Rountree v. State ( 2023 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 21, 2023
S23A0531. ROUNTREE v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
Quavion S. Rountree appeals his conviction for malice murder
in connection with the shooting death of Anahitdeep Singh Sandhu.1
1 Sandhu was killed on April 28, 2019. On May 7, 2019, a Houston
County grand jury indicted Rountree and Delvin Ross for malice murder,
felony murder, and aggravated assault. Rountree was tried separately before
a jury from June 21 to 23, 2021, and was found guilty on all counts. As of the
time of Rountree’s trial, the charges against Ross had not been resolved. On
July 7, 2021, Rountree was sentenced to serve life in prison for malice murder.
With respect to the remaining counts, the State accurately observes that the
trial court purported to merge the felony murder count into the count of malice
murder, but the felony murder count was actually vacated by operation of law.
See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993); Calmer v.
State, 309 Ga. 368, 368 n.1 (846 SE2d 40) (2020). And as the District Attorney
correctly recognizes, although the trial court purported to merge the
aggravated assault count into the felony murder count, the aggravated assault
count actually merged into the malice murder count for sentencing. See
Malcolm, 263 Ga. at 373-374 (5); Calmer, 309 Ga. at 368 n.1. Rountree filed a
timely motion for a new trial, which he amended on March 24, 2022. After a
hearing on October 4, 2022, the trial court denied the amended motion for new
trial on November 8, 2022. Rountree filed a timely notice of appeal, and the
case was docketed in this Court to the April 2023 term and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
Rountree contends that the trial court erred in failing to charge the
jury on voluntary manslaughter and on mutual combat. Because
Rountree has failed to carry his burden of showing plain error, we
affirm.
The evidence submitted at trial shows the following. 2 On April
28, 2019, Sandhu and his fellow United States Marine, Desmen
Worley, were on furlough, visiting Worley’s hometown and staying
at Grimaldi Miro’s apartment in the same apartment complex where
Rountree lived. That afternoon, Sandhu and Miro walked to
Rountree’s apartment for the purpose of trading a prescription
medication containing codeine for ecstasy pills. When Rountree said
that he did not have any pills, all of them walked out of the
2 Rountree makes a passing, one-sentence request that this Court review
the sufficiency of the evidence. However, he never argues or even asserts that
the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient. Thus, Rountree has
failed to carry his burden on appeal of showing that the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to support his conviction. See Charles v. State, 315 Ga.
651, 654-655 (2) (884 SE2d 363) (2023) (holding that the appellant had not
carried his burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient, because he
had “not articulated why he contends that the trial evidence was insufficient
to support his convictions, much less formulated an argument showing that
the trial evidence failed to prove an essential element of any crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt”).
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apartment. Rountree said that he considered Sandhu a “threat,”
although Miro did not see Sandhu flash a gun or do anything that
was threatening. Sandhu and Miro then walked back to Miro’s
apartment.
Rountree called Delvin Ross, walked away from his apartment,
and told Miro and others that he “felt like doing something stupid.”
They could tell Rountree was “angry” and “upset,” they tried to
reason with him and calm him down, and they told him that Sandhu
“didn’t mean . . . any type of disrespect.” Ross drove up and got out
of his car, and Rountree grabbed a pistol from Ross and chambered
a round. When Ross and Miro tried to hold Rountree back, he
threatened to shoot one of them.
Rountree went to Miro’s apartment, and Sandhu came out and
stood in the doorway. Rountree pointed Ross’s pistol at Sandhu and
told him to turn over the gun and the prescription drug that he had.
When Sandhu lowered his hands to reach for the gun in his
waistband, Rountree shot him several times, fatally wounding him.
Several eyewitnesses testified that Rountree shot Sandhu, and they
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gave other testimony consistent with the preceding summary of the
evidence.
Rountree testified that he was in his apartment with his two
children and his fiancée when Miro and Sandhu came over; that he
saw Sandhu had a firearm; that he feared for his life and his
children’s lives; that he ushered Miro and Sandhu outside where
Sandhu used racial epithets and asked Rountree if he “want[ed] to
do this out here or inside,” which Rountree took as a threat; that he
thought they were trying to rob him; that he called Ross and, when
Ross arrived, took the pistol from him and chambered a round; that
he went to tell Sandhu to stay away from his apartment; and that
he shot Sandhu after he saw Sandhu reach for his gun. Based on
this testimony, the jury was charged on the defense of justification
at Rountree’s request.
1. Rountree contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to charge the jury on mutual combat and on voluntary
manslaughter. He concedes that the omission of the mutual-combat
instruction can be reviewed for plain error only, but contends that
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he preserved for ordinary appellate review his enumeration
pertaining to the voluntary-manslaughter instruction. He has not,
however, so we review both contentions for plain error only.
Rountree argues that his objection at the charge conference to
the omission of his requested instruction on voluntary manslaughter
was sufficient to preserve the issue for ordinary appellate review.
However, “[o]bjections at a charge conference do not suffice to
preserve objections to the charge as subsequently given.” Carruth v.
State, 290 Ga. 342, 347 (6) (721 SE2d 80) (2012). In this case,
Rountree made no objection when the trial court finished reading
the charge to the jury. Instead, after the trial court excused the jury
and asked if the parties had objections to the charge, defense counsel
answered, “No, your Honor.” Because of Rountree’s failure to make
any objection to the charge as given, both his contention relating to
the trial court’s omission of his requested instruction on voluntary
manslaughter and his contention regarding omission of an
instruction on mutual combat can be reviewed only for plain error.
See OCGA § 17-8-58 (a), (b); Davis v. State, 312 Ga. 870, 873 (2) (866
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SE2d 390) (2021) (Failure to charge on voluntary manslaughter was
reviewed only for plain error where the appellant “made a written
request for a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter” and argued
the point at the charge conference but “did not object to the omission
of the charge after the trial court instructed the jury.”); Anderson v.
State, 309 Ga. 618, 622-623 (3) (847 SE2d 572) (2020) (Where the
appellant “did not request the charge in writing and made no
objections to the instructions ultimately given to the jury . . . , his
contention relating to the failure of the trial court to give the charge
in this instance is reviewed only for plain error.”). And where “an
alleged error regarding a jury instruction is not affirmatively
waived,” reversal is not authorized under plain error review unless
“the instruction was erroneous, the error was obvious, the
instruction likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Davis, 312 Ga. at 873-874 (2).
2. As for Rountree’s contention that the trial court erred by
failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, he has shown
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no error, much less plain error.
A person is guilty of voluntary manslaughter if he “causes the
death of another human being under circumstances which would
otherwise be murder” and “acts solely as the result of a sudden,
violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation
sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person[.]” OCGA §
16-5-2 (a). “Even slight evidence showing that the victim seriously
provoked the defendant requires the trial court to give a requested
charge on voluntary manslaughter.” Behl v. State, 315 Ga. 814, 816
(1) (885 SE2d 7) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).
In support of his argument that the evidence required the trial
court to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, Rountree
relies primarily on his own testimony that he was fearful for the
lives of his children and himself because Sandhu brought a weapon
to his home. But “neither fear that someone is going to pull a weapon
nor fighting are the types of provocation that demand a voluntary
manslaughter charge.” Behl, 315 Ga. at 816 (1) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
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Rountree also testified that Sandhu used threatening words
and racial epithets. But “angry statements alone ordinarily do not
amount to ‘serious provocation’ within the meaning of OCGA § 16-
5-2 (a). To put it simply, words alone generally are not sufficient
provocation to excite the passion necessary to give rise to voluntary
manslaughter.” Merritt v. State, 292 Ga. 327, 331 (2) (737 SE2d 673)
(2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Ramirez v. State,
307 Ga. 550, 553 (2) n.2 (837 SE2d 328) (2019) (stating that it is a
longstanding part of Georgia’s law of voluntary manslaughter that
“provocation by words, threats, menaces or contemptuous gestures
shall in no case be sufficient to free the person killing from the guilt
and crime of murder”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Indeed,
“words alone, regardless of the degree of their insulting nature, will
not in any case justify the excitement of passion so as to reduce the
crime from murder to manslaughter when the killing is done solely
on account of the indignation aroused by use of opprobrious words.”
Behl, 315 Ga. at 816 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). Cf. Ware
v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 850 (III) (815 SE2d 837) (2018) (recognizing
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the “limited exception to this rule for words informing a defendant
of adulterous conduct”) (citation and punctuation omitted). The
threatening and insulting words that Rountree testified were used
by Sandhu, no matter how menacing or offensive they were to
Rountree, were still only words, regardless of Rountree’s ultimate
violent response.3 See Hudson v. State, 308 Ga. 443, 446 (2) (a) (841
SE2d 696) (2020) (“[The victim’s] use of a crude phrase, [i.e., calling
the defendant a ‘mother f**ker’ after his mother recently had died,]
no matter how offensive to [the defendant], was still only words; [the
defendant’s] violent reaction to those words does not change the fact
that they were only words.”).
Accordingly, there was no evidence whatsoever of serious
provocation sufficient to excite a sudden, violent, and irresistible
passion in a reasonable person such that Rountree would have been
3 Rountree does not argue that the combined effect of Sandhu’s alleged
words and his possession of a weapon constituted the requisite serious
provocation. Moreover, given that the fear that someone will pull a weapon is
not a “type[ ] of provocation that demand[s] a voluntary manslaughter charge,”
Behl, 315 Ga. at 816 (1), we conclude that evidence of Sandhu’s mere possession
of a gun did not transform his alleged words into a serious provocation.
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entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. See id. And
Rountree, therefore, has failed to meet the plain-error test.
3. With respect to Rountree’s contention that the trial court
erred by failing to instruct the jury on mutual combat, he merely
“adopts” his previous “argument and citation of authority” regarding
the omission of a voluntary manslaughter charge. However,
Rountree never explains why it was error, much less plain error, not
to charge specifically on mutual combat. Indeed, the evidence
presented at trial, including that which Rountree argues in support
of his claim of error in the omission of a voluntary manslaughter
instruction, does not show “a willingness, a readiness, and an
intention upon the part of both parties to fight” and therefore does
not require a charge on mutual combat. Tidwell v. State, 312 Ga.
459, 463 (1) (863 SE2d 127) (2021) (citation and punctuation
omitted) (holding that the trial court did not err in denying a request
to charge on mutual combat where there was “no evidence of an
agreement, willingness, or readiness to fight between [the victim]
and any of his attackers”). See also Williams v. State, 309 Ga. 212,
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217-218 (2) (845 SE2d 573) (2020) (“Evidence of self-defense does not
support a jury instruction on mutual combat as a basis for voluntary
manslaughter.”); Venturino v. State, 306 Ga. 391, 398 (3) (830 SE2d
110) (2019) (Appellant “points to no record evidence that he and [the
victim] intended to engage in mutual combat, and we can find
none.”). Thus, Rountree has failed to carry his burden on appeal of
showing plain error. See Blackwell v. State, 302 Ga. 820, 823 (2) (809
SE2d 727) (2018) (“The appellant has the burden of showing a clear
or obvious error and further making an affirmative showing that the
error probably did affect the outcome below.”).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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