State v. Deguair. ( 2015 )


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  •    *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
    Electronically Filed
    Supreme Court
    SCWC-11-0000573
    17-SEP-2015
    07:45 AM
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    ---o0o---
    STATE OF HAWAI#I,
    Petitioner-Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
    vs.
    PATRICK W. DEGUAIR, JR.,
    Respondent-Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
    and
    ARYSS DAYNE K. KAMAI, Respondent-Defendant.
    SCWC-11-0000573
    CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    (CAAP-11-0000573; CR. NO. 08-1-0533)
    SEPTEMBER 17, 2015
    RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
    OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.
    This case arises from the murder of Jermaine Duckworth.
    On March 27, 2008, Duckworth’s body was discovered at the foot of
    a cliff on Yokohama Bay, a beach near Ka#ena Point on the island
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    of O#ahu, Hawai#i.
    On April 9, 2008, Patrick W. Deguair, Jr., was indicted
    for Duckworth’s murder and kidnapping, as well as firearms
    charges and other offenses, as follows:          (1) Murder in the Second
    Degree, in violation of Hawai#i Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 707-
    701.5 (2014) and 706-656 (2014) (Count I); (2) Kidnapping, in
    violation of HRS §§ 707-720(1)(d) (2014) and/or 707-720(1)(e)
    (2014)1 (Count II); (3) two counts of Carrying or Use of Firearm
    in the Commission of a Separate Felony, in violation of HRS
    § 134-21 (2011) (Counts III and IV); (4) Place to Keep Pistol or
    Revolver, in violation of HRS § 134-25 (2011) (Count V); (5)
    Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree, in violation of
    HRS § 712-1243 (2014) (Count VI); and (6) Unlawful Use of Drug
    Paraphernalia, in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a) (2010) (Count
    VII).2    Only Counts I through IV are at issue in this appeal.
    In two separate trials, the State attempted to prove
    that Deguair was the individual who shot and killed Duckworth.
    The alleged motive was that Deguair suspected Duckworth had made
    statements to police implicating Deguair in a 2007 home robbery.
    The defense’s theory was that Deguair was innocent of all charges
    1
    Deguair’s alleged offenses were committed on March 27, 2008.
    Although HRS § 707-720 was subsequently amended during the legislative session
    of 2008, the changes do not affect the sections of HRS § 707-720 with which
    Deguair was charged. 2008 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 147, § 2 at 391.
    2
    The indictment separately charged co-defendant Aryss Dayne K.
    Kamai (Kamai) under Counts VIII through X, and Kamai pled guilty to these
    counts before Deguair’s first trial.
    2
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    and “the real murderer was David Teo and his friends.”
    Both trials ended in mistrial on the counts now before
    this court.   In the second trial, Deguair was tried on Counts I
    through IV only.    The jury indicated that it could not reach a
    verdict on Counts I, III, and IV, and the circuit court declared
    a mistrial on those counts.       Although the jury appeared to reach
    a unanimous verdict of guilty on Count II, the circuit court
    concluded that the jury’s failure to reach a unanimous result on
    a related interrogatory meant that the jury was in fact hung on
    Count II, and so the circuit court declared a mistrial on that
    count as well.    The circuit court discharged the jury.
    Later that night, the circuit court concluded that it
    had erred by not accepting the verdict on Count II.            The circuit
    court reconvened the jurors eight days later, questioned them
    regarding their votes, and accepted the guilty verdict as to
    Count II.   Shortly thereafter, a juror contacted the circuit
    court regarding possible misconduct by the jurors during the
    trial.   After questioning all twelve jurors, the circuit court
    determined that the jury deliberations had been tainted by juror
    misconduct.
    The circuit court granted Deguair’s motion to dismiss
    Counts I, III, and IV under State v. Moriwake, 
    65 Haw. 47
    , 
    647 P.2d 705
     (1982).    The circuit court also granted Deguair’s motion
    to vacate Count II based on the juror misconduct but denied his
    motions to dismiss Count II under Moriwake.          Instead, the circuit
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    court ordered a retrial on Count II.          In addition, the circuit
    court rejected Deguair’s objections to recalling the jury.
    On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA)
    affirmed the circuit court’s orders on Counts I through IV.               The
    ICA explicitly stated it did not need to address whether the
    circuit court erred in recalling the jury because the circuit
    court had vacated the conviction on Count II.
    Both the State and Deguair applied for certiorari.               The
    State argues that the ICA erred in concluding that the circuit
    court did not abuse its discretion by granting Deguair’s motion
    to dismiss Counts I, III, and IV.
    Deguair argues that the ICA erred in ruling that a
    retrial on Count II was not barred by double jeopardy, and in
    failing to address whether the trial court erred in recalling the
    jury.
    For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment
    of the ICA.
    I.   Background
    A.     First trial proceedings
    This case first proceeded to jury trial before the
    circuit court in October 2009.3         The first trial lasted eight and
    one-half days, and after jury deliberations of seven days, the
    circuit court entered a finding of “manifest necessity” and
    3
    The Honorable Michael A. Town presided.
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    declared a mistrial as to Counts I through V because the jury
    could not reach a unanimous verdict.          There were no objections
    from either counsel.       It is undisputed that the jurors in the
    first trial were evenly split on Counts I through IV, with six
    jurors voting “not guilty” and six jurors voting “guilty” on each
    count.
    The jury also returned verdicts acquitting Deguair on
    Counts VI and VII, and the circuit court later granted the
    State’s motion for nolle prosequi without prejudice as to Count
    V.   The circuit court also denied Deguair’s first motion to
    dismiss the indictment as to Counts I through IV.             Therefore,
    Counts I through IV remained.
    B.     Second trial proceedings
    The second trial, which is presently at issue,
    commenced on March 7, 2011.4        The presentation of evidence began
    on March 10, 2011, and continued for eight days.             The evidence
    from the second trial was substantially similar to the evidence
    from the first trial, except that Ju Wong Woo and Duckworth’s
    brother, James Duckworth,5 testified at the second trial only.
    Teo and Woo were the State’s key witnesses.            Deguair also
    testified.
    Teo testified that around midnight on March 27, 2008,
    4
    The Honorable Glenn J. Kim presided.
    5
    James testified that Deguair accused Duckworth of implicating
    Deguair in a 2007 home robbery. James also testified that Deguair had twice
    threatened him and Duckworth.
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    he saw Deguair bring Duckworth to a sport utility vehicle (SUV)
    and that Duckworth’s mouth was covered with duct tape, and his
    arms were taped behind his back.         When they arrived at Yokohama
    Bay, Teo heard Woo tell Deguair to shoot Duckworth.            Teo
    testified that he saw Deguair shoot Duckworth and kick him off
    the cliff, all without untaping Duckworth.
    Woo testified that he did not tell Deguair to shoot
    Duckworth, but that he saw Deguair point a gun at Duckworth’s
    head and heard a gunshot, though he looked away before the gun
    fired.    Woo also testified that Deguair did all of this without
    untaping Duckworth.
    Deguair testified that he taped Duckworth at the
    direction of Teo, and that he untaped Duckworth before putting
    him in the back of the SUV.       Deguair testified that he drove
    until Teo told him to pull over in Nânâkuli, and that Teo walked
    off with Duckworth, leaving Deguair and Woo at the SUV.              Deguair
    testified that more than an hour later, Teo returned alone.             The
    apparent implication of this testimony was that Teo murdered
    Duckworth.
    Duckworth’s body was discovered that day by a
    lifeguard, who testified there was no duct tape on Duckworth’s
    body.    The photographs taken of Duckworth’s body at Yokohama Bay,
    which were received into evidence, did not show any tape on
    Duckworth’s body.    In addition, the doctor who conducted an
    autopsy of Duckworth’s body found adhesive residue on Duckworth’s
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    arms and hand.     Three additional witnesses testified that Deguair
    taped Duckworth.
    Jury deliberations began on March 31, 2011, and
    continued for two and one-half days.          On April 5, 2011, the jury
    notified the circuit court via “Communication No. 4 from the
    Jury” that it was “unable to come to a unanimous decision on
    Counts 1, 3, and 4, and is unlikely to do so.”            The circuit
    court, with concurrence of both counsel, responded by asking
    whether more time would assist the jury in reaching a unanimous
    verdict on Counts I, III, and IV.         The jury responded in
    “Communication No. 5 from the Jury” that “[n]o, the jury has
    unanimously decided that more time will not help.”
    In “Communication No. 6 from the Jury,” the jury asked,
    “[c]an the jury submit its verdict for Count #2 even though it is
    not unanimous on the interrogatory questions?”            The circuit
    court, with concurrence of both counsel, answered:
    If the interrogatory questions you are referring
    to are the questions on page 32[6] of the jury
    6
    Page 32 of the jury instructions states:
    If you find that the prosecution has proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed
    the offense of Kidnapping, then you must also answer
    the following three questions on a special
    interrogatory which will be provided to you:
    1.   Has the prosecution proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt that prior to trial the Defendant did not
    release Jermaine Duckworth voluntarily?
    2.   Has the prosecution proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt that prior to trial the Defendant did not
    release Jermaine Duckworth alive and not
    (continued...)
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    instructions, then you may not return a verdict on
    Count 2.
    If, however, the interrogatory questions you are
    referring to are not those on page 32, then please
    advise the court exactly what interrogatory questions
    you are referring to.
    The circuit court reconvened with the parties outside
    of the presence of the jury.          The circuit court reviewed the jury
    communications it had received thus far, including Communication
    Nos. 4, 5, and 6, and the circuit court’s responses.               At the
    close of this discussion, the circuit court explicitly asked both
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    (...continued)
    suffering from serious or substantial bodily
    injury?
    3.    Has the prosecution proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt that prior to trial the Defendant did not
    release Jermaine Duckworth in a safe place?
    Your [sic] must answer each of these questions
    separately. Your answer to each of these questions
    must be unanimous.
    Though not included in the jury instructions, HRS § 707-720(1)
    provides, in pertinent part:
    (1) A person commits the offense of kidnapping if the
    person intentionally or knowingly restrains another
    person with intent to:
    . . .
    (d) Inflict bodily injury upon that person or subject
    that person to a sexual offense;
    (e) Terrorize that person or a third person
    . . . .
    (2) Except as provided in subsection (3), kidnapping
    is a class A felony.
    (3) In a prosecution for kidnapping, it is a defense
    which reduces the offense to a class B felony that the
    defendant voluntarily released the victim, alive and
    not suffering from serious or substantial bodily
    injury, in a safe place prior to trial.
    (Emphases added).
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    counsel if they had “anything for the record on anything the
    court just put on the record?”        Both counsel stated that they had
    nothing further for the record.
    In “Communication No. 7 from the Jury,” the jury
    stated, “Re. Communication #6, the jury is not unanimous on
    Question #2 on p. 32 . . . .”        The circuit court again reconvened
    with counsel outside the presence of the jury.           The circuit court
    stated:
    [s]o they are not unanimous on all three of the
    questions on page 32, as they have to be to return a
    verdict. So basically, no matter what they did with
    that verdict form, the court will not be accepting a
    verdict on Count number II. The upshot of that is it
    looks like they’re hung on all four counts
    essentially. It’s going to be a mistrial declared on
    all counts again.
    (Emphases added).
    The Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (DPA) indicated the
    State was ready for the circuit court to bring in the jurors.
    Defense counsel, however, questioned whether and how
    the jurors’ votes would be determined.
    MR. HUNT: Your Honor, are we going to be able to
    determine from the record where they stand?
    THE COURT: I’m going to go in and talk to them right
    after we finish.
    MR. HUNT:   Because I think it would be--
    THE COURT: I’m going to go and talk to them right
    after we finish because I need to get that at least
    from them. And I--
    MR. HUNT:   Thank you.
    THE COURT: I normally talk to them anyway. And then
    you know the rules, counsel. I mean you can talk to
    them if you want to afterwards. I’m not going to make
    them wait around though.
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    MR. HUNT:    Are you going to ask them where they--
    THE COURT:   Well, I’ll just--
    MR. HUNT:    --numerically stand?
    THE COURT: I’ll just tell them sometimes the
    attorneys like to talk to the jurors. You can talk to
    them if you want to, and I’m going to leave it up to
    you.
    MR. HUNT:    As far as where they stood numerically?
    THE COURT: Oh, no.     No, that, I’m going to ask
    specifically.
    MR. HUNT: You’re going to ask.      Okay, that would be
    fine. I’d appreciate that.
    THE COURT: That, I’m going to ask them specifically.
    Obviously, I think it’s germane. And I’ll report it
    to both of you, too. As soon as I find out, I’ll let
    you know.
    (Emphases added).
    The DPA raised concerns about his availability to speak
    with the jurors.
    MR. BELL: I’d like to just inform the court that
    after the verdict--well, after the decision is
    received and the court makes the appropriate findings
    and makes its declaration and we take care of other
    procedural matters, I do have another matter before
    another court at 3 o’clock, and I don’t want to keep
    that other court waiting. I just say that because if
    it was the defense [sic] intention to speak with the
    jurors after the court has concluded its conversation
    with them, I cannot say that I would be immediately
    available and ready to do so. I say that because I’m
    going to be in another courtroom. But if it is the
    defense intention to speak with the jurors, if they
    choose to do so before they disperse, then I’ll stay
    and--
    THE COURT: Well, you guys work that out, because as
    you know, you can talk to them--both counsel don’t
    have to be there. You can call them up days later if
    they’re willing to speak to you, I mean, you know,
    because the rules had changed a long time ago on all
    of that, and I think you’re both aware of the ethical
    rules as far as that goes. So that, you need to work
    out among yourselves. I will tell you this. I am not
    going to have them stay in the jury room and bring one
    or both of you in. I’m going to talk to them, and
    then I’m going to release them. And then it’s up to
    you, I mean if you want to wait in the hall there,
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    catch them as they come out or something. Whatever
    you guys want to do is up to you, but I’m just going
    to leave that to you all, okay?
    Okay, bring them in.
    (Emphases added).
    After the jurors were called into the courtroom, the
    foreperson confirmed that the jury was “unable to reach a
    unanimous verdict as to Counts I, III, and IV” and that “more
    time would not help the jury to reach a unanimous decision on
    those counts.”
    With respect to Count II, the foreperson handed to the
    bailiff what the jurors “believe[d] to be” their verdict, noting,
    “[w]hether or not it would be accepted or not is the question.”
    The circuit court called both counsel to the bench,
    where the following discussion occurred outside the presence of
    the jury:
    THE COURT: Everything else except those three is
    blank, as it should be, because they were unable to
    reach unanimous verdicts. I’m showing counsel--for
    the record, I’m showing counsel the three verdict
    forms that the jury did fill out. They are Count II,
    kidnapping, the interrogatories for Count II, and also
    the interrogatory on the enhanced sentencing for use
    of a firearm for Count II.
    For the record, they returned a verdict of
    guilty on Count II. However--and I will clarify this
    with them in a second--they checked off 1 and 3 “Yes”
    on the interrogatories but just made dashes in number
    2 along with their last jury communication. And I
    will confirm that, for the record, that means they
    were not unanimous on that question. And the interrog
    as to firearms kind of is moot, but they were not
    unanimous as to that one either.
    So what I intend to do for the record is to
    clarify that, in fact, they were not able to reach
    unanimous answer as to question number 2 of the three
    interrogatories pertaining to kidnapping and that, in
    fact, they were not able to reach a unanimous verdict
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    as to the use--well, possession of a firearm or
    semiautomatic firearm. And given that, I am not going
    to receive the verdict as to Count II. That’s the
    court’s intention.
    Mr. Bell.
    MR. BELL: I understand that, Your Honor. I’d ask the
    court to consider the following. What the court has
    presented is what the parties, I believe, inferred
    what was going to transpire. For the purpose of
    establishing kidnapping as a class A, the prosecution
    only has to establish one of those three has been
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Before they reach
    the interrogatories, they have to establish as a
    matter of fact that the defendant knowingly or
    intentionally restrained Jermaine, and then there’s
    those two alternatives. Only after they’ve made a
    unanimous finding as to the two counts of kidnapping--
    two elements of kidnapping do they consider the
    interrogatories.
    So the prosecution is asking the court to
    consider this. Inasmuch as they’ve already reached a
    verdict as to the kidnapping as charged, questions of
    fact, and they do not reach the interrogatories until
    they made those findings and because they found at
    least as to one question a unanimous verdict as to
    yes, then there is a factual basis for the court to
    receive that verdict as to kidnapping as a class A
    felony.
    THE COURT:   Mr. Hunt.
    MR. HUNT:    Your Honor, can I see the verdict form
    again.
    No, I disagree.     I agree with the court’s
    position.
    THE COURT:   Okay, you made your record on that--
    MR. BELL:    Thank you.
    THE COURT: --Mr. Bell. I believe all three questions
    have to be answered unanimously in the affirmative,
    and they’re simply not. I think that’s required under
    the applicable statutes as contained in the Penal
    Code. So as I say, you’ve made your record. I’m
    respectfully not going to accept the verdict on Count
    number II, and I’m going to declare a mistrial due to
    manifest necessity on all four counts.
    MR. BELL:    I understand, Your Honor.
    Just on the last point, is the court’s reading
    of 707-720 that each of the three questions have to be
    answered in the affirmative? Is that what the court
    just said? I thought--I mean the law is one of the
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    three, not all three. That’s just the prosecution’s
    perspective. I just want to understand–-
    THE COURT:   No--
    MR. BELL:    --what the court said.
    THE COURT: --I’m not going to commit myself to an
    answer on that. I am saying that on the verdict form
    which the jury was provided with, the clear
    instructions to them is that the answer to each of
    these questions must be unanimous, and one of them was
    not. So, you know, I suppose you can file a writ
    seriously if you feel strongly enough about it. And
    if the appellate--the Supreme Court agreed with you,
    then maybe you could reinstate--maybe they would
    reinstate the verdict in Count II. After all, the
    verdict is in unambiguously, and it’ll be preserved
    for the record. But at this point, I’m going to
    declare a mistrial. I’m not going to accept the
    verdict. I’m going to declare a mistrial on Count II
    as well as the other three counts, and we’ll take it
    from there.
    MR. BELL: Thank you.
    (Emphases added).
    In the presence of the jury, the circuit court further
    discussed with the foreperson the verdict form on Count II.
    THE COURT: Okay . . . just so the record is very
    clear, on the verdict form containing the three
    interrogatories pertaining to Count II, the “Yes” box
    is checked off very clearly and unequivocally on
    questions 1 and 3. However, question number 2, there
    are just a couple of dash marks after both “Yes” and
    “No.” And my understanding based on your
    communication to the court on this issue is that the
    jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to
    question 2, is that correct?
    THE FOREPERSON:     Correct.
    . . . .
    THE COURT: All right. Well, in that case, then, I’m
    not going to receive the verdict as to Count II. And
    because the jury has informed the court and all of us
    on the record just now that, despite their efforts,
    they’re unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to
    Counts I, III, and IV, I’m going to find manifest
    necessity, and I’m declaring a mistrial as to all four
    counts in this case, Counts I, II, III, and IV.
    (Emphases added).
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    Thus, the circuit court did not accept the jury’s
    guilty verdict as to Count II, and declared a mistrial based upon
    “manifest necessity” on all four counts.            There were no
    objections made by either counsel, and both counsel indicated
    they had nothing further for the record.            Because the circuit
    court did not accept the verdict as to Count II, the circuit
    court did not poll7 the jury with respect to Count II at that
    time.
    The circuit court indicated it would meet with the
    jurors in the jury room, and twice stated that the jury was
    “discharged.”       The circuit court did not instruct jurors to
    refrain from discussing the case with others or that they could
    potentially be recalled.
    The circuit court then scheduled a retrial, and there
    were no objections made by either counsel.
    C.       Jury recall and misconduct proceedings
    Later that night, the circuit court concluded that it
    had erred in not accepting the guilty verdict on Count II.                The
    circuit court contacted counsel and “start[ed] gathering jurors
    7
    Under Hawai#i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 31© (2015), “Poll of
    Jury,”
    [w]hen a verdict is returned and before it is
    recorded, the jury shall be polled at the request of
    any party or upon the court’s own motion. If upon the
    poll there is not unanimous concurrence, or there is
    not concurrence by the number of jurors stipulated to
    as being necessary for returning a verdict, the jury
    may be directed to retire for further deliberations or
    may be discharged.
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    up” for recall.    There is no evidence in the record that the
    circuit court informed the jurors that they were not to discuss
    the case with others.     Due to “unavailability of counsel because
    of prior commitments,” the circuit court was unable to meet with
    counsel regarding this issue until April 7, 2011, which was two
    days after discharging the jury.
    At the April 7, 2011 chambers conference, the circuit
    court informed counsel that it believed it had made a mistake by
    not accepting the jury’s verdict on Count II because the jurors
    were required to vote unanimously in the affirmative on only one
    of the three interrogatory questions on the verdict form to
    submit a guilty verdict on Count II as a class A felony.             The
    circuit court also indicated its intention to “gather the jury
    members, go back on record and poll them, and then depending on
    the results of the poll, proceed from there.”          The circuit court
    scheduled the proceeding for April 13, 2011, and invited counsel
    to “file anything respective counsel wanted to on this issue.”
    The circuit court contacted all of the jurors, who “were all
    amenable to coming back at this day and time.”
    Deguair’s objections to the circuit court’s recall of
    the jury for the purposes of polling (Objections to Recall and
    Polling) were filed on April 11, 2011.         The State responded to
    Deguair’s objections.
    Without ruling on Deguair’s Objections to the Recall
    and Polling, the circuit court reconvened the jury on April 13,
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    2011.   Before the jurors were called into the courtroom, the
    circuit court stated that on April 5, 2011, the jurors were
    “deadlocked six to six” on Counts I, III, and IV.
    The DPA asked:
    [W]ill [t]he Court be open to confirming that on
    April 5, 2011, after the jury was discharged, that
    this Court, in fact, did speak with the jurors in the
    jury room, as it indicated that it was going to do so,
    and during that conversation, the Court was able to
    determine where the jurors stood on all counts,
    including Count 2? Will the Court confirm that?
    The circuit court answered, “[n]o, because I think
    that’s tantamount to making myself a witness in this case, and
    I’m not going to do that.”
    Defense counsel raised concerns about the jurors’
    potential exposure to “publicity” regarding the case.
    MR. HUNT: And my concern is since the jury was
    discharged almost ten days ago, you know, eight or
    nine days ago, there has been publicity. I did attach
    as an Exhibit A to my memo the fact that there was
    publicity, and there was a notation that there was an
    earlier murder. I think, it was in 2002 that Mr.
    DeGuair [sic] was a suspect in but was not prosecuted
    because there were no witnesses to testify and so
    forth. So, I’m concerned that the jury has had
    extraneous influence now that–-
    THE COURT:   Potentially.
    MR. HUNT:    Yes, yes.   After--
    THE COURT: I mean, you know, just--we don’t know in
    fact that any of them--
    MR. HUNT:    True.
    THE COURT: --that’s all I’m saying.
    Go on.
    MR. HUNT: And I agree with the Court. We don’t know
    unless we ask. And, I suppose, to be careful, I
    think, we should probably do some inquiry--at least,
    I’m making that request--what the jury has since
    exposed themselves to since being discharged, whether
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    they’ve gone on the internet and read newspapers and
    looked up the case and things. But, the bottom line
    is, with all due respect, I think the Court, once it
    discharged the jury, lost the power to call it back
    and ask it to poll--to poll it and to render a true
    verdict.
    THE COURT: No. Certainly, I understand your point.
    And as I say, in the fullness of time, you may be
    vindicated. I, frankly, am not sure. I would note
    just, sort of, parenthetically that, again, I don't
    know whether--how much water this will carry or, for
    example, how much it would make a difference to an
    appellate court looking at this. But, I would, like I
    said, note parenthetically that, you know, your client
    and defendants in his position have a right to a jury
    poll under the Hawai#i rules of penal procedure. It’s
    not a constitutional right.
    MR. HUNT: Correct.
    (Emphases added).
    The circuit court, again over defense counsel’s
    objection, questioned the jury as to whether they agreed with the
    guilty verdict on Count II and Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 3
    relating to Count II.     Each juror answered in the affirmative.
    The circuit court also asked the jurors whether their responses
    would have been the same if the circuit court had asked for their
    numerical split on April 5, 2011.         The jurors answered in the
    affirmative.   The circuit court did not ask the jurors whether
    they had been exposed to publicity or discussed the case with
    others.   The circuit court accepted the jury’s verdict on Count
    II and adjudged Deguair guilty of kidnapping as a Class A felony.
    Later that day, on April 13, 2011, the circuit court
    received a telephone voice mail message from Juror No. 4.             The
    message stated the following:
    [JUROR 4]: I was in the jury of Patrick Deguair
    trial, No. 4. Um, I had some concerns, and I was–I
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    didn’t know who to talk to.    And it probably happens
    all the time.
    But I really--during deliberation, I really
    suspected that people looked at the Internet ‘cause
    things came out that weren’t in trial, and it really
    bothers me. And I think some--and I think there was a
    fear factor for some of these jurors.
    And if you’re going to retry this, somehow--you
    know, you’re not--it’s going to come out the same way
    because people are going to be too scared. It’s too
    small of an island. I know you--you didn’t have that
    --you tried to put that fear out of our heads, but I--
    I have a concern.
    I don’t know, um--I don’t know what you can do
    about it except sequester, but I think that people
    did--did just go right on and looked and found out
    stuff.
    The circuit court reconvened to question Juror No. 4 on
    April 15, 2011.    Juror No. 4 testified that Juror No. 18 said
    “she was not going to get up in open court and say guilty.”
    Juror No. 4 also reported three instances of possible juror
    misconduct:   (1) statements made by Juror No. 1 during
    deliberation of the jury that there was “documented evidence”
    that Deguair had threatened four people, suggesting that Juror
    No. 1 had consulted outside sources of information9; (2) mention
    of the name of a “Samoan gang” that may have been involved, which
    Juror No. 4 claimed had not come to light during the trial; and
    (3) Juror No. 1 had conducted her own experiment by putting duct
    tape on her forearm to see if it left residue marks, the result
    of which experiment Juror No. 1 reported to other jurors.
    The other jurors were subsequently questioned
    8
    Juror No. 1 served as the foreperson.
    9
    Juror No. 1 later testified that she did not make this statement.
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    individually.    Five other jurors corroborated Juror No. 4’s
    testimony that Juror No. 1 had said that she would not say
    Deguair was guilty in open court.
    Juror No. 1 confirmed that she had been concerned about
    gang membership and being the target of retaliation.             When the
    circuit court asked about the jurors’ “fear of being on a hit
    list” and “the mention of Samoan gangs,” Juror No. 1 explained:
    A     ... [W]ell, it’s probably because people--people
    have told us or we’ve seen on TV where you’re--if
    you’re the identifiable person, the foreperson, that
    maybe there’s repercussions after. And so people were
    afraid.
    Q     Were they afraid that they might be killed or
    murdered by someone associated with a Samoan gang?
    A     Well, those words didn’t really come up, but it
    was just you’d get attacked or, you know, targeted.
    So when we started picking our foreperson, one person
    specifically said, I absolutely do not, cannot, don’t
    want to be it for these reasons. And then I even
    said, Okay, me too. For that reason, I don’t want to
    do it. And so it kind of--how the discussion went.
    And then we ended up doing it randomly. So we picked
    numbers out of a bag.
    Five other jurors recalled hearing statements regarding
    fear of reprisal should the jury find Deguair guilty and the
    consequences of being the foreperson.
    Regarding the duct tape experiment, Juror No. 1
    testified that, after the first day of deliberations, “I wanted
    to validate the residue part of the evidence that was in the
    picture, how that would happen.       So I took tape and I stuck it on
    my forearm and waited ten minutes and then pulled it off, and
    that was it.”
    Further, Juror Nos. 4 and 8 confirmed that after the
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    jury was discharged but before the jury was recalled, they did
    research Deguair on the internet.            Juror No. 4 testified that she
    found Deguair had allegedly threatened other people in the past.
    Juror No. 8 testified that she found Deguair had supposedly
    murdered someone else.
    D.     Post-trial motions
    Two separate motions by Deguair were filed in the
    circuit court on April 28, 2011.            Both motions are at issue on
    certiorari.     First, Deguair moved to dismiss Counts I through IV
    with prejudice (Second Motion to Dismiss) based on the factors
    set forth in State v. Moriwake, 
    65 Haw. 47
    , 56-57, 
    647 P.2d 705
    ,
    712-13 (1982).      Deguair argued that five of the six Moriwake
    factors weighed against retrial, while the “severity of the
    offense charged” did not weigh against retrial.             Deguair further
    submitted that if the circuit court were to grant his motion to
    vacate the conviction on Count II, it should also dismiss Count
    II with prejudice, rather than grant a new trial on Count II
    because the evidence that the State would lawfully be permitted
    to present in a third trial on Count II would be “substantially
    restricted” by the dismissals of Counts I, III, and IV.
    Deguair’s counsel also argued:
    On April 7, 2011, the Court held a chambers conference
    with counsel for the parties and informed the parties
    that the Court believed it made a mistake by not
    accepting the jury’s verdict on count II because the
    jury only needed to be unanimous on one of the three
    questions on the verdict form in order for the Court
    to accept the jury’s verdict on count II as a class A
    felony, and over defendant’s objection decided to
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    reconvene the jury on April 13, 2011, to accept the
    jury’s verdict on count II and poll the jury. The
    Court also informed counsel in chambers that it met
    with the jury for approximately and [sic] hour to an
    hour and a half after discharging the jury to answer
    questions from jurors and determine where the jurors
    stood on the deadlocked counts. The Court informed
    counsel the jurors were evenly split, six for guilty
    and six for not guilty on counts I, III and IV.
    In opposition, the State argued that five of the six
    Moriwake factors weighed in favor of retrial.          The State did not
    dispute defense counsel’s statement that the jury was evenly
    split, six-to-six.     Indeed, the State represented that on
    April 6, 2011, “the State received a phone call from the court’s
    law clerk/bailiff, who informed the State of the jury’s vote as
    to each count, including the kidnapping special interrogatories.”
    In a footnote, the State represented, “[i]t is the State’s
    understanding that, as to counts 1, 3 and 4, the jury was split
    evenly at 6/6.”
    Second, Deguair moved to vacate the conviction on Count
    II and dismiss Count II with prejudice (Motion to Vacate and
    Dismiss Count II) based on the juror misconduct.           Deguair
    requested that the circuit court dismiss Count II under Moriwake,
    rather than grant a new trial.       Deguair argued:
    [E]ven standing alone each of the improper instances
    of jury behavior described above warrant vacating the
    kidnapping conviction and granting a new trial on the
    kidnapping count. Defendant further submits, however,
    that the collective effect of the jury’s improper
    conduct makes it impossible for the State to prove
    that the jurors’ misconduct was harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt. Defendant was clearly denied a
    trial by a fair and impartial jury on the kidnapping
    charge and the only fair and just result should be
    that kidnapping conviction be vacated, and rather than
    granting a new trial, Count 2 must be dismissed with
    prejudice, based on State v. Moriwake . . . .
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    (Citation omitted).
    In other words, Deguair appeared to argue that juror
    misconduct prejudiced the jury’s deliberations as to Count II,
    but that because the circuit court should not have recalled the
    jury to receive a guilty verdict on Count II, the circuit court
    should dismiss Count II under Moriwake as if the jury were
    deadlocked on Count II.
    In opposition, the State argued (1) there was no
    “concrete evidence” that Juror No. 1 obtained information from
    outside the trial; (2) the comments regarding the threats and
    Samoan gangs did not prejudice Deguair; (3) Juror No. 1’s duct
    tape experiment did not prejudice Deguair because whether there
    was adhesive residue on Duckworth’s body was irrelevant to the
    kidnapping; and (4) Moriwake did not apply to Count II because
    the jury was not deadlocked on Count II.
    The circuit court held a hearing on both motions on
    May 18, 2011.    The circuit court first addressed and heard
    arguments regarding the Motion to Vacate and Dismiss Count II.
    The circuit court orally granted the motion to vacate the
    conviction on Count II, but denied the motion as to dismissal of
    Count II, stating “[t]he proper remedy is a new trial, and that’s
    what I’m ordering.”
    As to the Second Motion to Dismiss, the circuit court
    stated, “it’s the Court’s considered judgment that the chances of
    the State persuading 12 jurors unanimously to find the defendant
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    guilty as charged of Counts 1 and 3 and 4 are virtually nil.”
    The circuit court orally granted Deguair’s Second Motion to
    Dismiss.     At the hearing, the State did not dispute or put on
    contradictory evidence that the second jury was deadlocked six-
    to-six.
    On July 1, 2011, the circuit court entered two separate
    orders on the motions that confirmed its oral rulings.              The
    circuit court granted in part the Second Motion to Dismiss with
    respect to Counts I, III, and IV, and denied in part the Second
    Motion to Dismiss with respect to Count II (Second Dismissal
    Order).    The circuit court also granted Deguair’s request to
    vacate his conviction on Count II but denied his request to
    dismiss Count II with prejudice pursuant to Moriwake (Order re
    Motion to Vacate and Dismiss Count II).           The Second Dismissal
    Order and Order re Motion to Vacate and Dismiss Count II
    contained findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are
    discussed as relevant below.
    The circuit court denied and overruled Deguair’s
    Objections to Recall and Polling (Order re Recall and Polling) in
    an order entered on August 26, 2011.
    E.     ICA proceedings
    In the ICA, the State appealed the Second Dismissal
    Order, and on cross-appeal, Deguair appealed the Order re Motion
    to Vacate and Dismiss Count II and the Order re Recall and
    Polling.
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    In its July 31, 2014 Summary Disposition Order (SDO),
    the ICA affirmed the Second Dismissal Order and Order re Motion
    to Vacate and Dismiss Count II.       Because the circuit court
    vacated the conviction on Count II, the ICA did not address the
    circuit court’s recall of the jury.
    With respect to the State’s appeal, the ICA held:
    [t]he Circuit Court carefully considered and weighed
    each of the Moriwake factors in light of all of the
    particular circumstances of this case, including the
    juror misconduct in the second trial, and the
    seriousness and potential impact of that misconduct on
    the deliberations of the second hung jury.
    Notwithstanding the State’s challenges to certain
    aspects of the FOFs and COLs, on the whole of this
    record, we cannot conclude that the Circuit Court
    abused its discretion in concluding that the public’s
    interest and the defendant’s interest in fundamental
    fairness would not be served by conducting a third
    trial on Counts I, III, and IV.
    With respect to Deguair’s cross-appeal, the ICA held:
    Assuming, arguendo, that the Circuit Court erred
    in recalling the discharged jury and belatedly
    accepting the guilty verdict on Count II (including
    any errors related to jury polling), presumably the
    Circuit Court should have allowed the erroneous
    declaration of a mistrial to stand, notwithstanding
    the court’s error in initially rejecting the verdict.
    As implicitly acknowledged in Deguair’s alternative
    prayer for relief in this appeal, the appropriate
    proceeding would then have been a hearing on a motion
    to dismiss based on Moriwake. However, that is
    precisely what happened in this case, albeit with the
    added complications and considerations stemming from
    the juror misconduct, which were addressed in
    Deguair’s separate motion for relief. Deguair’s
    second motion to dismiss the indictment, which was
    filed on April 28, 2011, specifically argued that,
    applying the Moriwake factors to this case, Deguair
    should not be subjected to a third trial on any of the
    four remaining counts, with particularized arguments
    concerning Count II. Deguair does not argue on appeal
    that the Circuit Court erred in any aspect of its
    Moriwake analysis.
    Instead, Deguair argues that the dismissal of
    Count II based on the juror misconduct was not based
    on “manifest necessity,” and therefore retrial would
    be barred by double jeopardy. This argument is
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    without merit. As Deguair himself argued in his
    motion to vacate the conviction on Count II and
    dismiss it with prejudice, which was also filed on
    April 28, 2011, “the improper instances of jury
    behavior described above warrant vacating the
    kidnapping conviction and granting a new trial on the
    kidnapping count.” In essence, Deguair argued that it
    was a manifest necessity to vacate the conviction on
    Count II, which the Circuit Court then did. In the
    Circuit Court proceedings, Deguair further argued in
    the motion to vacate that, “rather than granting a new
    trial, Count 2 must be dismissed with prejudice, based
    on State v. Moriwake, 
    65 Haw. 47
     (1982),” and he
    incorporated by reference the Moriwake arguments made
    in his second motion to dismiss indictment, which was
    filed concurrently therewith. As stated above,
    Deguair does not argue on appeal that the Circuit
    Court erred in its Moriwake analysis.
    (Emphasis in original).
    In other words, the ICA appeared to conclude that there
    was manifest necessity to declare a mistrial because of the juror
    misconduct and that Deguair waived his ability to challenge the
    circuit court’s purported analysis of Count II under Moriwake.
    The ICA entered a judgment on appeal pursuant to its
    July 31, 2014 SDO on October 24, 2014.
    Both parties timely sought certiorari review.
    II.   Standards of Review
    A.     Motion to dismiss indictment
    This court has held:
    A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss an
    indictment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
    The trial court abuses its discretion when it clearly
    exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or
    principles of law or practice to the substantial
    detriment of a party litigant. The burden of
    establishing abuse of discretion is on appellant, and
    a strong showing is required to establish it.
    State v. Hinton, 120 Hawai#i 265, 273, 
    204 P.3d 484
    , 492 (2009)
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    (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
    B.      Double jeopardy
    Whether dismissal of a criminal charge is required
    under double jeopardy is “a question of constitutional law that
    we review under the right/wrong standard of review.”               State v.
    Toyomura, 80 Hawai#i 8, 15, 
    904 P.2d 893
    , 900 (1995).
    III.   Discussion
    A.      The State’s Application
    On certiorari, the State presents the following
    question:
    Whether the ICA committed grave errors of law and fact
    in concluding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate
    the court abused its discretion in its application of
    the Moriwake factors and by granting Respondent’s
    motion to dismiss with prejudice the murder and two
    gun related charges (counts I, III, and IV).
    (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    We hold that the ICA correctly concluded that the
    circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its application of
    the Moriwake factors and by granting Deguair’s motion to dismiss
    Counts I, III, and IV.
    1.    The State’s argument that the jury was not genuinely
    deadlocked fails
    The State argues that the record lacks “undisputed”
    evidence that the second jury was hung with six jurors voting
    “guilty” and six jurors voting “not guilty” on Counts I, III, and
    IV.     The State challenges the circuit court’s findings of fact to
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    the extent that they “recite and rely” on the jury’s purported
    six-to-six split.
    The State notes that at the April 13, 2011 hearing, the
    circuit court would not confirm where the jurors stood on all
    counts when it met with the jurors after the close of trial on
    April 5, 2011, and therefore, it is “unconfirmed” where the jury
    stood on Counts I, III, and IV.       The State also contends that the
    court “perhaps improperly, made itself a critical witness” by
    “meeting privately with the jurors . . . and purportedly
    receiving the only information regarding the jury’s split.”               The
    State further notes, “there does not appear to be any evidence in
    the record that all 12 jurors met with the trial court” and that
    those who attended the meeting could have been “reluctant” to
    reveal their verdicts or “confused” because the circuit court
    instructed the jury, before it began deliberating, as follows:
    You must not discuss this case with any person other
    than your fellow jurors. You must not reveal to the
    Court or to any other person how the jury stands
    numerically or otherwise until you have reached a
    unanimous verdict and it has been received by the
    Court.
    Although the State now argues that the six-to-six split
    was not “undisputed,” the State conceded in its response to
    Deguair’s Second Motion to Dismiss in the circuit court that “as
    to counts 1, 3 and 4, the jury was split evenly at 6/6.”             In
    addition, after the jury was discharged, the State could have but
    did not ask the jurors where they stood on Counts I, III, and
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    IV.10        Moreover, the State did not object to the circuit court’s
    plan to speak to the jurors without counsel present.
    The State next contends that “the fear and intimidation
    that weighed constantly on the jurors’ minds” further supports a
    conclusion that the jury was not “genuinely deadlocked.”                The
    State also notes the following:            a statement made by a
    prospective juror regarding his concerns about being identifiable
    as a juror; a statement that Deguair “unexpectedly” made at trial
    that “could have intimidated the jurors”; Juror No. 4’s voice
    mail message to the circuit court regarding a “fear factor for
    some of the jurors”; Juror No. 4’s corroborated statement that
    Juror No. 1 said “she was not going to get up in open court and
    say guilty”; and statements made by jurors regarding “the fear of
    being on a hit list,” the “mention of Samoan gangs,” and the
    perceived consequences of being the foreperson.               The State also
    argued that the multiple instances of juror misconduct undermine
    10
    Under the Hawai#i Rules of Professional Conduct (HRPC) Rule
    3.5(e)(4)(i) (2015), a lawyer may communicate with the jurors after the jury
    has been dismissed,
    upon leave of the court, which leave shall be freely
    granted, a lawyer may ask questions of, or respond to
    questions from, jurors about the trial, provided that
    the lawyer does so in a manner that is not calculated
    to harass or embarrass any juror and does not seek to
    influence the juror’s actions in future jury service
    in any particular case . . . .
    Before discharging the jury, the circuit informed both counsel that
    after the jury was discharged, they could talk to the jurors to ask them where
    they stood.
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    the circuit court’s conclusion that the jury deliberations and
    circumstances of the deliberations weigh “only slightly” for
    allowance of a retrial.
    The State’s arguments regarding the “fear and
    intimidation that weighed constantly on the jurors’ minds” and
    the juror misconduct fail because in its opposition in the
    circuit court to Deguair’s Motion to Vacate and Dismiss Count II,
    the State argued that the statements regarding the Samoan gang
    affiliation and the juror misconduct were not prejudicial.             In
    other words, the State argued that the jury’s fear of retaliation
    from Samoan gangs and juror misconduct did not prejudice jury
    deliberations with respect to the kidnapping charge, while now
    arguing that the fear and misconduct did prejudice jury
    deliberations with respect to the murder and firearm charges that
    it now asks this court for the opportunity to retry.            See Roxas
    v. Marcos, 89 Hawai#i 91, 124, 
    969 P.2d 1209
    , 1242 (1998)
    (“Pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, [a] party will
    not be permitted to maintain inconsistent positions or to take a
    position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or
    inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where
    he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and
    another will be prejudiced by his action.”) (quoting Rosa v. CWJ
    Contractors, Ltd., 
    4 Haw. App. 210
    , 218, 
    664 P.2d 745
    , 751
    (1983)).   In addition, the State’s argument that the jurors were
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    afraid to return a “guilty” verdict is undercut by the jurors’
    written guilty verdict as to Count II, kidnapping as a Class A
    felony, which the foreperson read in open court.           Cf. United
    States v. Watchmaker, 
    761 F.2d 1459
    , 1466 (11th Cir. 1985)
    (“Discussions among the jurors as to their fear of the defendants
    are not inappropriate, so long as such discussions do not lead
    them to form an opinion of the defendants’ guilt or innocence of
    the offenses charged.”).
    In sum, the State’s argument that the jury was not
    “genuinely deadlocked” fails.
    2.    The State’s argument regarding possible violations of
    HRE Rule 606(b) is irrelevant
    The State argues that the circuit court’s Moriwake
    analysis “cannot be accepted as correct” because, during the
    post-trial hearings, the circuit court “ignored the law and both
    counsels’ objections when soliciting repeatedly the jurors’
    opinions as to whether [Juror No. 1’s] experiment had an effect
    on their deliberations,” in violation of HRE Rule 606(b).
    However, the State’s challenge of these hearings with
    respect to Counts I, III, and IV is irrelevant.           First, there is
    no indication in the record that the circuit court considered the
    impact of the duct tape experiment when evaluating Counts I, III,
    and IV under Moriwake.      The circuit court instead conducted its
    own evaluation of the evidence and concluded that the conflicting
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    evidence as to whether there was duct tape on Duckworth’s body
    when he was murdered was a major weakness in the State’s case
    with respect to Counts I, III, and IV.
    Second, the circuit court’s inquiries appear to have
    been conducted to inform the circuit court’s analysis of
    Deguair’s Motion to Vacate and Dismiss Count II (concerning juror
    misconduct with respect to Count II), but not Deguair’s Second
    Motion to Dismiss (concerning the Moriwake factors only regarding
    Counts I, III, and IV).      The State did not challenge the Order re
    Motion to Vacate and Dismiss Count II on appeal before the ICA or
    this Court.    In other words, the State’s argument regarding the
    juror misconduct revealed during the post-trial hearings appears
    to be irrelevant to the circuit court’s Moriwake analysis with
    respect to Counts I, III, and IV, and accordingly this argument
    is irrelevant to the issues in the State’s Application.
    3.    The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
    dismissing Counts I, III, and IV under the Moriwake
    factors
    In Moriwake, this court addressed whether trial courts
    have discretionary power sua sponte to dismiss an indictment over
    the objection of the prosecuting attorney.          65 Haw. at 55, 
    647 P.2d at 712
    .   The court held, “the judicial power which seeks to
    administer justice is properly invoked when a trial court sua
    sponte dismisses an indictment with prejudice following the
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    declaration of one or more mistrials because of genuinely
    deadlocked juries, even though the defendant’s constitutional
    rights are not yet implicated.”        
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    Although the Moriwake Court acknowledged the
    discretionary nature of trial courts’ judicial power to dismiss
    an indictment and stated it would “accord deference” to the trial
    court’s conclusion, the court determined that “the magnitude of
    the respective interests of society and of criminal defendants
    which are implicated in this area of law requires that we more
    fully delineate the parameters within which this discretion is
    properly exercised.”      Id. at 56, 
    647 P.2d at 712
    .        The court set
    forth the following test for balancing the interests of the State
    against fundamental fairness to the defendant:
    The factors which the trial court should consider in
    undertaking this balance include the following: (1)
    the severity of the offense charged; (2) the number of
    prior mistrials and the circumstances of the jury
    deliberation therein, so far as is known; (3) the
    character of prior trials in terms of length,
    complexity and similarity of evidence presented; (4)
    the likelihood of any substantial difference in a
    subsequent trial, if allowed; (5) the trial court’s
    own evaluation of relative case strength; and (6) the
    professional conduct and diligence of respective
    counsel, particularly that of the prosecuting
    attorney.
    Id. at 56, 
    647 P.2d at 712-13
    .
    In State v. Hinton, this court explained, “[n]othing in
    Moriwake indicates that all factors must be given equal weight or
    that certain factors must be given more weight than others.”                120
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    Hawai#i at 280, 
    204 P.3d at 499
    .          In Hinton, this court held that
    the ICA erred in (1) injecting a “separation of powers” analysis
    (i.e., assessing when a court might be inappropriately
    encroaching upon prosecutorial discretion) into the Moriwake
    framework, and (2) holding that the trial court abused its
    discretion in dismissing an indictment with prejudice after one
    mistrial.      Id. at 278, 280, 
    204 P.3d at 497, 499
    .
    In this case, the circuit court, in the Second
    Dismissal Order, applied the Moriwake balancing test and
    ultimately granted Deguair’s motion to dismiss Counts I, III, and
    IV.     The circuit court concluded:
    Given the State’s evidence against the defendant, it
    is the Court’s considered judgment that the chances of
    the State persuading 12 jurors unanimously to find the
    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as charged
    of Counts I, III and IV are virtually nil. If the
    Court allowed a third, fourth or fifth retrial, all of
    the juries would still be hung, and it would be
    fundamentally unfair to the defendant, and a denial of
    due process, to continue to put him in jeopardy by
    subjecting him to another trial on Counts I, III and
    IV.
    Having resolved the State’s arguments challenging the
    circuit court’s findings of fact regarding the jury’s six-to-six
    split, supra, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its
    discretion in dismissing Counts I, III, and IV under the factors
    set forth in Moriwake.
    a.    The Severity of the Offense Charged
    Under the first Moriwake factor, the circuit court
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    found, “[i]t is undisputed that the charges against defendant are
    extremely serious” (FOF No. 23).          The court concluded, “the
    severity of the charges against [Deguair] argue[s] for allowance
    of a retrial” (COL No. 3).       Because neither party challenged the
    circuit court’s analysis of the first Moriwake factor, we need
    not address or disturb it here.11
    b.    The Number of Prior Mistrials and the
    Circumstances of the Jury Deliberations Therein,
    So Far as Known
    With respect to the second Moriwake factor, the circuit
    court concluded, “[e]ven though the jury that deliberated in the
    second trial deliberated only two and a half days, and their
    deliberations were compromised by some juror misconduct, [the
    second Moriwake factor] . . . so far as is know[n], argue[s] only
    slightly for the allowance of a retrial” (COL No. 4).
    In Moriwake, this court stated, “[w]ithout suggesting
    that trial courts are not free, within the bounds of properly
    exercised discretion, to differ, we proffer that in most cases,
    serious consideration be given to dismissing an indictment with
    prejudice after a second hung jury mistrial.”           64 Haw. at 57, 
    647 P.2d at 713
    .     This court has also indicated that the circuit
    court may consider the numerical breakdown of the hung jury under
    11
    This court has suggested that “murder . . . [and] kidnapping” are
    relatively serious offenses for purposes of the first Moriwake factor.
    Hinton, 120 Hawai#i at 278, 
    204 P.3d at 497
    .
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    the second Moriwake factor.       See Hinton, 120 Haw. at 278-79, 
    204 P.3d at 497-98
     (“The trial court found that this factor weighed
    in favor of retrial because there had been only one trial and,
    although the jury indicated that it was eight to four for
    acquittal at one point, it seemed confused.”).
    The following factual findings of the circuit court are
    relevant to the second Moriwake factor:         both trials ended in a
    mistrial (FOF Nos. 3, 17, 24); jury deliberations lasted seven
    days in the first trial (FOF No. 3) and two and one-half days in
    the second trial (FOF Nos. 14, 25); in the first trial, the
    jurors were evenly split on Counts I through IV, (FOF Nos. 4, 24,
    26); in the second trial, the jurors were evenly split on Counts
    I, III, and IV, (FOF Nos. 18, 24, 26); during the jury
    deliberations for the second trial, the jury informed the circuit
    court that it was “deadlocked” on Counts I, III, and IV (FOF No.
    14); and the jury deliberations in the second trial were
    “compromised by some juror misconduct” (FOF No. 25).            In
    addition, although the circuit court did not make a specific
    finding in this regard, when asked by the circuit court whether
    more time would assist the jury in reaching a unanimous verdict
    on Counts I, III, and IV, the jury responded, “[n]o, the jury has
    unanimously decided that more time will not help.”
    Because the two trials for this case ended in a
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    mistrial when the jurors were evenly split and unable to reach a
    unanimous decision on Counts I, III, and IV, the circuit court
    did not “exceed the bounds of reason” in concluding that the
    second Moriwake factor weighed “only slightly for the allowance
    of a retrial” (COL No. 4).
    c.    The Character of Prior Trials in Terms of Length,
    Complexity, and Similarity of Evidence Presented
    The circuit court concluded that the third Moriwake
    factor “argue[s] very strongly against a retrial” (COL No. 5).
    A comparison between the evidence presented, witnesses
    testifying, and legal theories argued in each trial are relevant
    to the third Moriwake factor.       See Moriwake, 65 Haw. at 49, 57,
    
    647 P.2d at 708, 713
    .     Relevant considerations can include, for
    example, the complexity of a trial and whether a case turns on
    credibility.    Hinton, 120 Hawai#i at 279, 
    204 P.3d at 498
    .
    Accordingly, the circuit court’s factual findings
    relevant to this conclusion are as follows:          both trials lasted
    approximately eight days, which was “somewhat long for criminal
    trials” (FOF Nos. 2, 12, 26); although both trials involved “a
    lot of witnesses [and] a lot of evidence, . . . at their core,
    the cases were credibility contests and not complex” (FOF No.
    26); and the second trial involved an additional “alleged
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    eyewitness”12 to Duckworth’s murder, which “did not appear to
    make a difference because the jury still voted six jurors for not
    guilty and six jurors for guilty” (FOF No. 26).           In addition, at
    the May 18, 2011 hearing on Deguair’s motions, the circuit court
    stated that “the single most important factor in the court’s view
    is that these were–-it’s not a complex case . . . .            It’s
    credibility at its core.”
    With respect to the murder and related firearm charges,
    the issues boil down to whether the jury believed Teo’s story,
    that Deguair shot and killed Duckworth even though no duct tape
    was found on his body, or Deguair’s story, that Teo murdered
    Duckworth.    Given the circuit court’s consideration of the
    similarities between both trials with respect to the legal
    theories, evidence presented, and witnesses who testified, and
    its finding that the case was not complex and turned on
    credibility, the circuit court did not “exceed the bounds of
    reason” in concluding that the third Moriwake factor “argue[s]
    very strongly against a retrial” (COL No. 5).
    12
    In opposition to Deguair’s Second Motion to Dismiss, the State
    contended that the second trial differed from the first because two additional
    witnesses–-James and Woo–-testified for the State in the second trial.
    Although the circuit court did not make a finding regarding James in the
    second trial, the State does not challenge the absence of such finding in its
    Application. Regardless, James’s testimony was not highly significant and,
    similar to Woo’s, apparently did not appear to make a difference.
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    d.    The Likelihood of Any Substantial Difference in a
    Subsequent Trial, if Allowed
    The circuit court concluded that the fourth Moriwake
    factor “argues very strongly against a retrial” (COL No. 6).
    This court has indicated that whether the evidence
    submitted in a subsequent trial would be substantially different
    from prior trials is relevant to this factor.          Hinton, 120
    Hawai#i at 279, 
    204 P.3d at 498
    .
    In opposition to Deguair’s Second Motion to Dismiss,
    the State explained its intention to submit fingerprint evidence
    that was permitted during the first but not the second trial and
    to again attempt to consolidate Deguair’s case with another that
    supposedly linked Deguair to a 2007 home robbery.           In its
    Application, the State does not raise any arguments regarding new
    evidence it might propose to introduce at a subsequent trial.
    The circuit court concluded, “[a]dditional evidence
    that the State proposes to offer in the third trial in the
    Court’s view would not make a difference, and the Court finds no
    cogent reasons for changing earlier pretrial rulings relating to
    evidence and [denial of] consolidation of cases, thus the
    evidence in the third trial would be substantially the same as
    the second trial” (FOF No. 27), and “[t]here was no substantial
    likelihood of a substantial difference in the result of a
    retrial” (FOF No. 28).
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    In sum, the circuit court fully considered the evidence
    that the State proposed to introduce in a subsequent trial and
    concluded that the fourth Moriwake factor weighs “very strongly
    against a retrial.”        This conclusion is consistent with the
    record.
    e.    The Relative Case Strength
    The circuit court concluded that the fifth Moriwake
    factor “argues very strongly against a retrial” (COL No. 7).
    Under this factor, the trial court may evaluate the
    evidence.      See Hinton, 120 Hawai#i at 279-280, 
    204 P.3d at
    498-
    99.
    The circuit court found as follows:
    29. The State had significant problems with the
    quality of its evidence even though it was able to
    present the testimony of the two alleged eyewitnesses
    to the murder who in one sense essentially testified
    consistent with each other about the circumstances of
    murder, but directly contradicted each other as to
    their alleged involvement with the defendant in the
    murder. There was also strong evidence of defendant’s
    alleged motive to murder Jermaine Duckworth, and
    corroborating evidence that the defendant rented the
    car in another person’s name and washed it twice after
    the murder.
    30. However, the crux of the State’s problem with the
    quality of its evidence was that based on both Teo’s
    and Woo’s testimony, Jermaine Duckworth was presumably
    still taped with duct tape when the defendant
    allegedly shot Duckworth and pushed him off the cliff
    at Yokohama Bay, yet there was no tape on Jermaine
    Duckworth’s body, or any other evidence consistent
    with Teo’s and Woo’s testimony, explaining why no tape
    was found on Jermaine Duckworth, or what happened to
    the duct tape.
    At trial, Deguair admitted that he placed duct tape on
    Duckworth.      Two other witnesses testified that they saw Deguair
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    place duct tape on Duckworth.        In addition, Teo and Woo both
    testified that they saw Deguair and Duckworth walking down the
    stairs together, and that Duckworth was bound with duct tape.
    Yet, both Teo and Woo testified that they did not see anyone
    remove the duct tape from Duckworth, and Teo testified that
    Duckworth was still bound when he was allegedly shot and
    murdered.    No party disputes that there was no duct tape on
    Duckworth’s body when he was found dead at Yokohama Bay.
    Because the circuit court evaluated the State’s case
    and concluded that it was not strong enough to merit another
    trial when weighed against fundamental fairness to the defendant,
    the circuit court did not “exceed the bounds of reason” in
    concluding that this factor weighs heavily against retrial.
    f.    The Professional Conduct and Diligence of
    Respective Counsel, Particularly that of the
    Prosecuting Attorney
    With respect to the sixth Moriwake factor, the circuit
    court found:
    The State’s prosecutor is an excellent prosecutor, one
    of the best prosecutors in the prosecutor’s office,
    and diligently and professionally presented the
    State’s case to the jury. No other prosecutor from
    the prosecutor’s office would have done better in
    presenting the State’s case to the jury.
    (COL No. 31).
    The circuit court concluded that the sixth Moriwake
    factor “argue[s] very strongly against a retrial” (COL No. 8).
    Because neither party challenged the circuit court’s analysis of
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    the sixth Moriwake factor, we need not address or disturb it
    here.
    In conclusion, the ICA correctly concluded that the
    circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing with
    prejudice Counts I, III, and IV under Moriwake.
    B.     Deguair’s Application
    Deguair presents the following questions:
    1) Did the Intermediate Court of Appeals Gravely Err
    in Ruling That a Retrial of the Count Two Kidnapping
    Charge Was Not Barred by Double Jeopardy?
    2) Did the Intermediate Court of Appeals Gravely Err
    in Failing to Address Whether the Trial Court Erred in
    Recalling the Jury?
    We hold that (1) the ICA did not err in concluding that
    retrial of Count II was not barred by double jeopardy, and (2)
    the ICA did not err in declining to address whether the circuit
    court erred in recalling the jury.
    1.    The retrial of Count II was not barred by double
    jeopardy
    Deguair argues that once the jury was discharged in
    open court on April 5, 2011, double jeopardy barred the State
    from subjecting Deguair to a third trial because the trial court
    erroneously found that there was manifest necessity for a
    mistrial in Count Two.
    The State responds that double jeopardy does not bar
    retrial.     The State adopts the ICA’s reasoning that Deguair’s
    double jeopardy argument was without merit because Deguair
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    conceded there was manifest necessity to declare a mistrial on
    Count II by arguing that the circuit court should vacate Count II
    because of juror misconduct.       The State further argues that
    Deguair “consented to the trial court’s declaration of mistrial
    on count II” by explicitly agreeing with the circuit court’s
    position on Count II, not objecting when the circuit court
    reiterated its intention to declare a mistrial, and not objecting
    after the circuit court declared a mistrial.
    Generally, under the double jeopardy clauses of the
    United States and Hawai#i constitutions, “a defendant may not be
    put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.”          State v. Wilmer, 97
    Hawai#i 238, 243, 
    35 P.3d 755
    , 760 (2001) (citing U.S. Const.
    amends. V & XIV; Hawai#i Const. art. I, § 10).
    This court has “described the purpose underlying the
    prohibition against double jeopardy” as follows:
    The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in
    at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence,
    is that the State with all its resources and power
    should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
    convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
    subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
    and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
    anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
    possibility that even though innocent he may be found
    guilty.
    State v. Quitog, 85 Hawai#i 128, 140, 
    938 P.2d 559
    , 571 (1997)
    (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Scott, 
    437 U.S. 82
    , 87-88 (1978)).
    This court has also “recognized that there are three
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    separate and distinct aspects to the protections offered by the
    double jeopardy clause.”      Quitog, 85 Hawai#i at 141, 
    938 P.2d at 572
     (quoting State v. Ontiveros, 82 Hawai#i 446, 450, 
    923 P.2d 388
    , 392 (1996)).    Thus, “[d]ouble jeopardy protects individuals
    against:   (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after
    acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after
    conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.”
    Quitog, 85 Hawai#i at 141, 
    938 P.2d at 572
     (internal quotations
    marks omitted) (quoting Ontiveros, 82 Hawai#i at 450, 
    923 P.2d at 392
    ).
    “However, even when a trial ends without a judgment, a
    defendant’s constitutional right to ‘have his trial completed by
    a particular tribunal’ still exists.”         Quitog, 85 Hawai#i at 141,
    
    938 P.2d at 572
     (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 
    434 U.S. 497
    , 503
    (1977)).
    The reasons why this “valued right” merits
    constitutional protection are worthy of repetition.
    Even if the first trial is not completed, a second
    prosecution may be grossly unfair. It increases the
    financial and emotional burden on the accused,
    prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized by an
    unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may even
    enhance the risk that an innocent bystander may be
    convicted. The danger of such unfairness to the
    defendant exists whenever a trial is aborted before it
    is completed. Consequently, as a general rule, the
    prosecutor is entitled to one, and only one,
    opportunity to require an accused to stand trial.
    Quitog, 85 Hawai#i at 141, 
    938 P.2d at 572
     (emphases in original)
    (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 503-05).
    Nonetheless, “retrial is not automatically barred [by
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    the double jeopardy clause] when a criminal proceeding is
    terminated without finally resolving the merits of the charges
    against the accused.”     State v. Lam, 
    75 Haw. 195
    , 199-200, 
    857 P.2d 585
    , 588-89 (1993) (brackets original to Lam, quotation
    marks omitted) (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 505).
    Because of the variety of circumstances that may make
    it necessary to discharge a jury before a trial is
    concluded, and because those circumstances do not
    invariably create unfairness to the accused, his
    valued right to have the trial be concluded by a
    particular tribunal is sometimes subordinate to the
    public interest in affording the prosecutor one full
    and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an
    impartial jury.
    Moriwake, 65 Haw. at 52, 
    647 P.2d at
    710 (citing Washington, 434
    U.S. at 505).
    “Case law requires a balance between the rights of the
    accused and the public interest.          Both are vitally important to
    our judicial system, and each must be considered in the context
    of a trial court’s rulings.”       Quitog, 85 Hawai#i at 142, 
    938 P.2d at 573
     (quoting Lam, 85 Hawai#i 128, 75 Haw. at 199-200, 
    857 P.2d at 588-89
    ).
    Accordingly, “[a] mistrial is properly declared and
    retrial is not barred by the defendant’s right against double
    jeopardy where the defendant consented to the mistrial or there
    was manifest necessity for the mistrial.”         Wilmer, 97 Hawai#i at
    242-43, 
    35 P.3d at 759-60
    .
    In essence, the ICA concluded that even though the
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    circuit court was unaware of the juror misconduct at the time it
    declared the mistrial on Count II, the subsequent discovery of
    such misconduct could justify the mistrial on the grounds of
    manifest necessity.     However, we do not need to rely on that
    ground because the record establishes that Deguair consented to
    the mistrial.
    For purposes of double jeopardy, consent may be express
    or implied.   Lam, 75 Haw. at 201-02, 
    857 P.2d at 589
    .              This court
    has held, “[e]xplicit consent arises when a defendant voluntarily
    moves or argues for a mistrial.        In such a situation, the
    defendant may be retried.”      
    Id.
        In the case at bar, Deguair did
    not voluntarily move or argue for a mistrial before the circuit
    court declared a mistrial on Count II on April 5, 2011.
    Therefore, there was no express consent.
    To determine whether a defendant impliedly consented to
    a mistrial, “[t]he actions of a defendant and the facts of a case
    must be examined.”     Id. at 202, 
    857 P.2d at 589
    .        This court has
    noted:
    [e]xamples of cases where waiver has been found
    include those where the defendant failed to raise a
    double jeopardy claim at trial, or in a timely manner;
    where a defendant pleaded no contest to a criminal
    charge; where a defendant sought a continuance at
    trial; where a defendant chose to oppose prosecution’s
    motion to consolidate; and when a defendant sought a
    new trial after being convicted.
    State v. Miyazaki, 
    64 Haw. 611
    , 618-19, 
    645 P.2d 1340
    , 1346
    (1982) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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    Further, “[t]hese waiver cases underscore the necessity
    of examining the particular facts of a case in determining
    whether waiver of a defendant’s double jeopardy right has
    occurred.”    Id. at 619, 
    645 P.2d at 1346
    .       Accordingly, “this
    court will not find waiver of constitutional rights readily but
    will carefully scrutinize facts of a case to determine if waiver
    has occurred.”    Id. at 620, 
    645 P.2d at 1347
    .
    During jury deliberations in the case at bar, the
    circuit court, without objection from either party, erroneously
    informed the jury in response to jury Communication No. 6 that a
    unanimous response was required for all three interrogatories
    before it could submit a verdict on Count II.          After the jury
    informed the circuit court that it was unable to reach a
    unanimous response for the second interrogatory, the circuit
    court informed the parties that a mistrial would be declared on
    Count II.    Again, neither party objected at that time.
    After the jury was called back into the courtroom, and
    the foreperson delivered what it “believe[d] to be [its]
    verdict,” the circuit court called both counsel to the bench.
    The circuit court stated that because the jury was unable to
    reach a unanimous verdict as to Count II, it would not “receive
    the verdict as to Count II.”       Although the State contended that a
    positive response as to only one of the three interrogatories was
    sufficient, when the circuit court asked for Deguair’s position,
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    Deguair explicitly “agree[d] with the court’s position” that to
    accept a verdict on Count II, a unanimous response was required
    for all three interrogatories.       In the presence of the jury, the
    circuit court declared a mistrial on Count II based on “manifest
    necessity.”   Deguair did not object.       The circuit court then
    scheduled the retrial, and Deguair did not object.
    Thus, the circuit court informed Deguair of its plan
    to declare a mistrial because the jurors could not reach a
    unanimous response for all of the interrogatories, and when asked
    for his position, Deguair expressly agreed with that plan.             Under
    these circumstances, Deguair consented to the circuit court’s
    declaration of a mistrial.
    Deguair cites to two cases to support his argument that
    retrial on Count II is barred by double jeopardy, State v. Lam,
    
    75 Haw. 195
    , 
    857 P.2d 585
     (1993), and People v. McGee, 
    636 N.W.2d 531
     (Mich. App. 2001).      However, they are distinguishable from
    the case at bar.
    In Lam, the prosecutor, after failing to elicit certain
    testimony from a witness at trial, spoke to the witness during a
    recess.   75 Haw. at 197-98, 
    857 P.2d at 587-88
    .          The trial court
    stated in a bench conference that it was “forced” to declare a
    mistrial, and indicated it would announce its ruling after a
    recess.   Id. at 203, 
    857 P.2d at 590
    .        After the recess, the
    trial court declared a mistrial, and defense counsel subsequently
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    stated that such a ruling “would be over the objections of the
    defense[.]”    
    Id.
       Lam was subsequently re-charged, and Lam moved
    to dismiss the charge based on double jeopardy grounds.            Id. at
    119, 
    857 P.2d at 588
    .     At a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the
    motions judge granted the motion and denied the prosecution’s
    motion for reconsideration.       
    Id.
    This court rejected the prosecution’s argument that Lam
    impliedly consented to the mistrial by remaining silent when the
    trial court “first considered a mistrial[.]”          Id. at 202, 
    857 P.2d at 590
    .    This court concluded that “Lam had no duty to
    object to the mistrial prior to the recess[,]” and explained that
    “Lam provided the court with an alternative to declaring a
    mistrial by requesting that [the witness’s] testimony be
    stricken.    In addition, Lam voiced his objection to the court’s
    declaration of a mistrial.      He had no further duty.”        Id. at 203,
    
    857 P.2d at 590
    .
    This court also rejected the prosecution’s argument
    that Lam impliedly consented to the mistrial by “call[ing] the
    prosecution’s discussion with [the witness] to the court’s
    attention.”    Id. at 204, 
    857 P.2d at 590
    .       This court reasoned
    that Lam “coupled his revelation to the [trial] court with a
    request to limit [the witness’s] testimony[,]” which could
    “hardly raise the implication of consent.”          
    Id.
    Lam is distinguishable from the case at bar because
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    here, Deguair did not offer an alternative course to declaration
    of a mistrial.    Instead, when asked for his position, Deguair
    expressly agreed with the circuit court’s plan.
    In McGee, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the
    trial court erroneously declared a mistrial on the grounds that
    an alternate juror was present during jury deliberations.             
    636 N.W.2d at 540
    .    The court further held that retrial was barred by
    double jeopardy because the defendant did not “explicitly
    indicate[] consent to the mistrial, and we will not presume
    consent in the absence of an affirmative showing.”           
    Id. at 537
    .
    The defendant “neither objected to nor agreed with the court’s
    conclusion that a mistrial was warranted.”          
    Id.
       However, on
    appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held that because “[t]he
    record in this case reveals circumstances from which consent to
    the circuit court’s declaration of a mistrial can be inferred
    . . . . [,] retrial is not barred by the constitutional
    protection against double jeopardy.”        McGee, 670 N.W.2d at 665.
    Therefore, the final disposition in McGee provides no support for
    Deguair’s argument that retrial is barred by double jeopardy.
    In sum, because Deguair impliedly consented to a
    mistrial, retrial is not barred by double jeopardy.
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    2.    The ICA did not err in declining to address whether the
    circuit court erred in recalling the jury
    Deguair argues that the ICA should have addressed
    whether the circuit court erred in recalling the jury.            Deguair
    contends that because the circuit court did not have authority to
    recall the jury, the circuit court should have disregarded its
    error in not accepting a guilty verdict as to Count II and should
    have instead analyzed Count II under Moriwake as if the jury was
    deadlocked on Count II.
    Deguair’s argument that the circuit court should have
    dismissed Count II under Moriwake as if the jury was deadlocked
    on Count II fails.     Before the circuit court recalled the jury
    for purposes of polling the jury, the circuit court realized it
    had erred in not accepting the guilty verdict on Count II.             The
    verdict form, which on its face showed that the jury had returned
    a unanimous verdict of guilty as to Count II and unanimous
    responses for two of the three interrogatories, confirmed that
    the circuit court had erred.       Thus, regardless of whether the
    circuit court had authority to recall the jury for purposes of
    polling the jury, the circuit court was not required to disregard
    its error and analyze Deguair’s Motion to Vacate and Dismiss
    Count II as if the jury was actually deadlocked as to Count II.
    Thus, whether the circuit court had authority to recall the jury
    for purposes of polling the jury is irrelevant to whether the
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    circuit court correctly ordered a retrial on Count II based on
    the juror misconduct.
    Further, the circuit court did not err in ordering a
    retrial on Count II.     This court has held that “[a] fair trial by
    an impartial jury is guaranteed to the criminally accused by both
    the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution and article
    I, § 14 of the Hawai#i Constitution.        Inherent in this
    requirement is that the jury be free from outside influences.”
    State v. Williamson, 
    72 Haw. 97
    , 102, 
    807 P.2d 593
    , 596 (1991).
    “The defendant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie
    showing of a deprivation that ‘could substantially prejudice [his
    or her] right to a fair trial’ by an impartial jury.”            State v.
    Chin, 135 Hawai#i 437, 443, 
    353 P.3d 979
    , 985 (2015) (emphasis
    and brackets in original) (quoting Williamson, 72 Haw. at 102,
    
    807 P.2d at 596
    ).    “Once the defendant makes a prima facie
    showing of a deprivation, ‘a rebuttable presumption of prejudice
    is raised.’”   
    Id.
     (quoting Williamson, 72 Haw. at 102, 
    807 P.2d at 596
    ).   “To overcome the presumption of prejudice, the State
    must prove that the outside influence on the jury was harmless
    beyond a reasonable doubt.”       Id. at 448, 353 P.3d at 990 (citing
    Williamson, 72 Haw. at 102, 
    807 P.2d at 596
    ).          In cases involving
    prejudicial juror misconduct, a retrial is an appropriate remedy.
    See, e.g., id. at 449, 353 P.3d at 991 (vacating the judgment of
    conviction and sentence and remanding to the circuit court for a
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    new trial because the defendant’s fundamental right to a fair
    trial by an impartial jury was compromised); Williamson, 72 Haw.
    at 104, 
    807 P.2d at 597
     (remanding for a new trial because the
    juror misconduct at issue was not harmless beyond a reasonable
    doubt).
    In its Order re Motion to Vacate and Dismiss Count II,
    the circuit court concluded:
    [T]he Court does not conclude as a matter of law that
    the jury misconduct and the resulting statements that
    were injected into the deliberations were harmless
    beyond a reasonable doubt given the totality of the
    circumstances of the trial and the jury’s
    deliberation.
    (COL No. 16)
    The circuit court further concluded that Deguair’s
    conviction on Count II should be vacated.         Neither party
    challenged these conclusions in the ICA or this court.
    Because it is undisputed that the jury misconduct in
    the case at bar was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the
    circuit court correctly ordered a retrial on Count II.
    Consistent with Hawai#i case law, Deguair conceded that a new
    trial is the appropriate remedy for prejudicial juror misconduct
    by stating in his Motion to Vacate and Dismiss Count II,
    “Defendant respectfully submits that even standing alone each of
    the improper instances of jury behavior described above warrant
    vacating the kidnapping conviction and granting a new trial on
    the kidnapping count.”
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    In sum, because the circuit court correctly ordered a
    retrial based on juror misconduct, whether the circuit court had
    the authority to recall the jury is moot.         Therefore, the ICA did
    not err in declining to address whether the circuit court erred
    in recalling the jury.
    IV.   Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the October 24,
    2014 judgment of the ICA.
    Donn Fudo for                      /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
    petitioner-respondent
    /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
    Dwight C.H. Lum for
    respondent-petitioner              /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
    /s/ Richard W. Pollack
    /s/ Michael D. Wilson
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