Hyland v. Gonzales. , 139 Haw. 386 ( 2017 )


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  •     ***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
    Electronically Filed
    Supreme Court
    SCWC-15-0000053
    02-MAR-2017
    08:06 AM
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
    ---o0o---
    LANRIC HYLAND,
    Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant,
    vs.
    RONALD GONZALES and STEWART MAEDA, in his official capacity as
    Hawaiʻi County Clerk,
    Respondents/Respondents-Appellees.
    SCWC-15-0000053
    CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    (CAAP-15-0000053; APPEAL NO. 14-01)
    MARCH 2, 2017
    RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
    OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.
    Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 11-25 provides
    procedures for the challenging of a person’s voter registration
    status.   When a challenge is brought prior to the day of an
    election, HRS § 11-25(a) applies, which allows a voter to
    challenge “the right of a person to be or to remain registered
    as a voter in any precinct” through a written challenge.            The
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    challenge must set forth the grounds upon which it is based and
    be delivered to the county clerk of the respective county; the
    clerk is required to promptly investigate and rule on the
    challenge.    HRS § 11-25(a).    In cases where the clerk rules on a
    challenge prior to election day, appeals may be made from the
    clerk’s ruling to the local board of registration pursuant to
    HRS § 11-26(b).    Such appeals must be brought within ten days of
    service of the adverse decision.         HRS § 11-26(b).
    The petitioner in this case, Lanric Hyland, appealed
    from a county clerk decision to the local board of registration
    for the County of Hawaiʻi (the “local board”).          The local board
    determined that Hyland’s appeal was due on October 14, 2014,
    based in part on its determination that October 13, 2014, was a
    holiday and tolled his appeal deadline for that day.           Although
    the local board determined that Hyland mailed his appeal within
    ten days of service of the county clerk’s decision, the board
    ruled that Hyland’s appeal was untimely because the board did
    not receive his appeal until after October 14, 2014.           Thus, the
    local board concluded that it was without jurisdiction to review
    the appeal.    The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed
    the local board’s determination that Hyland’s appeal was not
    timely because the board did not receive the appeal within ten
    days of service of the county clerk’s decision.          However, the
    ICA also determined that Hyland did not mail his letter within
    2
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    the ten-day filing period because the second Monday in October
    is not a Hawaiʻi state holiday.
    We hold that the board had jurisdiction to consider
    the merits of Hyland’s appeal, and we also determine that the
    second Monday in October--recognized by the federal government
    as Columbus Day--is a holiday for purposes of the computation of
    time as to when an act is to be done under HRS § 1-29.
    Accordingly, we vacate the decisions of the ICA and the local
    board and remand the case to the local board for further
    proceedings.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    Hyland challenged the voter registration of Ronald
    Gonzales in District 9 by filing a challenge with the Office of
    the County Clerk of the County of Hawaiʻi (the “county clerk”).
    In a letter mailed on October 2, 2014, the county clerk
    determined that Gonzales was properly registered in District 9.
    Hyland appealed the county clerk’s decision to the
    local board by a letter dated and sent by registered mail on
    October 14, 2014.    Hyland’s letter noted that the county clerk’s
    decision was served on October 2, 2014, and that his appeal was
    timely filed because, although the tenth day was Sunday, October
    12, the appeal did not need to be postmarked until Tuesday,
    October 14, as Monday, October 13, was a federal holiday.
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    Gonzales filed objections to the jurisdiction of the
    local board, arguing that the appeal was untimely because it was
    not received by the local board until October 16.               Gonzales
    argued the following with regard to the filing deadline:
    The Clerk issued his decision on October 1, 2014, and
    completed service via certified mail on October 2, 2014.
    Counting forward, the tenth day was Sunday, October 12,
    2014. Since the Clerk served his decision by mail, Hawaii
    Rules of Civil Procedure (“HRCP”) Rule 6(e) was triggered.
    This section enlarged the original 10-day period by two
    days, for a total of 12 days. The twelfth day fell on
    Tuesday, October 14, 2014. This was the deadline for the
    filing of the appeal.
    Gonzales contended that because October 14, 2014, was not a
    Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, there was no provision in any
    applicable law that allows for an extension beyond October 14,
    2014.       Gonzales asserted that the local board’s consideration of
    Hyland’s untimely appeal would infringe on his due process
    rights.      Hyland filed a reply arguing that Gonzales
    misinterpreted when the appeal was filed, and he maintained that
    the appeal was filed on the date of mailing--October 14, 2014.
    A prehearing conference was held before the local
    board.1      At the prehearing conference, Gonzales raised his
    objections to the board’s jurisdiction and the board heard
    arguments.       At the conclusion of the hearing, the local board
    decided that the appeal was untimely.            The board subsequently
    1
    The prehearing conference was held at Waimea Middle School on the
    island of Hawaiʻi, before local board chair Philip Matlage and member Andrew
    Kahili.
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    issued its decision in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
    and Order Dismissing Appeal, dated January 9, 2015.
    The board found that the appeal from the county clerk
    decision was filed on October 16, 2014.          The board concluded
    that the appeal was untimely because the mailing of the appeal
    by registered mail did not constitute “filing.”           The board
    relied on Hawaii Administrative Rules (HAR) § 3-172-43(a), which
    provides,
    An appeal of the clerk’s ruling shall be made in writing by
    filing a notice of appeal with the chairperson of the board
    of registration within ten days of the service of the
    clerk’s decision.
    Quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), the board
    reasoned that “filing” means delivery of legal documents “to the
    court clerk or record custodian for placement into the official
    record”:
    Haw. Admin. R. § 3-172-43(a) requires that an appeal be made in
    writing by “filing a notice of appeal” with the chairperson of
    the Board within ten days of service of the clerk’s decision.
    The common understanding of the word “file” means to “deliver a
    legal document to the court clerk or record custodian for
    placement into the official record.”
    The board also noted that, because October 13, 2014, was a
    holiday, the last day Hyland could have timely filed an appeal
    was on October 14, 2014.       Accordingly, the board concluded that
    it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the appeal
    was not received until October 16, 2014.
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    Hyland appealed to the ICA, challenging the local
    board’s determination that his appeal was not timely.2            In a
    memorandum opinion, the ICA affirmed the order dismissing the
    appeal, concluding that Hyland’s appeal was not timely as it was
    not filed until the date it was received by the local board in
    the mail.    The ICA endorsed the local board’s definition of
    “filing” within HAR § 3-172-43(a) to mean “deliver[y] of the
    Appeal letter to the Board within ten days of when the County
    Clerk properly mailed his adverse decision to them.”            Thus, the
    ICA concluded that in order for Hyland’s appeal to be timely, he
    was required to deliver his appeal letter to the local board
    within ten days of when the county clerk mailed the adverse
    decision.
    The ICA additionally held that the local board
    erroneously concluded that October 13 was a holiday that tolled
    the appeal deadline to October 14.         In a footnote explaining
    this ruling, the ICA noted that the second Monday in October is
    not listed as a state holiday under HRS § 8-1, which enumerates
    2
    Hyland also contended that the information given to him by the
    local board with regard to how to file his notice of appeal was insufficient,
    constituting a denial of his right to due process. The ICA held that Hyland
    waived his due process challenge regarding the information he received from
    the local board regarding filing an appeal because he failed to identify any
    legal authority for his contention. We do not review this ruling in light of
    our disposition in this case.
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    the holidays recognized by the State, and HRS § 8-1.5 provides
    that Discoverer’s Day is not recognized as a state holiday.3
    Hyland filed an application for writ of certiorari
    with this court, which was granted.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    Hyland challenges the local board’s dismissal of his
    appeal for lack of jurisdiction.          Hyland asserts that the
    board’s interpretation of the ten-day filing period “completely
    obliterates the legislative purpose” to provide ten days in
    which to file an appeal as provided by HRS § 11-26(b).4
    Accordingly, we consider whether the local board had
    jurisdiction to consider Hyland’s appeal.5          The resolution of
    this issue hinges on whether Hyland timely brought his appeal of
    the county clerk’s decision to the local board.           Thus, we first
    determine the date the ten-day statutory appeals period closed,
    3
    HRS § 8-1.5 states that “the second Monday in October shall be
    known as Discoverers’ Day, in recognition of the Polynesian discoverers of
    the Hawaiian Islands, provided that this day is not and shall not be
    construed to be a state holiday.”
    4
    Hyland also argues that his due process rights were violated
    based on incomplete information he received from the Board of Registration
    concerning the filing of his appeal. In his supplemental memorandum to this
    court, he also asserts that the local board’s delivery requirement violates
    equal protection. We do not address Hyland’s constitutional assertions in
    light of our disposition of the case.
    5
    Because the issue regarding the filing requirements to timely
    bring an appeal determines the jurisdiction of the local board, we review the
    board’s determination de novo. See Dupree v. Hiraga, 121 Hawaiʻi 297, 312,
    
    219 P.3d 1084
    , 1099 (2009) (“The existence of jurisdiction is a question of
    law that we review de novo under the right/wrong standard.” (quoting Captain
    Andy’s Sailing, Inc. v. Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 113 Hawaiʻi 184, 192, 
    150 P.3d 833
    , 841 (2006)).
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    and second, we review the local board’s interpretation of its
    jurisdiction under HRS § 11-26(b).
    A.
    The ICA determined that the local board erroneously
    concluded that October 13, 2014, was a holiday that tolled
    Hyland’s appeal deadline to October 14, 2014.
    HRS § 1-29 (2009) provides the following with regard
    to the computation of time:
    The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is
    computed by excluding the first day and including the last,
    unless the last day is a Sunday or holiday and then it is
    also excluded. When so provided by the rules of court, the
    last day also shall be excluded if it is a Saturday.
    Thus, if the last day to complete an act is a Sunday or holiday,
    the actor has until the following day to complete the act.              HRS
    § 1-29 is included in Chapter 1 of Title 1 pertaining to common
    law and the construction of laws.        Chapter 1 also includes HRS §
    1-32 regarding acts to be done on holidays:
    Whenever any act of a secular nature other than a work of
    necessity or mercy is appointed by law or contract to be
    performed upon a particular day, which day falls upon a
    Sunday or holiday, the act may be performed upon the next
    business day with the same effect as if it had been
    performed upon the appointed day. When so provided by the
    rules of court, the act also may be performed upon the next
    business day with the same effect as if it had been
    performed upon the appointed day if the appointed day falls
    on a Saturday.
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    HRS § 1-32 (2009).     Although both provisions reference
    “holiday,” there is no definition for the term in Chapter 1.6
    Chapter 8 of Title 1 is entitled “Holidays and Periods
    of Recognition and Observance.”        There is no definition of
    “holiday” in Chapter 8.      HRS § 8-1 lists the holidays that are
    designated as “state holidays” and also recognizes as a “state
    holiday” any day designated as a holiday by proclamation of the
    President of the United States.7          HRS § 8-1.
    As discussed, Chapter 1, which pertains to common law
    and the construction of laws, uses the term “holiday” with
    regard to the computation of time under laws and contracts as
    opposed to HRS § 8-1, which designates “state holidays.”
    Because Chapter 1 uses the term “holiday” rather than the term
    “state holiday,” it appears the legislature intended that the
    term “holiday” would include holidays other than state holidays.
    In this case, we must consider whether the second Monday in
    October is a holiday for purposes of HRS § 1-29, even though it
    is not designated as a state holiday under HRS § 8-1.
    6
    It appears the ICA’s interpretation of “holiday” as used in HRS §
    1-29 would also apply to the term “holiday” as used in HRS § 1-32 regarding
    acts that are specified to be done by law or contract.
    7
    Columbus Day was not designated as a holiday by presidential
    proclamation in 2014. See Presidential Proclamation--Columbus Day 2014, the
    White House (Jan. 26, 2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
    office/2014/10/10/presidential-proclamation-columbus-day-2014.
    9
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    Federal law designates the second Monday in October,
    Columbus Day, as a federal holiday.           See U.S.C. § 1603(a)
    (2012).     As a public holiday, October 13, 2014, was considered a
    legal public holiday for purposes of federal agencies and the
    United States Postal Service.8         Given that Columbus Day is a
    federal public holiday--and federal courts, agencies, and the
    United States Postal Service are closed--October 13, 2014, was a
    “holiday” for purposes of the computation of time under HRS § 1-
    29.9
    Although the ICA was correct to the extent that it
    determined October 13, 2014, was not a Hawaiʻi state holiday, the
    ICA erred in holding that “holiday” as used in HRS § 1-29 only
    includes “state holidays.”         Thus, the local board properly
    determined that October 13, 2014, was a holiday for purposes of
    computing the time Hyland had to appeal the county clerk’s
    decision.      For the reasons discussed, Hyland’s ten-day period to
    bring his appeal began on October 2, 2014, and continued through
    October 14, 2014.10
    8
    See Snow & Dismissal Procedures, Federal Holidays, OPM.GOV,
    https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/snow-dismissal-procedures/federal-
    holidays/#url=2014 (last visited Jan. 23, 2017) (listing Monday, October 13,
    2014, as a holiday for federal employees).
    9
    It appears that the only federal holiday that is not a state
    holiday is Columbus Day. Compare HRS § 8-1, with 
    5 U.S.C. § 1603
    .
    10
    Hyland maintained throughout the proceedings, including in his
    appeal to the ICA and his application for certiorari, that he was served on
    October 2, 2014. Given that Hyland did not challenge the adequacy of service
    until his supplemental memorandum, we decline to address this contention.
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    B.
    HRS § 11-26(b) provides for a challenger’s right to
    appeal a decision by the county clerk that is made prior to
    election day:
    In cases where the clerk rules on a challenge, prior to
    election day, or refuses to register an applicant, or
    refuses to change the register under section 11-22, the
    person ruled against may appeal from the ruling to the
    board of registration of the person’s county. The appeal
    shall be brought within ten days of service of the adverse
    decision. Service of the decision shall be made personally
    or by registered mail, which shall be deemed complete upon
    deposit in the mails, postage prepaid, and addressed to the
    aggrieved person’s last known address. If an appeal from a
    decision on a challenge prior to election day is brought,
    both the challenger and the challenged voter may be parties
    to the appeal.
    HRS § 11-26(b) (Supp. 2014).      Thus, HRS § 11-26(b) provides for
    a right to appeal from the ruling of the county clerk to the
    local board that must be brought within ten days of service of
    the adverse decision.     Service of the decision occurs upon the
    county clerk’s mailing of its decision.         HAR § 3-172-43(a),
    which relates to HRS § 11-26(b), provides that appeals are made
    by “filing a notice of appeal” within ten days of service of the
    clerk’s decision.11    Consequently, this case raises the question
    as to whether a local board has jurisdiction under HRS § 11-
    11
    HAR § 3-172-43(a) (2010) provides,
    Any appeal of the clerk’s ruling shall be made in writing
    by filing a notice of appeal with the chairperson of the
    board of registration within ten days of service of the
    clerk’s decision.
    11
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    26(b) to consider an appeal that is mailed, but not received,
    within ten days of service of the adverse decision.
    Although the statute is ambiguous as to what it means
    to “bring” an appeal, “brought” must be interpreted in a manner
    that achieves the legislature’s intent to provide a meaningful
    opportunity for appeal.       In this case, the local board
    interpreted HAR § 3-172-43(a)’s “filing” requirement to mean
    delivery of the appellate document to the local board’s Oʻahu
    office.       However, this interpretation of the rule to require
    delivery would commonly be unworkable and inconsistent with HRS
    § 11-26(b)’s provision of ten days for the bringing of an
    appeal.       For example, in this case, the county clerk mailed its
    decision to Hyland’s post office box address on October 2, 2014,
    a Thursday, via the United States Postal Service, first-class
    mail.        Because the letter was mailed on a Thursday afternoon, it
    is possible that the letter could have been delivered to
    Hyland’s post office box as late as the following Tuesday.12                In
    order to ensure that a letter of appeal sent via the United
    States Postal Service would be delivered to the local board’s
    Oʻahu mailing address by October 14, 2014, a person in Hyland’s
    position would have had to mail the letter on or before
    12
    Letters sent via first-class mail are delivered within three
    business days or less. Mail & Shipping Services, USPS.COM,
    https://www.usps.com/ship/mail-shipping-services.htm (last visited May 3,
    2016).
    12
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    Wednesday, October 8, 2014.13      Accordingly, a person under
    similar circumstances may have had only one day to mail the
    appeal following actual delivery of the county clerk’s decision.
    The local board’s narrow interpretation of its
    jurisdiction is particularly concerning given that claims under
    HRS § 11-26 involve the integrity of the electoral process and
    the right to vote.     The same procedures that apply to Hyland in
    this case would also apply to a voter whose right to vote in a
    particular precinct has been challenged.         This court has
    recognized that “[t]he right to vote is of ‘fundamental
    importance.’”    Green Party of Haw. v. Nago, 138 Hawaiʻi 228, 240,
    
    378 P.3d 944
    , 956 (2016) (quoting Hayes v. Gill, 
    52 Haw. 251
    ,
    269, 
    473 P.2d 872
    , 883 (1970)).
    Accordingly, given the remedial purpose of the statute
    and the import of the right to vote, we cannot conclude that HRS
    § 11-26 contemplates that a challenger may potentially have only
    a one-day window in which to appeal from a county clerk
    decision.    Cf. R.F.C. v. Prudence Sec. Advisory Grp., 
    311 U.S. 579
    , 582 (1941) (“Ambiguities in statutory language should not
    be resolved so as to imperil a substantial right which has been
    granted.”).    If the legislature intended that local boards of
    registration’s jurisdiction would be so limited, then the
    13
    See supra note 12.
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    legislature would have used language to indicate that delivery
    was required.    Instead, the legislature chose to use the word
    “brought,” which is not synonymous with “delivered” or even
    “filed.”   Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized
    that the term “brought” does not unambiguously require the
    delivery of the legal document to the relevant authority.            See
    Serna v. Law Office of Joseph Onwuteaka, P.C., 
    732 F.3d 440
    , 443
    (5th Cir. 2013) (“‘[B]ring such action’ does not plainly mean
    ‘file a pleading.’”); General v. E. Roseman Co., 
    336 A.2d 287
    ,
    289 (Pa. 1975) (interpreting “brought or taken” in a statute
    concerning appeals from a workmen’s compensation board to
    include appeals mailed within the appeal period).
    Further, the legislative history of HRS § 11-26(b)
    does not indicate that the legislature intended to limit a local
    board of registration’s jurisdiction so narrowly as to require
    physical delivery of all appeals within ten days.           In 1990, the
    legislature amended HRS § 11-26(b) to provide that appeals must
    be “brought” within ten days of the adverse decision.            1990 Haw.
    Sess. Laws Act 45, § 7 at 83-84.         Although the primary purpose
    of the bill was to provide for voter registration by mail, the
    1990 amendments also “update[d] statutory provisions relating to
    voter registration challenges” and “clarif[ied] the appeals
    procedures from a decision by the county clerk or an election
    official.”    S. Stand Comm. Rep. No. 2842, in 1990 Senate
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    Journal, at 1190-91.     The legislative history notes that, prior
    to the 1990 amendments, the law was “vague as to the length of
    time before an appeal must be brought by an applicant declared
    ineligible to vote.”     H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 627-90, in 1990
    House Journal, at 1074-75.      Given the primary purpose of the
    1990 amendments to make “the process of voter registration more
    convenient for the voters,” in combination with clarification of
    the appeal process, it appears that the legislature intended to
    make participation in the voter registration process more
    accessible, and thus the delivery requirement adopted by the
    local board in this case does not comport with this legislative
    intent.   S. Stand Comm. Rep. No. 2842, in 1990 Senate Journal,
    at 1190-91.
    Accordingly, the local board’s decision that it needed
    to receive Hyland’s appeal by the tenth day is inconsistent with
    the legislature’s intent to provide a meaningful time period for
    the bringing of an appeal from a county clerk decision.            See HRS
    § 11-26(b) (providing that the appeal must be brought within ten
    days).    By extension, the local board’s interpretation of the
    filing requirement of HAR § 3-172-43 to require delivery to the
    chairperson of the local board was erroneous as it substantially
    diminished the right to appeal pursuant to HRS § 11-26(b).             See
    Diamond v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 112 Hawaiʻi 161, 175, 
    145 P.3d 704
    , 718 (2006) (noting that an agency’s interpretation of
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    its regulation “must be consistent with the legislative purpose”
    of the related statute).      Indeed, while “[i]t is axiomatic that
    an administrative rule cannot contradict or conflict with the
    statute it attempts to implement,” it is also not within an
    agency’s authority to interpret and apply its own rules in a
    manner that restricts the act being administered.           See Lales v.
    Wholesale Motors Co., 133 Hawaiʻi 332, 354, 
    328 P.3d 341
    , 363
    (2014) (“[A]n agency’s authority to promulgate rules ‘is limited
    to enacting rules which carry out and further the purposes of
    the legislation and do not enlarge, alter, or restrict the
    provisions of the act being administered.’”).          Thus, the local
    board’s decision in this case is erroneous to the extent that it
    conflicts with the legislature’s intent to provide a meaningful
    opportunity to appeal and that it unnecessarily restricts the
    board’s jurisdiction to consider such appeals.          In short, an
    agency may not interpret its authority in a manner that yields
    an unjust result “obviously inconsistent with the purpose and
    policies of the statute.”      Cf. Pofolk Aviation Haw., Inc. v.
    Dep’t of Transp., 136 Hawaiʻi 1, 7, 
    354 P.3d 436
    , 442 (2015)
    (quoting Schmidt v. HSC, Inc., 131 Hawaiʻi 497, 508, 
    319 P.3d 416
    , 427 (2014)).
    Given that HAR § 3-172-43 does not unambiguously
    include the local board’s delivery requirement, this rule may be
    interpreted and applied in a manner to be consistent with HRS §
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    11-26(b).    Cf. Si-Nor, Inc. v. Dir., Dep’t of Labor & Indus.
    Relations, 120 Hawaiʻi 135, 146, 
    202 P.3d 596
    , 607 (App. 2009)
    (observing that a statute’s use of the term “filing” was
    “sufficiently indistinct” to allow for clarification by agency
    rule).     Indeed, it appears that HAR § 3-172-43’s “filing”
    requirement was previously interpreted by a local board of
    registration to include mailing in at least one other case.                 In
    Dupree v. Hiraga, 121 Hawaiʻi 297, 
    219 P.3d 1084
     (2009), the
    court considered a local board’s jurisdiction over an appeal
    from a county clerk’s decision.        The appeal in Dupree involved a
    challenge to a voter’s eligibility pursuant to HRS § 11-25.                 121
    Hawaiʻi at 304, 
    219 P.3d at 1090
    .         In that case, the local board
    found that the challenger “filed” his appeal on the date that
    the letter itself was dated.14       Id. at 304, 306, 
    219 P.3d at 1091, 1093
     (2009).     The voter in Dupree had challenged the local
    board’s jurisdiction over the appeal based on the contents of
    the appeal.    
    Id.
     121 Hawaiʻi at 299, 
    219 P.3d at 1086
    .          Although
    the voter’s argument was not based on the time of the filing of
    the appeal, the finding of fact regarding the date of filing was
    specifically challenged, and this court concluded that the local
    board did not clearly err in finding that the board had
    14
    The regulation that applied in Dupree included the same “filing”
    requirement that exists today. Compare HAR § 2-51-43 (2000) (“Any appeal of
    the clerk’s ruling shall be made in writing by filing a notice of appeal with
    the chairperson of the board of registration within ten days of service of
    the clerk’s decision.”), with HAR § 3-172-43 (2010) (same).
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    jurisdiction.    Id. at 315, 
    219 P.3d at 1102
    ; see also, e.g.,
    Brooks v. Dana Nance & Co., 113 Hawaiʻi 406, 412, 
    153 P.3d 1091
    ,
    1097 (2007) (recognizing that Hawaiʻi appellate courts are “under
    an obligation” to independently ensure jurisdiction in each case
    and to sua sponte dismiss an appeal where the court lacks
    jurisdiction).     Accordingly, it is also not inconsistent with
    this court’s previous decision in Dupree to conclude that the
    board has jurisdiction over an appeal when the appeal letter is
    mailed within ten days of service of the county clerk decision.
    In this case, the local board’s interpretation of HAR
    § 3-172-43 substantially diminished Hyland’s right to appeal
    under HRS § 11-26(b).      While the ICA correctly observes that
    Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 6(e)--which provides an
    additional two days for the filing of a response when the
    triggering event is served by mail--does not apply to
    computation for an agency proceeding, it appears that it would
    be consistent with HRS § 11-26--and within the agency’s
    authority--to apply such a rule to voter challenge appeals.                 We
    do not doubt that there are other procedures that the Office of
    Elections or local boards of registration may utilize that would
    provide for a meaningful opportunity to appeal consistent with
    HRS § 11-26.15    Accordingly, we hold that it is within the
    15
    For example, the local boards may also consider the date of
    mailing as the date of “filing” as the local board in Dupree did. The Office
    18
    ***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
    agency’s jurisdiction to provide for procedures that facilitate
    a meaningful opportunity to appeal consistent with HRS § 11-26.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons discussed, the ICA’s March 9, 2016
    judgment on appeal and the local board’s January 9, 2015
    “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Dismissing
    Appeals” are vacated, and the case is remanded to the local
    board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    Robert H. Thomas,                      /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
    Mark M. Murakami and
    Veronica A. Nordyke                    /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
    for petitioner
    /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
    Patricia Ohara,
    /s/ Richard W. Pollack
    Valri Lei Kunimoto and
    Ewan C. Rayner                         /s/ Michael D. Wilson
    for County of Hawaiʻi
    Board of Registration
    Molly A. Stebbins,
    Melody Parker,
    Christopher P. Schlueter and
    Laureen L. Martin
    for Stewart Maeda, in his
    official capacity as Hawaiʻi
    County Clerk
    of Elections may also allow for filing electronically or may designate that
    filing of an appeal may occur by submission of the appeal to the county clerk
    in each of the districts.
    19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SCWC-15-0000053

Citation Numbers: 139 Haw. 386, 390 P.3d 1273, 2017 WL 822614, 2017 Haw. LEXIS 41

Judges: Recktenwald, Nakayama, McKenna, Pollack, Wilson

Filed Date: 3/2/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024