In the Matter of Andrew Matteson ( 2023 )


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  • NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
    Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
    opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
    prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
    official text of the opinion.
    In the Supreme Court of Georgia
    Decided: August 16, 2023
    S23Y0585. IN THE MATTER OF ANDREW MATTESON.
    PER CURIAM.
    This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the renewed
    petition for voluntary discipline filed by Andrew Matteson (State
    Bar No. 477140) pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b) before the issuance
    of a formal complaint. In Matteson’s first petition for voluntary
    discipline, he sought a suspension of his license to practice law for a
    period of time ranging from three months to six months as a sanction
    for his violations related to two disciplinary matters. Matteson
    previously asserted several mitigating factors, including that he had
    mental health conditions that contributed to his misconduct and
    that he made restitution to his clients who were impacted by his
    misconduct. The Court rejected Matteson’s first petition because he
    failed to provide proof of his mental health conditions and proof that
    he made his clients whole, and because he failed to assure the Court
    that he had taken steps to ensure that he would not commit the
    same type of violations upon his readmission to the practice of law.
    See In the Matter of Matteson, 
    314 Ga. 576
    , 580-581 (
    878 SE2d 196
    )
    (2022) (“Matteson I”).   In this renewed petition, Matteson adds
    nothing to the recitation of the facts, the admitted violations, or the
    aggravating and mitigating factors supporting his requested
    discipline.   Instead, he addresses the concerns this Court
    highlighted in Matteson I by submitting proof related to his mental
    health conditions and the treatment thereof, submitting proof that
    his clients have been made whole, and by proposing conditions on
    his reinstatement. He also agrees to a six-month suspension but
    requests that it be imposed nunc pro tunc. Because Matteson has
    sufficiently addressed the deficiencies set forth in Matteson I, and
    because we agree that a six-month nunc pro tunc suspension is
    appropriate, we accept Matteson’s amended petition for voluntary
    discipline.
    2
    The underlying facts of the two disciplinary matters are recited
    at length in Matteson I. In summary, as to the first disciplinary
    matter, Matteson admits that he had represented a client in various
    legal matters over several years, and that at some point he stopped
    apprising his client of his work and of the important developments
    in the legal matters; that the client eventually sued Matteson, who
    chose not to dispute the client’s claims; that a consent judgment was
    eventually entered against Matteson in the amount of $86,520; and
    that he quickly took steps to satisfy the judgment. Matteson I, 314
    Ga. at 576-577. As to the second disciplinary matter, Matteson
    admits that he agreed to represent a client and his company in a
    lawsuit against them for damages related to a business dispute;
    that, although he filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, he failed to
    take any additional material action in the case, even after a motion
    for default judgment was filed and granted and a significant
    judgment was entered against his clients; that these clients pursued
    a legal malpractice claim against Matteson and his former law firm;
    and that the claim was arbitrated, resulting in the issuance of an
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    award of over $640,000 in the clients’ favor.                 Id. at 577-578.
    Although, in his initial petition, Matteson failed to support his
    assertion that his clients’ claims had been resolved in full, he has
    now provided proof that he satisfied the judgments his clients
    obtained against him.
    The facts set out in Matteson I support Matteson’s admissions
    in this renewed petition that
    in connection with his representation of the client in [the
    first matter] he violated Rules 1.2 (a),[1] 1.4 (a),[2] 1.15 (I)
    (c),[3] and 1.16 (a) (2)[4] of the [Georgia Rules of
    Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), found at Bar Rule 4-102
    (d)]. And, with regard to his representation of the clients
    1 “Rule 1.2 (a) requires a lawyer to consult with and abide by a client’s
    decisions concerning the scope and objectives of the representation.” Matteson
    I, 314 Ga. at 578 n.1.
    2 “Rule 1.4 (a) provides that a lawyer shall “promptly inform the client of
    any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed
    consent . . . is required; shall consult with the client about the means by which
    the client’s objectives are to be accomplished; shall keep the client reasonably
    informed about the status of the matter; shall promptly comply with
    reasonable requests for information; and shall explain matters to the extent
    necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
    representation.” Id. at 578 n.2.
    3 “Rule 1.15 (I) (c) provides that, upon receiving funds in which a client
    has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client and deliver that
    portion of the funds which the client is entitled to receive.” Id. at 578 n.3.
    4 “Rule 1.16 (a) (2) provides that a lawyer shall withdraw from
    representation of a client if the lawyer’s physical or mental condition
    materially impairs his ability to represent the client.” Id. at 578 n.4.
    4
    in [the second matter], Matteson admits that he violated
    Rules 1.1,[5] 1.2 (a), 1.3,[6] 1.4, and 1.16 (a) (2) of the GRPC.
    The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4 and
    1.16 (a) is a public reprimand, while the maximum
    sanction for a violation of Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.15 (I)
    is disbarment.
    Matteson I, 314 Ga. at 578-579.
    Similar to his first petition, Matteson admits no aggravating
    factors, but offers in mitigation “that he has no disciplinary record;
    that he lacked a dishonest or selfish motive; . . . that he made a
    timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
    consequences of his misconduct; that he displayed a cooperative
    attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings; and that he is
    remorseful for his actions and inactions.” Matteson I, 314 Ga. at 579
    (citing ABA Standard 9.32 (a), (b), (d), (e), and (l)). In addition,
    Matteson continues to offer as a mitigating factor that, at the time
    of these violations, he was suffering from a mental disability or
    emotional problems for which he was being treated by a doctor. See
    5 “Rule 1.1 requires a lawyer to provide competent representation to his
    client.” Id. at 578 n.5.
    6 “Rule 1.3 provides that a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
    promptness in representing a client.” Id. at 578 n.6.
    5
    ABA Standard 9.32 (c) and (i). However, unlike in his first petition
    for voluntary discipline, Matteson has now provided, under seal,
    letters from several mental health professionals who have treated
    or are continuing to treat Matteson.         These letters support
    Matteson’s claims that he began experiencing symptoms of
    depression during the above-described representations; that he has
    been treated for depression and anxiety since 2015; that he has been
    relatively compliant with treatment and medication since that time;
    and that his mental health does not present an impediment to his
    practice of law. Additionally, Matteson has provided an affidavit
    supporting his claim that his experience with depression ultimately
    led him to close his law practice in 2019 and to step away from the
    practice of law.
    Matteson further states in his petition and affidavit that, in
    early 2019, he began advising his clients in writing that he could no
    longer act as their attorney and that, for a six-month period
    beginning on April 1, 2019, he performed no legal work and had no
    source of income. In support of these claims, Matteson provided a
    6
    copy of a letter he sent to a client, in which Matteson informs the
    client that he is no longer able to serve as the client’s legal
    representative because he will no longer be practicing law due to
    personal issues, updates the client on the status of the client’s case,
    and offers to assist the client in retaining new counsel. Additionally,
    Matteson provided with his sworn affidavit, in which he states that
    from April 2019 through October 2019 he did not work at all, his
    2019 income tax returns as evidence that he was not fully employed
    in 2019.
    Based on these claims, Matteson now requests as discipline a
    six-month suspension from the practice of law and that this
    suspension be imposed nunc pro tunc, in consideration of the fact
    that, beginning in April 2019, he voluntarily refrained from the
    practice of law for at least six months and fulfilled his ethical
    obligations to his clients. See In the Matter of Onipede, 
    288 Ga. 156
    ,
    157 (
    702 SE2d 136
    ) (2010) (“[W]hen an attorney requests entry of a
    suspension or voluntary surrender order nunc pro tunc, it is the
    lawyer’s responsibility to demonstrate that they voluntarily stopped
    7
    practicing law, the date on which their law practice ended, and that
    they complied with all the ethical obligations implicated in such a
    decision, such as assisting clients in securing new counsel and
    facilitating the transfer of client files and critical information about
    ongoing cases to new counsel.”). Further, Matteson proposes as part
    of his discipline that every three months in the first year following
    his reinstatement he be required to provide the Office of General
    Counsel (“OGC”) with an opinion from a mental health professional
    certifying that his mental health does not present an impediment to
    his practice of law; that he participate in the State Bar of Georgia’s
    Law Practice Management Program’s General Consultation service;
    and that he implement any recommendations made by that service
    during such consultation.7
    7 Matteson has attached to his affidavit a letter from a mental health
    professional certifying that, as of January 2023, his mental health does not
    present an impediment to his practice of law. Further, Matteson states in his
    sworn affidavit that he has already participated in the State Bar of Georgia’s
    Law Practice Management Program’s General Consultation service, which
    occurred in February 2023, and the Bar does not dispute Matteson’s
    participation in this program.
    8
    The State Bar has filed a response, noting that Matteson has
    now submitted proof of the mental health conditions that
    contributed to his misconduct, provided evidence that his clients’
    claims have been resolved, and has taken steps to ensure that his
    ethical failures will not reoccur.            The Bar does not dispute
    Matteson’s asserted factors in mitigation and asserts that it does not
    oppose the six-month suspension requested by Matteson and that
    the discipline Matteson requests is sufficient to serve as “a penalty
    to the offender, a deterrent to others, and [] an indication to laymen
    that the courts will maintain the ethics of the profession.”8 In the
    Matter of Dowdy, 
    247 Ga. 488
    , 493 (
    277 SE2d 36
    ) (1981). Moreover,
    the Bar asserts that this Court has imposed similar discipline in
    other cases involving violations of the Rules implicated here. See,
    e.g., In the Matter of Kirby, 
    312 Ga. 341
     (
    862 SE2d 550
    ) (2021)
    (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing a six-
    8 Notably, however, the Bar notes in aggravation, as it did before, that
    Matteson’s behavior suggests a pattern of misconduct, that he committed
    multiple offenses, and that he had substantial experience in the practice of law.
    See ABA Standard 9.22 (c), (d), and (i).
    9
    month suspension for attorney who admitted violating Rules 1.2,
    1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 in four separate matters where attorney addressed
    his mental health and practice management problems); In the
    Matter of Johnson, 
    303 Ga. 795
     (
    815 SE2d 55
    ) (2018) (accepting
    petition for voluntary discipline and imposing a six-month
    suspension, with conditions, for attorney who violated Rules 1.3, 1.4,
    1.5, 1.15 (I), 1.16 (d), and 5.5 (a) in six separate client matters where
    attorney was suffering from personal and emotional problems at
    time of misconduct and had taken intervening efforts to improve
    himself and his law practice); In the Matter of Huggins, 
    291 Ga. 92
    (
    727 SE2d 500
    ) (2012) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline
    and    imposing    six-month     suspension     with    conditions    for
    reinstatement for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), 1.16,
    and 9.3 in five client matters, where attorney had no prior
    disciplinary history and was receiving treatment for his personal
    issues). Further, the State Bar does not oppose Matteson’s request
    that his suspension be imposed nunc pro tunc to April 1, 2019. The
    10
    Bar, therefore, recommends that the Court accept Matteson’s
    renewed petition for voluntary discipline.
    Having reviewed the record in this case, including the
    documentation submitted under seal which includes Matteson’s
    sworn affidavit, 2019 tax returns, and client letter, we agree that
    the imposition of a six-month suspension is appropriate under these
    circumstances and is consistent with the precedent cited above. We
    also agree that Matteson has made the required showing under
    Onipede to support the imposition of his six-month suspension nunc
    pro tunc to April 1, 2019, and note that, because Matteson has
    sufficiently shown that he voluntarily stopped practicing law from
    April 1, 2019, through September 30, 2019, he has completed his
    suspension. Accordingly, Matteson is hereby reinstated with the
    conditions that, within 90 days of the date of this opinion, he provide
    the OGC with an opinion from a mental health professional
    certifying that his mental health does not present an impediment to
    his practice of law and provide such an opinion every three months
    for the first year of his reinstatement, and that he implement any
    11
    recommendations made by the State Bar of Georgia’s Law Practice
    Management Program’s General Consultation service.
    For these reasons, Andrew Matteson is hereby suspended from
    the practice of law nunc pro tunc as of April 1, 2019, and he is hereby
    reinstated with the conditions set forth above.
    Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Six-month
    suspension nunc pro tunc. Reinstated with conditions. All the
    Justices concur.
    12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S23Y0585

Filed Date: 8/16/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/16/2023