Burley v. State ( 2023 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 31, 2023
S23A0322. BURLEY v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
A Calhoun County jury found Undrea Burley guilty of felony
murder in connection with the beating death of Joshua Brooks. 1
Burley contends the trial court committed plain error by failing to
1 On March 30, 2017, a Calhoun County grand jury indicted Undrea
Burley and co-defendants Wesley Adams, Shakera Burns, and Demetrious
Smith for offenses in connection with the beating death of Joshua Brooks, an
inmate of Calhoun State Prison. In Count 1 of the indictment, Burley, Adams,
Burns, and Smith were charged with felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault (“irrespective of malice”); in Count 2, they were charged with
aggravated assault “with intent to murder.” In Count 3, Burley, Adams, and
Smith were charged with violating the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention
Act. In Count 4, Smith was separately charged with violating the Street Gang
and Terrorism Prevention Act. The charges against Burns (a corrections
officer) were severed, and she was to be tried separately. The jury acquitted
Smith of all charges. The trial court directed a verdict of not guilty as to Count
3 of the indictment, and the jury found Adams and Burley guilty on Counts 1
and 2. At sentencing, the trial court merged Count 2 into Count 1. The trial
court sentenced Burley to life in prison without the possibility of parole on
Count 1. Burley filed a timely motion for a new trial on December 21, 2018,
and amended it on September 12, 2019. The trial court denied the motion on
September 14, 2020. Burley filed a notice of appeal on September 23, 2020, and
the appeal was docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2022
and orally argued on March 29, 2023.
instruct the jury sua sponte on the elements of malice murder
because the indictment charged Burley and his co-defendants,
Wesley Adams and Demetrious Smith, with felony murder
predicated on “aggravated assault with intent to murder.” As
explained below, the trial court’s instructions concerning the
offenses of felony murder and aggravated assault with intent to
murder, though erroneous, did not constitute plain error requiring
reversal. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
The evidence presented at trial showed the following. At about
9:00 p.m. on June 9, 2016, cell block H-1 of the Calhoun State Prison
was “put on lockdown” following a fight between inmates. Prison
surveillance video reveals that, as the lockdown began, inmates
Burley, Adams, and Brooks entered cell 107 of the H-1 block just
before the cell doors closed and locked. An hour and a half later,
Correctional Officer Shakera Burns can be seen slipping a note
beneath the door of cell 107. Security video recordings show that cell
107 – and all of the cells on cell block H-1 – remained locked from
9:00 p.m. on June 9 until shortly after noon the following day. A
2
video recording of the cell block shows that the inmates began
leaving their respective cells as soon as the cell doors opened at
12:12 p.m. on June 10. The video also shows several emergency
response officers entering the cell block to maintain order. At 1:03
p.m., after speaking with an inmate who approached him, a
corrections officer walked to and entered cell 107. Seconds later, the
officer called for the cell block to be locked down again.
One of the prison’s emergency response officers testified that
he was summoned to cell 107 after the cell block was put on
lockdown for the second time. Once there, he found Brooks on the
bottom bunk, “laying there stiff.” He concluded that Brooks was
dead because “rigor mortis had set in.” Nevertheless, prison medical
personnel moved Brooks’s body to the floor outside the cell and
began CPR. At about 4:00 p.m., agents of the Georgia Bureau of
Investigation arrived to investigate the death and to process the
crime scene.
GBI Agent Chris Samra testified that, when he arrived at the
cell block, he noticed that Brooks’s body, though clearly presenting
3
signs of “blunt force trauma, shoe prints, [and] numerous defensive
wounds,” was unusually clean and devoid of blood, leading him to
believe that “somebody cleaned the stuff up.” Agent Samra also
smelled “a strong odor of a cleaning agent,” which he suspected was
“Clorox” bleach, coming from inside cell 107. He observed that the
cell walls had been “wiped down.” While a forensic team processed
the cell, GBI agents reviewed the prison’s security video recordings.
The security video recordings, which were played for the jury,
showed that at 12:12 p.m. Burley and Adams emerged from cell 107
and stood together for a few moments, blocking the entrance to the
cell as corrections officers and inmates walked by them. Then, at
12:36 p.m. Adams took items from the cell and put them in a
trashcan. Moments later, co-defendant Smith joined Adams and
Burley and helped them mix cleaning solutions together in a bottle.
Adams took the bottle and returned to cell 107.
Inmate Brandon Walker testified that he spoke with Brooks
just before the lockdown and observed that Brooks appeared healthy
and uninjured. Inmate Jason White testified that he heard what he
4
assumed was Brooks being beaten throughout the night of June 9
by his cellmates, Adams and Burley. He also heard “a lot of
catcalling and hollers from other cells, [about] what to do to that boy
that night.” Inmate Demetrious Teague gave a statement to
investigators that Smith had ordered his fellow gang members,
Adams and Burley, to beat Brooks to death. At trial, however, he
denied having heard such orders.
Following the discovery of Brooks’s body in cell 107, Adams and
Burley were taken to separate cells. A corrections officer testified
that, as he walked Adams to a cell, Adams asked him if he was going
to be interviewed by an investigator. When the officer responded
“yes,” Adams volunteered that he, Burley, and Brooks had been
“wrestling” in cell 107 that night.
In cell 107, investigators identified several items that belonged
to Brooks, Burley, and Adams. They found blood-stained white
towels that smelled of bleach on top of a locker inside the cell. They
recovered a bottle containing a cloudy white liquid that also smelled
of bleach. They found blood residue throughout cell 107, including
5
on the walls, toilet, lockers, desks, door frame, radiator heater,
bunkbed, and bed ladder. The investigators also examined the
clothing Burley was wearing on June 10. Although his outer
garments were clean, they found bloodstains on Burley’s socks and
boxer shorts.
The investigators collected four bags containing items that
Adams had put in the trashcan. The bags contained damp clothing
and white bedsheets that smelled of bleach and had what appeared
to be bloodstains. The investigators identified Brooks’s blood-
spattered pants and Burley’s prison-issued pants, braided belt, and
blood-spattered white t-shirt. They also found a round, metal
combination lock inside a white sock – an item an officer testified
could be used as a weapon. Brooks’s personal items, other clothing,
and an identification card were also recovered from the bags of
trash. Although most of the blood samples analyzed were too
degraded by bleach for DNA-testing, investigators were able to
extract DNA from a blood stain on Adams’s boot. That DNA sample
matched Brooks’s DNA profile. Fingernail clippings from Burley and
6
Brooks did not yield any identifiable DNA for comparison purposes.
Investigators photographed injuries that Burley and Adams
had recently sustained to their bodies. Those photographs, which
were introduced in evidence, showed the following: Burley’s left eye
was bloodshot; he had scratches on his body and face; his knuckles
were bruised; and he had a bite mark on his body. Adams had
sustained similar recent injuries.
A GBI forensic pathologist autopsied Brooks’s body. The
autopsy revealed that Brooks suffered numerous deep, blunt-force
injuries to his head, forearm, chest, abdomen, arms, and legs.
Brooks’s head was so battered that it was asymmetrical, lumpy,
swollen, and “very pliable, mushy. It kind of felt like Play-Doh[.]”
His brain had swollen “massively,” as a result of blunt force injury.
He suffered seven broken ribs on the right side of his body and six
on the left, and he had a large amount of blood in his chest cavity.
Some of Brooks’s wounds had patterns that matched those of the
combination lock that Adams put in the trash. Brooks’s injuries were
“layered” and showed different rates of swelling, indicating that the
7
beating had occurred over “an extended period of time.”
The pathologist testified that Brooks’s injuries occurred within
12 hours of his death, and some may have been inflicted as he died.
His body showed signs of “agonal” vomiting, which occurs when
someone is dying of severe injuries. The pathologist explained that
it was very unlikely that Brooks sustained his injuries before he
entered the cell because Brooks could not have walked unaided into
cell 107 with his severe head injuries and numerous broken ribs. The
pathologist opined that Brooks likely lingered in a comatose or semi-
comatose state for a period of time after his beating and before his
death. The pathologist determined that Brooks’s death was a
homicide and that all of his injuries contributed to his death.
In his sole claim of error, Burley contends that the trial court
committed plain error “when it failed to instruct the petit jury on
the elements of malice murder because the grand jury indicted
[Burley] for the crime of aggravated assault with intent to commit
murder.” Burley contends this erroneous instruction tainted the
jury’s verdicts for both aggravated assault and felony murder.
8
The record shows that the State indicted Burley and his co-
defendants as follows. In Count 1, the defendants were charged
with the offense of Felony Murder for that the said
accused . . . , while in the commission of a felony,
Aggravated Assault, did cause the death of Joshua
Brooks, a human being, irrespective of malice, by
participating in the beating or allowing the beating of said
victim Joshua Brooks resulting in and causing broken
ribs, blunt force trauma and death, contrary to the laws
of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof.
In Count 2, the defendants were charged
with the offense of Aggravated Assault for that the said
accused . . . , did make an assault upon the person of
Joshua Brooks with intent to murder by beating or
allowing the beating of said victim, causing numerous
injuries to victim, including broken ribs and blunt force
trauma and death, contrary to the laws of said State, the
good order, peace and dignity thereof.
It does not appear from the record that the parties filed written
requests to charge that defined the specific crimes set forth in the
indictment. Rather, it appears that the trial court supplied the
parties with a copy of its proposed charge prior to the close of
evidence. During the charge conference, neither the judge nor
counsel commented on any apparent conflict between the lack of a
9
malicious intent to kill element in the felony murder count
(“irrespective of malice”) and the specific intent to murder element
in the aggravated assault count as drafted (“with intent to
murder”). 2 Nor was there any discussion concerning the type of
aggravated assault 3 asserted as the predicate offense or whether the
felony murder count set forth within that count the crime of
aggravated assault or relied on the separate aggravated assault
count to supply the elements of the required predicate offense. 4
2 “Unlike malice murder, felony murder does not require intent to kill;
rather, the defendant only must have intended to commit the underlying
felony.” (Footnote omitted.) Oliver v. State, 274 Ga. 539, 540 (2) (554 SE2d 474)
(2001). In this case, if the separate aggravated assault count (Count 2) was
intended to supply the underlying predicate felony for the felony murder count
(Count 1), there exists a conflict between the “irrespective of malice” language
in the felony murder count and the “intent to murder” language in the
separately charged aggravated assault count. In a prosecution for murder, the
express or implied malice the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
“incorporates the intent to kill.” Latimore v. State, 262 Ga. 448, 450 (421 SE2d
281) (1992).
3 OCGA §16-5-21 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person commits
the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults: (1) With intent to
murder, to rape, or to rob; (2) With a deadly weapon or with any object, device,
or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or
actually does result in serious bodily injury[.]”
4 “In order to satisfy due process when an indictment charges a
compound felony such as felony murder, the count charging the compound
offense must contain the essential elements of the predicate offense, or the
indictment must contain a separate count charging the predicate offense
10
Nevertheless, the trial court assumed that Count 2 supplied the
predicate offense for Count 1 and instructed the jury on felony
murder and aggravated assault as follows:
A person commits the crime of murder when in the
commission of a felony that person causes the death of
another human being. Under the laws of Georgia,
aggravated assault is a felony and defined as follows: A
person commits the offense of aggravated assault as
alleged in this indictment when the person assaults
another person with intent to murder. The intent to
murder is a material element of aggravated assault as
charged in this case.
In deciding the question of intent, you may consider
all of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as
the character of the weapon used and the manner in
which it was used, if you find that a weapon was used. To
constitute such an assault, actual injury to the alleged
victim need not be shown. It’s only necessary that the
evidence show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant or defendants intentionally committed an act
that placed the alleged victim in reasonable fear of
completely, or the indictment must elsewhere allege facts showing how the
compound offense was committed.” (Citation omitted.) Stinson v. State, 279 Ga.
177, 178 (2) (611 SE2d 52) (2005); see also Mikenney v. State, 277 Ga. 64, 65
(1) (586 SE2d 328) (2003) (“[A]n indictment which omits an essential element
of the predicate offense in a count charging a compound offense can
nonetheless satisfy the requirements of due process as long as the indictment
charges the predicate offense completely in a separate count.” (citations and
punctuation omitted)); Dunn v. State, 263 Ga. 343, 344 (2) (434 SE2d 60) (1993)
(same). Although the record is silent on whether the State had intended Count
2 to supply the essential elements of the predicate felony, during oral
argument, the District Attorney asserted on behalf of the State that Count 2
was intended to supply the predicate felony for Count 1.
11
immediately receiving a violent injury.
If you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant or defendants committed the homicide
alleged in this bill of indictment at the time the defendant
or defendants were engaged in the commission of the
felony of aggravated assault then you would be
authorized to find the defendant or defendants guilty of
murder, whether the homicide was intended or not. In
order for a homicide to have been done in the commission
of this particular felony, aggravated assault as alleged in
the indictment, there must be some connection between
the felony and the homicide.
The homicide must have been done in carrying out
the unlawful act and not collateral to it. It is not enough
that [a] homicide occurred soon or presently after the
felony was attempted or committed. There must be such
a legal relationship between a homicide and the felony so
as to cause you to find that the homicide occurred before
the felony was at an end or before any attempt to avoid a
conviction [or] arrest for the felony.
The felony must have a legal relationship to the
homicide, be at least concurrent within a part, and be part
of it in an actual and material sense. A homicide is
committed in the carrying out of a felony when it’s
committed by the accused or accused persons while
engaged in the performance of any act required for the full
execution of the felony.
In addition to its oral charge, the court gave the jury a written
copy of the charge and a redacted indictment 5 to take into the jury
5 The indictment was redacted to remove counts related to co-indictee
Burns.
12
room during deliberations. Burley voiced no objection to the
instructions either before or after the trial court charged the jury.
Because Burley failed to object at trial to the instructions he
now challenges on appeal, he failed to preserve his claim of error for
ordinary appellate review. This Court, however, must review the
instructions for plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). “[U]nder OCGA
§ 17-8-58 (b), appellate review for plain error is required whenever
an appealing party properly asserts an error in jury instructions.”
State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32 (1) (718 SE2d 232) (2011).
This Court established the following test for determining
whether there is plain error in jury instructions under OCGA § 17-
8-58 (b):
First, there must be an error or defect – some sort of
deviation from a legal rule – that has not been
intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively
waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be
clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.
Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s
substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he
must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial
court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three
prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion
to remedy the error – discretion which ought to be
13
exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted;
emphasis in original). If one prong of the plain error test is not
satisfied, we need not address the other prongs of the test. Id. at 34(2) (b) n.5. Satisfying this high standard “is difficult, as it should be.”
(Citation omitted.) Hood v. State, 303 Ga. 420, 426 (811 SE2d 392)
(2018). Consequently, an appellant’s “failure to specifically
articulate how the alleged error satisfies this high standard
increases the likelihood that [his or her] claims in this regard will
be rejected.” Kelly, 290 Ga. at 32 (1) n.2.
Burley did not affirmatively waive this issue at trial, so the
first prong is met. The second prong is met as well. The trial court’s
charge failed to accurately instruct the jury on the essential
elements of felony murder and aggravated assault as those offenses
were set forth in the indictment. See Anderson v. State, 309 Ga. 618,
623-624 (3) (847 SE2d 572) (2020) (A “trial judge must charge the
jury on each crime specified in the indictment unless the evidence
14
does not warrant a conviction of such crime, or unless the State has
affirmatively withdrawn a crime or stricken it from the indictment.”
(citation omitted)). In this case, given that the State drafted its
indictment such that the felony murder count was predicated on the
count alleging aggravated assault with intent to murder, the trial
court was required to instruct the jury that, in order to find Burley
guilty of felony murder as well as the predicate offense, it must find
that Burley assaulted Brooks with the specific intent to kill. As this
Court has explained, the main difference between felony murder and
malice murder is that felony murder does not require proof of malice
or intent to kill. See Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 576 (2) (690 SE2d
406) (2010). “Felony murder does, however, require that the
defendant possess the requisite criminal intent to commit the
underlying felony.” Holliman v. State, 257 Ga. 209, 209 (1) (356
SE2d 886) (1987). That is because “[p]roof of the elements of the
offense of felony murder necessarily requires proof of the elements
of the [predicate] felony.” Woods v. State, 233 Ga. 495, 501 (212 SE2d
322 (1975). Thus, to support a felony murder conviction in this case,
15
the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Burley committed the predicate offense of aggravated assault with
intent to murder.
Aggravated assault with intent to murder requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a simple
assault in one of the two ways defined in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) and
that he acted with the “intent to murder.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1).
Murder requires proof of a specific mens rea – malice aforethought,
which incorporates an intent to kill the victim. 6 See Guyse, 286 Ga.
at 576 (2) (discussing elements of aggravated assault); see also
Grant v. State, 326 Ga. App. 121, 122 (1) (756 SE2d 255) (2014) (“To
authorize a conviction for aggravated assault with intent to murder,
6See OCGA § 16-5-1 (a) (“A person commits the offense of murder when
he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes
the death of another human being.”); OCGA §16-5-1 (b) (“Express malice is that
deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of another human being which
is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be
implied where no considerable provocation appears and where all the
circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.”). See
also Latimore, 262 Ga. at 450 (“malice incorporates the intent to kill, and may
be implied where the facts show that the accused acted with an abandoned and
malignant heart, absent a showing of considerable provocation” (citations
omitted)).
16
the State must show that the defendant acted with the deliberate
intent to kill at the time of the assault[.]” (citation and punctuation
omitted)). In this case, the trial court defined simple assault. And,
although the court instructed the jury that “[t]he intent to murder
is a material element of aggravated assault as charged in this
case[,]” it did not define “intent to murder” as requiring a specific
intent to kill the victim. Thus, the trial court’s charge on aggravated
assault with intent to murder was incomplete because it did not fully
instruct the jury on an essential element of the offense. See Guyse,
286 Ga. at 576 (2); Grant, 326 Ga. App. at 122 (1).7
7 We note that, in the bench notes to the pattern jury instruction for
aggravated assault with intent to murder, rape, or rob, the Council of Superior
Court Judges of Georgia instructs the trial court to “include the definition of
the relevant felony” when charging aggravated assault with such specific
intent:
For aggravated assault, the State must prove that the Defendant:
1. assaulted another person 2. with the intent to (murder) (rape)
(rob). To prove assault, the State does not have to prove that the
other person was actually injured. However, the State must prove
that the Defendant (attempted to cause a violent injury to the
person) (committed an act that placed the person in reasonable
apprehension or fear of immediately receiving a violent injury).
The intent to (murder) (rape) (rob) is an essential element of
aggravated assault. (Murder) (Rape) (Robbery) is defined as
follows: (define alleged offense). Bench Notes: You must include
the definition of the relevant felony. See 2.10.10 (murder); 2.30.10
(rape) and 2.60.10 (robbery). Authority: OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1).
17
Nor did the trial court instruct the jury that “intent to murder”
is also a material element of the felony murder count as drafted. To
the contrary, the court instructed the jury that it could return a
verdict of guilty on the felony murder count “whether the homicide
was intended or not” so long as it concluded that “the defendant or
defendants were engaged in the commission of the felony of
aggravated assault.” An unintended homicide does not constitute
“murder” as that offense is defined in OCGA § 16-5-1 (a).
Given that the court’s charge, taken as a whole, failed to
instruct the jury that it was required to find that Burley acted with
the intent to take the victim’s life in order to find Burley guilty of
felony murder as drafted and the separately charged predicate
offense of aggravated assault with intent to murder, the charge
constituted clear and obvious error. See Anderson, 309 Ga. at 623-
624 (3). Compare Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 640 (2) (592 SE2d 656)
(2004) (The “failure to inform the jury of an essential element of the
crime charged is reversible error because the jury is left without
appropriate guidelines for reaching its verdict.”), with Whitaker v.
18
State, 283 Ga. 521, 525-526 (4) (661 SE2d 557) (2008) (“[T]he trial
court’s instruction as a whole made plain that the commission of
aggravated assault with the intent to murder necessitated the intent
to take the life of a human being.”).
However, to satisfy the third prong of the plain error test, it is
incumbent upon Burley to demonstrate that the erroneous charge
affected his substantial rights and affected the outcome of the trial
court proceedings. Burley’s brief is silent on this point. He appears
to assume that an instruction that relieves the State from proving
an essential element of the crime charged is presumptively harmful
under a plain error analysis. That is not necessarily so. As we have
explained, “relieving the State from proving an element of the crime
can certainly be harmful error affecting the outcome of a
proceeding.” (Citation omitted.) Williams v. State, 308 Ga. 228, 232-
233 (2) (838 SE2d 764) (2020). However, when an appellant fails to
carry his burden of showing that such an erroneous instruction
actually affected his substantial rights or likely affected the outcome
of the trial, the error does not constitute plain error. See id.19
In Williams, a jury charge relieving the State from proving the
essential element of actual consent in a prosecution for aggravated
sexual battery did not constitute plain error because Williams failed
to show that the third prong of the plain error test had been satisfied
under the circumstances of his case: The victim was four years old
when Williams, on several occasions, intentionally penetrated the
victim’s vagina with his finger. Consequently, even if the jury had
been instructed that the State had to prove lack of consent, “no
rational juror could have concluded, based on the record presented
at trial, that the State had failed to prove that element in this case.”
Id. at 233 (2). We reach a similar conclusion concerning the essential
element of Burley’s criminal intent, given the evidence in this case.
Although there is no direct evidence in the record that Burley
intended to kill Brooks, a rational juror likely would have inferred
that intent8 from the overwhelming circumstantial evidence
8 In its charge on intent, the court stated that, “[i]n deciding the question
of intent, you may consider all of the facts and circumstances of the case as
well as the character of the weapon used and the manner in which it was used,
if you find that a weapon was used.” Burley contends this charge allowed the
20
adduced. Most significantly, the forensic evidence concerning the
repeated, overlapping, and severe injuries that Brooks sustained as
a result of being beaten over a very long period of time is compelling
evidence from which a rational juror would infer a specific intent to
kill. See, e.g., Brewer v. State, 280 Ga. 18, 19 (1) (622 SE2d 348)
(2005) (Though the evidence was circumstantial, the jury was
authorized to infer from the evidence presented – including forensic
evidence that either wound, by itself, was mortal and would have
instantaneously rendered the victim incapable of purposeful
movement – that the defendant intended to kill the victim by
shooting him twice in the head.); Lord v. State, 297 Ga. App. 88, 91-
jury to find him guilty of aggravated assault in a manner not charged in the
indictment, that is, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The court,
however, did not charge the jury on alternate methods of proving an
aggravated assault. Further, the jury is authorized to infer an intent to kill
from the nature of the weapon used, among other things. See, e.g., Gipson v.
State, 332 Ga. App. 309, 312 (1) (772 SE2d 402) (2015) (“To authorize a
conviction for aggravated assault with intent to murder, the State must show
that the defendant acted with the deliberate intent to kill at the time of the
assault, which the jury may infer from the nature of the instrument used in
making the assault, the manner of its use, and the nature of the wounds
inflicted.”); Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 254 (2) (744 SE2d 447) (2013)
(Intent may be inferred from all of the circumstances surrounding the
assault.).
21
92 (1) (a) (676 SE2d 404) (2009) (“Intent to kill may be inferred from
the nature of the instrument used in making the assault, the
manner of its use, and the nature of the wounds inflicted, as well as
the brutality and duration of the assault.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).
Further, even if the jury had assumed that Adams was the
primary assailant, given the presence of Brooks’s DNA on Adams’s
boot, strong evidence shows that Burley was a party to that crime
and that he shared Adams’s criminal intent. 9 Pursuant to OCGA §
16-2-20 (a), “[e]very person concerned in the commission of a crime
is a party thereto and may be . . . convicted of commission of the
crime.” Although proof of a shared criminal intent with the actual
perpetrator is necessary to establish that one is a party to the crime,
“shared criminal intent may be inferred from the person’s conduct
before, during, and after the crime.” Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835, 837
(785 SE2d 285) (2016). That Burley participated in the crime is
evident from the blood stains on his clothes and the injuries he
9 The trial court instructed the jury on the law of parties to a crime.
22
sustained on his hands and face during the lockdown. Compelling
evidence also existed from which a rational juror likely would have
inferred that Burley and Adams shared a specific intent to kill. Both
acted to conceal evidence of the crime by blocking the view into his
cell when the lockdown ended, cleaning the cell with a bleach
solution, and attempting to dispose of clothing and towels that might
yield incriminating evidence. And the evidence showed that Burley
and Adams were in the same gang and that Smith, their gang
leader, had ordered them to kill Brooks. Finally, Burley has not
disputed these facts by demonstrating in the argument section of his
brief how a rational juror could have concluded from this evidence
that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a
specific intent to kill Brooks.
Given these circumstances, the instructional error did not
constitute plain error. That is because, “even had the jury been
instructed that the State had to prove [a specific intent to kill], no
rational juror could have concluded, based on the record presented
at trial, that the State had failed to prove that element in this case.”
23
Williams, 308 Ga. at 232-233 (2). Consequently, the court’s
erroneous instructions were unlikely to have affected Burley’s
substantial rights or the outcome of the proceedings. Because Burley
failed to satisfy one of the prongs of the plain error test, he has not
carried his burden of showing plain error. See Kelly, 290 Ga. at 34(2) (b) n.5. Therefore, we affirm his conviction for felony murder.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
24