Kevan C. Pickstock v. State ( 2016 )


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  • Court of Appeals
    of the State of Georgia
    ATLANTA,____________________
    March 03, 2016
    The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
    A16A1086. KEVAN C. PICKSTOCK v. THE STATE.
    In 1997, a jury convicted Kevan C. Pickstock of 13 counts including burglary,
    kidnapping, robbery, and aggravated assault, and his convictions were affirmed on
    appeal. See Pickstock v. State, 
    235 Ga. App. 451
     (509 SE2d 717) (1998). On May
    1, 2015, Pickstock filed a “Motion for Entry of a Valid Judgment of Sentence,”
    arguing his sentence was excessive. The trial court denied the motion on November
    16, 2015, and Pickstock filed a notice of appeal on January 1, 2016.1 We lack
    jurisdiction for two reasons.
    First, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the
    appealable order. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice
    of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See
    Rowland v. State, 
    264 Ga. 872
     (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Because Pickstock filed
    his notice of appeal 45 days after entry of the trial court’s order, his appeal is
    untimely.
    Second, pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), a court may correct or reduce a
    sentence during the year after its imposition, or within 120 days after remittitur
    following a direct appeal, whichever is later. Once this statutory period expires, a
    trial court may only modify a void sentence. See Frazier v. State, 
    302 Ga. App. 346
    ,
    1
    Pickstock also filed an application for discretionary review from the trial
    court’s order denying his Motion for Entry of a Valid Judgment of Sentence. That
    application was dismissed because it was untimely. See A16D0206, dismissed on
    January 19, 2016.
    348 (691 SE2d 346) (2010). A direct appeal may lie from an order denying a motion
    to vacate or correct a void sentence, but only if the defendant raises a colorable claim
    that the sentence is, in fact, void. 
    Id.
     “Motions to vacate a void sentence generally
    are limited to claims that – even assuming the existence and validity of the conviction
    for which the sentence was imposed – the law does not authorize that sentence, most
    typically because it exceeds the most severe punishment for which the applicable
    penal statute provides.” von Thomas v. State, 
    293 Ga. 569
    , 572 (2) (748 SE2d 446)
    (2013). Thus, when a sentence is within the statutory range of punishment, it is not
    void. See Jones v. State, 
    278 Ga. 669
    , 670 (604 SE2d 483) (2004). Accordingly,
    allegations that merely challenge the sentencing procedure or question the fairness
    of a sentence do not raise a colorable claim of voidness and cannot form the basis for
    a direct appeal. See Frazier, supra at 348. Here, Pickstock does not argue that his
    sentence fell outside the permissible statutory range and thus has not raised a
    colorable void sentence claim. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal,
    which is hereby DISMISSED.
    Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
    03/03/2016
    Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________
    I certify that the above is a true extract from
    the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
    Witness my signature and the seal of said court
    hereto affixed the day and year last above written.
    , Clerk.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A16A1086

Filed Date: 3/11/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/11/2016