Chandler v. Rohner , 334 Ga. App. 799 ( 2015 )


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  •                                FOURTH DIVISION
    BARNES, P. J.,
    RAY and MCMILLIAN, JJ.
    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
    http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
    November 20, 2015
    In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
    A15A0863. CHANDLER v. ROHNER.
    RAY, Judge.
    This is an appeal from the lower court’s dismissal of a biological father’s
    appeal from a grant of stepparent adoption. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the
    trial court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    Appellant Matthew Steven Chandler is the biological father (hereinafter
    “Biological Father”) of two minor boys. The mother’s husband, appellee Timothy
    Stewart Rohner (hereinafter “Adoptive Father”), petitioned for stepparent adoption,
    which the trial court granted in a detailed and substantive order. Biological Father
    appealed the adoption to this Court in June 2014, but in September 2014, Adoptive
    Father moved to dismiss the appeal because Biological Father had failed to pay costs
    for transmission of the record and transcript to this Court. The trial court held a
    hearing on September 11, 2014.
    On September 18, 2014, Adoptive Father filed an amended motion to dismiss
    and a motion for sanctions, arguing that since the hearing, new and important facts
    had come to light requiring the trial court’s consideration. The amended motion
    included, as an exhibit, an affidavit from the court reporter who prepared the
    transcript at issue, which was dated after the hearing. The day after the amended
    motion was filed, and prior to any response from Biological Father, the trial court
    granted Adoptive Father’s motion to dismiss in an order that clearly considered the
    affidavit and allegations in the amended motion. Biological Father appealed.1
    1. Biological Father contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his appeal
    without giving him the opportunity to respond to Adoptive Father’s amended motion.
    We agree.
    1
    We note that Adoptive Father initially opposed that appeal, as would be
    expected. However, after obtaining new counsel, Adoptive Father filed a
    supplemental brief in this Court essentially asking us to reverse the trial court’s
    dismissal of Biological Father’s appeal.
    2
    We review a trial court’s decision on whether to grant or deny a motion to
    dismiss an appeal for an abuse of discretion. Battaglia v. Duke, 
    230 Ga. App. 667
    ,
    669 (497 SE2d 250) (1998). It is well-settled that
    [a] trial court generally should allow a party 30 days to respond to a
    motion and to any evidence submitted in support thereof. See Uniform
    Superior Court Rule (USCR) 6.2. . . . A trial court has the discretion to
    rule before 30 days after the motion was filed; however, it must still
    afford the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard first.
    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Considine v. Murphy, 
    320 Ga. App. 316
    , 317-
    318 (739 SE2d 777) (2013). Here, it is clear from the record that Biological Father
    had neither notice nor an opportunity to respond to the specific allegations in the
    amended motion, or to the court reporter’s affidavit, both of which post-dated the
    hearing. As a result, we vacate the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss the
    appeal and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
    2. Because of our determination in Division 1, we do not reach the other
    enumerations of error.
    Judgment vacated and remanded. Doyle, C. J., Andrews, P. J., and Boggs, J.,
    concur; Miller, J., concurs in judgment only. McFadden, J., dissents and Barnes, P.
    J., concurs in the judgment of the dissent.
    3
    A15A0863. CHANDLER v. ROHNER.
    MCFADDEN, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    I agree that the trial court erred in failing to give the appellant an opportunity
    to respond to the amended motion to dismiss and supporting affidavit filed by the
    appellee and consequently that the dismissal of the underlying appeal is
    unsustainable. But I disagree with the majority about the appropriate disposition of
    this case. The majority limits itself to an issue two steps removed from the underlying
    termination of parental rights. The majority does not reach the merits of the dismissal
    order on appeal, but instead vacates that order and remands for further consideration
    of the merits of the motion to dismiss. Ordinarily, I would agree that that is what we
    must do. But in this case the appellee, the adoptive father, now asks us to reverse. The
    nature and circumstances of this case are such that his unusual request should be
    granted.
    In a supplemental brief to this court, the adoptive father (who appears to speak
    for the children’s mother as well as himself) disavows the tone and substance of his
    earlier filings. He confesses error and asks us to reverse. He admits in judicio that he
    has not been prejudiced – a proposition about which he can speak with authority. And
    he asserts that the children’s best interests would be subserved by prompt review of
    the merits of the termination of their natural father’s parental rights – a proposition
    about which he is plainly right.
    This is the second time we have reversed in this case. Chandler v. Rohner, 
    323 Ga. App. 713
    , 
    747 S.E.2d 870
     (2013). A review of the briefs in that earlier case
    suggests that the termination of parental rights may well have been error. Such error
    is a matter of the utmost seriousness.
    There can scarcely be imagined a more fundamental and fiercely
    guarded right than the right of a natural parent to its offspring. To
    terminate that right is to sever that right for the future as effectively in
    law as if it never had existed. It is a tearing of the flesh and it can be
    done by the court only under the most carefully controlled and regulated
    circumstances for the sake of the child.
    Nix v. Dep't of Human Res., 
    236 Ga. 794
    , 795, 
    225 S.E.2d 306
    , 307 (1976).
    In the first appeal in this case, we reversed because the trial judge had
    terminated the natural father’s parental rights when termination was not properly
    before him and had failed to hold an oral hearing before ruling on the natural father's
    motion for new trial. This time we reverse because the trial court failed to give the
    2
    natural father notice and opportunity to be heard as to the adoptive father’s post-
    hearing submissions. Remanding to allow the trial court to address the dismissal issue
    a second time would create the possibility of a third appeal before the merits are
    reached – and consequently the further possibility that the merits would come to us
    in a fourth appeal.
    Every appeal represents roughly an additional year of litigation. In any sort of
    case, the prospect of such additional delay would be antithetical to considerations of
    judicial economy and to the goal of a just and expeditious resolution. And we
    expedite cases involving child custody and termination of parental rights for good
    reasons.
    It is true generally that trial courts “have a duty which carries with it a
    commensurate power far greater than that accorded to the appellate courts. ‘Ours is
    a function merely to see that the law is followed. Theirs is the solemn responsibility
    to see to it that justice is administered according to the evidence as well as the law.’
    Mills v. State, 
    188 Ga. 616
    , 623, 
    4 S.E.2d 453
     (1939).” Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l
    Transp. Corp., 
    221 Ga. App. 363
    , 365, 
    471 S.E.2d 287
    , 288 (1996). But under the
    unique circumstances of this case, we have the authority and the duty to see that
    justice is done and the best interests of these children are subserved.
    3
    Consequently the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, the appellee’s
    confession of error should be adopted, and the underlying appeal should be reinstated.
    I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Barnes concurs in the judgment
    of the dissent.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A15A0863

Citation Numbers: 334 Ga. App. 799, 780 S.E.2d 449

Judges: Ray, Doyle, Andrews, Boggs, Miller, McFadden, Barnes

Filed Date: 11/23/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/8/2024