Hankook Tire Co. v. White , 335 Ga. App. 453 ( 2016 )

FOURTH DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
RAY and MCMILLIAN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
January 4, 2016
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A15A2099. HANKOOK TIRE CO. LTD. v. WHITE et al.
RAY, Judge.
Hankook Tire Co. Ltd. (“Hankook Tire”) was granted an interlocutory appeal
of the trial court’s order denying their motion to transfer venue. For the following
reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of the motion to transfer venue.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Gilbert White and Karen Hansberry-White (collectively the “Whites”) filed a
negligence suit against The Lions Group, Inc., Hankook Tire, and various other
defendants (collectively, the “Defendants”) in Clayton County. The Whites alleged
that Mr. White was injured when he lost control of the vehicle he was driving due to
tread separation on one of the truck’s tires.
During the course of litigation, the trial court granted summary judgment
against the Whites in favor of some defendants, and the Whites voluntarily released
all of the remaining Defendants, other than The Lions Group and Hankook Tire.
Subsequently, the Whites and The Lions Group entered into a confidential settlement
agreement, which included the entering of a consent judgement by the trial court
against The Lions Group. The Lions Group is a Georgia Corporation with whom
venue is proper in Clayton County , while Hankook Tire is a nonresident Korean
corporation.
Hankook Tire now claims that venue is not proper in Clayton County as “[the
Whites] entered into a collusive consent judgment with The Lions Group, specifically
designed to avoid the effect of vanishing venue.” Georgia follows the law of
vanishing venue whereby “[i]f all defendants who reside in the county in which an
action is pending are discharged from liability. . . a nonresident defendant may
require that the case be transferred to a county and court in which venue would
otherwise be proper.” OCGA § 9-10-31 (d) (emphasis added). Previously, we have
held that, “the entry of a consent judgment against a resident tortfeasor [is] analogous
to a finding of liability, so that the court [is] not divested of personal jurisdiction over
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the remaining defendant/nonresident joint tortfeasor.” (Citation omitted.) Nalley v.
Baldwin, 261 Ga. App. 713, 714 (583 SE 2d 544) (2003).
Our Supreme Court has held that the only exception to this general rule applies
when the nonresident defendant can prove collusion. Motor Convoy v. Brannen, 260
Ga. 340, 340 (393 SE2d 262) (1990). Hankook Tire claims that the agreement
between the Whites and The Lions Group was collusive because “they entered into
the [c]onsent [j]udgment with the Lions Group precisely because it was the only
resident defendant so that they would preserve their venue and trial date in Clayton
County.” Neither Brannen nor recent cases have provided us with an explanation of
what collusion looks like. However, we can definitively state that collusion is not
present here.
The consent judgment entered into between the Whites and The Lions Group
is a legitimate judgment that imposes real liability on The Lions Group. The liability
imposed is not nominal, but rather is a settlement over $500,0001. While it is true that
the Whites entered into the consent judgment with the goal of retaining venue in
Clayton County, if this were collusive, then arguably all consent judgments would be
1
While the consent judgment entered by the trial court itself only details
compensation of $5,000, the Whites have received The Lions Group’s permission to
disclose that the entire settlement amount was actually $500,000.
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collusive.2 In light of the lack of evidence, or even an allegation, that the Whites acted
improperly with The Lions Group, we cannot say the consent judgment was entered
into collusively.3
Therefore, the trial court did not err when it denied Hankook Tire’s motion to
transfer venue. The trial court’s order is AFFIRMED.
Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur.
2
Collusion generally requires evidence that the parties worked in concert in
some fashion. Here, it doesn’t appear that The Lions Group had any purpose to
collude with the Whites. Rather, The Lions Group merely consented to the manner
of settlement which the Whites negotiated.
3
As we do not find collusion present here, it is not necessary for us to define
collusion under these terms. It is enough for us to say that we can recognize collusion
when we see it, and it is not present here.
4