Georgia Lottery Corporation v. Tabletop Media LLC. , 346 Ga. App. 498 ( 2018 )

FOURTH DIVISION
DILLARD, C. J.,
DOYLE, P. J., and MERCIER, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 21, 2018
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A18A0595. GEORGIA LOTTERY CORPORATION v. DO-021
TABLETOP MEDIA LLC.
DOYLE, Presiding Judge.
Tabletop Media, LLC, d/b/a Ziosk (“Tabletop”) develops, produces, and
distributes its Ziosk brand tabletop computer tablets, which it leases to restaurants.
After the Georgia Lottery Corporation (“GLC”) issued an executive order finding that
the Ziosk was a coin-operated amusement machine (“COAM”)1 subject to licensing
requirements and regulations of GLC pursuant to OCGA § 50-27-70, Tabletop filed
a petition for judicial review in superior court. The superior court reversed GLC’s
decision, finding that the Ziosk was not a COAM, and this Court granted GLC’s
application for discretionary review. On appeal, GLC argues that the trial court erred
1
See OCGA § 50-27-70 (b) (2) (A).
by: failing to give deference to GLC’s interpretation of the relevant statute, OCGA
§ 50-27-70 (b) (2) (A); failing to consider the legislative history behind that Code
section; and ultimately concluding that the Ziosk did not constitute a COAM subject
to licensing and regulation by GLC. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The facts in this case are undisputed. The Ziosk is a seven-inch, Android-based
touchscreen tablet that Tabletop sells or leases (along with accompanying
customizable software and services) to restaurants, which place the tablets on tables
and bars. The Ziosk is used for two purposes: (1) a restaurant management function,
and (2) amusement. The restaurant management function, which is free for customers,
permits customers to view nutritional information, place food and drink orders,
summon a server, complete surveys, enroll or participate in loyalty or reward
programs, view promotions and advertisements, scan coupons, pay for their meals,
leave comments, and email or print a copy of their receipt. Customers can also use the
Ziosk to play free games.2 Customers can also, however, pay a one-time fee to access
“premium entertainment,” including videos, sports news, and unlimited games, which
require the use of skill by the player. Revenue from the premium entertainment is split
2
The free games do not require the insertion of a card or a coin to play.
2
between Tabletop and the restaurants; customers do not receive a reward or
redemption when playing premium games.
On September 17, 2015, GLC issued a notice entitled “Tablets as Class A Coin
Operated Amusement Machines” (“Notice”) in response to a question from Ryan,
LLC, regarding whether “tablets that are becoming more common in restaurants and
retail establishments as a form of entertainment” are considered Class A COAMs
subject to State COAM rules and laws. The Notice stated:
each tablet offered to the public by a business that allows a customer to
pay for access to games or music is considered a Class A COAM within
the State of Georgia. Even if a tablet is not for the sole and exclusive
purpose of playing games/music but allows it as an option, the tablet
would still be a Class A COAM . . . [as defined by] OCGA § 50-27-70
(b) (3) and GLC Rule 13.1.2. . . .
In other words, any tablet that a business uses to allow customers to pay
to play games (that involve skill, including trivia) or music is subject to
COAM laws and rules, including licensing requirements for the entity
that owns the devices and the location in which the devices are used.
If a location is offering Class A COAMs [i]n the form of tablets to its
customers, such location must be licensed as a Class A COAM
location[,] and the entity that owns such tablets must also be licensed as
a Class A COAM master. Additionally, each Class A COAM placed in
3
a licensed location must have a valid Class A COAM permit sticker
affixed to it [pursuant to] OCGA § 50-27-78 (b). Accordingly, a Class
A COAM permit sticker should be purchased for each tablet made
available to the public at the location.
On September 21, 2015, GLC sent a letter to Ryan, LLC, advising that the Android
tablets addressed in Ryan’s inquiry are considered COAMs by GLC pursuant to the
Notice.3
Tabletop formally challenged the Notice, and following a hearing, GLC issued
an executive order finding that the Ziosk was a COAM. After GLC denied Tabletop’s
motion for reconsideration and its motion for review,4 Tabletop filed a petition for
judicial review in superior court.5
The appeal to superior court was “confined to the record” and was decided by
the court without a jury pursuant to OCGA § 50-27-76 (a). The parties agreed that the
facts were not in dispute and that the issue was purely one of law. The superior court
3
Ryan’s letter is not contained in the appellate record.
4
GLC’s Chief Executive Officer did not issue an order on Tabletop’s motion for
review within 30 days, and therefore, the motion was deemed denied under GLC Rule
13.2.5 (1) (b) (4).
5
“Appeal by an affected person from all actions of the corporation or chief executive
officer shall be to the Superior Court of Fulton County. The review shall be conducted by
the court and shall be confined to the record.” See OCGA § 50-27-76 (a).
4
reversed GLC’s decision, concluding that the Ziosk does not constitute a COAM
under OCGA § 50-27-70 (b) (2) (A). This Court granted GLC’s application for
discretionary review, and this appeal followed.
1. GLC argues that the trial court erred by failing to give deference to the
GLC’s interpretation of the COAM statute. We disagree.
OCGA § 50-27-76 (b) provides the standard of review a superior court must
apply when reviewing a decision by GLC:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of [GLC] as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact committed to the discretion
of [GLC]. The court may affirm the decision of [GLC] in whole or in
part; the court shall reverse or remand the case for further proceedings
if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because
[GLC’s] findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of [GLC];
(3) Made upon unlawful procedures;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Not reasonably supported by substantial evidence in view of the
reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole; or
5
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
This Code section is “essentially identical” to the standard of review provided
in the Administrative Procedure Act.6 Thus, although GLC is “an instrumentality of
the [S]tate, and not a [S]tate agency,”7 we conclude that the trial court properly
applied the standard of review applicable to administrative decisions.
In Handel v. Powell,8 the Supreme Court of Georgia applied this same standard
of review to a decision by the Secretary of State on the Secretary’s challenge to a
candidate’s qualifications.9 The same rationale applies to the instant case. Thus,
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Handel, we hold that when reviewing
a decision of the GLC or its CEO,
[the superior court] must accept [GLC’s] findings of fact if there is any
evidence to support the findings[. T]he court must first determine if
there is evidence to support the factual findings; the court then is
6
See OCGA § 50-13-19 (h).
7
Kyle v. Ga. Lottery Corp., 290 Ga. 87, 91 (1) (718 SE2d 801) (2011), citing OCGA
§ 50-27-4.
8
284 Ga. 550 (670 SE2d 62) (2008).
9
See id. at 552, citing Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Community Health, 284 Ga. 550(670 SE2d 62) (2008).
6
statutorily required to examine the soundness of the conclusions of law
drawn from the findings of fact supported by any evidence.10
In this case, as in Handel, the facts are undisputed, and the trial court confined
its review to the soundness of GLC’s legal conclusions. As the Supreme Court
explained:
While judicial deference is afforded an agency’s interpretation of
statutes it is charged with enforcing or administering, the agency’s
interpretation is not binding on the courts, which have the ultimate
authority to construe statutes. It is the role of the judicial branch to
interpret the statutes enacted by the legislative branch and enforced by
the executive branch), and administrative rulings will be adopted only
when they conform to the meaning which the court deems should
properly be given. The judicial branch makes an independent
determination as to whether the interpretation of the administrative
agency correctly reflects the plain language of the statute and comports
with the legislative intent.11
10
(Punctuation omitted.) Handel, 284 Ga. at 552.
11
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 553, citing Harbuck v. State, 280 Ga.
775 (3) (631 SE2d 351) (2006), McKee v. City of Geneva, 280 Ga. 411, 413 (627 SE2d
555) (2006), and Sawnee EMC v. Ga. Public Svc. Comm., 273 Ga. 702, 706 (544 SE2d
158) (2001).
7
As the superior court properly concluded in this case, this same rationale applies to
a superior court’s review of a GLC decision. Accordingly, this enumeration presents
no basis for reversal.
2. GLC argues that the superior court erred by concluding that the Ziosk was
not a COAM as defined by OCGA § 50-27-70 (b) (2) (A). The issue before the
superior court was whether GLC’s decision violated the plain language of the statute;
exceeded its statutory authority; or constituted an abuse of discretion by misapplying
the statute. We find no basis for reversal.
Our analysis of the proper interpretation of OCGA § 50-27-70 (b) (2) (A) is
guided by the following principles:
A statute draws its meaning, of course, from its text. Under our
well-established rules of statutory construction, we presume that the
General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that
end, we must afford the statutory text its “plain and ordinary meaning,”
we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and
we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way,
as an ordinary speaker of the English language would. Though we may
review the text of the provision in question and its context within the
larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting
8
it, where the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the
statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.12
(a) Tabletop argues that the COAM statute must be construed strictly and
against GLC because (a) COAM laws authorize GLC to impose fines and fees for
noncompliance,13 and statutes that impose fees and fines are construed narrowly
against State actors14; (b) COAM manufacturers must obtain a license,15 and licensing
statutes are construed strictly against the government as an interference with the
12
(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Patton v. Vanterpool, 302
Ga. 253, 254 (806 SE2d 493) (2017), quoting Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (751
SE2d 337) (2013).
13
See OCGA § 50-27-71 (n) (“Failure to obtain a license as required by this Code
section shall subject the person to a fine of up to $25,000[] and repayment of all fees or
receipts due to the corporation pursuant to this article. . . “); OCGA § 50-27-82 (a) (“If any
owner or operator of any bona fide [COAM] in this state shall violate any provision of this
article or any rule and regulation promulgated under this article, [GLC] corporation may
investigate the violation and may seek sanctions, including late fees. . . . “).
14
See State Ethics Commr. v. Moore, 214 Ga. App. 236, 237-238 (447 SE2d 687)
(1994) (“[W]hen a statute imposes a fine or penalty, strict construction is required in favor
of the person penalized. The applicable rule of statutory construction is that forfeitures and
penalties are not favored and statutes relating to them must be strictly construed, and in a
manner as favorable to the person against whom the forfeiture or penalty would be exacted
as is consistent with fair principles of interpretation.”) (punctuation omitted).
15
See OCGA § 50-27-71 (a) (4).
9
operation of business16; (c) violations of COAM laws can constitute a misdemeanor,17
and criminal statutes are construed strictly against the State18; and (d) COAM laws
were enacted to “safeguard the fiscal soundness of the [S]tate, enhance public
welfare, and support the need to educate Georgia’s children through the HOPE
scholarship program and pre-kindergarten funding;”19 and laws that raise revenue are
construed against the State.20
GLC, on the other hand, argues that the COAM laws should be construed
liberally in its favor because the laws are remedial in nature, citing OCGA § 50-27-70
(a), which states that the legislature enacted the COAM laws “to prevent the
unregulated operation of [COAMs], . . . which will aid in the enforcement of the tax
obligations that arise from the operation of [COAMS] as well as prevent unauthorized
cash payouts.”
16
See Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 205 Ga. 429, 435 (54
SE2d 260) (1949).
17
See OCGA § 50-27-82.
18
See Frix v. State, 298 Ga. App. 538, 542 (1) (680 SE2d 582) (2009).
19
OCGA § 50-27-70 (a).
20
See Thompson v. Ga. Power Co., 73 Ga. App. 587, 597 (37 SE2d 622) (1946).
10
The COAM statutes are not remedial.21 “[L]aws which affect the remedy only
are remedial statutes, which are laws curing defects in the remedy, or confirming
rights already existing, or adding to the means of securing and enforcing the same.
. . A remedial statute has also been defined as one remedying defects in the common
law.”22 Although they do provide procedural safeguards to aid in tax collection
associated with COAMs and to prevent unauthorized cash payouts, the regulation of
COAMs is, as Tabletop argues, a licensing scheme intended to raise revenue “to
safeguard the fiscal soundness of the [S]tate, enhance public welfare, and support the
need to educate Georgia’s children through the HOPE scholarship program and
pre-kindergarten funding.”23 And “[r]evenue laws are neither remedial statutes nor
laws founded upon any permanent public policy . . . and are not, therefore, to be
21
Compare Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone, 280 Ga. 631, 632 (1) (632 SE2d 376)
(2006) (holding that the Georgia RICO Act should be “liberally construed” to effectuate
its remedial purpose of providing compensation to private persons injured or aggrieved by
reason of any RICO violation), citing OCGA § 16-14-2 (b).
22
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Glover v. Colbert, 210 Ga. App. 666, 668 (437
SE2d 363) (1993), citing Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed., p. 1457 (1968).
23
OCGA § 50-27-70 (a).
11
liberally construed; and whenever there is a just doubt, that doubt should absolve the
taxpayer from his burden.”24
(b) We now turn to the statute itself. OCGA § 50-27-70 (b) (2) (A) defines a
COAM as
every machine of any kind or character used by the public to provide
amusement or entertainment whose operation requires the payment of
or the insertion of a coin, bill, other money, token, ticket, card, or similar
object and the result of whose operation depends in whole or in part
upon the skill of the player, whether or not it affords an award to a
successful player pursuant to subsections (b) through (g) of Code
Section 16-12-35, and which can be legally shipped interstate according
to federal law.25
The statute divides COAMs into two categories: Class A machines and Class B
machines.26 GLC concluded that the Ziosk tablet was a Class A machine, which
does not allow a successful player to carry over points won on one play
to a subsequent play or plays, and: (A) Provides no reward to a
successful player; (B) Rewards a successful player only with free
24
Thompson, 73 Ga. App. at 597.
25
OCGA § 50-27-70 (b) (2) (A) & (b) (2) (B) respectively provide non-exhaustive
examples of both COAM machines and those machines and other devices that do not
constitute COAMs.
26
See OCGA § 50-27-70 (b) (3) & (b) (4).
12
replays or additional time to play; (C) Rewards a successful player with
noncash merchandise, prizes, toys, gift certificates, or novelties in
compliance with the provisions of subsection (c) or paragraph (1) of
subsection (d) of Code Section 16-12-35, and does not reward a
successful player with any item prohibited as a reward in subsection (i)
of Code Section 16-12-35 or any reward redeemable as an item
prohibited as a reward in subsection (i) of Code Section 16-12-35; (D)
Rewards a successful player with points, tokens, tickets, or other
evidence of winnings that may be exchanged only for items listed in
subparagraph (C) of this paragraph; or (E) Rewards a successful player
with any combination of items listed in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D)
of this paragraph.27
Although the parties disagree as to the application of OCGA § 50-27-70 (b) (2)
(A) to the Ziosk tablet, both agree that it is unambiguous, as did the superior court.
We agree.
It is undisputed that the Ziosk is used by the public and can be shipped
interstate legally according to federal law. The premium component of the machines
27
OCGA § 50-27-70 (b) (3). By contrast, a Class B COAM “allows a successful
player to accrue points on the machine and carry over points won on one play to a
subsequent play or plays in accordance with paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Code
Section 16-12-35 and: (A) Rewards a successful player in compliance with the provisions
of paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (d) of Code Section 16-12-35; and (B) Does not
reward a successful player with any item prohibited as a reward in subsection (i) of Code
Section 16-12-35 or any reward redeemable as an item prohibited as a reward in subsection
(i) of Code Section 16-12-35.” OCGA § 50-27-70 (b) (4).
13
requires payment, and the operation of the premium component depends in part or in
whole on the skill of the player. However, a user can use the Ziosk, without payment,
for other purposes, including to access nutritional information, order, pay, and play
certain other games. Therefore, as the superior court concluded, “the operation” of the
Ziosk tablet does not require payment, and users can operate the tablet without
exercising any skill. Thus, the trial court properly concluded that the Ziosk tablet is
not a COAM as defined by OCGA § 50-27-70 (2) (A).
3. Finally, GLC argues that the superior court’s conclusion that the Ziosk tablet
is not a COAM is inconsistent with the legislature’s intent. But as we discussed in
Division 2, if “statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its
plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.”28 As the Supreme Court
of Georgia has stated, “courts cannot construe statutes to force an outcome that the
legislature did not expressly authorize.”29 If the legislature intends to include as
28
(Punctuation omitted.) Patton, 302 Ga. at 254.
29
(Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 258, n.9, quoting Turner v. Ga. River Network, 297
Ga. 306, 308 (773 SE2d 706) (2015).
14
COAMs those devices and machines whose operation depend in part on the payment
of money and the exercise of skill, “the General Assembly will need to act.”30
Judgment affirmed. Mercier, J., concurs. Dillard, C. J., concurs fully and
specially.
30
Patton, 302 Ga. at 258, n.9.
15
A18A0595. GEORGIA LOTTERY CORPORATION v.
TABLETOP MEDIA, LLC.
DILLARD, Chief Judge, concurring fully and specially.
I concur fully in Presiding Judge Doyle’s thoughtful and well-reasoned
majority opinion. I write separately to encourage the parties who appear before us to
stop referencing altogether the ethereal fiction of “legislative intent” in the context
of statutory interpretation.1 As a judge, I do not give a wit about what some legislator
intended but did not expressly provide for in the statutory text.2 If the General
1
See generally BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC v. Cobb County, 342 Ga. App.
323, 334-35 n. 3 (802 SE2d 686) (2017) (Dillard, P.J., concurring fully and specially).
2
See King v. Burwell, ___ U. S. ___ (135 SCt 2480, 2505 (V), 192 LEd2d 483)
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“More importantly, the Court forgets that ours is a
government of laws and not of men. That means we are governed by the terms of our laws,
not by the unenacted will of our lawmakers.”).
Assembly “enacted into law something different from what it intended, then it should
amend the statute to conform to its intent.”3 Thus, so long as the meaning of the
relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead to an absurd result, that is the end of
our inquiry.4 Indeed, it is deeply troubling when
3
Id. (punctuation and citation omitted); accord Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U. S. 526,
542 (III) (124 SCt 1023, 157 LEd2d 1024) (2004); see Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, ___ U. S. ___ (138 SCt 1461, 1487, 200 LEd2d 854) (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“More fundamentally, even if courts could discern Congress’ hypothetical
intentions, intentions do not count unless they are enshrined in a text that makes it through
the constitutional processes of bicameralism and presentment.”); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No.
89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U. S. 81, 119 (II) (127 SCt 1534, 167 LEd2d 449) (2007) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (noting that because we have “a Government of laws, not of men,” we are
governed by “legislated text,” not “legislators’ intentions”); Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga.
App. 867, 870-71 (785 SE2d 414) (2016) (Peterson, J.) (“The General Assembly does not
enact a general intention; it enacts statutes. Statutes have words, and words have meanings.
It is those meanings that we interpret and apply, not some amorphous general intention.”).
4
See Shorter Coll. v. Baptist Convention of Ga., 279 Ga. 466, 470 (1) (614 SE2d 37)
(2005); Ray v. Barber, 273 Ga. 856, 856 (1) (548 SE2d 283) (2001); see also I.N.S. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (107 SCt 1207, 94 LEd2d 434) (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators’ intentions. Where
the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted
legislative intent.”); City of Atlanta v. Miller, 256 Ga. App. 819, 820 (1) (569 SE2d 907)
(2002) (“In construing a legislative act, a court must first look to the literal meaning of the
act. If the language is plain and does not lead to any absurd or impracticable consequences,
the court simply construes it according to its terms and conducts no further inquiry.”
(cleaned up)); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 397 (1st ed. 2012) (“Intentionalist theorists and courts
promote the idea that enacted texts merely evoke or suggest—as opposed to state—what
the true law is . . . . If this were true, then it would hardly be possible ever to reach a
consensus about the law. The traditional view is that an enacted text is itself the law.”); id.2
judges start discussing not the meaning of the statutes the legislature
actually enacted, as determined from the text of those laws, but rather
the unexpressed “spirit” or “reason” of the legislation, and the need to
make sure the law does not cause “unreasonable consequences,” [thus
venturing] into dangerously undemocratic, unfair, and impractical
territory. The “spirit or reason” approach to statutory interpretation
invites judges to read their own policy preferences into the law, as we
all believe that our own policy preferences are wise and reasonable,
which tempts us to assume, consciously or unconsciously, that the
legislature could not have intended differently.5
As Georgians (and Americans), we are “governed by laws, not by the intentions of
legislators.”6 And as judges, we should only be concerned with what laws actually
at 376 (“[T]hat the legislature even had a view on the matter at issue . . . is pure fantasy.
In the ordinary case, most legislators could not possibly have focused on the narrow point
before the court [and] the few who did undoubtedly had varying views.”).
5
Merritt v. State, 286 Ga. 650, 656 (690 SE2d 835) (2010) (Nahmias, J., concurring
specially) (punctuation omitted); accord Callaway Blue Springs, LLLP v. W. Basin
Capital, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 535, 541 (1) (801 SE2d 325) (2017); see also Christopher J.
Scalia and Ed Whelan, Scalia Speaks: Reflections on Law, Faith, and Life Well Lived, 236
(Crown Forum 2017) (“[W]e are, as the Constitution of Massachusetts describes it, a
government of laws, not of men—which means government by legislated text, not by
legislators’ intentions”).
6
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (113 SCt 1562, 123 LE2d 229) (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring); accord Callaway Blue Springs, LLLP, 341 Ga. App. at 541 (1);
Day v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 333 Ga. App. 144, 151 (775 SE2d 622) (2015) (Dillard,
J., concurring).
3
say, “not by what the people who drafted the laws intended.”7 Let us put to rest, then,
the fanciful notion that judges are somehow able to discern the collective intent of a
legislative body.8 Judges are not in the business of divining unexpressed legislative
intent, nor are we capable of doing so with any reasonable degree of accuracy. As
Judge Bethel (a former legislator) has aptly noted, “[a]ny attempt to discern
legislative intent beyond the express language passed by a legislative body is as
practical and productive as attempting to nail Jello to the wall.”9 I agree. Judges are
trained to interpret the meaning of the words expressly ratified by the people or
enacted by their representatives in a manner consistent with longstanding canons of
construction. Thus, when judges speak as if they are engaging in some mystical
search for the legislature’s unexpressed intent, they create an impression that is both
misleading and squarely at odds with the judicial duty. It is time to state plainly what
7
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, at 375; accord Callaway Blue Springs, LLLP,
341 Ga. App. at 541 (1); Day, 333 Ga. App. at 151 (Dillard, J., concurring).
8
See In re Whittle, 339 Ga. App. 83, 85-86 (1) (793 SE2d 123) (2016) (“[I]n the
context of legislation, discerning ‘collective intent is pure fiction because dozens if not
hundreds of legislators have their own subjective views on the minutiae of bills they are
voting on—or perhaps no views at all because they are wholly unaware of the minutiae.’”)
(citation omitted).
9
Bishop v. State, 341 Ga. App. 590, 593 (802 SE2d 39) (2017) (Bethel, J.,
concurring).
4
is already manifestly true: What legislators intend but do not expressly provide for
in the text of a statute is meaningless.
I realize, of course, that OCGA § 1-3-1 (a) provides that “[i]n all interpretations
of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly,
keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy,” but this statutory
directive—which, in my view, is constitutionally dubious—must be read in
conjunction with OCGA § 1-3-1 (b), which provides that “[i]n all interpretations of
statutes, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words . . . .” In any event,
the General Assembly can no more tell the judiciary how to generally interpret the
law than we can direct them how to legislate. The separation of powers is essential
to the maintenance of our constitutional republic, and it is high time that any
discussion of statutory interpretation between the bench and bar reflect the reality of
our jurisprudence and acknowledge the strict demarcation line between judicial
interpretation and legislating. We are judges, not black-robed philosopher kings.
5