Molfino v. Yuen. , 134 Haw. 181 ( 2014 )


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    Electronically Filed
    Supreme Court
    SCWC-10-0000150
    13-NOV-2014
    07:45 AM
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
    ---oOo---
    ________________________________________________________________
    GEOFFREY MOLFINO,
    Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant,
    vs.
    CHRISTOPHER J. YUEN, in his capacity as Planning Director,
    County of Hawaiʻi; COUNTY OF HAWAIʻI,
    Respondents/Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________________________________________________
    SCWC-10-0000150
    CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    (CAAP-10-0000150; CIV. NO. 07-1-0378)
    NOVEMBER 13, 2014
    RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, AND POLLACK, JJ., AND
    CIRCUIT JUDGE NAKASONE, IN PLACE OF ACOBA, J., RECUSED
    OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.
    I.     Introduction
    At issue in this appeal is whether this court should impose
    a duty of reasonable care on the Planning Department of the
    County of Hawaiʻi to a property owner, leading to potential
    negligence liability for damages allegedly sustained due to the
    Planning Department’s failure to maintain all pertinent
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    correspondence in its property files at all times.                We hold that
    policy considerations counsel against the judicial creation of
    such a legal duty under the common law, and also hold that there
    is no basis under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) Chapter 92F
    (the Uniform Information Practices Act (Modified), or “UIPA”),
    or Rule 1-8 of the Hawaii County Planning Department Rules of
    Practice and Procedure, to impose negligence liability upon the
    Planning Department based on the temporary absence of a
    government record from its files.            We therefore affirm the
    judgment of the ICA, which affirmed the Circuit Court of the
    Third Circuit’s1 order granting the County’s motion for summary
    judgment on Molfino’s negligence claim.
    II.     Background
    In this case, Molfino bought a piece of property on the
    Hamakua Coast of the Island of Hawaiʻi, identified by Tax Map Key
    (“TMK”) Number 3-2-002-035, for $350,000 in June 2003.                Molfino
    wanted to create a subdivision on the property.               He visited the
    Planning Department and made copies of the property’s TMK file.
    Based on the property’s zoning classification, Molfino
    understood that his property might consist of only two pre-
    existing lots.        Allegedly missing from the TMK file at that time
    was an April 2000 letter from a realtor to the former Planning
    Director, which requested a pre-existing lot determination, and
    1
    The Honorable Greg K. Nakamura presided.
    2
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    the former Planning Director’s May 2000 response letter, which
    stated that the property consisted of six pre-existing lots.
    Unaware of the prior six-lot determination, Molfino wrote a
    letter to the Planning Department in December 2003 requesting a
    pre-existing lot determination.           Based on the size of the
    property and the number of homes already built upon it, Molfino
    stated to the Planning Department that there was a possibility
    the property actually consisted of seven pre-existing lots.
    Christopher Yuen, the Planning Director, responded to Molfino’s
    letter in June 2004.      Yuen’s letter stated that Molfino’s
    property consisted of two pre-existing lots.           Apparently, the
    April 2000 and May 2000 letters were also missing2 from the
    Planning Department’s TMK files when Yuen and his employee,
    Edward Cheplic, prepared the June 2004 letter.
    While awaiting Yuen’s response, Molfino entered into a
    contract to sell the property for $795,000 to Mikhail Pruglo,
    and the deal was closed in July 2004.          When Pruglo applied to
    subdivide the property, the May 2000 letter resurfaced.              The
    Planning Department honored the May 2000 determination that the
    property consisted of six pre-existing lots and granted Pruglo a
    2
    The County does not dispute that these letters were temporarily
    missing from the TMK file. Yuen testified in a deposition that the Planning
    Department’s policy is to keep all correspondence related to a property in
    the property’s TMK file “essentially forever.” There is no allegation in the
    complaint, and no evidence in the record, that anyone at the Planning
    Department intentionally or maliciously removed the April and May 2000
    letters from the TMK file.
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    six-lot subdivision.      The Planning Director inadvertently
    excluded a sliver of land on the property in granting the six-
    lot subdivision approval, so he revised his final subdivision
    plat map to include the sliver of land as a seventh lot.              See
    Kellberg v. Yuen, 131 Hawaii 513, 518, 
    319 P.3d 432
    , 437 (2014).
    Molfino discovered that Yuen admitted making a mistake in
    the June 2004 letter, which initially determined that the
    property consisted of only two pre-existing lots.            Molfino then
    sued Yuen and the County of Hawaiʻi for negligence (among other
    claims, which are no longer at issue on certiorari), alleging
    that they breached a legal duty to use reasonable care in
    maintaining the TMK file, and that this breach caused Molfino
    monetary damages.      The County filed its Answer, raising as a
    defense that it owed no duty to Molfino.
    The County later filed a motion for summary judgment on
    Molfino’s negligence claim.        The County pointed out that Molfino
    based his negligence claim solely on a duty to maintain records
    purportedly contained in the Hawaii County Planning Department
    Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 1-8 (“Rule 1-8”), which
    provides the following:
    1-8 Public Records.
    All public records shall be available for inspection by any
    person during established office hours unless public
    inspection of such records is in violation of any other
    state, federal, or county law; provided that, except where
    such records are open under any rule of court, the
    Corporation Counsel or Prosecuting Attorney may determine
    which records may be withheld from public inspection when
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    such records pertain to the preparation of the prosecution
    or defense of any action or proceeding to which the County
    is or may be a party, or when such records do not relate to
    a matter in violation of law and are deemed necessary for
    the protection of the character or reputation of any
    person.
    Copies of records printed or reproduced for persons other
    than governmental agencies shall be given to any person,
    provided that the fees or costs prescribed in the Hawaii
    County Code are paid.
    (Emphasis added).      The County argued that Rule 1-8 mandates
    inspection of public records, not the maintenance of those
    records.    The County then cited to Cootey v. Sun. Inv. Inc., 
    68 Haw. 480
    , 485, 
    718 P.2d 1086
    , 1090 (1986), for the proposition
    that the County “is not intended to be an insurer of all the
    dangers of modern life, despite its ever-increasing effort to
    protect its citizens from peril.”         Further, “[w]ithout a
    reasonable and proper limitation of the scope of duty of care
    owed by the County, the County would be confronted with an
    unmanageable, unbearable, and totally unpredictable liability.”
    68 Haw. at 484, 
    718 P.2d at 1090
    .         The County concluded that
    imposing a legal duty upon it to maintain records that it has no
    duty to keep would impermissibly reallocate the County’s
    resources (a task better suited to a legislative body); expose
    the County to potentially infinite liability; lengthen the
    permit process timeline; and dissuade the County from enacting
    subdivision rules, regulations, and laws, contrary to the public
    interest.    Molfino counter-argued that “the duty to maintain
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    accurate records follows from [Rule 1-8’s] duty to make public
    records available to any person.”
    The circuit court agreed with the County.            In an order
    granting the County’s motion for summary judgment, the circuit
    court reasoned as follows:
    1. There is no express requirement in Rule § 1-8 of the
    Planning Department Rules of Practice and Procedure that
    the Planning Department records be kept in any particular
    condition. Rather, this rule allows records to be open for
    public inspection. It does not require that the records be
    maintained so that they can be relied upon by the general
    public in making major decisions;
    2. The Hawaii County Code contains a formal mechanism for
    subdivision approval which identifies how to determine
    whether real property is subject to subdivision and under
    what conditions. This determination should not be based
    upon a review of the Planning Department’s records.
    Whether or not real property is subject to subdivision and
    under what conditions based upon a review of Planning
    Department records only would be speculative, at best;
    3. Imposing a duty of care to maintain Planning Department
    records with reasonable accuracy invites unremitted
    liability. For example, it would be too easy for a person
    to manufacture a case by reviewing the records and claiming
    reliance upon the status of the records for their actions
    or omissions;
    4. If a duty and liability is to be imposed upon the
    County to maintain Planning Department records with
    unerring accuracy, it should be imposed by a legislative
    body. A legislative body is the proper entity to determine
    whether [to spend] the County’s scarce resources on such a
    duty and is capable of providing additional economic
    resources which may be necessary;
    5. The Planning Department owes no duty to keep its
    records accurate and complete for persons who seek
    information regarding the degree to which real property may
    be capable of subdivision.
    The circuit court subsequently entered judgment in favor of the
    County and against Molfino, and Molfino appealed.            Before the
    ICA, Molfino argued for the first time that the Planning
    Department’s legal duty to maintain accurate, relevant, timely,
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    and complete records stems from HRS Chapter 92F.                The County
    counter-argued that, even if the ICA were to consider HRS
    Chapter 92F, Molfino’s argument would still fail.                The County
    argued that HRS Chapter 92F simply requires access to those
    records a government agency has in fact maintained.                 See Nuuanu
    Valley Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 119 Hawaii 90, 97, 
    194 P.3d 531
    , 538 (2008) (citing State of Hawaii Org. of Police
    Officers (SHOPO) v. Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists- Univ. of Hawaii
    Chapter, 83 Hawaii 378, 393, 
    927 P.2d 386
    , 401 (1996)).
    In a summary disposition order, the ICA affirmed the
    circuit court’s judgment, holding that the circuit court
    properly concluded “that the Planning Department did not have a
    statutorily-based duty to maintain its records with unerring
    accuracy.”        Molfino v. Yuen, CAAP-10-0000150 (App. Aug. 28,
    2013) (SDO) at 5.          The ICA noted that Molfino had not cited any
    cases “establishing a common law duty of this nature. . . .”
    
    Id.
         The ICA lastly concluded, “Strong policy considerations
    compel us to reject” Molfino’s argument.              
    Id.
        This case is now
    before us on certiorari review.
    III.        Standard of Review
    This court reviews a circuit court’s grant of summary
    judgment de novo.          See Hawaii Cmty. Fed. Credit Union v. Keka,
    94 Hawaii 213, 221, 
    11 P.3d 1
    , 9 (2000).              “[S]ummary judgment is
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    appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
    interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
    affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
    any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.”           
    Id.
    IV.     Discussion
    In order to prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff is
    required to prove all four of the necessary elements of
    negligence:
    (1) A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring
    the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct,
    for the protection of others against unreasonable risks;
    (2) A failure on the defendant’s part to conform to the
    standard required: a breach of the duty; (3) A reasonably
    close causal connection between the conduct and the
    resulting injury; and (4) Actual loss or damage resulting
    to the interests of another.
    Takayama v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 81 Hawaii 486, 498-99, 
    923 P.2d 903
    , 915-16 (1996) (citation and brackets omitted)).                A
    prerequisite to any negligence action is the existence of a duty
    owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.             Lee v. Corregedore, 83
    Hawaii 154, 158, 
    925 P.2d 324
    , 328 (1996).             The existence of a
    duty is entirely a question of law.            See Hao v. Campbell Estate,
    76 Hawaii 77, 80, 
    869 P.2d 216
    , 219 (1994) (citation omitted).
    Whether a duty exists is a “question of fairness that involves a
    weighing of the nature of the risk, the magnitude of the burden
    of guarding against the risk, and the public interest in the
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    proposed solution.”      
    Id.
     (citation omitted).       This court has
    chosen to impose tort duties reluctantly:
    In considering whether to impose a duty of reasonable care
    on a defendant, we recognize that duty is not sacrosanct in
    itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those
    considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
    particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Legal
    duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely
    conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type,
    liability should be imposed for damage done. In
    determining whether or not a duty is owed, we must weigh
    the considerations of policy which favor the appellants’
    recovery against those which favor limiting the appellees’
    liability. The question of whether one owes a duty to
    another must be decided on a case-by-case basis. However,
    we are reluctant to impose a new duty upon members of our
    society without any logical, sound, and compelling reasons
    taking into consideration the social and human
    relationships in our society.
    McKenzie v. Hawaii Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 98 Hawaii 296,
    301, 
    47 P.3d 1209
    , 1214 (2002) (citations omitted).
    One such case in which this court declined to impose a duty
    was Cootey, 
    68 Haw. 480
    , 
    718 P.2d 1086
    , a case which the County
    relied upon in its moving papers, and which the circuit court
    and ICA drew heavily from in ruling in the County’s favor.                In
    Cootey, plaintiff homeowners (the Cooteys) sued the County of
    Hawaii for negligently approving a subdivision, the development
    of which allegedly caused flooding on the Cooteys’ property.                   68
    Haw. at 482, 
    718 P.2d at 1088-89
    .         The Cooteys claimed that the
    County owed them a “duty to administer and enforce the
    applicable laws, rules and regulations and directives of the
    County and the State of Hawaii. . . .”          68 Haw. at 482, 
    718 P.2d at 1089
    .    This court disagreed, holding that such a duty was
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    “too expansive in light of public policy considerations versus
    liability and remedial considerations.”          68 Haw. at 483, 
    718 P.2d at 1089
    .
    In Cootey, this court noted that the determination of
    whether a duty exists requires a balancing of “the policy
    considerations supporting recovery by the injured party against
    those favoring a limitation of the County’s liability.”              68 Haw.
    at 484, 
    718 P.2d at 1090
    .       The court struck the balance in favor
    of limiting the County’s liability.         68 Haw. at 483, 
    718 P.2d at 1089
    .    This court stated, “Government is not intended to be an
    insurer of all the dangers of modern life, despite its ever-
    increasing effort to protect its citizens from peril.”             68 Haw.
    at 485, 
    718 P.2d at 1090
    .       Government should not be “liable for
    all injuries sustained by private persons as a result of
    governmental activity, even though doing so would spread the
    losses over the largest possible base.”          
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    Government agencies must still be able to function effectively
    for their own “socially approved ends.”          
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    This court held that the imposition of a duty in the Cooteys’
    situation would “reorder[] priorities and forc[e] reallocation
    of resources upon the other branches [primarily the legislative
    branch] which make policy decisions in this regard.”             68 Haw. at
    485, 486, 
    718 P.2d at 1090-91, 1091
    .          Specifically, “exposure to
    such liability would unduly lengthen the permit process, or
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    could very well dissuade the County from enacting rules,
    regulations and laws applicable to proposed subdivisions and
    intended for the protection and welfare of the public, a result
    contrary to the public interest.”          68 Haw. at 486, 
    718 P.2d at 1091
     (citations omitted).       In conclusion, this court held that
    the imposition of a legal duty in Cootey would result in
    “unmanageable, unbearable, and totally unpredictable liability”
    for the County.     68 Haw. at 484, 
    718 P.2d at 1090
    .
    We agree with the ICA that similar policy considerations in
    the instant case counsel against the judicial creation of a
    legal duty for potential negligence liability to be imposed upon
    the County for an alleged failure to maintain the May 2000
    letter in the Planning Department’s TMK files.            First, we agree
    with the ICA that there appears to be no common law basis for
    imposing a legal duty to maintain government records in complete
    condition at all times.       Second, we also agree with the ICA that
    there is no statutory basis for imposing such a legal duty under
    these circumstances.
    In this case, before the circuit court, Molfino’s sole
    support for his claim that the County owed him a legal duty to
    maintain accurate Planning Department records was Rule 1-8,
    which requires only that “[a]ll public records shall be
    available for inspection by any person,” and contains no express
    duty to maintain these records in “accurate, relevant, timely,
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    and complete” condition.       We note, however, that Rule 1-8 is
    similar to HRS Chapter 92F in that both afford the public a
    right to inspect government records.          HRS § 92F-11(a) (2012)
    states, “All government records are open to public inspection
    unless access is restricted or closed by law.”            Further, HRS
    § 92F-12(a)(15) (2012) requires each agency to “make available
    for public inspection and duplication during regular business
    hours . . . [i]nformation collected and maintained for the
    purpose of making information available to the general public
    . . . .”    Although not an express record-keeping requirement
    under HRS §§ 92F-11(a) and -12(a)(15), HRS § 92F-2(2) (2012)
    provides that one of the “underlying purposes and policies” of
    HRS Chapter 92F is to “[p]rovide for accurate, relevant, timely,
    and complete government records. . . .”          Thus, it is helpful to
    examine HRS Chapter 92F and cases construing that chapter to
    determine whether the County owes a legal duty to Molfino to
    maintain accurate, relevant, timely, and complete government
    records at all times.
    Two key cases construing HRS Chapter 92F are Nuuanu Valley
    Ass’n, 119 Hawaii 90, 
    194 P.3d 531
    , and SHOPO, 83 Hawaii 378,
    
    927 P.2d 386
    .     In these cases, we held that HRS Chapter 92F
    “requires agencies to provide access to those records that are
    actually maintained.”      Nuuanu Valley Ass’n, 119 Hawaii at 97,
    
    194 P.3d at
    538 (citing SHOPO, 83 Hawaii at 393, 
    927 P.2d at
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    401).    In Nuuanu Valley Ass’n, this court further explained,
    “Whether the [records] are ‘actually maintained’ [by the
    government agency] depends on whether [the agency] ‘chose[] to
    retain possession or control[]’ of the records.”            
    Id.
       (citation
    omitted).
    In this case, Yuen testified at his deposition that the
    Planning Commission’s policy is that “any incoming or outgoing
    correspondence is supposed to be kept essentially forever” in a
    property’s TMK files.      Therefore, the Planning Commission
    generally chooses to retain possession and control over letters
    like the 2000 letters.       Thus, under Nuuanu Valley Ass’n and
    SHOPO, the Planning Department failed to provide Molfino with
    access to the May 2000 pre-existing lot determination, which the
    Planning Department admittedly should have maintained in its TMK
    files but did not.
    We must determine, however, whether this failure triggers a
    legal duty under tort law leading to potential negligence
    liability.    In examining the rest of Chapter 92F, however, we
    fail to discern any legislative intent to impose tort liability
    upon a government agency for its failure to maintain government
    records in accurate, relevant, timely, and complete condition at
    all times.    Legislative intent may be gleaned from reading
    “statutory language in the context of the entire statute and
    construing it in a manner consistent with its purpose.”              Lingle
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    v. Haw. Gov’t Emps. Ass’n, AFSCME, Local 152, AFL-CIO, 107
    Hawaii 178, 183, 
    111 P.3d 587
    , 592 (2005) (citation omitted).
    Other provisions of HRS Chapter 92F speak to the consequences
    for violating the UIPA.       HRS § 92F-17 (2012) provides the
    following:
    Criminal penalties. (a) An officer or employee of an agency
    who intentionally discloses or provides a copy of a
    government record, or any confidential information
    explicitly described by specific confidentiality statutes,
    to any person or agency with actual knowledge that
    disclosure is prohibited, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
    unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided for by law.
    (b) A person who intentionally gains access to or obtains a
    copy of a government record by false pretense, bribery, or
    theft, with actual knowledge that access is prohibited, or
    who intentionally obtains any confidential information by
    false pretense, bribery, or theft, with actual knowledge
    that it is prohibited [by] a confidentiality statute, shall
    be guilty of a misdemeanor.
    HRS § 92F-16 (2012) provides immunity from liability as follows:
    “Anyone participating in good faith in the disclosure or
    nondisclosure of a government record shall be immune from any
    liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred,
    imposed or result from such acts or omissions.”            Thus, HRS
    Chapter 92F only expressly imposes criminal penalties for
    intentional violations of confidentiality statutes.3             HRS Chapter
    92F, when read as a whole, does not reflect a legislative intent
    to impose tort liability for merely negligent acts or omissions
    of government agencies in the maintenance of public records.                  In
    3
    We express no opinion as to whether HRS Chapter 92F imposes tort
    liability for bad faith disclosures or nondisclosures of government records,
    as bad faith nondisclosure was not alleged in this case, nor does the record
    show that the absence of the May 2000 letter from the Planning Department's
    TMK files was in bad faith.
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    other words, HRS Chapter 92F does not create a statutory legal
    duty, flowing from the Planning Department to Molfino, to
    maintain a property’s TMK file in accurate, relevant, timely,
    and complete condition at all times, such that the Planning
    Department should be liable for negligence because the May 2000
    letter was temporarily missing from the file.
    V.    Conclusion
    We hold that neither Rule 1-8 of the Hawaii County Planning
    Department Rules of Practice and Procedure nor HRS Chapter 92F
    provides a statutory basis for imposing negligence liability
    upon the Planning Department of the County of Hawaii based on a
    breach of any duty to maintain its TMK files in accurate,
    relevant, timely, and complete condition at all times.               We hold
    that policy considerations counsel against the judicial creation
    of a legal duty under the common law, leading to negligence
    liability, under the circumstances present on the record in this
    case.      We therefore affirm the ICA’s judgment on appeal, which
    affirmed the circuit court’s order granting the County’s motion
    for summary judgment.
    Peter Van Name Esser                  /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
    for petitioner
    /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
    Laureen L. Martin
    for respondents                       /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
    /s/ Richard W. Pollack
    /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
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