William R. Amason v. Highland Park Homeowners' Association, Inc. ( 2021 )

FIFTH DIVISION
RICKMAN, C. J.,
MCFADDEN, P. J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE PHIPPS
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
DEADLINES ARE NO LONGER TOLLED IN THIS
COURT. ALL FILINGS MUST BE SUBMITTED WITHIN
THE TIMES SET BY OUR COURT RULES.
December 1, 2021
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A21A1339. AMASON v. HIGHLAND PARK HOMEOWNERS’
ASSOCIATION, INC.
MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.
Highland Park Homeowners’ Association, Inc. sued William R. Amason for
damages and injunctive relief, alleging that he had violated Highland Park’s
declaration of protective covenants. The trial court granted Highland Park’s motion
for summary judgment and denied Amason’s motion for summary judgment, and
Amason filed this appeal.
Amason argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because this action was
previously litigated and thus Highland Park’s claim is barred by res judicata. But
there is no identity of the causes of action in the two lawsuits, so the trial court did
not err in denying his motion for summary judgment on this ground. Amason argues
that the trial court erred in granting Highland Park’s motion for summary judgment
because his property is not subject to the declaration of protective covenants. But the
undisputed evidence shows to the contrary. Amason argues that the trial court erred
by denying his motion for stay before ruling on Highland Park’s summary judgment
motion. But he has not shown an abuse of discretion. Finally, Amason argues that
Highland Park waived and is estopped from asserting its claims. But he has not
shown waiver. So we affirm.
1. Background.
A trial court may grant summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). “We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment de novo, and we must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Pennington v.
Gwinnett County, 329 Ga. App. 255 (764 SE2d 860) (2014) (citation and punctuation
omitted).
So viewed, the record shows that in 2007, Amason acquired the property at
issue, Land Lots 1164 and 1191, via quitclaim deed from his former spouse as part
of their divorce. Four years later, Highland Park filed a claim against Amason in
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magistrate court for unpaid homeowners’ association dues. The magistrate court
entered judgment in favor of Highland Park, and Amason appealed to state court. In
2018, the state court entered an order that provided:
The Court has been advised that the above-styled action has been
settled. Therefore, it is not necessary that the action remain upon the
calendar of the Court. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that this
action is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Court retains complete
jurisdiction to vacate this Order and to reopen the action if necessary. If
the Court receives no motion to vacate within 30 days hereof, the
dismissal shall be with prejudice.
Highland Park did not move to vacate the order within 30 days. Eight months
later, Highland Park moved to set aside the order on the ground that, in fact, there had
been no settlement. The state court denied the motion.
In July 2020, Highland Park filed the instant complaint, seeking homeowners’
assessments that Amason allegedly had not paid, an injunction requiring Amason to
maintain the property in accordance with the declaration of protective covenants,
fines for his failure to comply with the declaration of protective covenants, and
interest, attorney fees, and expenses of litigation.
The parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted
Highland Park’s motion and denied Amason’s motion. Amason then filed this appeal.
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2. Res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar this action.
Amason argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary
judgment because Highland Park’s action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. He
argues that the action in state court and this action involve the same threshold issue
— whether his property is subject to the declaration of protective covenants — so
Highland Park could not again litigate that issue. We disagree.
OCGA § 9-12-40 codifies the common law rule of res judicata, James v. Intown
Ventures, 290 Ga. 813, 815 (2) (725 SE2d 213) (2012), and provides, “[a] judgment
of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and
their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have
been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment
is reversed or set aside.”
[T]hree prerequisites must be satisfied before res judicata applies — (1)
identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies,
and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction. “Cause of action,” in turn, is the entire set of facts which
give rise to an enforceable claim[,] with special attention given to the
“wrong” alleged.
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Coen v. CDC Software Corp., 304 Ga. 105, 112 (2) (816 SE2d 670) (2018) (citations
and punctuation omitted). “The fact that the subject matter of different lawsuits may
be linked factually does not mean that they are the same ‘cause’ within the meaning
of OCGA § 9-12-40. For res judicata to act as a bar, the cause of action in each suit
must be identical.” Salem Crossing Townhomes Homeowners Assn. v. Wagner, 347
Ga. App. 621, 623, (1) (820 SE2d 453) (2018) (citation, punctuation, and footnote
omitted).
Amason has not shown identity of cause of action. In the state court action,
Highland Park sought assessments payable as of February 2011, when it filed its
statement of claim in the magistrate court. In the instant suit, Highland Park sought
injunctive relief to require Amason to comply with the declaration of protective
covenants regarding maintenance of his property; fines for violating the declaration
of protective covenants; assessments from January 1, 2017 to October 15, 2020; and
interest, costs, and attorney fees.
“Although both of [Highland Park’s] lawsuits are related to the [declaration of
protective covenants], the two suits are based on different wrongs and different sets
of operative facts; accordingly, the suits contained different causes of action and the
second suit is not barred by res judicata.” Coen, 304 Ga. 113 (3). See also Salem
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Crossing, 347 Ga. App. at 623 (1) (two lawsuits seeking homeowners’ assessments
for different periods of time stated different causes of action).
“Finding that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to bar the present
action, we [will] determine whether the related doctrine of collateral estoppel
applies.” Salem Crossing, 347 Ga. App. at 623 (2).
Collateral estoppel precludes the re-adjudication of an issue that
has previously been litigated and adjudicated on the merits in another
action between the same parties or their privies. Like res judicata,
collateral estoppel requires the identity of the parties or their privies in
both actions. However, unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel does not
require identity of the claim — so long as the issue was determined in
the previous action and there is identity of the parties, that issue may not
be re-litigated, even as part of a different claim. Furthermore, collateral
estoppel only precludes those issues that actually were litigated and
decided in the previous action, or that necessarily had to be decided in
order for the previous judgment to have been rendered. Therefore,
collateral estoppel does not necessarily bar an action merely because the
judgment in the prior action was on the merits. Before collateral
estoppel will bar consideration of an issue, that issue must actually have
been decided.
Waldroup v. Greene County Hosp. Auth., 265 Ga. 864, 866-867 (2) (463 SE2d 5)
(1995) (citations omitted).
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Collateral estoppel does not bar litigation of the issue of whether Amason’s
property is subject to the declaration of protective covenants, because that issue was
not actually litigated and decided, and did not necessarily have to be decided, in the
state court action.
The state court dismissed Highland Park’s action because the court had been
informed that the case had settled. The state court did not decide the issue of whether
Amason’s property is subject to the declaration of protective covenants. See Karan,
Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 280 Ga. 545, 547-548 (629 SE2d 260) (2006) (issue of
whether insured timely notified insurer of lawsuit was not actually litigated and
decided in prior lawsuit that ended in default judgment against insured); Waldroup,
265 Ga. at 867-868 (2) (issues in wrongful death lawsuit were not actually litigated
and decided in prior malpractice lawsuit that was dismissed for failure to file an
OCGA § 9-11-9.1 expert affidavit); Cleland v. Gwinnett County, 226 Ga. App. 636,
638 (487 SE2d 434) (1997) (because interpretation of ordinance in prior litigation
was uncontested, it was not actually litigated). See also Blakely v. Couch, 129 Ga.
App. 625, 628 (200 SE2d 493) (1973) (when judgment is entered in conformance
with a settlement agreement, there has not been an adjudication on the merits). Only
where the determination of an issue of fact or law is essential to the earlier judgment
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is that determination conclusive in a subsequent action between the same parties.
Kent v. Kent, 265 Ga. 211 (1) (452 SE2d 764) (1995).
Since the issue of whether Amason’s property is subject to the declaration of
protective covenants was not actually litigated and was not essential to the state court
judgment, collateral estoppel does not bar this action. The trial court did not err in
denying Amason’s motion for summary judgment based on the ground of res judicata
or collateral estoppel.
3. Amason’s property is subject to the declaration of protective covenants.
Amason argues that the trial court erred in granting Highland Park’s motion for
summary judgment because the undisputed evidence shows that his property is not
subject to Highland Park’s declaration of protective covenants. We hold that Amason
has presented no evidence creating a question of material of fact on this issue. On the
contrary, the evidence establishes that Amason’s property was made subject to those
covenants under a unilateral power granted to HP Development Company by the
declaration of protective covenants and also with the consent of Amason’s
predecessor in title.
HP Development Company recorded the “Declaration of Protective Covenants
for Highland Park” in the superior court on September 18, 1991. Article II, Section
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1 and an attached exhibit described the property that HP Development Company was
submitting to be subject to the declaration. Amason’s property was not listed.
But Article II, Section 2 of the declaration provided that HP Development
Company and Highland Park Homeowners Association had the right to subject other
property to the declaration. An exhibit to the declaration listed the additional property
that “unilaterally [could] be submitted by declarant,” HP Development Company, for
inclusion, and Amason’s parcel was in that list.
Article IX, Section 1 (a) described how HP Development Company could
unilaterally annex the listed property into the declaration. That section provided:
As the owner thereof or, if not the owner, with the consent of the owner
thereof, [HP Development Company] shall have the unilateral right,
privilege, and option from time to time at any time until six (6) years
after the recording of this Declaration to subject all or any portion of the
real property described in [the attached exhibit] to the provisions of this
Declaration and the jurisdiction of the Association by filing for record
in the county in which the property to be annexed is located a
Supplementary Declaration describing the property being subjected.
In May 1992, less than one year into that six-year period, HP Development
Company conveyed the parcel that came to be Amason’s to Hedgewood at Highland
Park, Inc., noting that the deed was delivered “subject to restrictions and easements
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of record” applicable to the property. Those restrictions, of course, included that the
parcel could be submitted for inclusion in the declaration of protective covenants with
Hedgewood’s consent.
On August 7, 1992, HP Development Company recorded a Supplementary
Declaration of Protective Covenants for Highland Park. In the Supplementary
Declaration, HP Development Company stated that it “now desires to subject to the
provisions of the Declaration a portion of the real property described on [the exhibit
attached to the original declaration]. Declarant is the owner, or if not the owner has
the consent of the owner, of the real property described in Exhibit ‘A’ hereto[,]” an
exhibit listing the portions of real property to be included. Amason’s property was
listed in Exhibit A.
On August 24, 1992, Hedgewood conveyed the property to Amason’s
predecessors in title. The warranty deed recited that the conveyance was made subject
to “that certain Declaration of Protective Covenants for Highland Park, dated
September 18, 1991 and recorded in . . . Fulton County, Georgia Records. . . .”
The trial court correctly determined that Amason’s property is subject to the
declaration of protective covenants.
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Amason argues that Highland Park has not presented evidence that Hedgewood
consented to subject the property to the declaration of protective covenants, and so
that Highland Park has not presented sufficient evidence to show that his parcel is
subject to the declaration of protective covenants. But in the Supplementary
Declaration, HP Development Company expressly asserted that it had the consent of
then-property owner Hedgewood to annex the property to the declaration of
protective covenants. Amason has pointed to no evidence creating a question of fact
on this issue.
Moreover, when Hedgewood conveyed the parcel to Amason’s predecessors
in title, the deed
expressly made [their] interests in the conveyed property subject to the
terms of the Declaration. . . . By accepting a deed with covenants and
restrictions, [the predecessors in title] consent[ed] to be bound by such
covenants and restrictions. . . . [The eventual] conveyance of the lot[] to
[Amason] was also made subject to the Declaration because a grantor in
a deed can convey only that which it owns and a grantee takes no greater
title than that held by the grantor.
Homelife on Glynco v. Gateway Center Commercial Assn., 348 Ga. App. 97, 102 (1)
(819 SE2d 723) (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Great Water
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Lanier v. Summer Crest &c. Homeowners Assn., 344 Ga. App. 180, 185-188 (1) (811
SE2d 1) (2018).
4. The trial court did not abuse her discretion in denying Amason’s motion for
stay.
Amason argues that the trial court abused her discretion in denying his motion
for stay to allow him time to conduct discovery and to obtain affidavits in support of
his response to Highland Park’s motion for summary judgment. He has not shown an
abuse of discretion.
Highland Park moved for summary judgment on October 20, 2020. The trial
court granted Amason an extension of time until December 11, 2020, to respond to
the motion. On December 11, Amason sought an additional three-day extension to
respond, noting that no discovery was outstanding. The trial court granted that three-
day extension.
On December 14, 2020, Amason filed his response to Highland Park’s motion
for summary judgment as well as an amended answer, his own motion for summary
judgment, and a motion for a stay pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-65 (f) with respect to
Highland Park’s motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion for a stay,
Amason filed his attorney’s affidavit in which the attorney testified that he needed
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additional time, primarily to obtain expert witnesses. Amason argues that the trial
court erred by denying his motion for stay.
OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing [a] motion [for
summary judgment] that he cannot, for reasons stated, present by
affidavits facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment, or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had, or may make such other order as is just.
“The granting or denial of a motion under OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) lies in the sound
discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent a showing of clear abuse
of discretion.” Hernandez v. Schumacher Group Healthcare Consulting, 352 Ga.
App. 838, 845 (2) (835 SE2d 787) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted),
disapproved in part on other grounds in Bowen v. Savoy, 308 Ga. 204, 209 n. 7 (839
SE2d 546) (2020).
Given that no discovery was outstanding and that the trial court twice had
extended the time for Amason’s response to Highland Park’s summary judgment
motion, we cannot say that the trial court clearly abused her discretion in denying
Amason’s motion under OCGA § 9-11-56 (f). Cf. Parks v. Hyundai Motor America,
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258 Ga. App. 876, 877-880 (1) (575 SE2d 673) (2002) (holding that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to grant an OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) motion when the
plaintiffs had served discovery requests and moved to compel discovery, because it
was possible that such discovery could have added “substance” to the plaintiffs’
case); McCall v. Henry Med. Center, 250 Ga. App. 679, 685 (2) (551 SE2d 739)
(2001) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant an OCGA
§ 9-11-56 (f) motion when the plaintiff had moved to compel discovery and such
discovery could have added “substance” to the plaintiff’s case).
5. Amason has not shown waiver.
Amason argues that by failing to “complet[e] the judicial process” (in that it
failed to file an appeal in the 2011 state court action that originated in magistrate
court), Highland Park waived its right to pursue this action. In support of his
argument, he cites only cases that discuss waiver generally.
“Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be
established by express statements or implied by conduct. An implied waiver is one
shown by a party’s decisive, unequivocal conduct reasonably inferring the intent to
waive.” Kennestone Hosp. v. Hopson, 273 Ga. 145, 148 (538 SE2d 742) (2000)
(citations and punctuation omitted). Amason does not point to any express statement
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by Highland Park waiving its right to pursue this action. And Highland Park’s failure
to file an appeal in the state court action is not decisive, unequivocal conduct from
which its intent to waive can be inferred.
Amason has failed to show trial court error in the grant of Highland Park’s
motion for summary judgment. So we affirm.
Judgment affirmed. Rickman, C. J., and Senior Appellate Judge Herbert E.
Phipps concur.
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