Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Jervis ( 2015 )


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  •                                                        Electronically Filed
    Supreme Court
    SCAD-14-0000899
    12-OCT-2015
    12:19 PM
    SCAD-14-0000899
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL,
    Petitioner,
    vs.
    GERARD A. JERVIS,
    Respondent.
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
    (ODC CASE NOS. 10-060-8894, 10-034-8868)
    ORDER OF SUSPENSION
    (By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, Pollack, and Wilson, JJ.
    and Intermediate Court of Appeals Associate Judge Leonard,
    in place of McKenna, J., recused)
    Upon consideration of the Report and Recommendation of
    the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of the State of
    Hawai#i, submitted to this court on June 23, 2014, for the
    imposition of a six-month suspension upon Respondent Gerard A.
    Jervis, and upon a de novo review of the record, this court finds
    and concludes the following by clear and convincing evidence.
    A review of the record supports the Hearing Officer’s
    Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as amended by the
    Disciplinary Board, except for Conclusions 9 and 12, which we
    decline to adopt, for the reasons set forth below.
    With particularity, in Office of Disciplinary Counsel
    (ODC) Case No. 10-060-8894, the record supports Finding of
    Fact 6, that the retainer agreement between the client and
    Respondent Jervis did not contain the handwritten additions at
    the time it was signed by the client but was completed at a later
    time, and not by the client, insofar as the agreement bears the
    date of February 28, 2008, while the record contains a disclosure
    authorization form from the client dated February 1, 2008 and
    correspondence from Respondent Jervis’s office concerning the
    workers’ compensation claim began by at least February 12, 2008;
    the agreement bears a handwritten constructive discharge date of
    September 30, 2007, in handwriting which Respondent Jervis
    admitted was his, while the actual constructive discharge date of
    September 28, 2007 was known by the client and recorded
    previously in the client’s claim, filed by the client, with the
    Hawai#i Civil Rights Commission.       Based upon that Finding and a
    review of the record, including the extensive correspondence
    amongst the client, Respondent Jervis’s office, the Hawai#i
    Employers’ Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. and the Department of
    Labor & Industrial Relations, often either clearly addressed to
    Respondent Jervis or otherwise designating Respondent Jervis as
    the client’s attorney, to which Respondent Jervis offered no
    objection, and, in particular, the June 3 and 4, 2009 email
    exchange between the client and Respondent Jervis, we conclude
    the client reasonably concluded Respondent Jervis was
    representing him in his workers’ compensation claim.       See Otaka,
    Inc. v. Klein, 
    71 Haw. 376
    , 383, 
    791 P.2d 713
    , 717 (1990);
    Geoffrey C. Hazard, W. William Hodes, and Peter R. Jarvis, The
    2
    Law of Lawyering § 2.05 at 2-7 through 2-8 (4th ed. 2015);
    Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (1998).
    Insofar as the record supports the conclusion an attorney-client
    relationship existed between the client and Respondent Jervis in
    the workers’ compensation claim, it also supports the conclusion
    Respondent Jervis violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a) and 1.4(b) of the
    Hawai#i Rules of Professional Conduct (HRPC) (1994)1 in that
    representation, by failing to transmit the settlement offer to
    his client or otherwise act upon it, and by failing to attend the
    September 24, 2009 hearing on the claim.
    Also in ODC Case No. 10-060-8894, the record supports
    the conclusion Respondent Jervis was derelict in his
    representation of his client in the Civil Rights discrimination
    claim, and failed to communicate with the client regarding the
    matter, including regarding important information needed to make
    strategic decisions concerning the claim, including efforts by
    the Hawai#i Civil Rights Commission to interview his client.      His
    conduct in that representation violated HRPC Rules 1.3, 1.4(a),
    and 1.4(b).
    In ODC Case No. 10-034-8868, we conclude both the loan
    and the amendment to the fee agreement, which modified the loan,
    are subject to HRPC Rule 1.8(a).       See In re Curry, 
    16 So.3d 1139
    ,
    1153-54 (La. 2009); In re Hefron, 
    771 N.E.2d 1157
    , 1158 (Ind.
    2002); Naiman v. New York Univ. Hosps. Ctr., 
    351 F.Supp.2d 257
    ,
    1
    Unless otherwise indicated, all HRPC Rules cited herein are to
    HRPC (1994), the Rules in effect at the time of the conduct
    underpinning the alleged violations.
    3
    264 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); The Law of Lawyering, § 9.14 at 9-50 through
    9-53 (2015).   However, we also conclude, upon review of In re
    Trewin, 
    684 N.W.2d 121
     (Wis. 2004), Wisconsin’s SCR 20:1.7(b) and
    1.8(a) cited in that case, HRPC Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a), as well
    as HRPC Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a) (2014), that, at the time of the
    events here, neither HRPC Rule 1.7(b) nor 1.8(a) required the
    attorney to obtain a written conflict waiver from a client in
    these circumstances.2
    However, with regard to the $100,000.00 loan from the
    Trust to Respondent Jervis, we also conclude Respondent Jervis
    did not provide the trustee-client with a clear written
    explanation of the differing interests involved in the
    transaction, in violation of HRPC Rule 1.8(a), and that the terms
    of the loan were not fair and reasonable to the Trust, again in
    violation of HRPC Rule 1.8(a), in light of both the insufficient
    security for the loan and its vague and unclear terms of
    repayment of the indebtedness.     See In the Matter of Hultman, 3
    Cal. State Bar C. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Bar Ct. 1995);      Hunniecutt v.
    2
    In 2014, the Hawai#i Rules of Professional Conduct were amended
    to require a written waiver in these circumstances:
    Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest: Prohibited transactions.
    (a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business
    transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership,
    possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to
    a client unless:
    . . .
    (3) the client consents in writing to the essential
    terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the
    transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing
    the client in the transaction.
    4
    State Bar of California, 
    748 P.2d 1161
    , 1167 (Cal. 1988); In re
    Discipline of Singer, 
    865 P.2d 315
    , 316-17 (Nev. 1993); GMAC v.
    Everett Chevrolet, Inc. 
    317 P.3d 1074
    , 1078-79 (Wash. Ct. App.
    2014); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Miller, 
    66 P.3d 1069
    , 1076 (Wash. 2003); In re McGlothen, 
    663 P.2d 1330
    , 1336,
    1337 (Wash. 1983); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
    Lawyers § 126, at 323 (2000).
    With regard to the amendment of the fee agreement, we
    conclude Respondent Jervis failed to provide the Trust with a
    clear explanation of the differing interests involved in amending
    the contingency fee agreement and extinguishing the $100,000.00
    loan obligation he alone owed the Trust.   Respondent Jervis’s
    conduct again violated HRPC Rule 1.8(a).
    The record supports the aggravating factors found by
    the Hearing Officer and the Board:   substantial experience in the
    practice of law, one prior discipline, offering false statements
    in a disciplinary investigation (concerning his purported lack of
    previous workers’ compensation work), and a refusal to
    acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct in ODC Case No.
    10-034-8868.
    In mitigation, we note Respondent Jervis’s pro
    bono work, particularly on behalf of the Native Hawaiian
    community.
    In light of previous-settled litigation between
    Respondent Jervis and the successor trustees of the Trust, in
    which the successor trustees settled claims in part related to
    Respondent Jervis’s representation of this Trust, we decline to
    5
    order reimbursement.
    Nevertheless, in light of Respondent Jervis’s conduct
    regarding the Trust and the injury inflicted on the Trust, a
    substantial period of suspension is appropriate.     See ODC v.
    Bertelmann, SCAD-12-950 (February 15, 2013); ODC v. Ching, No.
    25697 (May 2, 2003); ODC v, Chatburn, No. 24777 (May 30, 2002);
    ODC v. Arnobit, Jr., No. 16932 (July 19, 1993).     Therefore,
    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent Jervis is
    suspended from the practice of law in this jurisdiction for six
    months, effective thirty days after the entry date of this order,
    as provided by Rules 2.3(a)(2) and Rule 2.16(c) of the Rules of
    the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai#i (RSCH).
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in addition to any other
    requirements for reinstatement imposed by the Rules of the
    Supreme Court of the State of Hawai#i, Respondent Jervis shall
    pay all costs of these proceedings as approved upon the timely
    submission of a bill of costs, as prescribed by RSCH Rule 2.3(c).
    IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Respondent Jervis shall,
    within 10 days after the effective date of his suspension, file
    with this court an affidavit that he is in full compliance with
    RSCH Rule 2.16(d).
    DATED:   Honolulu, Hawai#i, October 12, 2015.
    /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
    /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
    /s/ Richard W. Pollack
    /s/ Michael D. Wilson
    /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SCAD-14-0000899

Filed Date: 10/12/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/14/2015