Scoggins v. State ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: December 19, 2023
S23A0894. SCOGGINS v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
Christopher Reid Scoggins appeals his convictions for murder
and other offenses stemming from the shooting death of Stephanie
Daniel. 1 He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
1 Daniel was killed on the night of July 5, 2015. On March 21, 2016, a
Gordon County grand jury indicted Scoggins and co-defendant Fred Jason
Charles for various crimes: malice murder, two counts of felony murder,
aggravated assault, two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
theft by taking, conspiracy to commit arson in the second degree, and six
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The case
was tried before a jury in September 2016. The jury found both defendants
guilty on all counts. Charles received a sentence of life without the possibility
of parole for the malice murder count, as well as other sentences for additional
counts. We affirmed Charles’s convictions. See Charles v. State, 315 Ga. 651(884 SE2d 363) (2023). On October 6, 2016, Scoggins was sentenced to life
without parole for malice murder, plus a concurrent five-year sentence for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, ten years consecutive for theft by
taking, five years consecutive for conspiracy to commit arson in the second
degree, and two five-year sentences for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, consecutive to the arson sentence and concurrent to
one another. The other counts merged or were vacated by operation of law.
Scoggins filed a motion for new trial on October 7, 2016, and amended the
certain of his convictions and that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to request a jury instruction on concealing the death of
another or hindering the apprehension of a felon.2 We conclude that
the evidence was sufficient as to all of the challenged convictions and
that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to request
the cited instructions. We therefore affirm.
1. Scoggins first argues that the evidence was insufficient as
a matter of constitutional due process to sustain his convictions for
malice murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 3 We
motion on April 9, 2018. The trial court held hearings on the motion on January
28, 2022, and March 17, 2022, and orally denied the motion at the close of the
March 17 hearing. Scoggins filed a notice of appeal on April 4, 2022; the motion
ripened when the trial court entered an order denying the motion for new trial
on April 27, 2022. See Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 464-467 (1) (796 SE2d
261) (2017). The case was docketed to this Court’s August 2023 term of court
and orally argued on November 7, 2023.
2 Another enumeration of error, regarding evidence suggesting that
Scoggins was part of a gang, was withdrawn by defense counsel at oral
argument.
3 Scoggins also argues that the evidence was insufficient as to the felony
murder and aggravated assault charges, but because those counts merged or
were vacated by operation of law, with no sentence being entered on them, such
arguments are moot given our conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain Scoggins’s malice murder conviction. See White v. State, 287 Ga. 713,
714-715 (1) (a) (699 SE2d 291) (2010). We note that Scoggins does not challenge
2
disagree.
In considering a claim that evidence was insufficient in
violation of federal due process under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), “our review is limited to an
evaluation of whether the trial evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdicts, is sufficient to authorize a rational
trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of the crimes of which he was convicted.” Goodman v. State, 313 Ga.
762, 766 (2) (a) (873 SE2d 150) (2022) (citation and punctuation
omitted). So viewed, the evidence admitted at trial is as follows.
On July 5, 2015, Fred Jason Charles was living with his father,
Herbert Charles (“Herbert”), at Herbert’s mobile home in Gordon
County. Charles slept in an upstairs bedroom in the original part of
the mobile home, while Herbert had a bedroom and living room in
an addition to the home. Daniel, Charles’s girlfriend, had been
staying in the mobile home for several days. Daniel drove a dark-
the sufficiency of the evidence as to his convictions for theft by taking or
conspiracy to commit arson.
3
colored Nissan Xterra.
Scoggins was with Charles throughout the day on July 5, and
Charles was carrying a firearm. Sometime after lunchtime on July
5, Charles stopped at the house of a neighbor, James Hunter, driving
an Xterra. Another man, whom Hunter did not recognize, stayed in
the car. Charles showed Hunter a revolver and asked where he could
shoot it. At dusk later that day, Charles briefly stopped by Hunter’s
home in the Xterra; the same man was with him. Additionally,
Charles’s friend Stephanie Baldwin identified Scoggins as being
with Charles at a motel sometime between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.
on July 5. Charles showed Baldwin a firearm, and Baldwin saw a
black Nissan Xterra in the parking lot that she thought looked like
Daniel’s.
At some point during the day of July 5, Herbert saw Charles
and Scoggins at the mobile home. In the evening, Herbert observed
Charles and Scoggins leaving in Daniel’s vehicle.
That evening, around 7:30 p.m. or 8:00 p.m., another neighbor,
Jeff Ingle, saw Daniel and Charles arrive at Herbert’s mobile home.
4
Ingle testified that he did not see Scoggins with Charles, but
acknowledged, “I wouldn’t know [Scoggins] if I saw him.” Shortly
thereafter, the neighbor saw Charles throw a firecracker and then
leave. The sound of fireworks could be heard across the
neighborhood throughout the evening.
At some point after Charles left, Herbert noticed that the door
to Charles’s bedroom was open, and he saw Daniel lying on a bunch
of clothes on the bed in Charles’s bedroom and asked if she was
alright. Daniel did not respond, and Herbert “figured she had just
went to sleep” and proceeded to watch television downstairs.
Between 9:21 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. on July 5, the mother of
Scoggins’s child, Alisha Nelson, who was incarcerated at the time,
called Scoggins multiple times. She testified that she understood
Charles to be with Scoggins during those calls.4 On a call that began
at 9:21 p.m., Nelson overheard Scoggins telling Charles, “[D]on’t
4 Those calls were recorded and formally admitted at trial, but the jury
never heard the recordings. The quotations from those calls are from Nelson’s
words in her testimony, or the language of examining counsel with which she
agreed.
5
shoot yourself in the toe,” and, “[I]t’s loaded.” On a call that began
at 9:37 p.m., Nelson heard Scoggins praise the Nissan Xterra in
which he and Charles were traveling. On a call that began at 10:32
p.m., Nelson heard Scoggins say that he and Charles were “going
down the road,” Scoggins adding, “I’m fixing to hang out the ‘f’ing
window and ‘f’ing blow somebody’s tires out.” Nelson testified that it
sounded like Scoggins and Charles were having a good time.
At some point, Charles and Scoggins returned to the mobile
home, and Herbert told them to check on Daniel. Charles and
Scoggins did not say anything, but simply went into Charles’s
bedroom before leaving again. Herbert later that night discovered
that Daniel was still lying in Charles’s bedroom, bleeding and
unresponsive. He called 911 just after midnight.
Officers responded and found Daniel dead in the bedroom with
a bullet wound in her chest and an abrasion, consistent with a graze
from a bullet, on her arm. Officers also found a bullet hole in one of
Charles’s bedroom windows, with indications that the bullet
creating that hole (which was never recovered) had been fired from
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inside the room. Writing on the wall of the bedroom said, among
other things, “Kill fake friends” and “Fred Jason Charles.” A coroner
who pronounced Daniel dead at the mobile home estimated that
when he encountered her at about 4:50 a.m. on July 6, she had been
dead for about four to six hours, meaning that Daniel likely died
sometime between 10:50 p.m. and 12:50 a.m.
Charles, accompanied by Scoggins, was seen on video putting
gas into the victim’s vehicle at a gas station around 12:20 a.m. on
July 6.
Marcus Gunnin was camping in the Strawberry Mountain area
of Walker County on July 6 when he saw two “30ish, white males”
walking along an unpaved road toward Manning Mill Road around
3:00 a.m. 5 About 45 minutes later, Gunnin heard the sounds of a car
cranking up and doors slamming, coming from the direction the men
had been heading.
5 Scoggins is white. An exact date of birth for him is not apparent from
the record, and it does not appear that the jury was told his age. But a search
of the Georgia Department of Corrections web site indicates he was
approximately 30 years old at the time of the murder, and the jury was able to
observe his appearance at the trial that took place the following year.
7
In the early hours of July 6, Scoggins called his sister, Crystal
Scoggins (“Crystal”). At 1:58 a.m., Crystal reached out to a friend for
a ride. They proceeded to pick up Scoggins and Charles on an
unpaved road that intersected Manning Mill Road in the Strawberry
Mountain area, sometime between 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. Crystal
described Scoggins as “happy and giddy,” laughing at a joke during
a stop for gas; her friend said Charles and Scoggins were “cutting up
and acting goofy” in the car. After picking up Charles and Scoggins,
Crystal drove the men back to the house where she and Scoggins
lived with their parents. While there, Charles made a noose with a
belt, held the noose in Crystal’s presence, and “dared [her] to say a
word.” Scoggins proceeded to sleep on the couch, while Crystal and
Charles stayed up all night.
On July 6, officers found Daniel’s vehicle, burned down to the
metal frame at the end of the unpaved forestry road that intersects
Manning Mill Road.
At trial, a firearms examiner testified that a bullet recovered
from Daniel’s body was likely fired from one of several different
8
models of handguns. Although Herbert owned a handgun, the
firearms examiner ruled out Herbert’s handgun as the source of the
bullet that killed Daniel. And Herbert’s hands, swabbed by law
enforcement at approximately 4:27 a.m. on July 6, 2015, tested
negative for gunshot residue.
The State also introduced certified copies of Scoggins’s July
2013 felony drug convictions.
(a) Scoggins argues that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his malice murder conviction because, although he was
present at the time of the murder, there was no evidence supporting
a conclusion that he was even a party to that crime. We disagree.
A jury may find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
if the evidence shows either that he directly committed the crime or
that he was a “party thereto.” OCGA § 16-2-20 (a). A person is a
party to the crime if he aids or abets in its commission or if he
“advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another” to
commit it. OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (3), (4); see also Willis v. State, 315
Ga. 19, 24 (2) (880 SE2d 158) (2022). “And although the defendant’s
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mere presence at the scene is not enough to convict him as a party
to the crime, the jury may infer his criminal intent from his
presence, companionship, and conduct before, during, and after the
offense.” Willis, 315 Ga. at 24 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The required criminal intent for liability under a party-to-a-crime
theory is the same as that of the underlying crime. See Downey v.
State, 298 Ga. 568, 570 (1) & n.3 (783 SE2d 622) (2016). For a malice
murder conviction, the requisite criminal intent is that of malice,
which incorporates the intent to kill. See Benton v. State, 305 Ga.
242, 244 (1) (a) (824 SE2d 322) (2019); OCGA § 16-5-1 (a). “The
malice necessary to establish malice murder may be formed in an
instant, as long as it is present at the time of the killing.” Benton,
305 Ga. at 244 (1) (a). Whether a killing was intentional and
malicious is for the jury to determine. See id. Here, there was
sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Scoggins was
guilty of the malice murder of Daniel, at least as a party to the crime.
The State does not appear to argue on appeal that there was
evidence from which the jury could infer that Scoggins himself shot
10
Daniel. But Scoggins admitted in both his brief and oral argument
that he was present when Daniel was shot.6 And the evidence was
consistent with that concession. Multiple witnesses said that
Scoggins and Charles were together for most of the day on July 5.
They were the last two persons seen with the victim before Herbert
found her body and alerted authorities. Herbert was ruled out as a
perpetrator by law enforcement through a gunshot residue test.
Although Ingle testified that Charles and Daniel arrived at the
mobile home without Scoggins around 7:30 p.m or 8:00 p.m., Ingle
also testified that he did not know Scoggins, such that the jury could
have concluded that his failure to recall Scoggins’s presence was due
to either Ingle’s lack of memory or Scoggins entering the home at a
slightly different time than Charles and Daniel. Charles was seen
setting off a firework before leaving around that time, which the jury
6 We note that generally we no longer review sua sponte the sufficiency
of the evidence, except that of murder convictions resulting in the death
penalty. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 398-399 (4) (b) (846 SE2d 83)
(2020). Thus, instead of considering all conceivable sufficiency-related issues,
we limit our consideration to only the argument that Scoggins actually makes
in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to his malice murder conviction
— in essence, that his mere presence for the shooting of Daniel, even coupled
with flight, was insufficient.
11
could have inferred was done in order to give cover to the sound of a
gunshot, and Herbert found Daniel unresponsive after seeing
Charles leave. And even if Daniel was not shot until after Charles
and Scoggins returned to the mobile home later, the two men were
seen going into Charles’s bedroom together at that time.
Even if the evidence did not conclusively establish which of the
two defendants shot Daniel, “there was evidence of a common
criminal intent, including [Scoggins’s] presence, companionship,
and conduct before and immediately after the fatal shooting.” State
v. Cash, 302 Ga. 587, 596 (807 SE2d 405) (2017). “[I]f a defendant
has knowledge of the crime which is intended and shares in the
criminal intent of the principal actor, that defendant is an aider and
abettor.” Id. “Consequently, if such defendant is at the scene and
does not oppose the commission of the crime, the trier of fact may
consider such conduct in connection with prior knowledge and is
authorized to conclude that the defendant assented and lent
approval to the commission of the crime, and thus, was aiding and
abetting it.” Id. at 596.
12
Here, despite being admittedly present when Daniel was shot,
Scoggins made no attempt to seek medical aid for her. Indeed, after
Herbert found Daniel unresponsive, he told Scoggins and Charles to
check on her; according to Herbert’s testimony, Scoggins and
Charles “didn’t say nothing” when they went to check on Daniel, and
Herbert did not see Charles again that night. Instead of summoning
aid, Scoggins left the scene with Charles in Daniel’s vehicle, giving
rise to an inference that Scoggins shared Charles’s criminal intent.
See Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81, 88-89 (3) (868 SE2d 205) (2022)
(flight from scene of crime generally is circumstantial evidence of
guilt); Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743, 744-745 (1) (733 SE2d 294)
(2012) (concluding evidence sufficient to sustain murder conviction
of defendant on party to a crime theory, in part based on his presence
at the shooting, his failure to summon help for the victim, his fleeing
with the other possible perpetrator of the shooting, and his
continued association afterward).
It appears that Scoggins may have claimed at trial that he did
13
not share Charles’s criminal intent but instead acted under duress.7
The evidence belies any such claim. After Scoggins and Charles
disposed of Daniel’s vehicle,8 Scoggins obtained a ride for himself
and Charles, stayed overnight with Charles, and continued to laugh
and joke around Charles even in the hours after the shooting — all
of which undercut Scoggins’s apparent claim that he was acting
under duress. Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to enable a
rational trier of fact to find Scoggins guilty beyond a reasonable
7 Scoggins did not testify at trial, and the State did not introduce at trial
any statement by him to law enforcement. Closing arguments were not
transcribed. But trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that
her theory of the case was that Scoggins was “innocent” of Daniel’s murder and
subsequently acted “in fear for his own life.” The trial court declined to give
Scoggins’s requested instruction on coercion.
8 The State seeks to rely on the burning of Daniel’s vehicle in arguing
that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions challenged on
sufficiency grounds. But, in responding to Scoggins’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim about jury instructions, the State insisted before the trial court
and this Court that there is no evidence that Daniel’s vehicle was burned for
the purpose of destroying evidence of the murder. The State at oral argument
before this Court acknowledged the inconsistency in these two positions. We
recognize the possibility that the jury might have inferred that Scoggins
participated in the burning of the victim’s vehicle in an attempt to disassociate
himself from the car, rather than keeping it, because he had been involved in
her killing. But we place virtually no weight on this in our sufficiency analysis,
because it is not necessary to consider this evidence — and thus it is not
necessary to resolve the contradiction in the State’s arguments — in order to
find that the evidence was sufficient.
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doubt of the crime of malice murder. See Shockley v. State, 297 Ga.
661, 663-665 (1) (777 SE2d 245) (2015) (concluding evidence was
sufficient to support murder conviction where defendant was
present for the shooting, fled the scene with co-indictee, and later
fled the jurisdiction).
(b) Scoggins also argues that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his convictions for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. We disagree.
Scoggins does not make any particular argument as to the
firearm offenses, relying on his general argument that mere
presence, even coupled with flight, is insufficient to make one a
party to a crime. Regarding Scoggins’s conviction for possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, of course whoever shot
Daniel possessed a firearm during the shooting. And even if Charles
was the shooter, a defendant may be convicted of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony under a party-to-a-crime
theory. See Dublin v. State, 302 Ga. 60, 65-66 (3) (805 SE2d 27)
15
(2017); Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 368, 371 (1) (578 SE2d 885) (2003).
Given our conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to sustain
Scoggins’s murder conviction under the theory that he was a party
to the murder of Daniel, the evidence was sufficient to support
Scoggins’s conviction for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony under that theory, as well.
As for Scoggins’s felon-in-possession conviction, a defendant
may be convicted of that offense under a party-to-a-crime theory,
where the defendant is a party to possession of a firearm by someone
else who is a convicted felon. In that scenario, a defendant need not
even constructively possess a firearm in order to be guilty of the
crime. See Lebis v. State, 302 Ga. 750, 757-759 (II) (B) (808 SE2d
724) (2017) (concluding that evidence was sufficient for jury to
conclude that defendant was guilty of felony murder as a party to
her husband’s possession of a firearm as a convicted felon). But here
the felon-in-possession counts against Scoggins clearly alleged that
he, not Charles, had previously been convicted of a felony. Indeed,
the State clarified at oral argument that these counts were
16
predicated on the theory that Scoggins himself constructively
possessed a firearm.
“[I]f a person has both the power and the intention at a given
time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, then the person is
in constructive possession of that thing.” Lebis, 302 Ga. at 753 (II)
(citation and punctuation omitted). “Mere proximity to contraband,
absent other evidence connecting a suspect with that contraband, is
not enough to establish constructive possession.” Id. at 754 (II).
Whether the evidence shows more than mere proximity, and
whether circumstantial evidence of possession has excluded every
reasonable hypothesis save that of constructive possession, “are
questions committed principally to the trier of fact, and we should
not disturb the decisions of the trier of fact about these things unless
they cannot be supported as a matter of law.” Id. (citation and
punctuation omitted).
Given the jury’s role in that regard, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence that Scoggins constructively possessed a firearm.
There was evidence that Scoggins and Charles rode around together
17
in a vehicle on the day of the shooting, with Charles displaying a
firearm at various points that day. Although there was little
evidence about how that firearm was carried while the two were
driving around (i.e., whether the gun was in a place where Scoggins
could freely reach it, as opposed to being kept on Charles’s person),
the jury heard evidence that, while riding around with Charles,
Scoggins told his girlfriend that he was “fixing to . . . blow somebody’s
tires out.” From this evidence, the jury could infer that Scoggins
either actually possessed a gun at that time, or that he had “both
the power and the intention” to exercise control over a gun at that
time, such that he had constructive possession of that firearm.
Under these particular circumstances, we conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to find that Scoggins possessed a gun while
a convicted felon.
2. Scoggins also argues that trial counsel was ineffective in
that she failed to request “a charge of” concealing the death of
another or hindering the apprehension of a felon. We disagree.
To prove his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Scoggins
18
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Scoggins’s defense. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d
674) (1984). “To show that his lawyer’s performance was deficient,
the defendant must demonstrate that the lawyer performed his
duties in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the
circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”
State v. Spratlin, 305 Ga. 585, 591 (2) (826 SE2d 36) (2019) (citation
and punctuation omitted). “In reviewing a ruling on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, we defer to the trial court’s findings
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply the law to the
facts de novo.” See id.Scoggins argues that trial counsel should have “request[ed] a
charge of” concealing the death of another or hindering the
apprehension of a felon because had the jury been given “the
opportunity to hold [Scoggins] accountable for his actions” by finding
him guilty of those crimes, “it is highly likely that he would be
convicted of” those offenses. “A written request to charge a lesser
19
included offense must always be given if there is any evidence that
the defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense.” Soto v. State,
303 Ga. 517, 520 (2) (813 SE2d 343) (2018) (citation and punctuation
omitted). But “[i]t is error to charge the jury on an offense not
embraced in the indictment.” Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168, 181-182 (3)
(c) (815 SE2d 38) (2018); see also State v. Hightower, 252 Ga. 220,
222-223 & n.2 (312 SE2d 610) (1984) (“[W]here the defendant is
charged by a narrowly drawn indictment with a specific crime it is
not within the power of the judge or the jury to interpret the facts as
presented at trial to support an alternative, separate offense.
Criminal indictments are not deemed amendable to conform to the
evidence.”).
As Scoggins conceded at oral argument, neither concealing the
death of another nor hindering the apprehension of a felon is
included within any of the offenses with which Scoggins actually was
charged. A conviction for concealing the death of another requires
proof that the defendant “by concealing the death of any other
person, hinders a discovery of whether or not such person was
20
unlawfully killed[.]” OCGA § 16-10-31. And a conviction for
hindering the apprehension of a felon requires proof that the
defendant “with intention to hinder the apprehension or
punishment of a person whom he knows or has reasonable grounds
to believe has committed a felony” either “[h]arbors or conceals such
person” or “[c]onceals or destroys evidence of the crime.” OCGA § 16-
10-50. None of these elements are elements of the crimes with which
Scoggins was charged, and thus neither hindering nor concealing is
a lesser offense included within any of the charged offenses. See
OCGA § 16-1-6 (defining included crimes); see also Nalls, 304 Ga. at
176 (3) (a) (hindering the apprehension of a criminal is not included
within the crime of murder); Chapman v. State, 280 Ga. 560, 561 (4)
(629 SE2d 220) (2006) (concealing the death of another is not a lesser
offense of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault).
Therefore, counsel was not deficient for failing to request
instructions on either offense. See Jeffrey v. State, 296 Ga. 713, 716
(2) (770 SE2d 585) (2015) (“[T]rial counsel’s failure to request an
inapposite instruction cannot form the basis for an ineffectiveness
21
claim.”).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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