Loveless v. the State , 337 Ga. App. 894 ( 2016 )

SECOND DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
BOGGS and RICKMAN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
July 12, 2016
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A16A0161. LOVELESS v. THE STATE.
RICKMAN, Judge.
Following a stipulated bench trial, Gary Matthews Loveless was convicted of
trafficking in methamphetamine, driving without a license, giving false information
to a law enforcement officer, and obstruction of an officer. On appeal, he contends
that the trial court erred by failing to suppress evidence unlawfully seized following
a traffic stop based upon a check of State-maintained computerized records. He also
contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence because the
seizure was based on personal information protected by OCGA § 40-5-2 and by the
federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 USC § 2721, et seq. (the
“DPPA”). We affirm.
On appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, this Court must
construe the evidence most favorably to uphold the ruling of the trial
court. Furthermore, the trial court’s application of law to facts which are
undisputed is subject to de novo review. The trial court’s findings
should not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support them, and its
credibility determinations must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Spence v. State, 295 Ga. App. 583 (672 SE2d
538) (2009).
The undisputed facts from the motion to suppress hearing show that on January
19, 2015, an officer with the Cobb County Police Department was patrolling the
parking lot of a hotel on Powers Ferry Road. He saw Loveless and Beverly Baird
(Loveless’s co-defendant) walking from the hotel to two cars parked near where the
officer was parked. Loveless walked to a maroon Toyota Scion and Baird walked to
a tan Ford Explorer. The officer ran the tags on both vehicles and learned that Baird
was a co-owner of the Scion and that the Explorer was registered to Loveless.1 The
officer also ran a driver’s license check on the owner of the Explorer, thereby
obtaining the status of Loveless’s driver’s license and Loveless’s driver’s license
1
Prior to observing Loveless and Baird, the officer had checked the license
plates of some of the other vehicles in the parking lot.
2
photograph. As a result of these checks, the officer learned that Loveless’s driver’s
license was suspended and that he was wanted for a parole violation on a
methamphetamine trafficking charge.
The officer followed the Toyota Scion driven by Loveless out of the parking
lot and onto Powers Ferry Road, where he initiated a traffic stop after observing a
cracked taillight on the vehicle. The crack in the taillight was approximately three
inches long and there was also a hole in the lens. The officer approached the vehicle
and informed Loveless that he had pulled him over because of the crack in the
taillight. When the officer asked for his driver’s license, Loveless said that he did not
have it with him, and provided a false name (Christopher Bailey) and date of birth.
The officer ran a GCIC search on the name and date of birth provided by Loveless,
but found no record of any such person ever being licensed in the State of Georgia.
When the officer asked Loveless his name a second time, he again provided the same
answer, but had trouble spelling the first name.
At this point, the officer asked Loveless to exit the vehicle and informed him
that it was a crime to give false information to an officer. The officer then handcuffed
Loveless and asked him if he had heard the name Gary Loveless, to which Loveless
replied, “That’s my name.” After placing Loveless in handcuffs, the officer searched
3
Loveless and emptied his pockets. In his pockets, Loveless had a wallet containing
$2,200 in cash and a glass pipe containing methamphetamine residue. While the
officer was unlocking his patrol car, Loveless started running away, but was
apprehended and placed into the back of the patrol car. The Scion was ultimately
searched for drugs and a trafficking amount of methamphetamine was found inside
the vehicle.
Loveless filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized at the traffic stop,
alleging that the stop was illegal and that the search of his person and of “his motor
vehicle” were both unconstitutional. Following a hearing , the trial court denied the
motion. At trial, the parties stipulated to the facts set forth in the trial court’s order
and the facts that, after a drug dog responded to the scene, Loveless told the officers
that the methamphetamine was located “in a little grocery sack under one of my
shirts; backseat, back floorboard” of the vehicle, and the drug dog alerted to a grocery
bag in that location. The material inside the bag weighed 287.98 grams, and 220.11
grams of that material tested positive for methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced
Loveless to a life term, to serve 25 years in confinement and the remainder on
probation. Loveless appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and his conviction.
4
1. Loveless contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress evidence that was unlawfully seized, without a warrant, following a traffic
stop that was not supported by observable facts and was undertaken only after the
officer accessed “computer stored information” about the Explorer’s license plate and
Loveless’s driver’s license.
“All that is required to initiate a traffic stop is specific and articulable facts that
provide a reasonable suspicion that the individual being stopped is engaged in
criminal activity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Valentine v. State, 323 Ga.
App. 761, 763 (1) (748 SE2d 122) (2013). “Under the U. S. Constitution, a traffic
stop is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred.” (Punctuation omitted.) Maxwell v. State, 249 Ga. App. 747,
748 (549 SE2d 534) (2001), citing Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (116 SCt
1769, 135 LEd2d 89) (1996). And the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop
does not depend on the “actual motivations of the individual officers involved” as
“[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. at 813(II) (A); see Valentine, 323 Ga.
App. at 763-764 (1) (suppression motion arguing that traffic stop was pretextual
5
necessarily fails where officer observes the motorist committing even a minor traffic
violation).
Here, the officer testified that when he followed the Scion driven by Loveless,
he observed a three-inch crack in the taillight and a hole in the lens. Pursuant to
OCGA § 40-8-26 (d), “[a]ll lenses on brake lights and signal devices shall be
maintained in good repair and shall meet manufacturers’ specifications.” And it “is
a misdemeanor for any person to drive or move . . . on any street or highway any
vehicle . . . [w]hich does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with
such lights and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this
chapter. . . .” OCGA § 40-8-7 (b) (2). The officer’s observation of even this minor
traffic violation constituted a valid basis for the stop. See Valentine, 323 Ga. App. at
763-764 (1); Parker v. State, 307 Ga. App. 61, 62 (1) (704 SE2d 438) (2010); Quick
v. State, 279 Ga. App. 835, 837 (632 SE2d 742) (2006). And “[i]n light of the
officer’s testimony, the trial court was authorized to find that the traffic stop was
justified by specific articulable facts giving the officer a reasonable suspicion of a
traffic violation. . . .” See Parker, 307 Ga. App. at 62 (1).
6
After he had been stopped, Loveless gave the officer a false name and date of
birth, in violation of OCGA § 16-10-25.2 This violation provided the officer with
probable cause to arrest Loveless. See Smith v. State, 294 Ga. App. 761, 763 (669
SE2d 735) (2008) (when car passenger gave false identifying information to officers
during traffic stop for tag light violation, he provided them with probable cause for
his arrest); State v. Roberson, 165 Ga. App. 727, 729 (2) (302 SE2d 591) (1983)
(when officer asked car passenger his name and a response known to the officer to
be false was given, officer was authorized to arrest passenger for violating OCGA §
16–10–25). Once Loveless was placed under arrest, the officers “were authorized to
search his person for weapons or contraband incident to that arrest.” Polk v. State,
200 Ga. App. 17 (406 SE2d 548) (1991). The officers were also entitled to search the
vehicle’s passenger compartment incident to Loveless’s arrest, “and the contraband
found in the course of that search was admissible in evidence.” Garcia v. State, 293
Ga. App. 422, 425 (1) (667 SE2d 205) (2008).
2
OCGA § 16-10-25 provides that “[a] person who gives a false name, address,
or date of birth to a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official
duties with the intent of misleading the officer as to his identity or birthdate is guilty
of a misdemeanor.”
7
2. Given our holding in Division 1, we need not address Loveless’s additional
claims that the evidence should have been suppressed because its seizure was based
on information protected by OCGA § 40-5-2 (b) and the DPPA.
Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur.
8