OGLE v. the STATE. , 349 Ga. App. 872 ( 2019 )

FIRST DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
MERCIER and BROWN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
April 9, 2019
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A19A0624. OGLE v. THE STATE.
BROWN, Judge.
Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Jack David Ogle, Jr. appeals
his conviction for burglary in the second degree.1 He contends that the trial court
should have charged the jury sua sponte on his sole defense of mistake of fact. We
disagree and affirm.
On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, with the defendant no longer
enjoying a presumption of innocence. We neither weigh the evidence
nor judge the credibility of witnesses, but determine only whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
1
Ogle also was convicted of theft by taking, but he is not challenging that
conviction on appeal.
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Solomon v. State, 342 Ga. App. 836 (805 SE2d
293) (2017). So viewed, the record shows that at approximately 9:55 a.m. on
February 25, 2016, Ogle pulled into the victim’s driveway in a red pick-up truck and
proceeded to enter the victim’s carport. Two minutes later, Ogle came out of the
carport and entered the passenger side of the truck. The truck proceeded to back up
into the carport, and Ogle exited the vehicle. Ogle then entered the carport and tossed
an air compressor and garden tiller into the bed of the pick-up truck and drove off.
The victim testified that he realized the items were missing several days later
and valued them at $700-750. He immediately checked his surveillance cameras.
After investigators identified Ogle’s truck from the victim’s surveillance footage, the
victim realized that he had met Ogle the year before when Ogle approached the victim
in his yard to ask if he could buy some of the victim’s liriope, or edging grass. On that
day, the victim gave Ogle permission to come on his property. The victim did not give
Ogle permission to come into his carport or on his property on February 25, 2016.
During an interview with the Elbert County Sheriff’s Office, Ogle denied going
to the victim’s residence and taking the items. At trial, however, Ogle admitted to the
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theft by taking charge, but denied committing any other crime. He explained that he
works for different nurseries around the country, buying and thinning liriope. He
testified that he has been buying liriope from homes for over twenty years and that
he has visited some homes up to fifteen times to buy their liriope.
In this case, Ogle testified that he bought some liriope from the victim in 2015.
He explained that after he bought the liriope and thinned it out, he knocked on the
carport door and asked the victim if he could come back after it grows back and buy
again, and the victim said “sure.” When Ogle went by the victim’s home on February
25, 2016, he noticed that the liriope had died and he wanted to fix it by planting new
plants. He entered the carport and knocked on the door, but no one came to the door.
While he “waited and waited and waited” for someone to respond, he noticed the air
compressor and garden tiller next to the garbage can in the carport. He assumed both
were trash because they did not work, so he loaded them into his truck. Ogle testified
that he “had permission to stop back [at the victim’s home] when [he] was in the
area.” According to the victim, Ogle did not ask the victim if he could return after the
liriope grew back to buy more and the victim never gave Ogle permission to come on
his property or go in his carport on February 25, 2016.
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In his sole enumeration of error, Ogle contends that the trial court erred by
failing to charge the jury sua sponte on the defense of mistake of fact. He maintains
that it was his “primary” defense and that the evidence supported the charge.
“A person commits the offense of burglary in the second degree when, [1]
without authority and [2] with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, he or she
[3] enters or remains within an occupied, unoccupied, or vacant building, [or]
structure. . . .” OCGA § 16-7-1 (c). “Mistake of fact represents an affirmative defense,
under which a person shall not be found guilty of a crime if the act constituting the
crime was induced by a misapprehension of fact which, if true, would have justified
the act or omission.” Paul v. State, 331 Ga. App. 560, 563-564 (4) (769 SE2d 396)
(2015). See also OCGA § 16-3-5.
If the defense was raised by the evidence, including the defendant[‘s]
own statements, the trial court would have been required to present the
affirmative defense to the jury as part of the case in its charge, even
absent a request. The affirmative defense, however, would not have to
be specifically charged if the case as a whole had been fairly presented
to the jury.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Price v. State, 289 Ga. 459, 460 (2) (712 SE2d
828) (2011). Additionally, “[a] defendant is not entitled to a jury charge on this
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defense . . . where the evidence shows that his ignorance or mistake of fact was
superinduced by the defendant’s own fault or negligence.” (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Castaneira v. State, 321 Ga. App. 418, 422 (1) (740 SE2d 400) (2013).
In Price, the defendant was convicted of burglary. 289 Ga. at 459 (1). Evidence
presented at trial showed that the defendant entered the home through an unlocked
door because he thought the home was for sale. Id. The Supreme Court found that the
trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the defendant’s mistake of fact defense
because it was “based on the idea that he was authorized to enter the house as an
interested buyer, and because this authorization alone would have eliminated one of
the essential elements of burglary . . . [i.e.,] whether [the defendant] was authorized
to enter the dwelling house in the first place.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.
at 461 (2). In Price, there was evidence that the defendant saw “for sale” and “open
house” signs that led him to believe that he was authorized to enter the house. Id. at
460 (2).
Citing to Price, Ogle contends that the charge was warranted here because he
was under the mistaken belief that the victim’s “previous authorization to enter the
carport created a reasonable impression that the same authorization applied on the
second visit [in 2016] to the property.” Even assuming, without deciding, that mistake
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of fact was Ogle’s sole defense, and that his action in entering the victim’s carport on
February 25, 2016, was induced by the misapprehension of fact that the victim had
given him permission in 2015, that misapprehension would not have justified Ogle’s
action in backing his truck into the carport and entering the carport a second time –
after confirming on his first entry into the carport that no one was home – and tossing
the air compressor and garden till into the back of his truck.
In his reply brief, Ogle argues that the unauthorized entry element of burglary
is independent and not conditioned on the intent to commit a theft element of OCGA
§ 16-7-1 (c). He further contends that because of the nature of the previous
transaction, he was not negligent in believing he had permission to enter the carport.
The video footage presented at trial, however, shows that Ogle chose to enter the
carport twice, the second time after ascertaining during his first entry that no one was
home. Having been made aware that no one was home to discuss the liriope during
that first entry, Ogle nevertheless climbed back into his truck, backed it into the
carport, exited the truck, and then re-entered the carport a second time. These
circumstances do not support a finding that Ogle acted under a reasonable and honest
mistake of fact. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to sua sponte charge
the jury on mistake of fact.
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Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Mercier, J., concur.
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