcement officers participating in a
common investigation are reliable informants. Information provided
by police officers, arising out of an official investigation, may be used
to establish probable cause for a search warrant.” (citations and
24
punctuation omitted)). Accordingly, even though the contested
language is phrased as Detective Irving’s attestation that he, not
Detective Jackson, took the investigative steps described, Detective
Jackson’s oath swearing to the veracity of that information, attests
that such actions were, in fact, taken. And under the circumstances
of this case, the magistrate could reasonably infer that Detective
Irving took the steps described and relayed the resulting
information to Detective Jackson.
This Court addressed a somewhat analogous situation in
Dudley v. State, 228 Ga. 551 (186 SE2d 875) (1972). There, the police
officer applying for a search warrant attached an affidavit made by
him and also an affidavit of a federal agent stationed in Miami,
Florida, who had been working jointly with Atlanta police on the
investigation. The federal agent’s affidavit had information on
which Georgia police sought to rely in obtaining the warrant. The
defendant argued that the affidavit of the police officer, the only one
who appeared in person to obtain the search warrant, was based on
the affidavit of another, and that probable cause was not shown in
25
the police officer’s affidavit. We concluded that “[t]he hearsay
information relied on by [the police officer] was mainly from fellow
officers engaged in the same investigation, and under such
circumstances the hearsay information was sufficient evidence of
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.” Id. at 560 (7).
Here when Detective Jackson’s Affidavit includes information
obtained from another officer working on the investigation, the
magistrate was entitled to consider such hearsay evidence.
Therefore, we conclude that the magistrate properly could rely on
the Affidavit in determining that probable cause existed to issue the
Warrant.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Britton’s motion
to suppress on this ground.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.
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