Mitchell v. State ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 21, 2023
S23A0599. MITCHELL v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
Scean Mitchell appeals his convictions for malice murder and
other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Calvin Clark,
Jr. 1 Mitchell argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of other acts under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule
1 The crimes occurred on July 14, 2017. In October 2017, a Fulton County
grand jury indicted Mitchell and Jaquavious Johnson for violation of the
Criminal Street Gang Act (Count 1); malice murder (Count 2); felony murder
predicated on Criminal Street Gang Act violations, armed robbery, and
aggravated assault (Counts 3-5); armed robbery (Count 6); aggravated assault
(Count 7); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count
8). Mitchell was also charged with influencing a witness. At a joint trial in
April 2018, Mitchell and Johnson were found guilty of all charges. The trial
court sentenced Mitchell to life in prison for malice murder, a consecutive life
term for armed robbery, a 20-year consecutive term for the Street Gang Act
violation, a five-year probated term for the firearms charge, and a three-year
term for influencing a witness. The remaining counts merged or were vacated
by operation of law. Mitchell filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later
amended in December 2019, August 2020, June 2021, and May 2022. His
motion for new trial was denied in January 2023. Mitchell filed a timely notice
of appeal and his case was docketed to this Court’s April 2023 term and orally
argued on May 18, 2023.
404 (b)”). He also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object when the trial court instructed the jury to disregard
evidence of self-defense and for failing to request a jury instruction
on self-defense. We reject both claims. There was no abuse of
discretion in admitting the Rule 404 (b) evidence because it was
relevant to the issue of intent and its probative value was not
substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect. And trial
counsel was not ineffective because the self-defense claim was not
supported by strong evidence and was inconsistent with the defense
theory counsel had reasonably pursued instead. We affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
trial evidence showed the following. On the afternoon of July 14,
2017, Clark was at the home of his girlfriend, Quintara Russell, who
lived at the Forrest Cove apartment complex in Fulton County.
Clark left to buy some food and marijuana, and returned with only
food because he did not see anyone selling drugs. Clark left the
apartment again but did not tell Russell.
At some point, Russell heard two gunshots and called to Clark
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to ask if he heard them. Clark did not respond, and Russell next
heard someone knocking on her door and screaming that “he was
shot.”Russell looked out the window and saw her porch “full of
blood.” She ran to the door and opened it, and Clark, bleeding from
a gunshot wound, collapsed when she got there. Clark died from his
gunshot wound.
Russell testified that Clark owned a gun and had it with him
that day, but she did not see it on him when he was on the porch.
One of the responding police officers saw shell casings near Clark’s
body and that his hand was positioned as though he had been
holding a gun. From this, the officer testified that it was possible
Clark may have been shooting a gun, although no weapon was found
on Clark.
Several neighbors saw at least parts of the shooting and
testified at trial. Mary Cooper testified that she heard the gunshots
and then saw Jaquavious Johnson, Mitchell’s co-defendant, pointing
a gun while backing away as Mitchell scooped something off the
ground near Clark’s body. Cooper said that Johnson and Mitchell
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fled the scene together. Cooper, who had identified both defendants
in a photo lineup, testified that she had seen the defendants
standing under a tree outside Russell’s apartment for at least an
hour prior to the shooting.
Chastity Spear testified that she was on her porch when she
saw Clark talk to a group of men including Johnson and Mitchell
outside his apartment. The group walked off, and less than three
minutes later, Spear heard gunshots. Spear next saw Mitchell
running away with a gun in his hand. Marshavia Horton did not see
the shooting, but heard the gunshots, looked up immediately, and
saw Johnson and Mitchell running away from Clark, who was on his
porch.
Marshavia’s mother, Jasmon, met with a detective to report
that she saw the shooting and provided descriptions of the
assailants. Jasmon reported that Clark went with two men behind
one of the apartment buildings to buy some marijuana, and when
walking back, Clark appeared to reach for his gun when it appeared
that he was about to be robbed. Before he could get his gun, Johnson
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and Mitchell pulled their guns and started shooting at Clark, who
began running back to his apartment. Jasmon found pictures of
Mitchell and Johnson on social media and provided these pictures to
the detective, identifying them as the assailants. Jasmon reported
that when Clark collapsed in front of his apartment door, Mitchell
and Johnson were “grabbing something” from Clark that looked like
a gun. During her police interview, Jasmon was shown a photo
lineup and identified Johnson as one of the shooters. Although she
did not identify Mitchell in a photo lineup, she identified him at trial.
Jasmon also testified that, about an hour after the shooting, she
talked to another neighbor, Soniyka Pullins, who reported that
Mitchell and Johnson had been at Pullins’s apartment planning the
robbery of Clark. Jasmon told the detective that Mitchell and
Johnson had been planning the robbery for weeks. The detective
who interviewed Pullins testified that Pullins denied ever hearing
anyone planning the robbery of Clark, but the detective explained
that Pullins lived with Johnson and she seemed to be afraid of
“snitching” on him. The detective also testified that he interviewed
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Takezia Johnson at the scene, and when he interviewed her again
later, she told him that Mitchell heard she had been talking to the
police and threatened to put her in a “body bag” if he learned it was
true.
Evidence at trial showed that the Forrest Cove apartment
complex had a lot of criminal gang activity, and that the “Glock”
gang, which was identified as a Crips-related gang, controlled the
area. Further evidence showed that Mitchell and Johnson were
Glock gang members, and Mitchell identified himself as such on
social media.
The State also presented evidence under Rule 404 (b) showing
that in August 2015, Mamady Sylla was robbed at gunpoint by
several people, including Mitchell, near the Forrest Cove
Apartments. Sylla was selling items from an ice cream truck during
the day after school. Sylla retrieved an item from a cooler and when
he approached the window, Mitchell pulled a gun on him while the
other assailants went through Sylla’s pocket, took his iPhone, and
took money from inside the truck.
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1. Mitchell argues that the trial court erred in allowing the
State to introduce other-acts evidence of the 2015 robbery under
Rule 404 (b). The trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible
for the purposes of showing motive, intent, and knowledge.
Reviewing the trial court’s decision to admit Rule 404 (b) evidence
for an abuse of discretion, see Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 479 (4)
(819 SE2d 468) (2018), we conclude that it did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence for the purpose of showing
intent. 2
Under Rule 404 (b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith[,]” but such evidence may be
admissible for other purposes, including to prove intent, motive, and
opportunity. See OCGA § 24-4-404 (b); State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156,
2 Because we conclude that the evidence was properly admitted for the
purpose of intent, and Mitchell raises no claim as to the jury instruction about
the other purposes for which the jury could consider the evidence, arguing only
that the evidence was erroneously admitted, we need not address his
arguments that the evidence was not admissible for the purposes of showing
motive and knowledge. See Naples v. State, 308 Ga. 43, 52 (2) n.9 (838 SE2d
780) (2020).
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159 (2) (773 SE2d 170) (2015) (Rule 404 (b) “is, on its face, an
evidentiary rule of inclusion which contains a non-exhaustive list of
purposes other than bad character for which other acts evidence is
deemed relevant and may be properly offered into evidence”). A
party offering Rule 404 (b) evidence must show that (1) it is relevant
to an issue in the case other than the defendant’s character; (2) its
probative value is not substantially outweighed by its unfair
prejudice under OCGA § 24-4-403; and (3) there is sufficient proof
for a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed the other act. See Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 544,
545 (802 SE2d 234) (2017). On appeal, Mitchell addresses only the
first and second prongs of the Rule 404 (b) test, and his arguments
fail.
(a) On the first prong, “a defendant who enters a not guilty plea
makes intent a material issue, and the State may prove intent by
qualifying Rule 404 (b) evidence absent affirmative steps by the
defendant to remove intent as an issue.” Naples v. State, 308 Ga. 43,
51 (2) (e) (838 SE2d 780) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).
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When intent is at issue, the first prong of Rule 404 (b) is established
when the prior act was committed with the same state of mind as
the charged crime. See id.; see also Booth v. State, 301 Ga. 678, 683
(804 SE2d 104) (2017) (“Where the intent required for the charged
offenses and other acts is the same, and intent is at issue, the first
prong of the Rule 404 (b) test is satisfied.”).
Here, Mitchell made intent a material issue by pleading not
guilty, and he took no affirmative steps to remove it as an issue.
Because intent was at issue, the relevance of the 2015 robbery was
satisfied because it required the same state of mind (intent to rob)
as some of the crimes — felony murder predicated on armed robbery
and armed robbery — that Mitchell was charged with here. See
Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 653, 661 (3) (872 SE2d 732) (2022) (where
defendant was charged with felony murder predicated on armed
robbery, armed robbery, and aggravated assault with intent to rob,
other-acts evidence of prior robberies was relevant to the issue of
intent).
(b) On the second prong, the Rule 403 balancing test requires
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other-acts evidence to be excluded if it constitutes “matter of scant
or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake
of its prejudicial effect.” McKinney v. State, 307 Ga. 129, 137 (3) (b)
(834 SE2d 741) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Factors
to be considered in determining the probative value of other act
evidence offered to prove intent include its overall similarity to the
charged crime, its temporal remoteness, and the prosecutorial need
for it.” Hood v. State, 309 Ga. 493, 501 (2) (847 SE2d 172) (2020). For
purposes of evaluating overall similarity, we must also consider any
differences between the other acts and the charged crimes. See
Kirby, 304 Ga. at 484 (4) (a) (i) (noting that significant differences
would be fatal to the admissibility of other-acts evidence offered to
prove identity).
Here, the two offenses both occurred in the same area (in or
near the Forrest Cove apartment complex), in broad daylight, and
involved the use of a firearm. There was at least one significant
difference between the other act and the charged crime. In the 2015
robbery, the victim did not appear to have any interaction with
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Mitchell or his accomplices prior to getting robbed, whereas in this
case, Clark was seen going behind a building with several men,
including Mitchell and Johnson, before the robbery and shooting.
But this difference was not so significant such that it would have
been an abuse of discretion to conclude that the similarities gave the
other-acts evidence substantial probative value. See Kirby, 304 Ga.
at 484 (4) (a) (i) (where prior armed robbery and charged crime had
significant similarities and differences, the trial court had the
discretion to determine that prior act retained substantial probative
value). This significant probative value was not diminished by
temporal remoteness, as the events were separated by only two
years. See Hounkpatin v. State, 313 Ga. 789, 795-796 (873 SE2d 201)
(2022); see also United States v. Cardenas, 895 F2d 1338, 1344 (11th
Cir. 1990) (“[t]he probative value of the extrinsic offense correlates
positively with its likeness to the offense charged” and an extrinsic
offense carries more probative value where less time separates it
from the charged offense) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The probative value of the evidence was strengthened by the
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prosecutorial need for it. Although Mitchell’s chief defense at trial
was that he was misidentified as the second participant in the crime,
pointing out during closing argument that only one trial witness had
identified him as one of the assailants prior to trial, his intent was
also a crucial issue. In making the argument about being
misidentified as the second assailant, Mitchell conceded that
witnesses may have seen him in the area at the time of the crime,
as he “hangs out in the area,” and argued the jury would be
instructed on “mere presence,” which essentially provides that
although “mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient
evidence to convict one of being a party to a crime, criminal intent
may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before,
during and after the offense.” Rainwater v. State, 300 Ga. 800, 802
(797 SE2d 889) (2017). The jury was charged on mere presence. By
suggesting that, even if he were not misidentified and had actually
been at the scene, he was merely present and did not share the
criminal intent of the primary assailant, Mitchell made intent an
important issue. See Hood, 309 Ga. at 501 (2) (“As we have
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explained, if the principal in the killing was not the defendant, . . . a
question then would have arisen about whether the defendant was
a party to the crime as an accomplice, which would have depended
substantially upon [his] intent.”); Heard v. State, 309 Ga. 76, 94 (3)
(g) (844 SE2d 791) (2020) (intent is a “crucial issue[ ]” where a
defendant is, at most, a party to the crimes charged); Fleming v.
State, 306 Ga. 240, 248 (830 SE2d 129) (2019) (the State had a high
prosecutorial need for the other-acts evidence in order to overcome
the defendant’s mere presence defense and prove that he shared the
same criminal intent as the unknown assailants).
On balance, the similarities between the offenses, the
prosecutorial need, and the temporal proximity of the evidence
provided significant probative value to the other-acts evidence. The
evidence was certainly prejudicial, but Mitchell has not
demonstrated that this unfair prejudice substantially outweighed
its probative value. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence.
2. Mitchell next argues that his defense counsel was ineffective
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on two grounds related to ensuring that a justification defense was
presented to the jury. Mitchell argues that trial counsel should have
requested a jury instruction on self-defense since there was evidence
to support it, and that she should have objected when the trial court
instructed the jury to disregard any claim of self-defense. Neither of
these grounds has merit.
To prevail on his claims, Mitchell must show both that his
counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and that he
was prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
To establish deficient performance, Mitchell must “overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide
range of reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel’s
decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.” Mims v. State, 304 Ga. 851, 855 (2) (823 SE2d 325) (2019)
(citation and punctuation omitted). “[D]ecisions regarding trial
tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim
only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent
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attorney would have followed such a course.” Richards v. State, 306
Ga. 779, 781 (2) (833 SE2d 96) (2019) (citation and punctuation
omitted). To demonstrate prejudice, Mitchell must establish “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Mims, 304 Ga. at 855 (2) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Failure on one prong of the Strickland test is fatal to an
ineffective assistance claim. See Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2)
(770 SE2d 610) (2015).
In support of his argument that a jury instruction on self-
defense was justified, Mitchell points to evidence showing that Clark
pointed a gun at him and that Mitchell shot in return. Although
counsel did not request a jury instruction on self-defense, she used
this evidence in closing arguments, arguing that Mitchell did not
have the criminal intent to shoot the victim, because he just fired
back and was defending himself after Clark pulled out a gun. The
State objected, arguing that counsel had improperly raised self-
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defense when Mitchell had not admitted to committing the act.
Defense counsel responded that she was not trying to mount a self-
defense argument, and the trial court then instructed the jury,
without objection from defense counsel, 3 that self-defense was not
an issue in the case and that it should disregard any evidence that
Mitchell may have acted in self-defense because he did not admit to
firing a weapon in self-defense.
At the motion for new trial hearing in May 2022, defense
counsel generally acknowledged that trial counsel should have
objected to the trial court’s instruction, but also explained that the
theory of misidentification was the strongest defense available, even
after she was able to elicit previously unknown evidence at trial that
Mitchell may have acted in self-defense.
Based on this testimony, Mitchell argues that a self-defense
claim was viable and that defense counsel should have requested a
jury instruction on self-defense or objected to the court’s action. But
3 Defense counsel objected to some of the language in the curative
instruction, but did not argue against a curative instruction.
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at the time of his trial in April 2018, the trial court’s action was
supported by existing case law. See, e.g., Kellam v. State, 298 Ga.
520, 522 (2) (783 SE2d 117) (2016) (“[A]n affirmative defense is one
that admits the doing of the act charged but seeks to justify, excuse,
or mitigate it. Accordingly, if a defendant does not admit to
committing any act which constitutes the offense charged, he is not
entitled to a charge on the [affirmative defense].” (citation and
punctuation omitted)); McLean v. State, 297 Ga. 81, 83 (2) (772 SE2d
685) (2015) (“[T]o assert an affirmative defense, a defendant must
admit the act, or he is not entitled to a charge on that defense.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)).
It was not until a year later that this Court overruled that case
law and held that a defendant need not “admit” that any alleged
facts are true, but can accept certain facts as true for argument’s
sake, in order to raise an affirmative defense and is entitled to a jury
instruction when slight evidence supports it, “whether in the State’s
evidence or evidence presented by the defendant, and regardless of
whether the theory of the affirmative defense conflicts with any
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other theory being advanced by the defendant.” McClure v. State,
306 Ga. 856, 858-859, 864 (1) & n.17 (834 SE2d 96) (2019). It is well
settled that trial counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to
anticipate changes in the law. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 309 Ga. 630,
637 (2) (847 SE2d 555) (2020) (“The standard for effectiveness of
counsel does not require a lawyer to anticipate changes in the law
or pursue novel theories of defense.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).
Setting aside that Mitchell’s self-defense claim was dubious, at
best, and logically conflicted with the theory of misidentification, 4 to
4 The evidence shows that Mitchell and Johnson had planned to rob
Clark and that Clark responded to this threat by pulling (or attempting) to pull
out his gun. A self-defense argument would have been weak at best. See OCGA
§ 16-3-21 (b) (2) (a person is not justified in using force to defend himself when
he is “attempting to commit, committing, or feeling after the commission or
attempted commission of a felony”). Moreover, because there is a high risk of
alienating a jury by presenting “defense theories that logically conflict, such as
misidentification and self-defense,” “it is rarely an unreasonable strategy to
not pursue” alternative defense theories. Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 637 (2)
(a) (837 SE2d 808) (2020); see also McClure, 306 Ga. at 866 (Nahmias, P.J.,
concurring) (“Presenting inconsistent defenses to the jury, particularly when
the evidentiary support for one defense is considerably weaker than for others
or where a defense is contradicted by the defendant's own account of events,
risks losing credibility for all of the defenses. Thus, a decision by defense
counsel to forgo the option of presenting an inconsistent alternative defense
and instead to focus on the defense or defenses that he reasonably believes to
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ask counsel to have argued against the trial court’s action and for a
jury instruction on self-defense would have required counsel to
anticipate a change in the law. Counsel’s failure to do so is not
deficient performance, so Mitchell’s claims fail.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except LaGrua, J.,
disqualified.
be the strongest under all the circumstances will usually not constitute
deficient performance under Strickland[.]” (emphasis in original)).
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