Lucious L. Johnson v. State ( 2018 )


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  • Court of Appeals
    of the State of Georgia
    ATLANTA,____________________
    July 18, 2018
    The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
    A18A1921. LUCIOUS L. JOHNSON v. THE STATE.
    Lucious Johnson was convicted of aggravated assault, rape, and false
    imprisonment, and we affirmed his convictions on appeal. Johnson v. State, 
    238 Ga. App. 677
     (520 SE2d 221) (1999). Johnson later filed a motion to vacate a void
    sentence and an extraordinary motion for new trial. The trial court merged two of his
    convictions and vacated his sentence as to one count but otherwise denied the
    motions, and we again affirmed on appeal. Johnson v. State, 
    272 Ga. App. 294
     (612
    SE2d 29) (2005). Johnson then filed another motion to vacate a void sentence. The
    trial court denied the motion, and once more we affirmed, this time in an unpublished
    opinion. Johnson v. State, Case No. A13A1411 (affirmed July 16, 2013). Johnson
    subsequently filed additional pro se motions, including a motion for an out-of-time
    appeal and a motion for relief from convictions due to actual innocence. The trial
    court denied the motions on the ground that its prior orders were “res judicata as to
    these matters.” Johnson filed an application for discretionary appeal from this order,
    which we dismissed, specifically noting that Johnson was not entitled to an out-of-
    time appeal and that a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an
    appropriate remedy in a criminal case. Johnson v. State, Case No. A15D0225
    (dismissed February 2, 2015). Johnson also filed a direct appeal from that trial court
    order, which this Court dismissed. Johnson v. State, Case No. A15A1214 (dismissed
    April 8, 2015).
    Back in the trial court, Johnson filed new pro se motions, including a “Motion
    for Evidentiary Hearing to Demonstrate Actual Innocence, “Motion for Declaratory
    Judgment,” “Motion for Appointment of Counsel,” and “Motion to Set-Aside and Re-
    Enter Judgment.” The trial court denied the motions in a single order on the ground
    that its prior orders were “res judicata as to these matters.” Johnson then filed this
    direct appeal.1 We, however, lack jurisdiction.
    To the extent that Johnson seeks to set aside his convictions in his “Motion for
    Evidentiary Hearing to Demonstrate Actual Innocence” and “Motion for Appointment
    of Counsel” for the evidentiary hearing, we reiterate that the Supreme Court has made
    clear that “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an
    appropriate remedy in a criminal case.” Harper v. State, 
    286 Ga. 216
    , 218 (1) (686
    SE2d 786) (2009). Further, any appeal from an order denying such a motion must be
    dismissed. See id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 
    286 Ga. 532
    , 532 (690 SE2d
    150) (2010). In these motions, Johnson again seeks to have his convictions set aside
    and counsel for a hearing on his motion to have his convictions set aside. Johnson
    is not authorized to collaterally attack his convictions in this manner and the trial
    court is not authorized to set his convictions aside. See State v. Green, 
    308 Ga. App. 33
    , 34-35 (1) (706 SE2d 720) (2011) (reversing grant of defendant’s motion to vacate
    conviction because motion “should have been dismissed”).
    As for Johnson’s “Motion for Declaratory Judgment,” the denial of this motion
    is moot. An appeal of an issue that has become moot is subject to dismissal. See
    OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (3). “An appeal becomes moot if the rights insisted upon could
    not be enforced by a judicial determination.” Randolph County v. Johnson, 
    282 Ga. 160
    , 160 (1) (646 SE2d 261) (2007). Here, Johnson has no right to file a declaratory
    judgment action because “a suit for declaratory judgment cannot be maintained by a
    person accused of [a] crime where the alleged criminal conduct has already taken
    place.” Ross v. State, 
    238 Ga. 445
    , 445 (233 SE2d 381) (1977). Thus, any ruling by
    this Court would have no practical effect. Accordingly, Johnson’s appeal of the
    denial of his declaratory judgment motion is moot and subject to dismissal.
    Finally, the denial of Johnson’s one-page “Motion to Set-Aside and Re-Enter
    1
    Johnson filed his appeal in the Supreme Court, which transferred the case to
    this Court. See Case No. S18A1041 (transferred May 7, 2018).
    Judgment” is also moot. In his motion, Johnson sought to set aside and reenter orders
    on his motions pending before the trial court. It appears that Johnson filed this
    motion because he had not received any orders on his pending motions and was
    unsure whether the trial court had in fact ruled on the motions. However, the orders
    Johnson sought to set aside and reenter were orders that were not yet rendered or
    entered. The trial court ruled on the motions and that order is the subject of this
    appeal. Thus, the denial of this motion is moot and subject to dismissal. See Dean
    v. City of Jesup, 
    249 Ga. App. 623
    , 624 (2) (549 SE2d 466) (2001) (If “reversal of a
    trial court’s judgment is of no practical benefit to the parties, any issues raised on
    appeal are rendered moot.”)
    For these reasons, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
    Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
    Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________
    07/18/2018
    I certify that the above is a true extract from
    the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
    Witness my signature and the seal of said court
    hereto affixed the day and year last above written.
    , Clerk.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A18A1921

Filed Date: 7/19/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/19/2018