Jackson v. the State , 329 Ga. App. 240 ( 2014 )

THIRD DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
BOGGS and BRANCH, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/
October 7, 2014
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A14A1352. JACKSON v. THE STATE.
BRANCH, Judge.
James Gower Jackson was tried by a Clayton County jury and found guilty on
two counts of criminal damage to property in the second degree1 and one count of
simple assault.2 He now appeals from the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing
that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the defense of
justification. We find no error and affirm.
“On appeal from a criminal conviction, the defendant is no longer entitled to
a presumption of innocence and we therefore construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s guilty verdict.” Marriott v. State, 320 Ga. App. 58, (739 SE2d
1
OCGA § 16-7-23 (a) (1).
2
OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2).
68) (2013) (citation omitted). So viewed, the record shows that Jackson was
previously employed as a truck driver for Super Service Trucking. On October 27,
2011, while driving a trailer of freight to Tennessee, Jackson used the Qualcom
system3 located in the cab of the Super Service truck he was driving to send a
message to Bruce Ellington, Super Service’s Director of Operations. Jackson told
Ellington that he was going to bring Ellington his “ god damn truck” because he was
“tired of delivering [Super Service’s] freight for nothing”; he concluded the message
by writing “[w]hatever happens now just remember you drove me to it.” Ellington
replied to the message, telling Jackson that he accepted Jackson’s resignation. After
receiving Ellington’s reply, and assuming that he had been fired, Jackson dropped the
trailer loaded with freight at a truck stop off of I-75 in north Georgia, near the
Tennessee line. Jackson then drove the truck cab to the Super Service facility in
Ellenwood, Georgia.
Vehicles enter the Super Service facility at Ellenwood through a parking lot.
Trucks entering the lot are then supposed to drive to a guard shack located at an
interior gate, check in with the guard, and then drive around the building to the back
3
Qualcom is a computerized system that allows drivers to exchange messages
with people at the Super Service offices.
2
entrance. When he returned with the truck cab, however, Jackson neither stopped at
the guard gate nor attempted to drive to the back of the building. Instead, he drove
past the guard shack and through the interior gate, made a sharp left turn, and ran into
two SUVs parked near the building. One of the SUVs belonged to Ellington and the
other belonged to Danny Bryan, the Super Service terminal manager. Jackson then
exited the truck cab carrying his tire bat, which was described as a long wooden
object that resembles a billy club. Carrying the tire bat, Jackson walked into
Ellington’s office and told Ellington he was “going to whoop somebody’s ass.”
Jackson also told Ellington that he had “hit a couple of cars in the parking lot.” After
observing the damaged cars and truck cab from his office window, Jackson called the
police while another Super Service Employee walked Jackson out of the building.
Following an investigation at the scene, the responding officer arrested Jackson.
Jackson testified in his own defense and stated that as he pulled into the Super
Service parking lot, the truck’s throttle became stuck. He then accidentally hit the
accelerator instead of the brake, and he indicated that the accelerator got stuck. At
that point, Jackson decided to steer the truck into the parked cars to avoid hitting
either the guard or two Super Service employees who were sitting at a nearby picnic
3
table. Jackson further explained that he confronted Ellington while carrying a tire bat
because he was afraid Ellington would be angry about the damage to his car.
During the charge conference, Jackson requested charges on the affirmative
defenses of justification and accident. The trial court agreed that the charge on
accident was supported by the evidence, but declined to give the charge on
justification, finding that Jackson’s testimony showed that the damage to the cars was
accidental. As the court explained its reasoning, “what [Jackson’s] saying here is the
truck malfunctioned. [He] had an accident and [he] ran into their cars instead of
running into people. I think that’s all covered by accident.” Jackson excepted to the
jury charge and on appeal he contends that the trial court’s refusal to give his
requested charge on justification constitutes reversible error.
A defendant is entitled to a requested jury charge on an affirmative defense as
long as there is at least some evidence, including the defendant’s own testimony, to
support it. Price v. State, 289 Ga. 459, 459-460 (2) (712 SE2d 828) (2011). Whether
the evidence presented supports a particular affirmative defense is a question of law,
Lewis v. State, 292 Ga. App. 257, 264 (2) (663 SE2d 721) (2008), and the trial court’s
ruling on this issue is therefore subject to de novo review. Burdett v. State, 285 Ga.
App. 571 (646 SE2d 748) (2007).
4
When a defendant claims justification, he admits that he intended to engage in
the conduct which constitutes the crime but argues that under the circumstances he
was justified in so acting and that he therefore lacked the requisite criminal intent.4
Brower v. State, 298 Ga. App. 699, 702 (1) (680 SE2d 859) (2009) (the defense of
justification requires that a defendant admit all elements of the crime except intent).
See also Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 (409 SE2d 513) (1991) (defendant was
entitled to a jury instruction on justification where he admitted driving without a valid
license, but argued that he was justified in doing so because his pregnant wife was
experiencing labor pains and was unable to drive, and the doctor had instructed her
to come to his office); Moore v. State, 234 Ga. App. 332, 333 (1) (506 SE2d 685)
(1998) (on charge of interference with government property, defendant was entitled
to a charge on justification where he admitted kicking out the window in a police car,
4
Under Georgia law, a criminal defendant may prove that his conduct was
justified because it occurred in defense of himself, his home or his property, or in
defense of other persons; resulted from entrapment or coercion; occurred in
reasonable fulfillment of his duties as a government officer or employee; constituted
the reasonable discipline of a minor by his parent or a person in loco parentis; was
both reasonable and performed in the course of making a lawful arrest; or was
“justified for any other reason under the laws of [Georgia]”. OCGA § 16-3-20 (1)-(5).
A defendant may also assert justification “[i]n all other instances which stand upon
the same footing of reason and justice as” any of the foregoing grounds. OCGA § 16-
3-20 (6).
5
and the evidence showed that he was in respiratory distress resulting from an allergic
reaction to pepper spray and needed air).
Unlike justification, the defense of accident is premised on the defendant’s
assertion that he did not intend to commit the act which constitutes the crime.5 See
State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 9 (2) (b) (734 SE2d 50) (2012) (in cases involving strict
liability traffic offenses, the defense of accident “must be based . . . on evidence that
the prohibited act was committed involuntarily, for example, because of an
unforeseeable physical ailment or external force”) (citations omitted); McBurnette v.
State, 236 Ga. App. 398, 399 (512 SE2d 298) (1999) (defendant entitled to jury
charge on accident where he testified that he did not deliberately strike victim but that
victim was struck inadvertently by defendant’s elbow as defendant turned in an
attempt to keep the defendant from striking him); Sapp v. State, 179 Ga. App. 614,
615 (2) (347 SE2d 354) (1986) (in a prosecution for obstructing a police officer, the
defendant’s testimony that her conduct in obstructing the officer resulted from a fall
caused by illness required a jury charge on accident). Additionally, a defendant
5
The defense of accident is set forth in OCGA § 16-2-2, which provides “[a]
person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident
where it satisfactorily appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention,
or criminal negligence.”
6
claiming accident must also show that the allegedly unintentional act did not occur
while he was engaged in a “criminal scheme or undertaking” and that he was not
criminally negligent, i.e., that his conduct “did not show an utter disregard for the
safety of others who might reasonably be expected to be injured thereby.” Lee v.
State, 320 Ga. App. 573, 578-579 (2) (740 SE2d 307) (2013) (where defendant hit
victims’ car while fleeing from police at a high rate of speed, he was not entitled to
a jury instruction on accident) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Given that a defendant claiming justification admits intentionally engaging in
the charged conduct while a defendant claiming accident does not, the two defenses
are usually considered mutually exclusive and as a general rule will not be charged
in the same case. Hill v. State, 300 Ga. App. 210, 212 (1) (684 SE2d 356) (2009);
Lewis v. State, 292 Ga. App. 257, 264 (2) (663 SE2d 721) (2008); Payne v. State, 273
Ga. App. 483, 487 (7) (615 SE2d 564) (2005). The cases in which Georgia’s appellate
courts have found that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on both justification
and accident are those in which some evidence shows that the defendant was armed
with a weapon while defending himself from another party and the other party was
wounded or killed accidentally by that weapon. See Hudson v. State, 284 Ga. 595,
597 (4) (669 SE2d 94) (2008) (evidence supported a jury charge on both accident and
7
justification where defendant testified that she brandished knife at the victim after he
threatened her, that she did not intend to stab him, and that she could not recall how
the knife wound up in the victim); Koritta v. State, 263 Ga. 703, 704 (438 SE2d 68)
(1994) (a trial court should charge the jury on both accident and justification “where
one who is armed with a weapon claims it accidentally discharged while he was
defending himself from another party”) (citation omitted); Turner v. State, 262 Ga.
359, 360-361 (2) (b) (418 SE2d 52) (1992) (same). Under those particular
circumstances, a jury could find that the defendant acted intentionally in using his
weapon, but that his conduct was justified by self-defense. Alternatively, the jury
could find that the use of the defendant’s weapon was unintentional, in which case
the defense of accident would apply. See Hill, 300 Ga. App. at 212-213 (1) (where
evidence shows that defendant had armed himself for purposes of self-defense and
that the victim was injured accidentally, the defendant was not required to choose
between the defenses of accident and justification “but [was] entitled to have the jury,
under proper instruction, to determine which, if either, of the defenses is applicable”)
(citations omitted).
In this case, Jackson argues that he was entitled to a jury instruction on both
accident and justification because although he claimed that the entire incident resulted
8
from a malfunctioning truck, he also testified that he deliberately chose to strike the
parked cars to avoid striking people. Although that testimony explains why Jackson
made a sharp turn into the parked cars, Jackson’s defense was that the truck’s throttle
and/or accelerator stuck, that he was unable to stop the truck, and that he elected to
steer the truck towards fixed objects and away from the Super Service employees
present in the parking lot. According to Jackson, therefore, his crashing of the truck
was the unintentional result of unforeseen circumstances over which he had no
control. Thus, under his version of the events, the damage to the parked cars resulted
from an unavoidable accident. Moreover, Jackson’s testimony as to the reasons for
his decision to steer the truck towards the parked cars served to support his accident
defense. If believed by the jury, that testimony would have shown when he decided
to hit the cars Jackson “was acting with regard for the safety of others, i.e., without
criminal negligence.” Davis v. State, 269 Ga. 276, 280 (3) (496 SE2d 699) (1998)
(citations omitted).
Additionally, Jackson’s position that the damage to the property was the result
of a malfunctioning truck is inconsistent with a justification defense. As discussed
supra, such a defense requires that a defendant admit to otherwise criminal conduct.
9
Here, however, Jackson claimed his conduct was the result of an accident, and he
therefore has not admitted that the conduct was otherwise criminal.
Given Jackson’s theory of defense and the evidence presented at trial, we find
no error in the trial court’s refusal to give Jackson’s requested jury charge on
justification. See London v. State, 289 Ga. App. 17, 19 (1) (656 SE2d 180) (2007).
Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur.
10