Woodward v. the State ( 2017 )

FOURTH DIVISION
DILLARD, C. J.,
RAY, P. J., and SELF, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
August 8, 2017
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A17A0677. WOODWARD v. THE STATE.
RAY, Judge.
Dontavious Woodward was indicted on two counts of aggravated assault-
family violence (OCGA § 16-5-21)1 and a separate count of arson (OCGA § 16-7-60).
A jury found Woodward guilty of arson and of the second count of aggravated
assault-family violence. Woodward appeals from the denial of his motion for new
1
In rendering this opinion, we rely upon the version of the statute in effect at
the time the crimes were committed in March 2010. See OCGA § 16-5-21, Laws
2006, Act 571, §4, effective July 1, 2006. The statute has since been amended several
times, though the sections pertinent to this opinion remain unchanged.
trial, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
On appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution to discern whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 S. Ct. 2781) (1979).
The evidence adduced at trial showed that Woodward, who was 17 years old,
lived in a two-story house in DeKalb County with his mother, his step-father, and his
four younger siblings. At about 11:00 p. m. on March 28, 2010, as the family was
getting ready for bed or had gone to bed, Woodward’s parents and siblings heard a
loud crash from Woodward’s bedroom followed by the smoke detector going off.
When family members came out of their rooms, they saw fire coming from
Woodward’s bedroom. The floor was on fire, and Woodward was laughing.
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Woodward was setting things on fire with a grill lighter and with an aerosol spray can
he was using as a torch to set the walls, floor, and his bed alight. Family members
also saw him setting the couch afire. Woodward’s burning stereo or television was
lying on the floor of his bedroom, and his window blinds were on fire.
Using his makeshift torch, Woodward was shooting flames “three feet” out
toward his family, saying “Get back, nobody come in here,” although he forced one
of his younger siblings back into the room. No one had threatened Woodward in any
way. Woodward’s parents eventually got the younger children out of the house, but
when his step-father tried to get Woodward to leave, Woodward would use his “man-
made torch” with lighter fluid that he would light and would “spray [his step-father]
back” while laughing. He told his step-father, “I only want you.”
After the rest of the family had evacuated, his step-father ran back to the house
to try to get Woodward to leave. Woodward had locked the door, and his step-father
used a key to get back in. Eventually, Woodward came out. Though accounts differ,
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testimony showed that Woodward began walking toward his step-father’s car with the
lighter and spray can in his hands. One of the siblings and the step-father testified that
they believed Woodward intended to set the car on fire.
The step-father had at some point picked up a hand-weight or dumbbell, and
he began walking or running toward Woodward to fend him off. However, he
dropped the dumbbell and did not strike Woodward with it. Woodward struck his
step-father on the head with the spray can. After his step-father had dropped the
dumbbell, Woodward then ran at his step-father with a knife in each hand, saying,
“I’m gonna kill you[,]” and stabbed him multiple times. Family members saw a “knife
going up and down.” One of Woodward’s siblings testified that, earlier in the
evening, she had seen Woodward put kitchen knives in his pocket.
Eventually, Woodward was subdued by family members until firefighters came
on the scene. His mother took one of the knives from him, and firefighters took the
others. Woodward was arrested, but even after being restrained by law enforcement,
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he continued laughing and smirking. Woodward was uninjured, but his step-father
was bleeding heavily from knife wounds and was transported to the hospital for
treatment.
1. Woodward argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction
for aggravated assault-family violence. He argues that the State failed to disprove his
contention that he was acting in self-defense. We disagree.
When a justification defense has been raised, the State’s evidence must be
sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Woodward did not act in self-defense. Noble v. State, 282 Ga. App. 311, 312 (638
SE2d 444) (2006). This Court does not weigh the evidence or determine the
credibility of witnesses, as that is the function of the jury. This Court will sustain a
jury’s verdict if there is competent evidence, even if contradicted, to support that
verdict. Waller v. State, 267 Ga. App. 608, 608 (600 SE2d 706) (2004).
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The count of the indictment under which Woodward was convicted charged
him with injuring his step-father by stabbing him with a knife. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a)
(2) provides that “a person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she
assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which,
when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious
bodily injury[.]” In order to prevail on a justification defense, the person who is
claiming self-defense must not have been the aggressor. OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (3).
Woodward argues that he presented evidence that he acted in self-defense, that
his step-father was armed with the dumbbell and followed him outside, and that he
defended himself because he thought he was in imminent danger. He testified that he
hit his step-father with the spray can because his step-father chased him out of the
house, and that when his step-father charged him again with the dumbbell, he used
a knife to defend himself. As outlined above, however, there was conflicting evidence
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indicating that Woodward stabbed his step-father only after his step-father had
dropped the dumbbell.
Whether the State has met its burden of proof that Woodward was the
aggressor and not entitled to a justification defense was for the jury, Noble, supra, as
was the resolution of conflicts in the evidence. Waller, supra. Woodward’s evidence
conflicted with the State’s evidence, as outlined above, which showed that Woodward
was the aggressor in using a knife as a deadly weapon to injure his step-father. We
find that the evidence was sufficient. See Hazelwood v. State, 265 Ga. App. 709, 710
(595 SE2d 564) (2004) (finding the evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s
conviction for aggravated assault where jury believed the victim’s story regarding
how a stabbing occurred instead of the defendant’s version of events).
2. Woodward also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction for arson in the first degree because the State failed to disprove his defense
that he accidentally started the fire. Again, we disagree.
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OCGA § 16-7-60 (a) (5) states that “[a] person commits the offense of arson
in the first degree when, by means of fire or explosive, he or she knowingly damages
. . . [a]ny building . . . under such circumstances that it is reasonably foreseeable that
human life might be endangered.” (Emphasis supplied).
Woodward alleges that the evidence failed to show that he intentionally started
the fire. He argues that he started the fire accidentally when he fashioned a make-shift
flame-thrower out of curiosity, based on things he had seen at the circus or on his
computer, using a lighter and an aerosol spray can to project a flame which
accidentally set fire to a paper shopping bag filled with trash.
It is true that there is a presumption that “any fire is a result of accident and
providential cause rather than criminal design.” Frost v. State, 200 Ga. App. 267, 270
(3) (b) (407 SE2d 765) (1991). The State bears the burden of overcoming this
presumption by proving “from either direct or circumstantial evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the fire was of incendiary origin and that the defendant was the
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guilty party.” (Citations omitted.) Id. Moreover, “[a] person will not be presumed to
act with criminal intention but the trier of facts may find such intention upon
consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances
connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.” OCGA § 16-2-6.
However, pretermitting whether the very first spark was initiated by accident
or design, the evidence and testimony, as outlined above, certainly supports the
conclusion that Woodward intentionally used his makeshift flame-thrower to start
additional fires in his home which he must have known would cause damages. Family
members testified that, after they initially saw flames issuing from Woodward’s room,
they saw him using the makeshift flame-thrower to, among other things, start
additional fires on the walls and sofa. The State’s fire investigator testified that the
damage caused to the house was consistent with that of fires set by a blow torch, and
a detective from the police department testified that the whole top portion of the
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house was on fire. The fire caused smoke damage, melted the eaves of the house, and
burned the roof and Woodward’s bedroom floor.
The State’s evidence was sufficient to disprove Woodward’s claim of accident.
The State showed that he set fire to the walls and the sofa and, pursuant to OCGA §
16-7-60 (a), “knowingly damage[d]” the building in which he lived, while his family
was in upstairs bedrooms near where he was setting fires. As outlined above, it was
“reasonably foreseeable that human life might be endangered.” OCGA § 16-7-60 (b).
Judgment affirmed. Dillard, C. J., and Self, J., concur.
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