Jean C. Timmons v. Suntrust Bank ( 2019 )

FOURTH DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
COOMER and MARKLE, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
October 9, 2019
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A19A1262. TIMMONS et al. v. SUNTRUST BANK. DO-044
DOYLE, Presiding Judge.
Jean C. Timmons and Lauren L. Timmons (“the Plaintiffs”) purchased a
vehicle, entering into a loan contract with Master Buick GMC (“the Dealer”); the loan
was then assigned to SunTrust Bank (“the Bank”). The Plaintiffs sued the Dealer and
the Bank, seeking to revoke acceptance of the vehicle and alleging claims including
violation of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act (“GFBPA”) and breach of
various warranties.1 The Bank moved for summary judgment, arguing that that it was
a holder in due course of a note pursuant to OCGA § 11-3-302 and that the Plaintiffs’
allegations did not meet any of the available defenses set forth in OCGA § 11-3-305.
1
The Plaintiffs’ claims against the dealer are not at issue in this appeal.
The trial court granted the motion, and the Plaintiffs appeal. For the following
reasons, we reverse.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant or denial
of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable
conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.2
So viewed, the record shows that on July 9, 2015, the Plaintiffs purchased a
2015 GMC Sierra from the Dealer. On that day, the Affidavit of Sale was signed by
the Plaintiffs and a representative of the Dealer; it lists identifying information about
the Sierra, including the 6,738-mile odometer reading, and states that “the above
described vehicle is free of all liens and encumbr[a]nces in the buyer’s name except:
SUNTRUST BANK.” The “Customer Order” document, also dated July 9, 2015,
identifies the Sierra and the vehicle that the Plaintiffs traded to the Dealer, details the
line items of the transaction, including purchase price, trade allowance, etc., and
states: “LIEN TO SUNTRUST BANK.” A third document (“the Contract”), which
2
(Punctuation omitted.) L.D.F. Family Farm v. Charterbank, 326 Ga. App. 361(756 SE2d 593) (2014). See also OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
2
identifies the Plaintiffs as co-buyers and the Dealer as “Creditor-Seller,” contains
Federal Truth In-Lending Disclosures specifying the annual percentage rate, the
finance charge, the total amount financed, and details regarding the monthly
payments, including amount, due date, and number. In the Contract, the Plaintiffs
agreed “to pay the Creditor-Seller” the amount financed and the finance charge
pursuant to the payment schedule listed. The Contract provides that “[t]he Seller may
assign this Contract,” which “contains the entire agreement between you and us
relating to this contract.” It also states:
NOTICE: ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT
CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER
OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR
WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY
THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE
DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
In March 2017, the Plaintiffs sued GM Motors, LLC, the Dealer, and the Bank,
seeking to revoke acceptance of the vehicle and alleging various claims including
breach of warranty and breach of the GFBPA, contending that the truck sold as “new”
3
had collision damage that was unrepaired.3 In the complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that
their
truck is financed by [the] Bank and that financing was arranged through
[the Dealer]. As a result[, the Bank] is not a holder in due course and is
subject to any defenses that the Plaintiffs have against [the Dealer]. As
a result[,] the Plaintiffs owe little if anything to [the Bank]. The note
should be cancelled as to the Plaintiffs.4
The Plaintiffs reiterated such claims against the Bank in a subsequent amended
complaint. In their answers to the initial and amended complaints, the Bank
“admit[ted] that it financed the purchase of the Plaintiffs’ vehicle[, but] denie[d] the
remaining allegations. . . .”
The Bank moved for summary judgment on the ground that it is a holder in due
course of Plaintiff’s “financial note” for the vehicle. The trial court granted the
motion, concluding that the Bank entered into a loan agreement with the Plaintiffs
and that the Bank “was assigned the financing for the subject vehicle, via a note and
3
The Plaintiffs contend that the truck “was sold as a new truck even though it
had 6738 miles on the odometer because the service manager was using it as his
personal truck.”
4
In support of this allegation against the Bank, the Plaintiffs refer to Exhibit
B, which is the first page of the TIL statement.
4
financial agreement in which financing terms were agreed upon and signed by [the]
Plaintiffs and [the Dealer]”; the court cited only the complaint and the single-paged
Contract as support for this conclusion. The court then concluded that the Bank “is
a holder in due course of the financial note for the subject vehicle, and [the]
Plaintiffs’ allegations do not meet any of the available defenses under Georgia law.
Therefore, [the Bank] has the right to enforce the terms of the vehicle note.” This
appeal followed.
The Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment
to the Bank based on its conclusion that the Bank was a holder in due course. We
agree.
5
“‘Holder in due course’ status gives the holder of an instrument . . . the right
to enforce it and to cut off certain defenses of the obligor under the instrument.”5
Under Georgia law,
the holder of an instrument[6] is holding “in due course” if: (1) the
instrument is not apparently forged, altered, irregular, or incomplete “as
to call into question its authenticity,” and (2) the holder took the
instrument for value; in good faith; and without notice that the
5
Jenkins v. Wachovia Bank, Nat. Assn., 309 Ga. App. 562, 564 (1) (711 SE2d
80) (2011), citing OCGA § 11-3-305 (b) and official comment 2 thereunder; “Proof
of Fraud in the Making of Commercial Paper and the Resulting Consequences,” by
Thomas M. Geisler, Jr., 93 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 141 §11 (except for certain
“real defenses,” an obligor’s possible defenses are extinguished if the holder is one
“in due course”). See also OCGA § 11-3-306 (“A person taking an instrument, other
than a person having rights of a holder in due course, is subject to a claim of a
property or possessory right in the instrument or its proceeds, including a claim to
rescind a negotiation and to recover the instrument or its proceeds. A person having
rights of a holder in due course takes free of the claim to the instrument.”).
6
Pursuant to OCGA § 11-3-104 (b), an “[i]nstrument” is “a negotiable
instrument.” A “negotiable instrument” is defined as “an unconditional promise or
order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges
described in the promise or order, if it: (1) Is payable to bearer or to order at the time
it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder; (2) Is payable on demand or at
a definite time; and (3) Does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the
person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of
money, but the promise or order may contain: (i) An undertaking or power to give,
maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment; (ii) An authorization or power to the
holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral; or (iii) A waiver of
the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor. OCGA
§ 11-3-104 (a).
6
instrument was overdue, dishonored, contained an unauthorized
signature, was subject to claims as set forth in OCGA § 11-3-306, or
was subject to defenses or recoupment under OCGA § 11-3-305 (a)
(infancy, duress, fraud, bankruptcy).7
OCGA § 11-3-106 (d), however, provides:
If a promise or order at the time it is issued or first comes into
possession of a holder contains a statement, required by applicable
statutory or administrative law, to the effect that the rights of a holder
or transferee are subject to claims or defenses that the issuer could
assert against the original payee, the promise or order is not thereby
made conditional for the purposes of subsection (a) of Code Section
11-3-104; but, if the promise or order is an instrument, there cannot be
a holder in due course of the instrument.8
Here, assuming that the Contract, which the parties agree was thereafter
assigned to the Bank, was a negotiable instrument, the first page explicitly states that
any holder of the Contract is subject to all claims and defenses that the Buyers could
assert. Thus, pursuant to OCGA § 11-3-106 (d), the Bank is not a holder in due
7
Dalton Point, L.P. v. Regions Bank, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 468, 470 (1) (651
SE2d 549) (2007). See also OCGA § 11-3-302 (a).
8
(Emphasis supplied).
7
course, and the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the Bank on this
basis.
The Bank argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’s
claims even if it is not a holder in due course because the record is devoid of evidence
that would permit the Plaintiffs to void the Contract. But neither the parties nor the
trial court have engaged (either in the trial court or on appeal) in any meaningful
argument regarding defenses that the Plaintiffs might have against the Bank’s right
to enforce the Contract, and the evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs, including
Lauren Timmons’s deposition testimony, creates genuine issues of material fact that
preclude summary judgment to the Bank.
Judgment reversed. Coomer and Markle, JJ., concur.
8