Royce Robinson, Jr. v. State ( 2020 )

SECOND DIVISION
MILLER, P. J.,
RICKMAN and REESE, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
January 15, 2020
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A19A1675. ROBINSON v. THE STATE
MILLER, Presiding Judge.
Following a jury trial, Royce Robinson seeks review of his life sentence and
criminal convictions stemming from allegations that he kidnapped and attacked his
(now ex-) wife. He argues on appeal that (1) the trial court erred when it sentenced
him for kidnapping with bodily injury when the verdict form indicated that the jury
only found him guilty of kidnapping and that (2) the State made an improper “golden
rule” argument when it asked the jury during its closing argument to remember “a
traumatic experience in your own life.” Because the verdict form did not specially ask
the jury to choose between kidnapping and kidnapping with bodily injury, the
indictment charged Robinson with kidnapping with bodily injury, and the trial court
charged the jury with the elements of kidnapping with bodily injury, the trial court did
not err in sentencing Robinson accordingly. The state’s comments during its closing
argument also did not constitute an improper “golden rule” argument because, viewed
in context, they only sought to explain away discrepancies in the witnesses’
statements and did not improperly ask the jury to put themselves in the shoes of the
victim. We therefore affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts,1 the evidence adduced at
trial showed that the victim was Robinson’s wife at the time of the incident. One
evening, during an argument, Robinson drew a knife on the victim and placed it at her
neck. To get away from him, the victim went to stay at her aunt’s house after work
the following day. Robinson eventually went to the aunt’s house and asked the victim
if he could talk with her.
The victim agreed to talk with Robinson and went with him to talk in his car,
which was parked in the driveway. The victim kept the car door next to her propped
open with her foot to keep the door from closing. Once the victim made it clear that
she did not want to be with Robinson anymore, he “grabbed” her by her head, put the
car in reverse, and drove away while the victim screamed for help. During the drive
back to their house, Robinson hit the victim multiple times on her head, causing the
1
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
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victim to strike her head on the car window. When the two arrived at their house, the
victim locked herself in the car so that Robinson could not get to her. Robinson
forced down one of the car windows, yanked her out of the car by her feet, and
dragged her into the house. Once inside, Robinson hit, kicked, and choked the victim
before police arrived on the scene. The victim suffered multiple bruises, abrasions,
and injuries to her face, neck, arms, and eyes.
A grand jury indicted Robinson on one count of kidnapping (OCGA § 16-5-
40), one count of false imprisonment (OCGA § 16-5-41), one count of aggravated
assault (OCGA § 16-5-21), one count of battery (OCGA § 16-5-23.1), and one count
of criminal trespass (OCGA § 16-7-21 (b)). At trial, the jury found Robinson guilty
of kidnapping, false imprisonment, and battery but acquitted him of aggravated
assault and criminal trespass. The trial court merged the false imprisonment count
with the kidnapping count and sentenced Robinson to life imprisonment. Robinson
filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied after a hearing. This appeal
followed.
1. Robinson first argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to life
imprisonment for kidnapping with bodily injury when the jury’s verdict form
indicated that they only found him guilty of kidnapping. Because the indictment
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charged Robinson with kidnapping with bodily injury, and because the trial court
charged the jury with the elements of kidnapping with bodily injury, the trial court did
not err in sentencing Robinson accordingly.
We review the trial court’s imposition of a sentence for abuse of discretion. See
Reed v. State, 342 Ga. App. 466, 468-470 (804 SE2d 129) (2017) (reviewing the
imposition of a sentence for abuse of discretion).
Our law proscribes a substantially different punishment for kidnapping when
bodily injury has been done to the victim during the course of said kidnapping. Under
the Georgia Code, the offense of kidnapping is normally punishable by
“[i]mprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years.” OCGA § 16-5-40 (d)
(1). However, “if the person kidnapped received bodily injury,” then the offense of
kidnapping is punishable by life imprisonment. OCGA § 16-5-40 (d) (4). “Although
the statute does not make it explicit, the courts have treated kidnapping with bodily
injury as a distinct offense separate from and greater than kidnapping.” Hester v.
State, 216 Ga. App. 400 (2) (454 SE2d 604) (1995). “Thus, even if there is evidence
that the kidnapping victim suffered bodily injury, it is not proper to sentence the
defendant for kidnapping with bodily injury where the indictment charged only
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simple kidnapping and/or the jury was instructed only on simple kidnapping.”
(Citations omitted.) Id.
Even though the verdict form here indicated that the jury found Robinson
guilty of “kidnapping,” the trial court nevertheless properly sentenced Robinson for
kidnapping with bodily injury. The pre-printed verdict form used at Robinson’s trial
read, “We, the Jury, find the Defendant, ROYCE ROBINSON, JR., ________ of the
charge of KIDNAPPING.” The verdict form did not give the jury the option to choose
between kidnapping or kidnapping with bodily injury or specially ask the jury
whether bodily injury occurred. Instead, the indictment alleged that Robinson
committed kidnapping when he “unlawfully abduct[ed the victim] without lawful
authority or warrant and held such person against her will, said act resulting in bodily
injury to [the victim].” (Emphasis supplied.) When the trial court instructed the jury,
it read the indictment for the jury and also instructed them on the elements of
kidnapping with bodily injury. Given these circumstances, the verdict was clear that
the jury found Robinson guilty of kidnapping with bodily injury, and so the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Robinson to life imprisonment for
kidnapping with bodily injury. See Jenkins v. State, 269 Ga. 282, 295 (23) (c) (498
SE2d 502) (1998) (defendant was properly sentenced for kidnapping with bodily
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injury rather than kidnapping, even though verdict form just listed “kidnapping,”
when the indictment specified that bodily harm was done to the victims and the trial
court charged the jury on bodily injury and set out the elements of kidnapping with
bodily injury). Compare Patrick v. State, 247 Ga. 168, 170 (274 SE2d 570) (1981)
(defendant was not properly sentenced for kidnapping with bodily injury when trial
court only instructed the jury on simple kidnapping); Smith v. State, 302 Ga. App.
222, 225-226 (2) (690 SE2d 867) (2010) (life sentence vacated where indictment
alleged the defendant committed kidnapping, not kidnapping with bodily injury);
Hester, supra, 216 Ga. App. at 400 (2) (life sentence vacated where indictment and
jury charge both alleged simple kidnapping rather than kidnapping with bodily
injury).
2. Robinson also argues that the State made an improper “golden rule”
argument during its closing statement that asked the jury to put themselves in the
position of the victim. Because the State’s argument did not ask the jury to put
themselves in the shoes of a crime victim, and because they were more likely an
attempt to explain discrepancies in some of the witnessess’ statements, we disagree.
We review a decision regarding an improper closing argument for abuse of
discretion. Satterfield v. State, 339 Ga. App. 15, 22 (3) (792 SE2d 451) (2016). “A
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‘golden rule’ argument is one that, regardless of the nomenclature used, asks the
jurors to place themselves in a victim’s position. Such an argument is impermissible
because it encourages the jurors to depart from neutrality and to decide the case on
the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence.” (Citations
omitted.) Id.
Robinson specifically points to the following statements made by the State
during closing:
Think back to a traumatic experience in your own life. How many
details do you remember about the experience itself? You remember
what somebody did or what you heard or what you saw, but do you
necessarily remember what you were wearing?
...
Do you remember every specific detail about the things that were not
important to the trauma themselves?
Now, think about who you were with. Would every person that was with
you remember it in the same way? Would they remember the same
details, or would they remember different details?
...
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So is it any wonder that [three State witnesses and the victim] remember
things differently? No. It’s not any unexpected thing. Of course they
remember things differently. They’re standing in different positions.
They’re seeing things differently.
Viewed in context, we cannot say this statement constituted an impermissible
golden rule argument. The statement, taken as a whole, did not ask the jury to put
themselves in the victim’s shoes for the purpose of asking the jury to sympathize with
the victim or ask the jury how they would have felt if they were the victim to a crime.
Instead, the prosecutor made this statement in an attempt to explain away
inconsistencies in the testimonies of many of the witnesses. See Menefee v. State, 301
Ga. 505, 512-513 (4) (a) (ii) (A) (801 SE2d 782) (2017) (no improper “golden rule”
argument where prosecutor’s statements could be “more reasonably seen as the
prosecutor’s efforts to explain . . . the inconsistencies in the [witness’s] statements);
Satterfield, supra, 339 Ga. App. at 22 (3) (no improper “golden rule” argument where
statement “was not concerned with how a juror would feel if he or she were the
victim.”). We also note that the statement also asked the jury to remember a
“traumatic experience,” which would not necessarily cause the jury to remember a
crime. Furthermore, the statement was in reference to the memories of many of the
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other witnesses to the incident, all but one of which were not victims to the crime.
Given all of these circumstances, we cannot say that the State’s argument here was
an improper golden rule argument.
Accordingly, for the reasons provided above, we affirm Robinson’s convictions
and total sentence.
Judgment affirmed. Rickman and Reese, JJ., concur.
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