JOHN R. BACKMAN v. CATHERINE BACKMAN A/ka/ CATHERINE OTALVARO CESPEDES ( 2022 )


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  •                                FIRST DIVISION
    BARNES, P. J.,
    BROWN and HODGES, JJ.
    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
    https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
    June 28, 2022
    In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
    A22A0428. BACKMAN v. BACKMAN.
    HODGES, Judge.
    In this divorce action, we are asked to decide whether the sponsor of an
    immigrant, pursuant to an I-864 Affidavit of Support,1 must provide financial support
    to the sponsored immigrant upon the parties’ divorce when the parties previously
    executed a prenuptial agreement that waives spousal support. In its order granting a
    husband’s petition for divorce, the Superior Court of Fulton County found that the
    husband’s I-864 affidavit, executed to provide support to his Colombian wife, was
    enforceable and ordered the husband to pay the wife $1,000 in support per month as
    a result. We granted the husband’s application for discretionary appeal to consider his
    argument that the trial court erred in awarding support to the wife because: (1) the
    1
    See 8 USC § 1183a at seq.; 8 CFR § 213a.
    parties waived spousal support in their prenuptial agreement; and (2) the wife’s
    income exceeded the limit for which additional support was required. These
    arguments raise issues of first impression in Georgia and, for the following reasons,
    we conclude that the trial court correctly found that the husband’s I-864 Affidavit of
    Support was enforceable despite the parties’ prenuptial agreement and divorce.
    However, the trial court imposed a support award that was not authorized by federal
    law due to the amount of the wife’s income. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse
    in part.
    The underlying facts are generally undisputed. John Backman (“Husband”) and
    Catherine Backman a/k/a Catherine Otalvaro Cespedes (“Wife”) met through an
    online dating site in 2011. Thereafter, Husband visited Wife, who was a citizen of and
    resided in Colombia, on multiple occasions before proposing marriage.2 The couple
    wed in February 2013, but Wife did not have a visa to enter the United State and was
    2
    In December 2012, the parties executed a prenuptial agreement which
    provided, in relevant part, that “[e]ach party releases any right to claim temporary
    alimony, permanent alimony, rehabilitative alimony, periodic alimony, lump sum
    alimony, special equities, equitable distributions, remuneration, support, and
    attorney’s fees or costs” except as related to child support obligations. During the
    divorce proceedings, Husband moved to enforce the agreement; Wife filed responses
    in opposition to Husband’s motion, to which Husband replied. The trial court
    ultimately granted Husband’s motion.
    2
    unable to immediately join Husband. To expedite Wife’s arrival in the United States,
    Husband executed an I-864 Affidavit of Support pursuant to the Immigration and
    Nationality Act, in which he pledged to financially support Wife. See 8 USC § 1183a
    et seq.; 8 CFR § 213a. Wife then moved to the United States and is now a legal
    permanent resident.
    However, the couple’s relationship soured, and in July 2018, two months after
    the birth of their second child, Husband filed a complaint for divorce. Following a
    bench trial, the trial court granted Husband’s petition for divorce and awarded
    physical custody of the couple’s two children to Husband. In its final order, the trial
    court found that
    Husband has an obligation to support Wife pursuant to the I-864
    Affidavit of Support under Section 213A of the [Immigration and
    Nationality Act]. As such, the Court will use [its] discretion and award
    the Wife the amount of $1,000.00 per month, to be paid directly to the
    Wife, until such time that the I-8[6]4 Affidavit of Support is no longer
    enforceable on January 1, 2023.3
    3
    The trial court’s order did not contain any citation of authority or discussion
    supporting its conclusion. During the bench trial, however, the trial court indicated
    it had reviewed the parties’ briefing “regarding the prenuptial agreement and issues
    regarding [Husband’s] affidavit that he presented to the government when he
    requested that [Wife] come here.” The court stated that it “took that to mean that
    [Husband] had an obligation to provide a certain level of financial support” and that
    3
    Husband filed an application for discretionary appeal to challenge the trial
    court’s award of support pursuant to the I-864 affidavit. We granted Husband’s
    application, and this appeal follows.4
    In a single enumeration of error, Husband argues that the trial court erred in
    enforcing a support payment in excess of the maximum required by the I-864
    Affidavit of Support. Specifically, Husband argues that the I-864 affidavit only
    requires a spouse to “maintain the immigrant spouse at 125% of the federal poverty
    guidelines”5 and that Wife’s income exceeded that limit such that no additional
    support was available. In part, we agree.
    it “will establish the dollar amount that it believes should be provided for [Wife’s]
    minimal support . . . [u]nless you can provide me some guidance, through case law,
    that says this is the minimum amount that sponsors are to provide, and I do not have
    the discretion to do otherwise.”
    4
    Wife’s motion to dismiss Husband’s appeal is denied.
    5
    Husband does not contend that the I-864 Affidavit of Support is
    unenforceable as a result of the parties’ divorce. See generally Motlagh v. Motlagh,
    
    100 NE3d 937
    , 942 (II) (Ohio App. 2017) (“Divorce is not a condition under which
    the sponsor’s obligations under Form I-864 can be terminated.”). Indeed, Husband’s
    counsel stated that she had “no problem with the Court including a provision in its
    order that [Husband] will comply with his obligations under I-864.” Rather, he
    contends that Wife excused his obligation in view of her waiver of spousal support
    in the prenuptial agreement and because Wife’s income exceeds the amount for which
    support would be required.
    4
    As this appears to be an issue of first impression under Georgia law, we start
    with a review of the controlling federal statutes that authorize the I-864 Affidavit of
    Support. See 
    8 USC § 1182
     et seq. To begin, “the Immigration and Nationality Act
    forbids admission to the United States of any alien who ‘is likely at any time to
    become a public charge.’ 
    8 USC § 1182
     (a) (4); 8 CFR § 213a.2 (a).” Erler v. Erler,
    824 F3d 1173, 1175 (I) (9th Cir. 2016). As a result,
    [f]amily-sponsored immigrants seeking admission are admissible only
    if the person petitioning for the immigrants’ admission signs an
    Affidavit of Support Form I-864. A Form I-864 is a legally enforceable
    contract between the sponsor and both the United States Government
    and the sponsored immigrant. The signing sponsor submits himself to
    the personal jurisdiction of any court of the United States or of any
    State, territory, or possession of the United States if the court has subject
    matter jurisdiction of a civil lawsuit to enforce the Form I-864. See 
    8 USC § 1182
     (a).
    (Citations omitted.) Motlagh v. Motlagh, 
    100 NE3d 937
    , 941 (II) (Ohio App. 2017);
    see also Erler, 824 F3d at 1175 (I). “By signing a Form I-864 the ‘sponsor agrees to
    provide support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less
    than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line during the period in which the affidavit
    is enforceable.’ 8 USC § 1183a (a) (1) (A).” Motlagh, 100 NE3d at 941 (II). Stated
    5
    succinctly, then, “when a sponsored immigrant separates from the sponsor’s
    household, the sponsor’s obligation under the affidavit of support is to provide the
    immigrant with whatever support is necessary to maintain him or her at an annual
    income of at least 125% of the poverty guidelines for a one-person household.” Erler,
    824 F3d at 1179-1180 (III); see also Younis v. Farooqi, 597 FSupp2d 552, 557 (C)
    (D. Md. 2009) (same).
    (a) Availability of I-864 Support Generally. In this case, Husband argues that
    the application of “an I-864 obligation where the immigrant spouse waived the right
    to seek spousal support under state law” is not permitted. This argument is
    unfounded.
    In Erler, the Ninth Circuit considered an appeal in which a husband and wife
    executed a “premarital agreement stating that neither party would be entitled to
    alimony or support from the other.” 824 F3d at 1175 (I). Shortly after the parties
    married, the husband executed an I-864 affidavit to support the wife, a Turkish
    national. Following their divorce, the wife, who had moved in with her adult son,
    filed an action in federal district court to enforce the husband’s I-864 obligation to
    provide support. The husband argued that “the parties’ premarital agreement and the
    6
    [state] divorce judgment terminated his obligation under the affidavit of support.” Id.
    at 1176 (II).
    In concluding that the district court correctly rejected the husband’s argument,
    the Ninth Circuit noted that “the right of support conferred by federal law exists apart
    from whatever rights a sponsored immigrant might or might not have under state
    divorce law.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Erler, 824 F3d at 1177 (II); see
    generally Kawai v. UaCearnaigh, 249 FSupp3d 821, 824 (V) (D. S. C. 2017). As a
    result, “under federal law, neither a divorce judgment nor a premarital agreement may
    terminate an obligation of support.”6 Erler, 824 F3d at 1177 (II); see also Belevich v.
    Thomas, 17 F4th 1048, 1052 (II) (11th Cir. 2021). Other courts considering similar
    claims have reached similar conclusions. See Liu v. Mund, 686 F3d 418, 419-420 (7th
    Cir. 2012); Golipour v. Moghaddam, 438 FSupp3d 1290, 1299 (D. Utah 2020);
    Shumye v. Felleke, 555 FSupp2d 1020, 1024 (I) (A) (N. D. Cal. 2008).
    6
    “Under federal law, an affidavit of support remains enforceable until the
    sponsored immigrant: (1) becomes a citizen of the United States; (2) has worked or
    can be credited with 40 qualifying quarters of work under title II of the Social
    Security Act; (3) ceases to be a lawful permanent resident and departs the United
    States; (4) obtains in a removal proceeding a grant of adjustment of status as relief
    from removal; or (5) dies.” Erler, 824 F3d at 1176 (II), citing 8 USC § 1183a (a) (2) -
    (3) and 8 CFR § 213a.2 (e) (2) (i). Based upon the record and the parties’ arguments,
    none of these factors appear to be satisfied in this case.
    7
    We agree with the weight of persuasive authority holding that a premarital
    agreement under state law does not excuse an I-864 sponsor’s obligation under
    federal law to support the subject immigrant, and the parties have not shown why
    such authority should not be applied in Georgia. Therefore, we conclude that neither
    the parties’ waiver of spousal support in their prenuptial agreement nor their divorce
    terminated Husband’s I-864 Affidavit of Support.
    (b) Availability of Excess I-864 Support. Having confirmed that Husband’s I-
    864 obligation survived the parties’ prenuptial agreement and divorce, we turn next
    to whether the trial court correctly awarded Wife $1,000 of support per month
    pursuant to Husband’s affidavit. We conclude that trial court’s award was improper.
    (i) Size of Wife’s Household. In Erler, the court held that “in the event of a
    separation, the sponsor’s duty of support must be based on a household size that is
    equivalent to the number of sponsored immigrants living in the household, not on the
    total number of people living in the household.” 824 F3d at 1178 (III). Therefore,
    [i]f the sponsor agreed to support more than one immigrant, and those
    immigrants separate from the sponsor’s household and continue to live
    together, then the sponsor must provide them with whatever support is
    necessary to maintain them at an annual income of at least 125% of the
    poverty guidelines for a household of a size that includes all the
    sponsored immigrants. When measuring the immigrant’s income, the
    8
    court must disregard the income of anyone in the household who is not
    a sponsored immigrant.
    (Footnote omitted.) 824 F3d at 1180 (III). Applying this principle to the present case,
    we conclude that the size of Wife’s household following the divorce was one,
    notwithstanding that she resided with her mother. See id.; Motlagh, 100 NE3d at 943-
    944 (III). Husband’s contractual obligation arising from the I-864 Affidavit of
    Support bound him to support Wife only. See Erler, 824 F3d at 1178 (III) (“The
    sponsor would not reasonably expect the obligation of support to be based on a
    household that includes the sponsored immigrant or immigrants plus anyone else with
    whom the immigrant might choose to live.”) (emphasis in original). As a result, there
    is no support in the record, and nothing in the trial court’s order, to suggest that
    Wife’s household size was anything other than one for purposes of Husband’s I-864
    obligation. See Erler, 824 F3d at 1180 (III) (finding no obligation to support former
    wife’s adult son with whom wife lived).
    (ii) Amount of Wife’s Income. Next, we consider the trial court’s calculation of
    Wife’s income and whether it exceeded 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines
    for a one-person household.
    9
    Under federal law, an I-864 sponsor must agree “to provide support to maintain
    [a] sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the
    Federal poverty line during the period in which the affidavit is enforceable[.]” 8 USC
    § 1183a (a) (1) (A). “‘Federal poverty line’ means the level of income equal to the
    official poverty line (as defined by the Director of the Office of Management and
    Budget, as revised annually by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in
    accordance with [
    42 USC § 9902
    ] that is applicable to a family of the size involved.”
    8 USC § 1183a (h).
    Accordingly, “[a] minimum standard or floor is set by [8 CFR] § 213A, i.e.,
    125 percent of the Federal Poverty Line for the appropriate family unit size. 8 USC
    § 1183a (a) (1) (A).” Naik v. Naik, 944 A2d 713, 717 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
    2008). Courts have construed this provision
    to mean that the sponsor is not necessarily required to pay the sponsored
    immigrant 125 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines for the
    appropriate family unit size. Rather, considering the sponsored
    immigrant’s own income, assets and other sources of support, the
    sponsor must pay any deficiency in order to meet this minimum level or
    floor.
    10
    Id.; see also Shumye, 555 FSupp2d at 1024 (I) (B) (calculating a sponsor’s annual
    support obligation by comparing the sponsored immigrant’s income against the 125%
    poverty threshold); Barnett v. Barnett, 238 P3d 594, 598 (IV) (A), n. 13 (Alaska
    2010), citing Younis, 597 FSupp2d at 554 (A) (“To determine the appropriate support
    due from the sponsor, courts compare the sponsored immigrant’s annual income for
    the particular years at issue against the 125% poverty threshold for each particular
    year.”) (punctuation omitted).
    In this case, the trial court found that Wife’s income totaled $2,610 per month.7
    The 2020 Federal Poverty Guidelines, introduced into evidence during the bench trial,
    listed 125 percent of the monthly federal poverty guideline for a one-person
    household as $1,329. Accordingly, under prevailing case law, Wife was not entitled
    to additional support pursuant to Husband’s I-864 obligation because “a sponsor is
    required to pay only the difference between the sponsored non-citizen’s income and
    the 125% of poverty threshold.” Barnett, 238 P3d at 598 (IV) (A); see also Naik, 944
    A2d at 717.
    Nevertheless, the trial court “use[d] [its] discretion” to award Wife $1,000 per
    month in purported satisfaction of Husband’s I-864 obligation. This was error.
    7
    The parties have not challenged this figure.
    11
    Because the I-864 Affidavit of Support represents a contractual obligation by the
    sponsor with United States government for the benefit of the sponsored immigrant,
    the trial court’s exercise of discretion in this context was inappropriate. Instead,
    enforcement of a sponsor’s I-864 obligation is based upon a rather simple formulaic
    calculation to determine “the sponsored immigrant’s own income, assets and other
    sources of support,” the sponsored immigrant’s household size, and the concomitant
    125 percent federal poverty guideline. See Naik, 944 A2d at 717. Put simply, if the
    sponsored immigrant’s income is less than the 125 percent federal poverty guideline
    for his or her household size, “the sponsor must pay any deficiency in order to meet
    [the] minimum level or floor.” Id. It necessarily follows that if the sponsored
    immigrant’s income exceeds the relevant federal poverty guideline, additional support
    is not warranted.8 See id.; see also Barnett, 238 P3d at 598-599 (IV) (A) (finding “no
    authority supporting the proposition that federal law requires a sponsor to pay spousal
    support when the sponsored non-citizen’s earned income exceeds 125% of the federal
    8
    Indeed, even were the trial court authorized to exercise its discretion, the
    record does not indicate the manner in which the trial court did so to arrive at the
    seemingly arbitrary $1,000 figure. See generally Kim v. Lim, 
    254 Ga. App. 627
    , 633
    (4) (563 SE2d 485) (2002) (remanding case to the trial court, in part, because “the
    trial court denied appellants’ motion . . . without any explanation of the manner in
    which it exercised its discretion”).
    12
    poverty threshold for a household the size of the sponsored non-citizen’s
    household”).9
    In sum, we conclude that, consistent with multiple federal courts as well as
    courts in other states, a sponsor’s obligation to support a sponsored immigrant
    pursuant to an I-864 Affidavit of Support is not terminated by either a prenuptial
    agreement or the parties’ divorce under Georgia state law. Furthermore, we conclude
    that the sponsor of a sponsored immigrant is not required to provide I-864 support if
    the sponsored immigrant’s income exceeds the 125 percent federal poverty guideline
    for his or her household size; however, if the sponsored immigrant’s income is less
    than the relevant federal poverty guideline, the sponsor is required to pay any
    deficiency in order to satisfy that minimum level of support. Because the trial court
    recognized initially that Husband’s I-864 Affidavit of Support was enforceable
    despite the parties’ prenuptial agreement and subsequent divorce, we affirm that
    portion of the trial court’s ruling. However, we reverse the trial court’s award of
    9
    Wife contends that the trial court retains some level of discretion because the
    Immigration and Nationality Act contains “no regulations or statutes [that] explain
    how to calculate the sponsored immigrant’s income and household size when the
    parties have divorced and no longer live together.” However, Wife cites no authority
    in support of this novel argument.
    13
    $1,000 per month to Wife because it was not authorized by federal law in view of the
    amount of her monthly income.10
    Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Barnes, P. J., and Brown, J.,
    concur.
    10
    We note that, consistent with courts in other states, “[i]f [Wife’s] earned
    income falls below 125% of the federal poverty threshold for a family of one before
    the occurrence of a terminating event . . ., she may bring suit in state or federal court
    to enforce [Husband’s] obligation.” Barnett, 238 P3d at 599 (IV) (A); see also Erler,
    824 F3d at 1176 (II), citing 8 USC § 1183a (a) (2) - (3) and 8 CFR § 213a.2 (e) (2)
    (i) (terminating events).
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A22A0428

Filed Date: 6/28/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/28/2022