In THE MATTER OF RYAN CURTIS CLEVELAND (Two Cases) ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: October 11, 2023
S23Y0688, S23Y0918. IN THE MATTER OF RYAN CURTIS
CLEVELAND.
PER CURIAM.
These disciplinary matters are before the Court on two Notices
of Discipline filed by the State Bar of Georgia’s State Disciplinary
Board (“the Board”) against Respondent Ryan Curtis Cleveland
(State Bar No. 142377). The Notices of Discipline arise out of
Cleveland’s misconduct in the representation and abandonment of
eight clients.1 Cleveland, who was admitted to the State Bar in 2005,
1 The grievances underlying S23Y0688 were filed in July and September
2022, and resulted in the initiation of four State Disciplinary Board Docket
matters, SDBD Nos. 7679, 7680, 7681, and 7682. Following the State Bar’s
investigation, the Notice of Discipline was filed in March 2023 and sought a
six-month suspension. The grievances underlying S23Y0918 were filed in
February 2022, October 2022, and February 2023, and resulted in the
initiation of four State Disciplinary Board Docket matters, SDBD Nos. 7708,
7709, 7710, 7711. Following the State Bar’s investigation, the Notice of
Discipline was filed in May 2023 and sought disbarment. Because of the
similarity in the misconduct alleged, we consider the matters together and
is currently suspended as a result of his failure to respond to the
Notice of Investigation underlying S23Y0688. See Bar Rule 4-204.3
(a), (d); Case No. S23Y0560 (Jan. 27, 2023). Additionally, Cleveland
received a formal letter of admonition in January 2022 for
misconduct similar to the misconduct charged here.2 We agree that
Cleveland’s history of abandonment of clients and failure to
participate in the disciplinary process warrants his disbarment.
Cleveland was properly served with the Notice of Discipline in
each matter, but has not filed a Notice of Rejection in either case.
Therefore, he is in default and has waived his right to an evidentiary
hearing. See Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b). Additionally, by virtue of his
default, the facts alleged in the Notices of Discipline are deemed
admitted. See, e.g., In the Matter of Bonnell, 316 Ga. 460, 460 (888
focus on the sanction of disbarment recommended in S23Y0918. See Bar Rule
4-208.1 (b) (Court is not bound by the discipline recommended in a Notice of
Discipline).
2 Although the issuance of a formal letter of admonition is a form of
confidential discipline, see Bar Rule 4-102 (b) (6), in the event of a later
disciplinary proceeding, the confidentiality of the imposition of the prior
confidential discipline is waived. See Bar Rule 4-208.
2
SE2d 523) (2023); In the Matter of Blain, 315 Ga. 475, 476 (883 SE2d
315) (2023).
The facts, as deemed admitted, are as follows. In the matter
underlying State Disciplinary Board Docket (“SDBD”) No. 7679, a
client hired Cleveland in August 2019 to represent him in a divorce
and custody case and paid Cleveland a $2,600 retainer. The client
asked Cleveland to seek a temporary parenting plan so that he could
have visitation with his daughter, whom he had not seen since June
2019. Cleveland failed to file any pleadings or motions in the client’s
case; failed to conduct discovery; refused to communicate with the
client despite the client’s repeated attempts; failed to notify the
client that a final bench trial had been scheduled in August 2022;
and failed to return the unearned fee.
With regard to each of the other seven matters, Cleveland was
assigned to represent an indigent defendant pursuant to a contract
with a county’s public defender office. Cleveland failed to
communicate with the clients, who were all incarcerated; failed to
respond to requests for information from the clients and their
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families; failed to file any substantive pleadings or motions for bond
in the clients’ cases; and repeatedly misled one client and the client’s
family about the status of the client’s case. Additionally, Cleveland
failed to notify his clients or the trial courts that he was suspended
from the practice of law in January 2023 and was no longer able to
represent them.
Based on these facts, the Board found probable cause to believe
that Cleveland committed a single violation of Rule 1.53 and
3 Rule 1.5 (a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement for,
charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for
expenses.”
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multiple violations of Rules 1.1,4 1.2,5 1.3,6 1.4,7 1.16 (a) and (c),8 3.2,9
8.4 (a) (4),10 and 9.311 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct
4 Rule 1.1 requires a lawyer to “provide competent representation to [his]
client.”
5 In five matters, the Bar alleged violations of Rule 1.2, without
specifying which of the four subparts of the rule was violated. In three other
matters, it alleged violations of Rule 1.2 (a), which requires a lawyer to abide
by his client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of the
representation, and in criminal matters, to “abide by the client’s decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury
trial and whether the client will testify.” Based on the facts in the records, it
appears that the Bar intended to charge violations of Rule 1.2 (a) in the five
matters where the subpart was not specified.
6 Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client.”
7 In each matter, the Bar alleged a violation of Rule 1.4 without
specifying which subparts of the rule were violated. Based on the facts in the
records, it appears that the Bar intended to charge violations of Rule 1.4 (a) (3)
and (4), which provide that a lawyer shall “keep the client reasonably informed
about the status of the matter” and shall “promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information.”
8 Rule 1.16 (a) (1) and (2) provide that a lawyer shall withdraw from
representation if the representation will result in a violation of the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct or if “the lawyer’s physical or mental condition
materially impairs [his] ability to represent the client.” Rule 1.16 (c) provides
that when a lawyer withdraws, he shall do so “in compliance with applicable
laws and rules.”
9Rule 3.2 provides that “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”
10 Rule 8.4 (a) (4) provides that a lawyer shall not “engage in professional
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” Certainly,
Cleveland’s knowing misrepresentations about the status of one client’s
criminal case supports the determination that he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4). See,
e.g., In the Matter of Lawrence, 315 Ga. 723, 725 n.1 (884 SE2d 377) (2023)
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(“GRPC”), found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).12 The maximum penalty for
a single violation of any one of Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 8.4 (a) (4) is
(noting that violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) arose, in part, from lawyer’s
misrepresentation to client that matter was proceeding when in fact it was
not). However, the Bar has not shown what facts support a violation of Rule
8.4 (a) (4) in the two other matters in which the violation was charged. It is
possible that the Bar intended to charge one Rule 8.4 (a) (4) violation based on
Cleveland’s failure to return an unearned fee. We recently recited a special
master’s determination that a lawyer violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) “because his
retention of [a] client’s $1,500 [fee] amounted to a dishonest and unlawful
conversion of those funds.” In the Matter of Hardy, ___ Ga. ___ (890 SE2d 770,
777) (2023). However, some of us have doubts that the failure to return
unearned fees, without more, necessarily constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4 (a)
(4), which is punishable by disbarment. The wrongful retention of unearned
fees is typically charged only as a violation of Rule 1.16 (d), for which the
maximum sanction is a public reprimand and which requires, in part, that a
lawyer refund any unearned fee upon the termination of a representation. See,
e.g., In the Matter of Lain, 311 Ga. 427, 432-433, 434-435 (2021) (reciting
special master’s determinations that attorney violated Rule 1.16 (d) by failing
to refund unearned fee and violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) when she filed a motion
containing false information); In the Matter of Starling, 297 Ga. 359, 362-363
(2015) (agreeing with special master’s report that determined, in part, that an
attorney violated Rule 1.16 (d) by failing to refund an unearned fee). But in
this case we need not decide whether the retention of an unearned fee
constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) where it is not clear that the Bar
intended to assert that Cleveland violated that rule by his one instance of
retaining an unearned fee. Accordingly, we rely on only one Rule 8.4 (a) (4)
violation in our consideration of this matter.
11Rule 9.3 provides that during investigation of a Bar disciplinary
proceeding against him, a lawyer shall respond to disciplinary authorities in
accordance with State Bar Rules, which require that a lawyer file a written
response to a notice of investigation. See Bar Rule 4-204.3.
12 The Notices of Discipline set forth a number of factual allegations and
summarily allege that Cleveland violated the enumerated rules. However, the
Bar has not indicated what conduct constitutes a violation of which rule, and
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disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a single violation of any
one of Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 3.2, and 9.3 is a public reprimand.
In determining the appropriate level of discipline, the Board
appropriately considered the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, including the existence of aggravating or mitigating
factors. See In the Matter of Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (456 SE2d 52)
(1995), superseded by Rule on other grounds as stated in In the
Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 214-215 (857 SE2d 212) (2021). We
agree with the Board’s determination that the following factors
should be considered in aggravation: Cleveland’s prior disciplinary
record; his pattern of misconduct; his commission of multiple
offenses; the vulnerability of his clients; his substantial experience
in the practice of law; and his indifference to making restitution to
the specific rule violation is not always obvious from the facts in the records.
Additionally, the Notices of Discipline fail to always specify the subsections of
the rule that Cleveland is alleged to have violated. But see Bar Rule 4-208.2
(a) (2) (a notice of discipline “shall include” “the allegations of facts that, if
unrebutted, support the finding” that the specific rules charged have been
violated).
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the client in SDBD No. 7679.13 See ABA Standard 9.22 (a), (c), (d),
(h)-(j). We have identified no factors in mitigation.14
Having reviewed the records in both cases, we conclude that
disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Cleveland’s misconduct
in these matters and is consistent with the sanction imposed in
similar cases. See In the Matter of Proctor, 313 Ga. 637 (872 SE2d
691) (2022) (disbarring attorney who abandoned clients in civil and
criminal matters and was found in default in disciplinary
13 The Board also cited Cleveland’s failure to respond to the grievances
and Notices of Investigation as a factor in aggravation. See ABA Standard 9.22
(e) (identifying as a factor in aggravation “bad faith obstruction of the
disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders
of the disciplinary agency”). However, as noted above, Cleveland was charged
with violating Rule 9.3 for failing to respond to the Notices of Investigation,
and we generally decline to rely on specific conduct in aggravation of discipline
when that same conduct is also charged as a violation of the GRPC. See, e.g.,
In the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga. 409, 418 n.3 (877 SE2d 248) (2022).
Moreover, the State Bar rules do not require that a lawyer respond to a
grievance. See Bar Rule 4-202 (c) (Bar’s investigation into grievance “may
include forwarding information received to the respondent so that the
respondent may respond”) (emphasis supplied).
14 Although the Board considered in mitigation that Cleveland “appears
to be suffering from some undefined personal or emotional problems,” there is
no indication in the records about what led the Board to this supposition. While
a lawyer’s personal and emotional problems may be a factor in mitigation, see
ABA Standard 9.32 (c), we decline to consider it as a mitigating factor in the
absence of any evidence in the record supporting such a claim.
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proceedings); In the Matter of Powell, 310 Ga. 859 (854 SE2d 731)
(2021) (disbarring attorney who abandoned client in criminal matter
and was found in default in disciplinary proceedings); In the Matter
of Larson, 305 Ga. 522 (826 SE2d 99) (2019) (disbarring attorney
who abandoned clients in criminal matters and was found in default
in disciplinary proceedings). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that
the name of Ryan Curtis Cleveland be removed from the rolls of
persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Cleveland
is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).
Disbarred. All the Justices concur.
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