Southern Piedmont Law, Pc. v. Jionel E. Pierre ( 2022 )

FOURTH DIVISION
DILLARD, P. J.,
MERCIER and PINSON, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
DEADLINES ARE NO LONGER TOLLED IN THIS
COURT. ALL FILINGS MUST BE SUBMITTED WITHIN
THE TIMES SET BY OUR COURT RULES.
February 3, 2022
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A21A1795. SOUTHERN PIEDMONT LAW, PC v. PIERRE.
MERCIER, Judge.
Southern Piedmont Law, PC (“Southern Piedmont”) appeals from the trial
court’s order requiring Jionel Pierre to pay Southern Piedmont’s attorney fees and
costs in this action. Although the award was in its favor, Southern Piedmont argues
that the trial court erred in allowing Pierre to satisfy the judgment through
installments paid over a two-year period. Because the trial court lacked authority to
establish a payment plan for Pierre, we vacate that portion of the trial court’s ruling
and remand for further proceedings.1
1
We have circulated this decision among all nondisqualified judges of the
Court to consider whether this case should be passed upon by all members of the
Court. Fewer than the required number of judges, however, voted in favor of a
hearing en banc on the question of disapproving, in part, language in Hill v. Burnett,
349 Ga. App. 260 (825 SE2d 617) (2019), as described in Footnote 2, infra.
The record shows that Southern Piedmont represented Pierre’s wife in the
parties’ divorce proceeding, and Pierre represented himself. During the divorce
litigation, Pierre objected to Southern Piedmont’s use of electronic mail to correspond
with him. When Southern Piedmont continued to communicate and serve documents
through electronic mail, Pierre sued the firm for malpractice, negligence per se,
trespass, and libel.
Southern Piedmont moved to dismiss the complaint and, pursuant to OCGA §
9-15-14, sought an award of attorney fees and costs incurred while defending against
litigation it deemed frivolous. The trial court agreed that Pierre’s claims could not
proceed and dismissed his complaint. Following an evidentiary hearing, it also
awarded Southern Piedmont $9,444.92 in costs and attorney fees under OCGA § 9-
15-14 (a) and (b). In conjunction with that award, the trial court stated: “[Pierre] shall
make a payment of no less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) per month for twenty-
four months, with any remaining balance to be paid no later than twenty-four months
from the date of this Order.”
Southern Piedmont objected to the installment provision, arguing that the trial
court could not subject an OCGA § 9-15-14 fee award to a two-year payment plan.
2
The trial court disagreed, and we granted Southern Piedmont’s application for
discretionary review.
As mandated by the legislature, an award of attorney fees and costs entered
under OCGA § 9-15-14 “shall constitute and be enforceable as a money judgment.”
OCGA § 9-15-14 (f). Georgia law offers several mechanisms for enforcing and
collecting money judgments. A court, for example, may issue a writ of fieri facias
(“fi. fa.”), which “authoriz[es] sheriffs and their lawful deputies to proceed with levy
on real and personal property.” Black v. Black, 245 Ga. 281, 283 (2) (264 SE2d 216)
(1980). After properly recording the fi. fa., a judgment creditor may pursue a lien on
the debtor’s property. See generally Synovus Bank v. Kelley, 309 Ga. 654, 657-658
(1) (847 SE2d 592) (2020); OCGA § 9-12-86 (b). A judgment creditor may also
initiate garnishment proceedings to collect a money judgment. See OCGA § 18-4-40.
Southern Piedmont argues that by establishing a two-year installment plan for
payment of the fee award, the trial court improperly altered the method for collecting
a civil money judgment. We agree. Nothing in OCGA § 9-15-14 permitted the trial
court to break Southern Piedmont’s judgment into monthly payments and delay final
execution of the award for two years. See also Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019) (defining “money judgment” as “[a] judgment for damages subject to
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immediate execution, as distinguished from equitable or injunctive relief”).
Moreover, Southern Piedmont has little recourse if Pierre fails to make the required
payments. As a money judgment, the fee award cannot be enforced through a
contempt action. See McKenna v. Gray, 263 Ga. 753, 755 (438 SE2d 901) (1994)
(“Normally . . . a money judgment may be enforced only by execution thereon, not
by contempt proceedings.”); Eden v. Eden, 344 Ga. App. 864, 866 (1) (812 SE2d 317)
(2018) (“[I]n the absence of statutory authority or other extraneous circumstances not
present here, contempt is not an available remedy to enforce a money judgment.”)
(citation and punctuation omitted). And the trial court cited no means by which
Southern Piedmont might otherwise compel Pierre to pay the monthly installments
as they become due over the next two years.
Describing the payment terms at the fee award hearing, the trial judge noted
that an installment plan is “how we do attorney fees in typical divorce litigation.” But
this is not divorce litigation. Although the parties initially crossed paths in connection
with Pierre’s divorce, he brought this tort action against Southern Piedmont outside
of that proceeding. And we cannot find the trial court’s divorce approach proper here.
Divorce litigation is unique, with specific procedures and statutory provisions
applicable only to that area of the law. See generally Jacob v. Koslow, 282 Ga. 51, 52
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(644 SE2d 857) (2007) (noting the “unique nature of divorce cases”). Unlike fees
granted under OCGA § 9-15-14, attorney fees awarded in the domestic relations
context are not designated as a money judgment and are subject to enforcement
through a contempt action. See OCGA § 19-6-2 (a) (2); see also OCGA § 19-9-3 (g)
(trial court may award attorney fees in child custody action “to be paid by the parties
in proportions and at times determined by the judge”).
The $9,444.92 award entered against Pierre under OCGA § 9-15-14 is a money
judgment that can be collected and enforced like any other money judgment. The trial
court erroneously restricted Southern Piedmont’s ability to recover the award by
imposing a two-year payment plan.2 Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order to
2
The trial court cited Hill v. Burnett, 349 Ga. App. 260, 266 (3) (825 SE2d
617) (2019), for the proposition that a court may set a deadline for the payment of
fees and expenses awarded under OCGA § 9-15-14. In Hill, we found no error in the
trial court’s decision to require a party to pay an attorney fee judgment by a particular
date. See id. But because the party assessed with attorney fees — rather than the party
seeking to collect the fees — objected to the payment deadline, we did not address
how the deadline impacted the party awarded the fees. We found only that the
judgment debtor could not object to the judgment based on the deadline. See id.
Moreover, although the Hill decision does not specify the terms of the deadline at
issue there, nothing indicates that the deadline undermined collection of the attorney
fee award or converted an immediately-enforceable money judgment into an
extended, two-year installment plan. The Hill decision does not control our analysis
or require a different result here. To the extent, however, that the language in Hill
could be interpreted as allowing a trial court to delay the enforcement of an award
entered under OCGA § 9-15-14 or subject that award to a payment plan, the language
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the extent it set forth the payment plan and remand the case for the trial court to enter
the award without payment terms.
Judgment vacated and case remanded. Dillard, P. J., and Pinson, J., concur.
is hereby disapproved.
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