James Allen Johnson v. State ( 2022 )

THIRD DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
REESE and BROWN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
February 8, 2022
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A21A1306. JOHNSON v. THE STATE.
BROWN, Judge.
A jury found James Allen Johnson guilty of aggravated assault, felony
obstruction of a police officer, and misdemeanor obstruction of a police officer.1
Johnson contends that his convictions should be reversed because the State failed to
prove that a deputy sheriff was acting within the lawful scope of his duties. For the
reason explained below, we affirm his aggravated assault conviction and reverse his
misdemeanor obstruction conviction.
On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, with the defendant no longer enjoying
a presumption of innocence. We neither weigh the evidence nor judge the
1
After receiving the jury’s guilty verdict on all three counts, the trial court
merged the felony obstruction of an officer count into the aggravated assault count.
credibility of witnesses, but determine only whether the evidence was
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 348 Ga. App. 643, 644 (824 SE2d
382) (2019). So viewed, a POST certified deputy testified that he was on patrol when
he received a dispatch to Caldonia Street based upon a 911 call stating that a subject
fit the description of someone having an active arrest warrant for grand theft auto. In
the 911 call, the caller gave his first and last name, as well as his phone number. He
stated that he was calling because, “I just seen a guy on the corner of Lafayette Drive
and Caldonia Street and I went to Mapco and they had a picture up of a guy that was
wanted for grand theft auto and I swear it’s the dude. . . . He’s on foot. . . . It’s a dead-
on match.” When asked to describe him, the caller stated that he was a white guy,
“wearing a ball cap, I believe it’s blue, got on some khaki shorts, and a dark colored
t-shirt.”
When the deputy first arrived in the area approximately 11 minutes after the 911
call was placed, he “turned on Caldonia Street and made [his] way down to Lafayette
Drive,” but did not see anyone. When he circled back around to Caldonia, he saw
Johnson walking down the roadway, wearing clothing similar to the description he had
2
received from dispatch. Johnson was the only person walking in the area. At this point,
the deputy planned to stop, identify himself, and ask Johnson for identification to
determine if he had an active arrest warrant. If he had no active warrant, the deputy
testified that Johnson would have been free to go.
When the deputy stopped his marked patrol car, Johnson was about 20 yards
away and walking toward him. He explained that they do not normally begin a
conversation with “hey, we think you have felony warrants. We like to be able to
identify that person and go from there.” The deputy, who was wearing his uniform,
testified that he told Johnson that he was with the sheriff’s office and had received “a
call about him in the area, a suspicious person in the area.” Johnson, who was looking
at his phone, ignored the deputy and continued walking. When Johnson was directly
beside the deputy, the deputy told him that he needed to see his identification. After
Johnson stepped past the deputy, he asked Johnson “to stop and to quit walking away
from me and provide his ID.” Johnson took several steps and then “took off running.”
The deputy chased Johnson down the street and through side yards onto an
adjacent street. Throughout the chase, the deputy continued to command him to stop
and get on the ground. The deputy unsuccessfully deployed his taser during the chase.
After Johnson tripped and fell, the deputy tackled him to the ground as Johnson
3
attempted to regain his footing. The deputy and Johnson then engaged in a physical
altercation in which Johnson repeatedly struck the deputy while the deputy
“attempt[ed] to get his hands behind his back to place him in handcuffs.” “Early into
the altercation,” the deputy felt a sharp pain on his left wrist and noticed a lot of blood
on his arms. At one point, Johnson was “turned around” as the deputy “still had a hold
of him,” and the deputy saw Johnson strike his leg twice. The deputy initially thought
that Johnson was bleeding and did not realize that Johnson had stabbed him with a
knife. The deputy saw the knife for the first time while Johnson attempted to stab him
in the face or neck. The deputy blocked the knife with his hand, rolled away, pulled his
service weapon, and fired twice, hitting Johnson each time. While holding the weapon
on Johnson, the deputy realized that blood was pouring from his leg. A few minutes
later, other police officers arrived, and both the deputy and Johnson were transported
to the hospital. The deputy learned he was stabbed twice in the leg, once in the arm,
and also had cuts on his hand and left shoulder. The deputy testified that he did not
recall ever choking Johnson and described him as “extremely violent. He clearly
showed that he did not want to be taken into custody.”
During cross-examination, the deputy acknowledged that he did not know
anything about the person who made the 911 call or the wanted poster, such as the
4
wanted person’s name, type of car that had been stolen, when the car had been stolen,
whether a warrant for arrest actually existed, how old it might have been, whether the
person had already been arrested, and whether the wanted poster was based upon an
active arrest warrant or someone wanted for questioning who was a witness to a crime.
He responded to the scene based only upon the dispatch he received.
Based upon the use of force by the deputy, the GBI investigated this case. A
GBI agent testified that he interviewed the citizen who made the 911 call, and a
recording of this interview was played at trial. In this interview, which took place a
little over two hours after the incident, the caller stated,
I went up to the top of the hill to purchase some cigarettes at my local
Mapco. . . . The lady there . . . had told me once before that a guy had
stole a car out there you know don’t leave my keys running. . . . That was
about a month ago when she told me about that. Well today, she actually
had a picture of the guy and . . . I was [like] can I see the picture and she
was like sure so she showed me the picture. And I was on my way home
. . . as I turned in . . . off Lakeview here on Caldonia, I saw a suspicious
looking guy standing there on his phone. . . . I tooted my horn a little bit
to get him to look up. He looked dead at me and it was the exact same
guy I had just seen the picture of. . . . As a concerned citizen and knowing
that this guy’s a thief, I don’t want him in my neighborhood. So I called
my local authorities, 911 . . . at 4:48.
5
The caller explained that he saw the man again five or six minutes after talking to 911
and that his description of a dark shirt was either incorrect or the man had changed.
When he saw him the second time, the man was still messing with his phone and
wearing a short-sleeved, khaki shirt, black ball cap, green “khakish” shorts. He stated
that when he saw the man a second time, he was walking down Lakeview, away from
Caldonia, towards Nason. He explained that he had seen the man several times before
on the side of the Mapco building charging his phone. The caller confirmed to the GBI
agent that the man was “on a wanted picture” at the Mapco.
A GBI agent testified that he “didn’t see the [flyer]” and agreed that the State’s
case did not include a claim that Johnson was the car thief or that he had pending theft
by taking charges. He explained that he “never got to that point.” The caller did not
testify at trial.
In a recorded interview, Johnson stated that as he was walking down the road,
the deputy stopped, and said “hey, hey, hey.” Johnson stated that he was just walking
and “the next thing [he] knew,” the deputy was running after him and started tasing
him. When Johnson spun around, the deputy tackled him. According to Johnson, he
had his knife open while he was walking because he uses it to clean his nails and he
“reckoned” the deputy got hit with the knife when he tackled him. The deputy then
6
threatened to kill him, started “beating the shit” out of him, and the next thing he knew
the deputy started shooting him. Johnson denied running until the deputy tried to tase
him. During the interview, Johnson acknowledged that he previously had stated that
he ran when the deputy asked for identification because he knew he had outstanding
warrants. He denied stabbing the deputy to get away, but admitted that the knife was
still in his hand while they were scuffling.
The State introduced evidence that Johnson was subject to arrest for a contempt
order based upon his failure to pay child support. A paramedic who responded to the
scene testified that Johnson told him “he was getting warrants served on him and he
needed to use the restroom. The officer declined his request and he stabbed the
officer.” The paramedic did not notice any signs that Johnson “had been hit or beaten
or anything like that.” The State did not take any photographs of Johnson or collect any
of his clothing.
The State charged Johnson with aggravated assault of the deputy with a knife
while the deputy was “engaged in the performance of [his] official duties,” OCGA §
16-5-21 (c) (1), felony obstruction of an officer for stabbing the deputy while he was
“in the lawful discharge of [his] official duties,” OCGA § 16-10-24 (b), and
7
misdemeanor obstruction for running away after being given a lawful verbal command
to stop, OCGA § 16-10-24 (a).
On appeal, Johnson asserts that “the jury verdicts” in this case should be
reversed based on insufficient evidence because the deputy was not acting within the
lawful scope of his duty. A claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction that
a trial court has merged into another conviction for sentencing purposes is moot.
McIntyre v. State, 312 Ga. 531, 534 (1), n.5 (863 SE2d 166) (2021). We will therefore
only consider the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to Johnson’s misdemeanor
obstruction and aggravated assault convictions.
1. Johnson contends that insufficient evidence supports his misdemeanor
obstruction conviction because the deputy gave him an unlawful command to stop. “It
is well settled that detaining or arresting a person without authority to do so under the
law does not constitute the lawful discharge of the duties of a law enforcement officer,
and, therefore, one who resists an unlawful arrest or detention does not commit the
offense of obstruction.” Glenn v. State, 310 Ga. 11, 25 (1) (c) (849 SE2d 409) (2020).
Therefore, we first must determine whether the deputy’s actions were lawful during
his interaction with Johnson, as well as Johnson’s right to end the encounter.
8
[W]hen we analyze police-citizen encounters and determine
whether defendants could lawfully leave those encounters, we follow
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SCt 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968). For
example, in State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 249 (630 SE2d 847)
(2006), we applied the Terry analysis for two purposes: to determine
whether the officers were engaged in lawful duties and also to determine
whether their initial encounter with the defendant was a second-tier or
first-tier encounter from which the defendant could lawfully flee.
(Citation omitted.) Thomas v. State, 322 Ga. App. 734, 737 (2) (b) (746 SE2d 216)
(2013). Under Terry, “there are at least three types of police-citizen encounters: verbal
communications that involve no coercion or detention; brief stops or seizures that must
be accompanied by a reasonable suspicion; and arrests, which can be supported only
by probable cause.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Copeland, 310 Ga.
345, 351 (2) (b) (850 SE2d 736) (2020). See also Thomas, 322 Ga. App. at 737 (2) (b).
Under this analysis, if the encounter between [Johnson] and [the
deputy] was a first-tier encounter — involving no detention but simply
communication — then [Johnson] had the right to walk away. A citizen’s
ability to walk away from or otherwise avoid a police officer is the
touchstone of a first-tier encounter. Even running from police during a
first-tier encounter is wholly permissible. If the encounter between
[Johnson] and the [deputy] was a second-tier encounter — involving a
lawful attempt to seize [Johnson] briefly — then [Johnson] could not
lawfully flee.
9
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Thomas, 322 Ga. App. at 737 (2) (b). “[A]
police-citizen encounter rises to the level of a second-tier investigatory stop if the
officer restrains the citizen’s movement by physical force, command, or show of
authority.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Durden v. State, 320 Ga. App. 218, 220
(1) (739 SE2d 676) (2013). In this case, we therefore must determine whether the
deputy had a reasonable suspicion authorizing him to command Johnson to stop as he
walked past the deputy during their initial encounter. Id. (where officer called out to
defendant as he was walking away and told him to stop so he could speak with him,
encounter between the officer and defendant rose to second tier).
“If police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts,
that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a
completed felony, then a Terry . . . stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Perkins v. State, 360 Ga. App. 782, 783 (1) (a)
(861 SE2d 621) (2021). “[R]easonable, articulable suspicion need not be based on an
arresting officer’s knowledge alone, but may exist based on the collective knowledge
of the police when there is reliable communication between an officer supplying the
information and an officer acting on that information.” (Citations and punctuation
omitted.) Hall v. State, 351 Ga. App. 695, 700 (1) (832 SE2d 669) (2019).
10
Although the primary means by which officers acquire reasonable
suspicion is personal observation, information acquired from an
informant that exhibits a sufficient indicia of reliability can also be the
basis for reasonable suspicion. If the informant is a “concerned citizen”
as that term is used in our precedents, the information provided to the
police is presumed to be reliable. . . . Generally, as the terminology itself
implies, we have distinguished a concerned citizen from an anonymous
tipster by the fact that the identity of the citizen is known to the police.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Durden, 320 Ga. App. at 221-222 (1). As a sister
court has explained, a concerned citizen tip is considered reliable when identifying
information is provided because the citizen informant may be subject to penalty for
providing false information. State v. Prows, 178 P3d 908, 912 (I) (A) (Utah Ct. App.
2007). See also Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266, 270 (120 SCt 1375, 146 LE2d 254)
(2000) (“Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and
who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, . . . an
anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or
veracity.”).
In this case, even if we accept that the information provided by the concerned
citizen was true and reliable, the information conveyed must also amount to a
reasonable articulable suspicion. Cf. Heitkanp v. State, 342 Ga. App. 674, 678-679 (1)
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(804 SE2d 702) (2017) (holding that even if informant were to be deemed a reliable
source, information provided was insufficient to establish probable cause to enter a
home without a warrant). In this case, the deputy acted upon a dispatch relaying
information from a 911 call about the location of a man who the citizen reported was
a “dead-on match” for a man wanted for “grand theft auto.” While our research has not
revealed any Georgia opinions addressing a similar fact scenario, guidance can be
found in United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221 (105 SCt 675, 83 LE2d 604) (1985).
In Hensley, the Supreme Court concluded:
If a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts
supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed
an offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check
identification, to pose questions to the person, or to detain the person
briefly while attempting to obtain further information. If the flyer has
been issued in the absence of a reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the
objective reliance upon it violates the Fourth Amendment. . . . It is the
objective reading of the flyer or bulletin that determines whether other
police officers can defensibly act in reliance on it.
(Citations omitted.) Id. at 232-233 (II) (B). In this case, the State presented no evidence
of the wanted flyer, much less evidence showing a reasonable, articulable suspicion to
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believe that Johnson had committed a crime involving “grand theft auto.”2 We
therefore find that the deputy was not acting within the lawful discharge of his duties
when he commanded Johnson to stop and that insufficient evidence supports Johnson’s
misdemeanor obstruction conviction. See Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F3d 430, 440 (B) (1)
(6th Cir. 2003) (holding officer could not reasonably rely on information in “Read &
Sign” logbook from another police agency where no evidence was presented showing
that the other agency had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in
criminal activity).
2. Johnson contends that his aggravated assault conviction must also be
reversed. We disagree. His “common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest or
detention” extends only to a “proportionate use of force necessary to resist the force
used to arrest or detain a person. . . .” Glenn, 310 Ga. at 23-24 (1) (b). Based on the
particular facts and circumstances of this case, a rational trier of fact could conclude
that Johnson’s use of a knife to resist arrest was a disproportionate use of force.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Doyle, P. J., and Reese, J.,
concur.
2
The fact that Johnson was later discovered to be subject to arrest for contempt
based upon his failure to pay child support is not relevant to our analysis.
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