The State v. Lewis. , 829 S.E.2d 785 ( 2019 )

FIFTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
MCMILLIAN and GOSS, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 17, 2019
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A19A0470. THE STATE v. LEWIS.
MCMILLIAN, Judge.
The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting defendant Michael
Lewis’ motion to dismiss his indictment on one charge of possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court’s order and
remand for further proceedings.
The limited record shows that Lewis and his co-defendant, Dexter Harris, were
stopped by police on August 12, 2013, after the officers saw that neither man was
wearing a seatbelt. When the officers approached the vehicle, they observed what
appeared to be a marijuana cigar tucked into Lewis’ waistband. During a subsequent
search of the vehicle, officers located a handgun in the center console. When neither
man admitted to owning or possessing the handgun, both Lewis and Harris were
arrested and later charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
In 2018, Lewis and Harris filed a motion to suppress and a motion to dismiss
the indictment on the grounds that they had been deprived of their constitutional right
to a speedy trial. After the motions were set for a hearing during a period when the
testifying officer would be unavailable, the State moved to continue the hearing on
the defendants’ motions to suppress. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Harris
elected to waive his motions and enter a guilty plea, which the trial court accepted.
In discussing sentencing, Harris’ counsel told the trial court:
And we’re not getting into actual ownership or anything like that, but he
is taking responsibility for the gun that was in there. Because he was the
driver of the car, and it’s presumed to be – anything in there is presumed
to be that of the owner, and I’ve tried to explain that to him, too. And he
can’t even be around somebody that has a firearm because this can
happen again even though it’s not his firearm.
Later that same day, Lewis appeared in the same trial court for a hearing on his
speedy trial motion. Immediately, the trial court asked the State what it was “trying
to accomplish” given that Harris had just entered a guilty plea on the same charge.
The State explained that the defendants were not charged with ownership of the
firearm, but rather with constructive joint possession because the firearm was found
within arm’s reach of both men in the vehicle. When the State attempted to address
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the factors involved in the analysis of Lewis’ speedy trial motion, the trial court again
turned to the fact that Harris had pleaded guilty to possession of the firearm. The trial
court then asked – despite the State’s motion for continuance in the absence of the
testifying officer – whether it was permitted to dismiss the case by converting Harris’
constitutional speedy trial motion to a “motion for directed verdict.” Although the
State maintained that a directed verdict would not be appropriate, the trial court
entered an order dismissing the indictment on the grounds that the State “had not
spoken to the arresting officer to clarify the area where the firearm was recovered.”
This appeal followed.
Although it is not entirely clear from the record what the trial court intended
to do in issuing its order following the hearing on Lewis’ speedy trial motion, we find
that it was without authority to act as it did. We first note that a directed verdict of
acquittal is proper “[i]f, construing the evidence in favor of the State, no rational jury
could make the requisite finding.” Shivers v. State, 286 Ga. 422, 430 (3), n.4 (688
SE2d 622) (2010). Thus, a motion for directed verdict “has no meaning when a case
is tried without a jury.” Poole v. State, 249 Ga. App. 409, 410 (1) (548 SE2d 113)
(2001) (trial court cannot direct a verdict of acquittal in a bench trial). Because there
has been no trial – much less a jury trial – in this case, the trial court was not
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authorized to issue a directed verdict. See Fluellen v. State, 264 Ga. App. 19, 22 (4),
n.1 (589 SE2d 847) (2003) (trial court cannot direct verdict of acquittal in a bench
trial). If there had been a bench trial, “the issue [would have been] whether the
evidence was sufficient at trial to support a conviction under the standards of Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).” Poole, 249 Ga. App.
at 410 (1). However, suffice it to say, neither the trial court nor this Court can
undertake an analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence prior to trial.
If the trial court intended to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, it
was first required to evaluate Lewis’ claim under the two-part framework set out in
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (92 SCt 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and Doggett v.
United States, 505 U.S. 647 (112 SCt 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992). See Johnson v.
State, 300 Ga. 252, 257 (3) (794 SE2d 60) (2016). Because the trial court did not
make the required findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding the Barker-
Doggett analysis, we must vacate the order and remand the case for further
proceedings and the entry of an order containing the appropriate findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Id. at 258 (3).
Judgment vacated and case remanded. McFadden, P. J., and Goss, J., concur.
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