In the Interest of S. W., a Child (Mother) ( 2022 )


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  •                            THIRD DIVISION
    DOYLE, P. J.,
    REESE, J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE PHIPPS
    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
    https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
    April 18, 2022
    In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
    A22A0515. IN THE INTEREST OF S. W., a child.
    PHIPPS, Senior Appellate Judge.
    The mother of eight-year-old S. W. appeals the juvenile court’s temporary
    order addressing visitation in this dependency case. For the following reasons, we
    vacate that order, as well as a previous custody order entered by the juvenile court,
    and remand the case to the juvenile court with direction.
    The record shows that the Columbia County Department of Family & Children
    Services (“DFCS”) received a report on May 1, 2019, regarding the death of S. W.’s
    two-year-old sibling. At that time, DFCS took S. W., who was then five years old,
    into custody and placed her with her father. DFCS also filed a complaint seeking to
    place primary sole custody of the child with her father. A 72-hour hearing was held,
    and all parties agreed that S. W. was dependent. DFCS subsequently filed a
    dependency/deprivation1 petition claiming that S. W. was “deprived” due to
    allegations of inadequate supervision and “unexplained child injuries.” At the 10-day
    hearing, the parties again agreed that S. W. was dependent.
    On June 7, 2019, the juvenile court issued both a preliminary protective order
    and an order of adjudication and temporary disposition. In the preliminary protective
    order, the court found that (a) S. W. “ha[d] been abused or neglected[,]” (b) she was
    “in need of the protection of the Court,” and (c) continuation in the present custody
    situation was in her best interest. In its order of adjudication and temporary
    disposition, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that S. W. was
    dependent and that “return to the [mother’s] home [was] contrary to the welfare of the
    child.” In both orders, the court noted that continued placement outside of the
    1
    “The Juvenile Code was substantially revised in 2013. Importantly, the former
    Juvenile Code authorized a juvenile court to award custody to [DFCS] of any minor
    child shown to be ‘deprived.’ But the current Juvenile Code uses the word
    ‘dependent’ in lieu of ‘deprived.’” In the Interest of L. K., 
    353 Ga. App. 855
    , 857, n.
    4 (840 SE2d 76) (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, DFCS filed its
    initial complaint in 2019, so the new Juvenile Code applies. 
    Id.
     For reasons that are
    unclear on the current record, the May 2019 petition filed by DFCS is labeled
    “Deprivation,” rather than “Dependency,” and alleges that the child is “deprived,”
    rather than “dependent.” Nonetheless, given the similarities between the definition
    of a ‘deprived child’ and that of a ‘dependent child,’ the language used in the petition
    filed by DFCS in this case is immaterial, and “our previous decisions addressing the
    deprivation of a child are relevant to appeals involving the dependency of a child.”
    
    Id.
     (citation and punctuation omitted).
    2
    mother’s home was necessary “to ensure the safety of the child due to the death of the
    child’s sibling and the open investigation by law enforcement surrounding the
    circumstances and violent death of the child’s sibling.” The protective order further
    noted that the mother was to have no visitation or contact with S. W.
    The father filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the juvenile court.
    On June 20, 2019, the father filed, in the juvenile court action, a document entitled
    “Complaint for Change of Custody.” The filing requested that sole legal custody of
    S. W. be changed from DFCS to the father, noting that the father shared physical and
    legal custody with the mother and a change in circumstances materially affected the
    welfare of S. W. On June 21, 2019, the juvenile court held a disposition hearing
    during which the DFCS caseworker updated the court on the case. The court also
    heard argument on the father’s request for change of custody. Following the hearing,
    the juvenile court entered a July 9, 2019 temporary order (a) awarding the father sole
    temporary custody of S. W. until further order of the court, (b) relieving DFCS of
    legal custody, (c) restraining the mother from communication and/or contact with S.
    W., (d) allowing the maternal grandparents supervised visitation with S. W., (e)
    noting that child support was not ordered, and (f) indicating that a guardian ad litem
    was being appointed to represent S. W.’s best interests (the “July 2019 temporary
    3
    order”). The order did not include any findings of fact or conclusions of law
    supporting the juvenile court’s decisions. The court subsequently held a status
    hearing2 and, on September 30, 2019, issued an order essentially continuing its
    previous order.
    Following a number of counsel substitutions and a request for continuance by
    the mother, the juvenile court held what is labeled as a “Final Hearing” on the front
    page of the September 8, 2020 hearing transcript. The record does not show that a
    final order of disposition has been entered; however, on April 5, 2021, the juvenile
    court issued a temporary order permitting the mother to have supervised telephone
    visitation with S. W. (the “April 2021 temporary order”). The order indicates that
    visitation “shall be conducted once a week for a period of thirty (30) minutes in
    duration” and that “[s]aid time will be at the discretion of the custodian.” The mother
    filed a notice of appeal on May 5, 2021, purporting to appeal from “all judgments,
    rulings, orders, and decisions in this action that are adverse to [her], including, but not
    limited to, the Court’s April 5, 2021 Temporary Order.”3
    2
    The transcript of that hearing is not included in the record on appeal.
    3
    The mother’s appellate brief challenges only the juvenile court’s July 2019
    and April 2021 temporary orders. We therefore limit our review to those two orders.
    4
    1. Before addressing the merits of the mother’s enumerations of error, we must
    determine whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider the mother’s direct appeal.
    See Parham v. Stewart, 
    308 Ga. 170
    , 171 (1) (839 SE2d 605) (2020) (an appellate
    court has a duty to raise the question of its jurisdiction in all cases where there may
    be any doubt about its existence).
    This Court has held that custody orders entered by juvenile courts in
    dependency proceedings are directly appealable. See In the Interest of J. N., 
    302 Ga. App. 631
    , 631, 633-634 (1) (691 SE2d 396) (2010) (denial of petition to modify order
    terminating reunification services and placing children in the custody of relatives was
    subject to direct appeal as a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1)). This
    includes temporary or interlocutory custody orders issued in dependency proceedings.
    See In the Interest of S. J., 
    270 Ga. App. 598
    , 608 (1) (a) (607 SE2d 225) (2004) (“An
    order within a [dependency] proceeding deciding temporary custody of the child is
    a ‘final order,’ within the meaning of [OCGA §] 5-6-34 (a) (1), from which a direct
    appeal lies.”). “Under Georgia law, visitation rights are a part of custody.” Vines v.
    Vines, 
    292 Ga. 550
    , 551 (2) (739 SE2d 374) (2013). Accordingly, the juvenile court’s
    April 2021 temporary order addressing the mother’s visitation rights is directly
    appealable.
    5
    The father argues that the mother cannot challenge the juvenile court’s July
    2019 temporary order or any other orders issued more than 30 days before the date
    she filed her notice of appeal. We disagree. Generally a notice of appeal must be filed
    within 30 days after entry of an appealable decision or judgment. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
    However, where, as here, a direct appeal is proper, “all judgments, rulings, or orders
    rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings
    below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court.” OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).
    This applies to earlier, unappealed orders issued in the dependency proceeding:
    Although the juvenile court made its [dependency] finding well over 30
    days before [the appellant] filed her notice of appeal, a party may
    challenge the propriety of an earlier, unappealed [dependency] order in
    the course of a timely direct appeal from a subsequent order arising out
    of the [dependency] proceeding. This is true even if the party’s
    enumerated errors relate solely to the earlier [dependency] finding and
    do not address the subsequent order supporting the timely direct appeal.
    In the Interest of J. R. P., 
    287 Ga. App. 621
    , 622 (1), n. 2 (652 SE2d 206) (2007)
    (citations and punctuation omitted). See also In the Interest of S. J., 270 Ga. App. at
    608 (1) (b) (dependency order relied upon by the juvenile court in deciding a custody
    issue was reviewable during direct appeal of the custody order in a dependency
    proceeding).
    6
    Parties are foreclosed from subsequently challenging the conclusive
    effect of a [dependency] order only when the order has been reviewed
    on appeal and the challenged portion of the order either was or could
    have been considered by the appellate court or where the [dependency]
    order is used in unrelated proceedings, such as a proceeding to terminate
    parental rights.4
    In the Interest of I. S., 
    278 Ga. 859
    , 860-861 (607 SE2d 546) (2005) (citations
    omitted). Accordingly, the mother may challenge the propriety of any earlier,
    unappealed orders in the course of her timely direct appeal taken from the April 2021
    temporary order arising out of the dependency proceeding.
    2. We must also consider for purposes of this appeal what type of case is before
    us. The father argues that this case began as a dependency proceeding, but morphed
    into a custody modification proceeding when the juvenile court relieved DFCS of
    legal custody. This is incorrect.
    Child dependency proceedings are brought on behalf of the child, focus on the
    needs of the child, and may include custody orders “best suited to the protection and
    4
    “[Dependency] proceedings and parental rights termination proceedings are
    separate and distinct,” and unappealed dependency orders are binding in separate
    actions to terminate parental rights. In the Interest of I. S., 
    278 Ga. 859
    , 861, n. 6 (607
    SE2d 546) (2005) (citation and punctuation omitted); accord In the Interest of C. M.,
    
    258 Ga. App. 387
    , 387 (1) (574 SE2d 433) (2002).
    7
    physical, emotional, mental, and moral welfare of a child adjudicated as a dependent
    child.” OCGA § 15-11-212 (a) (2); In the Interest of J. N., 302 Ga. App. at 632 (1).
    “Although child custody determinations may be necessary in a [dependency]
    proceeding, the proceeding itself is to determine whether the child is [dependent] and
    is not an action brought to decide custody matters.” In the Interest of J. N., 302 Ga.
    App. at 632 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted); accord In the Interest of J. P., 
    267 Ga. 492
    , 492 (480 SE2d 8) (1997). We find that temporarily awarding legal custody
    of the child to her biological father and relieving DFCS of further responsibility for
    the child merely turned this action into a private dependency action. See generally In
    the Interest of C. A. J., 
    331 Ga. App. 788
     (771 SE2d 457) (2015) (private dependency
    action brought by the child’s grandmother); In the Interest of G. R. B., 
    330 Ga. App. 693
     (769 SE2d 119) (2015) (private dependency action brought by grandparents).
    This is true for at least two reasons.
    First, the juvenile court is authorized under the dependency proceeding statutes
    to order a change in its award of temporary legal custody of a dependent child and
    relieve DFCS of further responsibility for the child:
    After transferring temporary legal custody of a child adjudicated as a
    dependent child to DFCS, the court may at any time conduct sua sponte
    8
    a judicial review of the current placement plan being provided to such
    child. After its review, the court may . . . make any other order relative
    to placement or custody outside DFCS as the court finds to be in the best
    interests of such child. Placement or a change of custody by the court
    outside DFCS shall relieve DFCS of further responsibility for such child
    except for any provision of services ordered by the court to ensure the
    continuation of reunification services to such child’s family when
    appropriate.
    OCGA § 15-11-212 (d); In the Interest of B. K., 
    326 Ga. App. 56
    , 57-58 (755 SE2d
    863) (2014) (juvenile court within its authority to change custody from DFCS to
    another party). There is no indication in the statute that this change of custody ends
    the dependency proceeding.
    Second, OCGA § 19-9-23 governs actions to obtain a change of legal or
    physical custody. Under the version of that statute that was in effect at the time the
    father filed his complaint for a change of custody on June 20, 2019,5 filing a separate
    5
    OCGA § 19-9-23 was enacted in 1978, Ga. L. 1978, pp. 1957, 1958-1959, §
    4, and its language regarding the filing of a separate complaint to change custody
    essentially has remained unchanged. From 1978 until the statute was revised in 2019,
    the law mandated that filing a separate action was the only method to seek a change
    in custody: “[a] complaint by the legal custodian seeking a change of legal custody
    or visitation rights shall be brought as a separate action” in the appropriate venue. Ga.
    L. 1978, pp. 1957, 1959, § 4 (b); see Ga. L. 1983, pp. 3, 112, § 52 (revising statute
    to reflect correct constitutional provision regarding venue). Effective July 1, 2019,
    the statute was revised to explicitly authorize a party to bring a counterclaim for
    9
    action in the appropriate venue was the only method to seek a permanent change of
    custody. OCGA § 19-9-23 (a) (2018) (“[A]fter a court has determined who is to be
    the legal custodian of a child, any complaint seeking to obtain a change of legal
    custody of the child shall be brought as a separate action in the county of residence
    of the legal custodian of the child.”). “This Court repeatedly has noted that the
    language of OCGA § 19-9-23 requiring a party to bring a separate complaint to
    change custody is clear and unequivocal and is mandatory.” Pascal v. Pino, 
    361 Ga. App. 212
    , 214 (1) (863 SE2d 694) (2021) (citations and punctuation omitted).
    Notwithstanding the denomination of his filing as a “complaint,” the father did not
    file a separate action seeking a change of custody. We, therefore, do not construe the
    father’s complaint for change of custody to be anything more than a request for a
    temporary change of legal custody during the dependency proceeding. See In the
    Interest of M. F., 
    298 Ga. 138
    , 141 (1) (780 SE2d 291) (2015) (“substance, rather
    than nomenclature, governs pleadings”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
    For these reasons, the case before us is a dependency proceeding, and the
    juvenile court was obligated to comply with the dependency proceeding statutes. This
    modification of legal or physical custody in response to a complaint initiated to
    change custody. Ga. L. 2019, pp. 904, 905, § 2; OCGA § 19-9-23 (d) (2019).
    10
    conclusion also negates the father’s argument that the mother’s direct appeal of the
    April 2021 temporary order should be dismissed because she fails to challenge any
    substantive ruling of the order. To support his argument, the father cites the rule that
    a judgment or order is not directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) unless
    the case also involves “custody [as] an issue on appeal.” Voyles v. Voyles, 
    301 Ga. 44
    ,
    47 (799 SE2d 160) (2017); accord Capehart v. Mitchell, 
    358 Ga. App. 86
    , 88 (2) (851
    SE2d 846) (2020). This argument fails for two reasons. First, as stated previously,
    “[a]n order within a deprivation proceeding deciding temporary custody of the child
    is a ‘final order,’ within the meaning of 5-6-34 (a) (1), from which a direct appeal
    lies.” In the Interest of S. J., 270 Ga. App. at 608 (1) (a). Second, pretermitting
    whether the rule regarding orders entered in child custody cases applies to temporary
    custody orders entered in dependency proceedings, the mother in this appeal does
    specifically challenge the substance of the April 2021 temporary order permitting
    telephone visitation, claiming that this order, by inference, extended the father’s
    custody of S. W. without including the requisite findings of fact or conclusions of
    law.
    With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of the mother’s appeal.
    11
    3. In related enumerations of error, the mother asserts that the juvenile court
    erred by failing to enter a final disposition order following the September 8, 2020
    final hearing. Indeed, it does not appear that a final disposition order has been entered
    in this case. However, it also does not appear from the record before us that the
    mother sought a final disposition order in the trial court. It is well settled that “a
    judgment must be entered before an appeal is taken.” Crimminger v. Habif, 
    174 Ga. App. 440
    , 440 (330 SE2d 164) (1985) (citations and punctuation omitted); G. M. J.
    v. State, 
    130 Ga. App. 420
    , 422 (5) (203 SE2d 608) (1973) (“There can be no
    effective appeal from anything but a judgment . . . .”). “In the absence of a judgment
    in writing no question for decision is presented to the [appellate court].” Seabolt v.
    Seabolt, 
    220 Ga. 181
    , 181 (1) (137 SE2d 642) (1964); accord Bishop v. State, 
    176 Ga. App. 357
    , 358 (335 SE2d 742) (1985) (appeal subject to dismissal where party’s
    claim addresses issue for which there is no written order). Under the circumstances
    here, the mother’s argument regarding the juvenile court’s failure to enter a
    disposition order provides nothing for this Court to review. See West v. Life Ins. Co.,
    
    142 Ga. App. 877
    , 879 (2) (237 SE2d 239) (1977) (failure to rule on motion for
    partial summary judgment cannot be considered).
    12
    4. The mother also argues in related enumerations of error that the juvenile
    court’s July 2019 and April 2021 temporary orders failed to comply with dependency
    proceeding statutory requirements mandating that the court include necessary
    findings of fact and conclusions of law in its orders. Specifically, the mother asserts
    that the juvenile court’s orders failed to include required statutory findings that (a)
    DFCS or the father established by clear and convincing evidence that S. W. was
    dependent and her dependency was likely to continue, and (b) the change in custody
    to S. W.’s father was in her best interest and welfare. We agree with the mother that
    the juvenile court’s orders are deficient.
    A juvenile court in a dependency proceeding has the authority to enter an order
    “best suited to the protection and physical, emotional, mental, and moral welfare of
    a child adjudicated as a dependent child[.]” OCGA § 15-11-212 (a); accord In the
    Interest of G. R. B., 330 Ga. App. at 700-701. This includes, in relevant part,
    “[g]rant[ing] or transfer[ring] temporary legal custody to . . . [a]ny individual,
    including a biological parent, who, after study by the probation officer or other person
    or agency designated by the court, is found by the court to be qualified to receive and
    care for such child” or to a public agency such as DFCS. OCGA § 15-11-212 (a) (2)
    (A) & (C); see also In the Interest of A. L. S., 
    350 Ga. App. 636
    , 639 (1) (829 SE2d
    13
    900) (2019) (a juvenile court may assign temporary custody of a dependent child).
    “Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-212 (d), the court may conduct a judicial review of the
    custody and placement arrangements of any child previously adjudicated as
    dependent, and may order a change in custody, if the court finds such change to be
    in the best interest of the child.” In the Interest of A. M., 
    350 Ga. App. 333
    , 334-335
    (1) (829 SE2d 422) (2019); see OCGA § 15-11-212 (d) (“After transferring temporary
    legal custody of a child adjudicated as a dependent child to DFCS, the court may at
    any time conduct . . . a judicial review of the current placement plan being provided
    to such child. After its review, the court may . . . make any other order relative to
    placement or custody outside DFCS as the court finds to be in the best interests of
    such child.”). Accordingly, the juvenile court was authorized to (a) change legal
    custody from DFCS to the father in the July 2019 temporary order, and (b) continue
    custody with the father and modify the mother’s visitation rights in the April 2021
    temporary order. As stated previously, however, the juvenile court’s orders in this
    case failed to comply with the statutory requirements for dependency proceedings.
    It is well settled that under OCGA § 15-11-111 (b) (2), “[a]n order entered
    following a hearing in a dependency proceeding shall include findings of fact” to be
    “made in accordance with OCGA § 9-11-52 (a).” In the Interest of B. G., 
    345 Ga. 14
    App. 167, 168 (1) (812 SE2d 552) (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted); accord
    In the Interest of T. Y., 
    350 Ga. App. 553
    , 561 (829 SE2d 808) (2019); In the Interest
    of D. L. G., 
    212 Ga. App. 353
    , 353 (1) (442 SE2d 11) (1994). These findings of fact
    must reflect consideration of the oral and written testimony offered by the parties and
    “state not only the end result of that inquiry but the process by which it was reached.”
    In the Interest of J. G., 
    350 Ga. App. 588
    , 591-592 (1) (829 SE2d 828) (2019)
    (citations and punctuation omitted). “[T]he facts must be found specially; and the
    conclusions of law must be stated separately, regardless of whether the order
    otherwise is sufficient for purposes of review.” In the Interest of T. Y., 350 Ga. App.
    at 561 (citation and punctuation omitted).
    Here, at a minimum, the orders at issue should have included findings of fact
    demonstrating clear and convincing evidence that (a) present, not merely past or
    future, dependency existed, (b) the dependency resulted from the unfitness on the part
    of the mother, and (c) awarding custody to the father was best suited to the protection
    and physical, emotional, mental, and moral welfare of the child. See OCGA §§ 15-11-
    180 (“The petitioner shall have the burden of proving the allegations of a dependency
    petition by clear and convincing evidence.”); 15-11-212 (a) (orders must be “best
    suited to the protection and physical, emotional, mental, and moral welfare of a child
    15
    adjudicated as a dependent child”); In the Interest of A. L. S., 350 Ga. App. at 641 (1)
    (“The paramount concern in any change of custody must be the best interests and
    welfare of the minor child.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); In the Interest of G.
    R. B., 330 Ga. App. at 700 (record must contain evidence of present, not merely past
    or future dependency based on unfitness of a parent). However, neither the July 2019
    nor April 2021 temporary orders included findings of fact or “any discussion of [the]
    facts of the case within the context of the applicable statutes, the standard of review,
    or governing case authority.” In the Interest of T. Y., 350 Ga. App. at 561. They
    likewise did not include any conclusions of law, but merely stated directives to the
    parties. Therefore, the orders do not comply with OCGA § 15-11-111 (b) (2).
    In addition, both the July 2019 and April 2021 temporary orders failed to
    comply with other statutory fact-finding requirements. Under OCGA § 15-11-134 (b),
    “[a]ny order continuing a child’s placement outside of the physical custody of his or
    her parent, guardian, or legal custodian shall be based on a finding by the court that
    return of such child to such custody would be contrary to his or her welfare.”
    Moreover, “[f]indings under this Code section shall be made on an individualized
    case-by-case basis and shall be documented in the court’s written order.” OCGA §
    15-11-134 (c). Neither the July 2019 nor the April 2021 temporary orders — both of
    16
    which continued S. W.’s placement outside the mother’s custody by awarding sole
    custody to the father — included any finding by the court that, at the time of the
    orders, return to the mother’s custody would be contrary to the child’s welfare as
    required by OCGA § 15-11-134. Nor did the orders include a finding that the July
    2019 temporary transfer of legal custody to the father, which was continued by
    inference in the April 2021 temporary order, was in the best interests of S. W., as
    required by OCGA § 15-11-212 (d).
    Moreover, if we construe the July 2019 temporary order as a disposition order
    — since it was the only order entered after the June 21, 2019 disposition hearing that
    could constitute a disposition — it failed to comply with OCGA § 15-11-213. That
    statute mandates that “[a]ny order of disposition shall contain written findings of fact
    to support the disposition . . . .” The juvenile court’s July 2019 temporary order did
    not contain any written findings of fact supporting its change of temporary legal
    custody from DFCS to the father. In fact, as the mother correctly argues, the order did
    not contain any finding, much less a finding by clear and convincing evidence
    pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-180, that S. W. was dependent at the time of the order or
    that such dependency was likely to continue. See generally In the Interest of G. R. B.,
    330 Ga. App. at 700 (“the record must contain evidence of present [dependency], not
    17
    merely past or potential future [dependency])” (citations, punctuation, and emphases
    omitted). Based on the foregoing, we agree with the mother that the juvenile court’s
    July 2019 and April 2021 temporary orders are deficient.
    5. To the extent that the mother challenges the merits of the juvenile court’s
    orders, we are unable to address any such issues, given the absence of required
    findings in the orders. See generally In the Interest of J. B., 
    241 Ga. App. 679
    , 681
    (3) (527 SE2d 275) (1999).
    Because the juvenile court failed to include the appropriate findings of fact and
    conclusions of law in both its July 2019 and April 2021 temporary orders, we vacate
    those orders and remand the case to the juvenile court for resolution of the temporary
    custody determination and dependency petition using the proper standards and
    issuance of a proper order. See In the Interest of T. Y., 350 Ga. App. at 560-561 (case
    remanded where juvenile court failed to enter appropriate findings of fact and
    conclusions of law in order denying mother’s motion for return of custody in
    dependency action); In the Interest of J. B., 241 Ga. App. at 681 (1) (case remanded
    where court “inappropriately treat[ed] a [dependency] determination as part of a
    custody determination which does not require separate, specific findings of fact”).
    18
    On remand, the juvenile court shall hear evidence relevant to the child’s
    current status and enter a disposition order containing findings of fact
    to support the order. See OCGA § 15-11-213 (setting forth factors to be
    considered before court enters disposition order and the requirement of
    written findings of fact); see generally [Scott v. Scott, 
    276 Ga. 372
    , 377
    (578 SE2d 876) (2003)] (noting that whether a change of custody is
    warranted depends on the factual situation at the time the change would
    occur).
    In the Interest of A. L. S., 350 Ga. App. at 641 (1).
    Judgments vacated and case remanded with direction. Doyle, P. J., and Reese,
    J., concur.
    19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A22A0515

Filed Date: 4/18/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2022