Andrew Fordham v. State ( 2019 )

FOURTH DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
COOMER and MARKLE, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
October 25, 2019
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A19A1575. FORDHAM v. THE STATE.
MARKLE, Judge.
Following a jury trial, Andrew Fordham was convicted of two counts of
aggravated battery and one count of aggravated assault. Fordham appeals his
conviction and from the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial, as amended,
arguing, as is relevant here, that (1) he was denied his constitutional right to be
present at all critical stages of the proceeding, (2) he was denied effective assistance
of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object when a witness improperly
expressed his opinion on the ultimate issue in the case, and (3) the trial court erred by
failing to merge his aggravated battery and aggravated assault convictions for
purposes of sentencing. After a through review of the record, we affirm the trial
court’s denial of the motion for new trial, finding that Fordham was not deprived of
his right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings, nor was he denied
effective assistance of counsel. However, because the aggravated battery counts and
the aggravated assault count merged, we vacate the sentence and remand for re-
sentencing consistent with this opinion.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the record shows that,
in April 2013, Fordham was in a six-year relationship with his then girlfriend, C. S.
On April 28, 2013, Fordham and C. S. were spending the weekend together at her
home when Fordham went into the bathroom, presumably to take a shower. He called
to C. S. to bring him a towel because he had spilled water on the floor. As C. S.
approached the bathroom door, she noticed Fordham was holding a bowl, and he
splashed the contents, later discovered to be sulfuric acid drain cleaner, onto C. S.’s
face and upper body. C. S. begged Fordham to rinse her off with water, but he
refused. Fordham eventually called 911.1 The 911 operator instructed Fordham to
rinse C. S. off and he replied that he had, but Fordham told C. S. that he had been told
not to rinse her off.
1
The recording of the 911 call was admitted into evidence and played for the
jury.
2
Emergency Medical Technicians (“EMTs”) arrived at C. S.’s home, assessed
her condition, and took her outside into the rain to rinse the chemical off of her. C.
S. was subsequently taken to Grady Hospital, where she was placed in a medically-
induced coma for two months. C. S. suffered chemical burns to 20 percent of her
body, including her face and upper chest; she is legally blind in her right eye; and she
has undergone at least 13 reconstructive surgeries. She also had to learn to walk
again.2
On the day of the incident, detectives took pictures and measurements of the
chemical splash marks, and noticed large burn patterns on the carpet outside the
bathroom and extending up to eight feet on the walls. One EMT stated that something
about the scene did not seem right to him. Another EMT indicated that the story of
how the chemical came into contact with C. S. did not make sense, and that
Fordham’s explanation kept changing as the EMTs assessed C. S. and the scene.
Investigators from the Henry County police department crime scene unit conducted
2
Photographs of C. S.’s injuries were admitted at trial and shown to the jury.
3
re-enactments of the scene in C. S.’s bathroom and hallway.3 The re-enactments were
inconsistent with Fordham’s claim that he accidentally spilled the liquid onto C. S.
Fordham testified in his own defense at trial, stating that the incident was an
accident, and that he slipped on the wet floor and spilled the liquid on C. S.
The jury convicted Fordham of two counts of aggravated battery (Counts 1 and
2) and one count of aggravated assault (Count 3).4 The trial court sentenced him to
20 years’ probation as to Count 1, to run consecutive to the sentence imposed on
Counts 2 and 3; 20 years’ imprisonment on Count 2, to run concurrent with Count 3;
and 20 years’ imprisonment on Count 3. Fordham filed a motion for new trial, an
amended motion for new trial, and a second amended motion for new trial. Following
a hearing, the trial court denied the motions. This appeal followed.
1. In his first enumeration of error, Fordham argues that his exclusion from the
bench conferences during jury selection, at which certain jurors were excused for
cause, violated his constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the
proceeding. We disagree and find that Fordham acquiesced to his absence.
3
The videotaped re-enactments were admitted into evidence and played for the
jury.
4
Fordham was also charged with burglary in the first degree. However, the trial
court directed a verdict of not guilty on this count.
4
It is well-established that “[p]roceedings at which the jury composition is
selected or changed are . . . critical stage[s] at which the defendant is entitled to be
present.” (Citations omitted.) Zamora v. State, 291 Ga. 512, 518 (7) (b) (731 SE2d
658) (2012). As such, Fordham “clearly had a constitutional right to be present during
the proceedings at which one of the jurors trying his case was removed.” Id.; see also
Williams v. State, 300 Ga. 161, 165 (3) (794 SE2d 127) (2016) (although defendant
was present when juror asked to be excused for hardship and when court announced
that juror was excused for that reason, he had a right to be present during the bench
conference at which juror’s excusal was discussed); Ramirez v. State, 345 Ga. App.
611, 616 (2) (814 SE2d 751) (2018) (recognizing a defendant’s right to be present at
a bench conference where the topic of striking a potential juror is discussed).
Nevertheless, a defendant is free to waive this right, either personally or
through counsel. See Williams, 300 Ga. at 165 (3).
For a waiver by counsel to be binding on the defendant, it must be made
either at the defendant’s express direction or in open court in the
defendant’s presence; if it is not, however, the waiver may be
subsequently made effective by the defendant’s acquiescence.
Acquiescence, which is a tacit consent to acts or conditions, may occur
when counsel makes no objection and a defendant remains silent after
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he or she is made aware of the proceedings occurring in his or her
absence.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 165-166 (3); see also Murphy v. State, 299
Ga. 238, 240-241 (2) (787 SE2d 721) (2016). Furthermore, our Supreme Court has
explained that a defendant’s failure to object to his exclusion from a bench
conference, after the trial court has advised those in the courtroom, including the
defendant, about the topic discussed constitutes acquiescence. See Heywood v. State,
292 Ga. 771, 775 (3) (743 SE2d 12) (2013); see also Jackson v. State, 278 Ga. 235,
237 (3) (599 SE2d 129) (2004) (holding that appellants acquiesced in the proceedings
when their counsel made no objection to their exclusion from an in-chambers
conference and appellants remained silent after the subject was brought to their
attention).
Here, during jury selection, the prosecutor asked potential jurors if there was
any prejudice or bias resting upon their minds either for or against the accused. After
several jurors raised their hands in response, the trial court held a bench conference
with each individual potential juror. The prosecutor and defense counsel were present
for these conferences.5 After each bench conference, the potential juror was excused.
5
The bench conferences were not transcribed.
6
Jury selection resumed, and, at the conclusion of questioning, counsel for both sides
and the trial court discussed in open court the dismissal of certain potential jurors
who had already formed an opinion about the case or had a hardship, and the trial
court reviewed with counsel the three jurors previously struck for cause. Once the
jury was selected, the trial court asked both the prosecutor and defense counsel if
there was any objection to the jury selection process, and Fordham’s trial counsel did
not object. Fordham was present throughout jury selection with his attorney.
On this record, we conclude Fordham was aware of the subject matter of the
proceedings from which he was excluded, and he acquiesced to counsel’s waiver of
his presence by failing to voice any objection, either directly or through counsel, to
his absence at the bench conferences at which the jurors’ excusals were discussed.
See Williams, 300 Ga. at 166 (3); see also Murphy, 299 Ga. at 240-241 (2); Heywood,
292 Ga. at 775 (3). Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
2. Fordham next argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when
his attorney failed to object to the EMT’s testimony in which he opined that the
incident was not an accident because such testimony improperly invaded the province
of the jury. We conclude that Fordham has not met his burden.
7
To succeed on a claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective,
[Fordham] must show both that his attorney’s performance was
deficient, and that he was prejudiced as a result. Under the first prong of
this test, counsel’s performance will be found deficient only if it was
objectively unreasonable under the circumstances and in light of
prevailing professional norms. And under the second prong, prejudice
is demonstrated only where there is a reasonable probability that, absent
counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different. A
reasonable probability is defined as a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. Failure to satisfy either prong of the
Strickland test is sufficient to defeat a claim of ineffective assistance,
and it is not incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong. And
although both the performance and prejudice components of an
ineffectiveness inquiry involve mixed questions of law and fact, a trial
court’s factual findings made in the course of deciding an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim will be affirmed by the reviewing court
unless clearly erroneous.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Green v. State, 302 Ga. 816, 817 (2) (809 SE2d
738) (2018).
Fordham’s sole defense at trial was that the incident that caused C. S.’s
injuries was an accident, and he asserts that his trial counsel should have objected
when the EMT intimated otherwise. “Georgia law generally precludes a witness from
testifying as to his or her opinion regarding an ultimate issue in the case because to
8
do so would invade the province of the jury.” (Citation omitted.) Patterson v. State,
327 Ga. App. 695, 699 (4) (761 SE2d 101) (2014); see also Chamberlain v. State, 347
Ga. App. 775, 782 (3) (b) (819 SE2d 303) (2018). However, “[a] witness who
personally observed the event to which [he] is testifying may state [his] impressions
drawn from, and opinions based upon, the facts and circumstances observed by
[him].” (Citation omitted.) Patterson, 327 Ga. App. at 699 (4).
At trial, when asked about the victim and the scene, one of the responding
EMTs testified that his observations “kind of threw me off to where it just didn’t
seem right.” The EMT stated that, in viewing the bathroom scene, hearing Fordham’s
comments at the scene, and observing the liquid in the coffee cup, “[t]he amount that
was used, stating that it was an accident. And it just didn’t make any sense of why
you would put that kind of liquid in something that you drink out of or eat out of.”
Here, Fordham has not shown how counsel’s failure to object to this testimony
was deficient. The EMT merely gave his personal opinion of the event based on his
observations of the scene. His statement did not invade the jury’s province as to the
ultimate issue in the case because he never stated that the incident was not an
accident. In this regard, an objection to this challenged testimony “would have been
9
meritless, and failure to make a meritless objection cannot be evidence of ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Chamberlain, 347 Ga. App. at 783 (3) (b).
Moreover, at the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel explained that he
did not object to the EMT’s testimony because “it just didn’t seem significant to
object to it.” Counsel further stated that his interpretation of the EMTs’ cumulative
testimony was that they were relying on C. S.’s initial impression that the incident
was an accident, but that they could not tell if it was an accident. Trial counsel thus
made a strategic decision not to object to the EMT’s testimony because he felt it
supported his defense theory that the incident was, in fact, an accident. “[T]rial tactics
and strategy . . . are almost never adequate grounds for finding trial counsel
ineffective unless they are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would
have chosen them.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fleming v. State, __ Ga. __
(830 SE2d 129, 138 (5)) (2019); see also Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 647 650 (3) (b)
(670 SE2d 421) (2008) (“As a general rule, matters of reasonable trial strategy and
tactics do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation omitted).
“Decisions as to whether to interpose certain objections fall within the realm of trial
tactics and strategy and usually provide no basis for reversal of a conviction.” Goldey
v. State, 289 Ga. App. 198, 199 (2) (a) (656 SE2d 549) (2008). Fordham has not
10
shown that his trial counsel’s strategy was unreasonable. Goldey, 289 Ga. App. at 199
(2) (a). Thus, Fordham has not shown that counsel’s performance was deficient, and,
therefore, he has not met his burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel.
3. Finally, Fordham argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him on both
aggravated battery counts as well as on aggravated assault based on a single unlawful
act, and that the counts should have merged into one for purposes of sentencing. The
State concedes that Fordham must be resentenced, and we agree.
“The doctrine of merger precludes the imposition of multiple punishments
when the same conduct establishes the commission of more than one crime. Whether
offenses merge is a legal question, which we review de novo.” (Citations omitted.)
Louisyr v. State, 307 Ga. App. 724, 730 (2) (706 SE2d 114) (2011).
While an accused may be prosecuted for more than one crime arising
out of the same criminal conduct, he may not be convicted of more than
one crime arising out of the same criminal conduct where one crime is
included in the other. A crime is included in the other when: (1) It is
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts or a less
culpable mental state than is required to establish the commission of the
crime charged; or (2) It differs from the crime charged only in the
respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person,
property, or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to
establish its commission. With respect to subsection (1), the “required
11
evidence test” is utilized to determine whether multiple convictions are
precluded because one of the crimes was established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts that were required to establish the other
crime.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Regent v. State, 299 Ga. 172, 175 (787 SE2d
217) (2016); see also OCGA § 16-1-6; OCGA § 16-1-7.6
Here, Fordham was charged with two counts of aggravated battery against C. S.
for causing bodily harm to her when he threw the drain cleaner on her, seriously
disfiguring her head and rendering her eye useless. He was also charged with
aggravated assault against C. S. for using the drain cleaner as an offensive weapon,
which was likely to result in serious bodily injury, when he threw it on her. The
evidence was sufficient to support the convictions on all three counts. However, the
trial court sentenced Fordham separately on these counts.
As to the two counts of aggravated battery, both counts were accomplished by
the single act of throwing acid on C. S. and, therefore, one count should have merged
6
Under OCGA § 16-1-6 (2), a crime is included in another crime when “it
differs from the crime charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of
injury to the same person, . . . or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its
commission.” OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) (1) provides that the accused may not be convicted
of more than one crime if one crime is included in another.
12
into the other for purposes of sentencing. See Gonzales v. State, 298 Ga. App. 821,
823 (1) (681 SE2d 248) (2009) (merger required where the two counts of aggravated
battery resulted from the single act of pushing the victim out of a moving car);
compare Eskew v. State, 309 Ga. App. 44, 48-49 (4) (709 SE2d 893) (2011) (trial
court did not err in sentencing Eskew on both counts of aggravated battery where the
act of fracturing the child’s skull was a separate act from violently shaking the child).
As to the charge of aggravated assault, this count likewise was based on the
single criminal act of Fordham throwing acid on C. S. It required proof that Fordham
threw the acid, a weapon likely to result in serious bodily injury, and differs from the
aggravated battery counts only with respect to the specificity of the injury or risk of
injury C. S. actually suffered because the battery counts alleged disfigurement or
rendering a member of her body useless. Thus, as charged in the indictment, the
aggravated assault is included in the aggravated battery and should have merged for
purposes of sentencing. See Regent, 299 Ga. at 176.
Accordingly, as the State concedes, we must vacate the sentence imposed on
these counts, and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing, consistent with
this opinion.
13
Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and case remanded with direction.
Doyle, P. J., and Coomer, J., concur.
14