McNORRILL v. THE STATE , 338 Ga. App. 466 ( 2016 )

SECOND DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
BOGGS and RICKMAN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
August 3, 2016
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A16A1016. MCNORRILL v. THE STATE.
BARNES, Presiding Judge.
A Richmond County jury found Todderius McNorrill guilty of hijacking a
motor vehicle, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime. On appeal from the denial of his motion
for new trial, McNorrill challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions. McNorrill further contends that he was deprived of his constitutional
right to effective counsel because his trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest
and failed to object to certain jury instructions. For the reasons discussed below, we
affirm.
“Following a criminal conviction, the defendant is no longer presumed
innocent, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustain the verdict.”
Anthony v. State, 317 Ga. App. 807 (732 SE2d 845) (2012). The evidence in the
present case, viewed in favor of the verdict, was recently summarized by this Court
in Whaley v. State, __ Ga. App. __ (785 SE2d 685) (2016), the appeal of McNorrill’s
co-defendant, Meguel Whaley:
[A]round 10:30 p.m. on July 5, 2010, the victim received a call
from his friend Chris asking if the victim wanted to hang out. The victim
did not know Chris very well,1 but agreed to pick him up at a gas station.
After meeting up with Chris, the victim drove them around until Chris
asked to stop at someone’s house for a few minutes. The victim drove
Chris to the house, and Chris went inside while the victim remained in
his car. After Chris returned to the car, they continued to ride around
until Chris received a call on his cell phone. The victim pulled his car
into another gas station and let Chris out of the car so that he could talk
on the phone privately. After talking on his phone, Chris got back into
the car and asked the victim to drive to a nearby elementary school so
that they could meet up with two men whom Chris identified as his
cousin and his friend.
After Chris directed the victim to the elementary school, the
victim drove into a lot on the side of the school to wait for Chris’ cousin
and friend to approach the car. Once the victim had driven into the lot,
however, Chris asked the victim to turn off his car and walk with him
behind the school to meet up with his cousin and friend there. Although
he “felt kind of suspicious” at that point, the victim agreed to walk with
Chris behind the school. Upon walking behind the school, the victim
saw two men, later identified as . . . [co-defendant] Whaley and . . .
1
The victim did not know Chris’ last name or where he lived.
2
McNorrill, sitting on some steps. Chris approached Whaley and
McNorrill, gave them a high-five, and spoke with them privately for a
few minutes while the victim stood nearby.
The victim thought they were going to walk back to his car, but
Whaley suddenly approached the victim and pointed a handgun at him.
Whaley said, “You know what time it is,” which the victim understood
to mean that he was being robbed. Whaley held the gun to the victim’s
head as he went through the victim’s pockets with his other hand. Chris
began protesting, but Whaley told McNorrill to “shut him up,” and
McNorrill pulled out a handgun and pointed it at Chris. The victim later
told the police that one of the guns was a .22 caliber weapon and the
other was a .380 caliber black and silver weapon.
Whaley told the victim to lie down on the ground and asked
McNorrill for a roll of duct tape. After the victim lay on the ground,
Whaley got the duct tape from McNorrill and wrapped it around the
victim’s eyes, mouth, and hands. Whaley placed his gun against the
victim’s head and again went through the victim’s pockets, taking $125
in cash, a cell phone, the victim’s keys, and his driver’s license. Whaley
warned the victim that he and McNorrill had the victim’s identification
and would kill the victim if he called the police. Before running from the
scene, Whaley and McNorrill kicked the victim in the legs, ribs, and
head.
The victim was able to free himself from the duct tape in time to
see Whaley and McNorrill get inside his car and drive away from the
3
school.2 The victim then walked to a gas station a few minutes away and
used the phone to call the police. A sheriff’s deputy arrived at the gas
station shortly thereafter, and the victim told the deputy about what had
happened, described the two suspects, and provided a description of his
stolen car. The deputy radioed the information to his dispatcher, and
other deputies in the area were told to be on the lookout for the victim’s
car.
A few minutes later, another deputy saw the victim’s car stopped
at a red light at an intersection, confirmed that it matched the description
of the stolen vehicle, and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. When the
deputy activated the emergency lights on his marked patrol car, the
driver of the victim’s car ignored the lights and drove away, resulting in
a police chase.
A deputy in a second marked patrol car activated his emergency
lights and took over the chase. As the chase continued, Whaley jumped
out of the driver’s side door while the victim’s car was still moving and
ran towards the woods. McNorrill remained in the front passenger seat
after Whaley jumped out, and the victim’s car crashed through a fence
and came to a stop against a tree. Deputies pursued Whaley on foot and
gave several verbal commands for him to stop, but he continued running
from them. One of the deputies caught up with Whaley and was able to
apprehend him. . . .
2
Chris apparently ran off separately, but the record is unclear on this point.
4
Another deputy approached the crashed car and arrested
McNorrill, who was still in the passenger seat. The deputy searched
McNorrill and discovered twelve .22 caliber bullets in his pocket. The
victim subsequently was driven to the scene where the car chase had
concluded, and he confirmed that Whaley and McNorrill were the
perpetrators in a show-up identification.
Deputies searched the victim’s car that had been taken by Whaley
and McNorrill. Marijuana weighing a total of 4.5 grams was in plain
view on the passenger seat and on the driver’s side floorboard. From the
way the marijuana was packaged, it appeared to be for distribution. The
victim later testified at trial that the marijuana did not belong to him.
Additionally, deputies found a loaded Hi-Point .380 caliber handgun on
the driver’s seat, and the victim testified that it was the gun that Whaley
had pointed at him.
Deputies also searched behind the elementary school, where they
found an empty roll of duct tape and a baseball cap that belonged to the
victim. However, the victim’s cell phone, cash, and other personal items
were never found.
Whaley and McNorrill were jointly charged with hijacking a
motor vehicle, armed robbery, false imprisonment, possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, and two counts of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime. . . . Whaley and McNorrill
subsequently were tried together. The victim and responding deputies
testified to the events as summarized above, and the State introduced
5
and showed to the jury a video recording of the police car chase and
photographs of the items seized at the elementary school and from the
victim’s car. Whaley and McNorrill elected not to testify and did not
present any defense witnesses.
After reviewing all the evidence, the jury found both Whaley and
McNorrill guilty of hijacking a motor vehicle, possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute, and one count of possession of a firearm during
the commission of a crime. . . . The jury acquitted Whaley and McNorrill
of armed robbery, false imprisonment, and one count of possession of
a firearm during the commission of a crime. . . .
McNorrill filed a motion for new trial, as amended, in which he challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence and contended that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
This appeal followed.
1. McNorrill contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.3 While he concedes
3
In his enumerations of error, McNorrill also contends that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of hijacking a motor vehicle. However, in the argument
section of his brief, McNorrill provides no argument or citations of authority
addressing the sufficiency of the evidence as to the motor vehicle hijacking offense.
McNorrill thus has abandoned any challenge he may have had to his motor vehicle
hijacking conviction on the asserted ground. See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (a) (3),
(c) (2); Jones v. State, 289 Ga. App. 219, 221 (1), n.1 (656 SE2d 556) (2008).
6
that there was evidence that he possessed the marijuana found in the victim’s stolen
car, McNorrill maintains that there was insufficient evidence showing that he acted
with the intent to distribute the marijuana. We disagree.
To prove possession with intent to distribute, the State must show
more than mere possession of a controlled substance. No bright line rule
exists regarding the amount or type of evidence sufficient to support a
conviction for possession with intent to distribute, and whether the State
has proven an intent to distribute is peculiarly a question of fact for
determination by the jury. Furthermore, in addressing the sufficiency of
the evidence, we are always mindful that it is not our role to weigh the
evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses; instead, under the
standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B)
(99 SCt 2781, 61 LEd2d 560 (1979), we only determine whether a
rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Flemister v. State, 317 Ga. App. 749, 752 (1),
(732 SE2d 810) (2012). Additionally, where, as in the present case, the conviction at
issue is based solely on circumstantial evidence, “the proved facts shall not only be
consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable
Nevertheless, we have reviewed the trial record and conclude that there was sufficient
evidence for a rational trier of fact to find McNorrill guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of hijacking a motor vehicle.
7
hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused,” and whether that State has met this
burden is normally a question for the jury. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Noble
v. State, 225 Ga. App. 470, 471 (484 SE2d 78) (1997).
Here, the marijuana found in the car was packaged in nine individual baggies,
with eight of the baggies contained in a larger plastic bag on the driver’s side
floorboard and the ninth baggie on the passenger seat. The sheriff’s investigator
testified that, based on his training and experience, the marijuana was packaged in a
manner commonly used for distribution.4 The evidence that the marijuana was
“packaged in a manner commonly associated with the sale or distribution of such
contraband would authorize any rational trier of fact to infer that [McNorrill]
possessed marijuana, a controlled substance, with intent to distribute.” (Citations and
punctuation omitted.) Flemister, 317 Ga. App. at 752 (1). See Williams v. State, 303
Ga. App. 222, 224-225 (2) (692 SE2d 820) (2010); Mayo v. State, 277 Ga. App. 282,
4
While McNorrill argues that the State failed to qualify the sheriff’s
investigator as an expert, McNorrill failed to object on that ground at trial and
therefore has waived any objection to the investigator rendering an opinion regarding
the marijuana packaging. See Boring v. State, 303 Ga. App. 576, 579 (1) (694 SE2d
157) (2010). Furthermore, the State laid a foundation for the investigator’s opinion
testimony by eliciting testimony about his “couple hundred” encounters with
marijuana and its different forms of packaging during the course of his career.
8
283 (1) (a) (626 SE2d 245) (2006); Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga. App. 666, 668 (1) (482
SE2d 403) (1997); Bowers v. State, 195 Ga. App. 522, 522 (1) (394 SE2d 141)
(1990).
Moreover, in addition to the packaging of the marijuana, the evidence shows
that a loaded handgun was found on the driver’s seat, bullets were found in
McNorrill’s pocket, and the victim testified that McNorrill had a handgun that night.
This evidence further supported McNorrill’s conviction for possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute. See State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 652 (2) (697 SE2d 757)
(2010) (pointing out that it is “not unusual” for drug dealers to be armed); Smith v.
State, 335 Ga. App. 742, 744 (2) (782 SE2d 824) (2016) (noting that a “loaded
handgun with a bullet in the chamber was found in the front passenger seat” in
affirming conviction for possession of drugs with intent to distribute). Conversely,
there was no evidence that McNorrill or his co-defendant were drugs users or were
under the influence of drugs, and no evidence of any smoking devices, rolling papers,
or other paraphernalia associated with drug use found in the car. Accordingly, under
the totality of the evidence, a rational jury could reject the alternative hypothesis that
the marijuana was for personal use rather than distribution. See Jackson v. State, 314
Ga. App. 272, 276 (1) (c) (724 SE2d 9) (2012).
9
Two cases relied upon by McNorrill, Hicks v. State, 293 Ga. App. 830 (668
SE2d 474) (2008); and Clark v. State, 245 Ga. App. 267 (537 SE2d 742) (2000), do
not require a different result. In Hicks, we concluded that the evidence presented at
trial supported the reasonable alternative hypothesis that the drugs found in the
defendant’s car were for personal use rather than distribution, where the only
evidence of intent to distribute was that the defendant possessed a pill bottle
containing an unidentified number of broken-up pieces of cocaine, and an
investigator testified that storing drugs in such a disposable container indicated an
intent to sell. 293 Ga. App. at 831-833. We specifically noted, however, that there
was no evidence of weapons or of “drug packaging materials such as baggies in the
vehicle.” Id. at 832. Hicks thus is materially distinguishable in light of the loaded
handgun and individualized packaging of the marijuana found in the car here.
Clark is likewise distinguishable. In Clark, we concluded that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that the drugs were for distribution rather than personal use,
where the police discovered eight bags of an unidentified amount of marijuana in a
van with four people inside of it parked behind a restaurant in the middle of the night.
245 Ga. App. at 267-269. The passengers in the van were sitting on or next to several
of the bags. Id. at 268. The police also found a cigar on the dashboard of the van that
10
had been cut open with the tobacco removed, which a police officer testified was
“consistent with people getting ready to replace the tobacco with marijuana, [to] make
a joint.” Id. at 267. Given the number of people in the van where the marijuana was
found, the unidentified amount of marijuana, the absence of any guns or “drug
packaging materials,” and the presence of the cigar made into a drug smoking device,
Clark clearly diverges factually from the situation here. Id. at 269.
As we have emphasized, “the intent with which an act is done is peculiarly a
question of fact for determination by the jury. Intent, which is a mental attitude, is
commonly detectible only inferentially, and the law accommodates this.” (Citation
and punctuation omitted.) Mayo, 277 Ga. App. at 283 (1) (a). Given the combined
evidence in this case, we conclude that the State met its burden of proving that
McNorrill intended to distribute the drugs, and the jury was authorized to find
McNorrill guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (III) (B).5
5
McNorrill also argues that because the evidence was insufficient to convict
him of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, the evidence likewise was
insufficient to convict him of possession of a firearm during the commission of that
drug-related crime. McNorrill’s argument is without merit, in light of our conclusion
that there was sufficient evidence to convict him of possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute.
11
2. McNorrill next contends that he was denied his constitutional right to
effective counsel because his trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest that
adversely affected the representation. According to McNorrill, an actual conflict of
interest arose because his trial attorney was employed in the same circuit public
defender’s office as the attorney who represented his co-defendant, and he and his co-
defendant had antagonistic interests that precluded them from being represented by
attorneys in the same office. We are unpersuaded.
As our Supreme Court has pointed out, “[t]he potential for serious conflicts of
interest [exists] when one lawyer represents co-defendants in a criminal proceeding.”
Tolbert v. State, 298 Ga. 147, 148 (2) (a) (780 SE2d 298) (2015), citing In re Formal
Advisory Opinion 10-1, 293 Ga. 397, 400 (2) (744 SE2d 798) (2013). And
if it is determined that a single public defender in the circuit public
defender’s office of a particular judicial circuit has an impermissible
conflict of interest concerning the representation of co-defendants, then
that conflict of interest is imputed to all of the public defenders working
in the circuit public defender office of that particular judicial circuit.
In re Formal Advisory Opinion 10-1, 293 Ga. at 399 (1). See Pryor v. State, 333 Ga.
App. 408, 410 (2) (776 SE2d 474) (2015).
12
But “the mere ‘possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal
conviction.’” Lytle v. State, 290 Ga. 177, 178 (2) (718 SE2d 296) (2011), quoting
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (IV) (C) (100 SCt 1708, 64 LE2d 333) (1980).
Rather, “[t]o prevail on a claim that a conflict of interest worked a denial of the
effective assistance of counsel, a defendant like [McNorrill] – one who failed to
object to the conflict at trial – must show that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer’s performance.’” (Footnote omitted.) Tolbert, 298 Ga. at 149 (2),
quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348 (IV) (B). See State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 604
(1) (715 SE2d 48) (2011); Pryor, 333 Ga. App. at 412-413 (2).
[T]he critical question is whether the conflict significantly affected the
representation, not whether it affected the outcome of the underlying
proceedings. That is precisely the difference between ineffective
assistance of counsel claims generally, where prejudice must be shown,
and ineffective assistance of counsel claims involving actual conflicts
of interest, which require only a showing of a significant effect on the
representation.
(Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Abernathy, 289 Ga. at 604-605 (1). Thus,
McNorrill had to show that the simultaneous representation of himself and his co-
defendant by two lawyers working in the same public defender’s office created a
13
conflict of interest that significantly affected his own lawyer’s performance. See id.;
Pryor, 333 Ga. App. at 412-413 (2).
In reviewing whether McNorrill proved that his trial counsel was laboring
under a conflict of interest that adversely affected his counsel’s performance, we owe
no deference to the trial court’s application of the law to the facts. Tolbert, 298 Ga.
at 151 (2) (a). “We owe substantial deference, however, to the way in which the trial
court assessed the credibility of witnesses and found the relevant facts.” Id. Mindful
of this standard of review, we turn to the record in this case.
While McNorrill and his co-defendant were represented by attorneys in the
same trial team at the same circuit public defender’s office, there was no evidence of
any communications or corroboration between the attorneys regarding this case.
Rather, McNorrill’s trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial
that she recalled no such communications or corroboration with the other attorney in
her office. Furthermore, trial counsel testified that she felt no constraints in her
representation of McNorrill and did not feel that there was any conflict that inhibited
her trial performance, and there is nothing in the trial transcript reflecting otherwise.
Trial counsel also testified that if a conflict had existed, she would have reviewed the
issue with her supervisor, but there had been no need to do so under the
14
circumstances here. Given this record, the trial court was entitled to find that
McNorrill failed to show that his trial counsel was laboring under an actual conflict
of interest that negatively impacted her pre-trial preparation or her performance
during trial.
McNorrill nevertheless argues that an actual conflict of interest arose at one
point before trial when the prosecutor offered him a plea conditioned on McNorrill
testifying against his co-defendant, thereby causing McNorrill and his co-defendant
to have interests that were antagonistic to one another. However, McNorrill’s trial
counsel testified at the new trial hearing that she fully informed McNorrill of the plea
offer, that she told him that it was his decision whether to accept the offer, and that
“it [had been] of no account to [her]” whether McNorrill chose to testify against his
co-defendant. Trial counsel also testified that McNorrill was very “deferential” to his
co-defendant and looked to his co-defendant “for cues . . . in making decisions about
what he wanted to do.” The trial transcript reflects that when the plea offer was later
brought up in open court, McNorrill rejected the offer, stating, “I would take the
offer, but I don’t want to testify.” In light of this combined record evidence, the trial
court was entitled to find that any potential conflict arising from the plea offer did not
adversely affect the manner in which trial counsel handled the offer or conveyed it
15
to McNorrill, and that McNorrill made his own independent decision not to accept
the offer because he did not want to testify at trial.
In sum, as the trial court was authorized to conclude, McNorrill failed to
establish that the simultaneous representation of himself and his co-defendant by two
public defenders in the same office created an actual conflict of interest that
significantly affected his own lawyer’s performance before or during trial. See
Abernathy, 289 Ga. at 604-605 (1); Lytle, 290 Ga. at 178-179 (2); Pryor, 333 Ga.
App. at 413-414 (2); Johnson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 161, 165-166 (4) (739 SE2d 469)
(2013). It follows that the trial court did not err when it denied McNorrill’s motion
for new trial on this ground.
3. McNorrill also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the trial court’s jury instruction on possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute. We disagree.
Count 5 of the indictment charged McNorrill with violating the Georgia
Controlled Substances Act, OCGA § 16-13-30 (j), by possessing marijuana with the
intent to distribute. In defining the alleged offense to the jury, the trial court
instructed: “The offense charged in count 5 of this indictment is a violation of the
Georgia Controlled Substances Act, which provides that it is unlawful for any person
16
to [a] possess, or have under one’s control or [b] possess with intent to distribute any
quantity of marijuana, which is a controlled substance.” According to McNorrill, the
trial court’s instruction was erroneous because it included a reference to simple
possession of marijuana as a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, and
thus could have misled the jury into convicting him of a drug crime different from
that charged in the indictment. Consequently, McNorrill contends that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instruction.
While instructing the jury that a crime can be committed in a
manner different from that charged in the indictment can constitute
reversible error, a reversal is not mandated where, as here, the charge as
a whole limits the jury’s consideration to the specific manner of
committing the crime alleged in the indictment.
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Machado v. State, 300 Ga. App. 459, 462 (5)
(685 SE2d 428) (2009). See Wheeler v. State, 327 Ga. App. 313, 319 (3) (758 SE2d
840) (2014). Here, the trial court read the indictment to the jury, instructed the jury
that the State had the burden of proving every material allegation of the indictment
beyond a reasonable doubt, further instructed the jury that it could find McNorrill
guilty if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offenses “alleged
in the indictment,” and provided the indictment to the jury during its deliberations.
17
These instructions, when considered as a whole, cured any potential error in the
trial court’s instruction on count 5 of the indictment. See Dugger v. State, 297 Ga.
120, 123 (6) (772 SE2d 695) (2015); Faulks v. State, 296 Ga. 38, 39 (2) (764 SE2d
846) (2014); Wheeler, 327 Ga. App. at 319-320 (3); Machado, 300 Ga. App. at 462-
463 (5). Under these circumstances, McNorrill cannot show that the jury instruction
prejudiced his case, and thus cannot succeed on his ineffective assistance claim. See
Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga. App. 14, 18 (3) (c) (512 SE2d 640) (1999) (“Failure to
object to a court’s charge[] . . . is not ineffective assistance where the appellant does
not show how this prejudiced his case.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
4. Lastly, McNorrill contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to the trial court’s jury instruction on possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime. Again, we disagree.
OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (4) provides that a person commits a felony when he
possesses a firearm on or within arm’s reach of his person during the commission of
certain felony drug-related crimes. The trial court instructed the jury on the definition
of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime:
A person commits the offense of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime when the person has on or within arm’s reach of
18
his person a firearm during the commission of or any attempt to commit
a felony, which is . . . any crime involving the possession, or possession
with intent to distribute a controlled substance. I charge you marijuana
is a controlled substance.
McNorrill argues that the trial court’s instruction, by including a reference to
possession of marijuana as a potential predicate felony offense for the firearm crime,
was an incorrect statement of the law under the facts of this case. He emphasizes that
possession of marijuana is only a felony if the amount of marijuana possessed is
greater than one ounce, OCGA § 16-13-2 (b), but the amount of marijuana found in
the victim’s stolen vehicle was less than that amount. Consequently, McNorrill
argues, his mere possession of marijuana in this case would not have supported a
conviction of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instruction on that basis.
Even if McNorrill’s trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to the jury
instruction, McNorrill has failed to show how that error was prejudicial. The jury
found McNorrill guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, there was
sufficient evidence to support that felony conviction as explained supra in Division
1, and it is undisputed that possession of marijuana with intent to distribute could
serve as the predicate felony offense for McNorrill’s conviction of possession of a
19
firearm during the commission of a crime under OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (4). Hence,
“there is not a reasonable probability that, if the trial court had omitted the [reference
to simple possession of marijuana from the instruction] at [McNorrill’s] behest, the
outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to him.” Daughtry v. State, 296
Ga. 849, 859 (2) (g) (770 SE2d 862) (2015). McNorrill therefore cannot succeed on
his ineffective assistance claim. Id.
Judgment affirmed. Boggs, J. concurs. Rickman, J., concurs in judgment only.
20