Collins v. Wassell. , 133 Haw. 34 ( 2014 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-30070
28-FEB-2014
07:46 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
COLLEEN P. COLLINS, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
JOHN A. WASSELL, Respondent/Defendant-Appellee.
SCWC-30070
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(ICA NO. 30070; FC-D NO. 07-1-0206)
FEBRUARY 28, 2014
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, AND McKENNA, JJ., WITH ACOBA, J.,
CONCURRING SEPARATELY, AND POLLACK, J., DISSENTING SEPARATELY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.
In June 2000, Colleen Collins and John Wassell gathered
at a park with their friends, families, and a minister, for the
apparent purpose of getting married. After the wedding ceremony,
the couple began having second thoughts about the marriage
because of its financial implications. Specifically, they
believed that Collins and her two daughters would be better able
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to afford college tuition if Collins was listed as a single
parent on financial aid applications. Thus, the couple requested
that the minister not submit the completed license and
certificate of marriage to the State Department of Health. The
minister returned the form to Collins and Wassell, and they
subsequently wrote to the State Department of Health stating that
they were not getting married.
Following a one-week honeymoon, Collins and Wassell
began living together. They each maintained individual financial
accounts, but also shared a joint bank account. The couple
deposited monetary gifts from their wedding into the joint
account and they each agreed to deposit funds into the account.
Collins made regular monthly deposits to the joint account.
Collins also deposited funds from the sale of her separately
owned townhouse and a tax refund into the joint account. Funds
from the joint account were used to pay off the mortgage on
Wassell’s separately owned house, and for the couple’s shared
utility and grocery bills. The couple legally married in January
2005, after Collins no longer needed financial aid to fund her
daughters’ college educations.
In 2007, Collins filed for divorce against Wassell, and
argued that she was entitled to an equalization payment for her
contributions during the period of premarital cohabitation.
Wassell, however, maintained that an equalization payment was not
warranted because he and Collins had agreed that they would each
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maintain separate financial identities until the time of their
legal marriage. The family court agreed with Wassell and
determined that the couple did not form a premarital economic
partnership within the meaning of Helbush v. Helbush, 108 Hawai#i
508, 122 P.3d 288 (App. 2005).1 The Intermediate Court of
Appeals affirmed the divorce decree entered by the family court,
and Collins sought review in this court.
For the reasons set forth below, we now affirm the rule
set forth in Helbush, that, in dividing and distributing property
of a married couple pursuant to Hawai#i Revised Statutes (HRS)
section 580-47, premarital contributions are a relevant
consideration where the parties cohabited and formed a premarital
economic partnership. We further hold that the family court
clearly erred in concluding that Collins and Wassell did not form
a premarital economic partnership. We therefore vacate the
judgment of the ICA and the family court’s divorce decree and
remand to the family court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Because our resolution of these two issues is
dispositive, we do not consider Collins’s arguments that: (1) in
the absence of a premarital economic partnership the family court
should have nevertheless considered her premarital contributions;
1
As discussed further infra, the Intermediate Court of Appeals
determined in Helbush that “a ‘premarital economic partnership’ occurs when,
prior to their subsequent marriage, [two people] cohabit and apply their
financial resources as well as their individual energies and efforts to and
for the benefit of each other’s person, assets, and liabilities.” 108 Hawai#i
at 515, 122 P.3d at 295.
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and (2) premarital contributions are a valid and relevant
consideration warranting deviation from partnership principles.
I. Background
The following factual background is taken from the
record on appeal.
A. Family Court Proceedings
On August 8, 2007, Collins filed a complaint for
divorce against Wassell, alleging that their marriage was
irretrievably broken. In her position statement, Collins stated
that she should be awarded an equalization payment for her
contributions during the couple’s premarital cohabitation:
Cohabitation occurred on June 18, 2000 when
[Wassell] moved into [Collins’s townhouse]. [Wassell]
did not pay [Collins’s] mortgage at that time although
he was receiving rent from his house. From the time
of cohabitation until the date of marriage, the
parties had a joint financial relationship where
[Collins] paid off the mortgage in the marital house,
previously owned by [Wassell] and continued to pay
into the joint account from where joint bills were
paid. Although[] marriage did not occur until 2005
equalization is due [Collins] for the amount of:
$74,122.00. [Collins] is further entitled to her
prorata rental equity due to [Wassell’s] sole use of
the marital home during separation.
(Emphasis added).
After Wassell filed an answer, he filed a motion for
partial summary judgment, requesting that the family court
determine the following: (1) the couple was married on
January 19, 2005; (2) the couple agreed after their wedding
ceremony on June 19, 2000, that they would not file their
marriage license and would not be married; (3) the purpose of the
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couple not filing their marriage license was to allow Collins to
complete financial aid forms as a single parent; and (4) the
couple’s “arrangement, whereby the partners would cohabitate but
keep their finances separate while maintaining their single
status . . . in lieu of a traditional marriage indefinitely and
expressly for [Collins’s] personal financial interest” was a
valid and enforceable premarital agreement.
Collins filed an opposition to Wassell’s motion arguing
that pursuant to the ICA’s decision in Helbush, she and Wassell
had formed a premarital economic partnership after their 2000
wedding ceremony. The family court granted the motion in part,
determining that Wassell’s and Collins’s date of marriage (DOM)
was January 19, 2005, but denied the motion as to the remaining
issues.
Wassell argued in his position statement the following:
[Collins] argues for deviation from the
Partnership Model division based upon DOM [(]January
19, 2005) valuations. [Collins’s] argument is based
upon a June 18, 2000 marriage ceremony which she put
on for show. Although [Wassell] thought that the
marriage was taking place, at the post-ceremony
reception [Collins] told [Wassell] that she did not
want the marriage for financial reasons. [Collins’s]
daughters were about to attend prestigious colleges[.]
. . . [Collins] would need financial aid to pay for
the $30,000 plus annual cost. If [Collins] was
married the financial aid available would be less.
[Collins] wanted to keep their finances separate so
she could complete the financial aid forms showing her
separate individual income and expenses. [Wassell]
agreed not to be married on June 18, 2000 and to keep
their finances separate.
It is [Wassell’s] position that there was no
joint financial relationship from June 18, 2000, as
[Collins] contends. It is [Wassell’s] position that
they loved each other and wanted to live together.
When they lived together as gestures of their love
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they bought each other meals, and shared their living
arrangements and helped each other in various ways.
A one-day trial was held on the division of the
parties’ marital estate. Collins and Wassell were the only two
witnesses to testify and they testified in relevant part as
follows.
Collins testified that, on June 18, 2000, she and
Wassell had a wedding ceremony with their friends, families, and
a minister. After the ceremony, the couple signed the marriage
license, but neither Collins nor Wassell mailed the marriage
license to the State Department of Health because Collins “was
afraid that [her] daughters would lose a lot of financial aid
that they were receiving for college.” Specifically, Collins was
concerned that the colleges would consider both her and Wassell’s
incomes in determining financial aid awards for her daughters if
she were married. Wassell told Collins that he thought her
daughters should pay their own way through college. Collins did
not believe that it was Wassell’s responsibility to help pay for
her daughters’ college educations.
Collins further testified that, following their
honeymoon, for a few weeks the couple moved back and forth
between Collins’s separately owned townhouse and Wassell’s
separately owned house. Wassell then moved into Collins’s
townhouse. Wassell moved all of his furniture into the
townhouse, but left some appliances in his house. While the
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couple was living at the townhouse, Wassell did not pay any part
of the mortgage nor did he pay rent to Collins. Collins paid for
all of the townhouse’s utilities. Collins acknowledged that
Wassell may have done small things around the townhouse, but
testified that he did not make any major repairs. While Wassell
was living in Collins’s townhouse, he was able to rent out his
house.
Collins testified that, even though they were not
legally married between June 2000 and January 2005, she and
Wassell conducted their finances as if they were married.
Specifically, Collins testified that although she and Wassell
agreed to maintain their individual bank accounts, they also
agreed to contribute to a joint bank account, which would be used
to pay for shared living expenses. The monetary gifts the couple
received at their wedding ceremony, totaling $1,120, were
deposited into this joint account. Collins regularly deposited
between $500 and $700 a month into the joint account. Collins
also deposited a personal income tax refund totaling $1,043.60
into the joint account. According to Collins, Wassell made a few
contributions to the account.
Collins sold the townhouse in 2001, at which point the
couple moved into Wassell’s house. The money from the sale of
Collins’s townhouse, totaling $23,020.74, was deposited into the
joint account. On the same day that deposit was made, $4,239.59
from the joint account was used to pay off the mortgage on
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Wassell’s house. Funds from the joint account were also used to
pay for the utilities of Wassell’s house, the couple’s groceries,
and gas for Collins’s and Wassell’s vehicles. Collins and
Wassell continuously cohabited until their separation on
January 1, 2007. Collins testified that, as of 2004, all of her
friends thought that she was married.
Wassell testified that he made repairs and improvements
to Collins’s townhouse, such as replacing a water heater,
painting, and fixing the plumbing, louvered windows, and an
outdoor clothesline. Wassell acknowledged that Collins had paid
approximately $4,200 to pay off the mortgage on his house, and
testified that, after they were separated in 2007, he offered to
repay Collins the money.
With regard to the marriage license that was signed but
never submitted to the State Department of Health, Wassell
testified that Collins wanted to remain single for purposes of
completing the financial aid forms. Wassell further testified
that he and Collins therefore agreed to have separate finances.
According to Wassell, that agreement lasted until January 19,
2005, when he and Collins were officially married. At that
point, Collins no longer needed to submit financial aid
applications.
Wassell also testified that he made deposits into the
joint account, which was previously held in his name only.
Wassell explained that he and Collins set up the joint account so
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that they could both have access to its money, and so that bills
could be paid automatically from the account.
Wassell indicated that he (1) paid Collins $1,000 on
April 17, 2001, (2) paid for the propane, internet, and telephone
bills with funds from his separate bank account, and (3) paid for
food between ninety and ninety-five percent of the time that he
and Collins went out to eat.
The family court made the following relevant findings
of fact:
FINDINGS OF FACT
. . . .
16. Ms. Collins believed that if she were to marry
Mr. Wassell and disclose financial information
reflecting her change in financial status to the
two colleges, she would likely be unable to
afford the resulting tuition, with the
consequence that her daughters would not be able
to attend those colleges.
17. In order to avoid that consequence, Ms. Collins
and Mr. Wassell agreed that they would not mail
their marriage license and certificate to the
Department of Health, and that each of them
would maintain separate financial identities, so
that Ms. Collins could continue to qualify for
the financial aid she needed to send her
daughters to their schools of choice.
18. Ms. Collins believed that the financial
responsibility for sending her daughters to
college was hers alone, and that Mr. Wassell did
not share in that obligation, and for his part,
Mr. Wassell did not believe he was obligated to
assist Ms. Collins with the financial burden
arising from her daughters’ college education.
. . . .
21. Mr. Wassell owned a residence in Hawaiian
Paradise Park, and Ms. Collins owned a townhouse
in Pacific Heights.
22. For a time, the couple went back and forth
between the two residences, then settled on
living in Ms. Collins’[s] townhouse.
23. Mr. Wassell’s house in Paradise Park was rented
out during some portion of the time that the
couple lived in Ms. Collins’[s] townhouse.
24. The rent that Mr. Wassell received from the
rental of his residence in Hawaiian Paradise
Park was not shared with Ms. Collins.
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25. Mr. Wassell did not pay rent to Ms. Collins
during the period that the couple was living in
Ms. Collins’[s] townhouse.
26. Shortly after the apparent marriage in June of
2000, Ms. Collins’[s] name was added to an
account that Mr. Wassell had at CU Hawaii FCU,
and the account thereafter remained a joint
account.
27. The couple agreed that the joint account would
be used for household expenses; both were to
deposit funds in the account.
28. The couple received wedding gifts and gifts of
cash at their apparent wedding in June, 2000;
the cash gifts were deposited into the joint
credit union account.
29. Following her addition to the joint account, Ms.
Collins made regular monthly deposits, typically
in the amount of $500.00, into the joint
account.
30. Mr. Wassell made few, if any, deposits into the
joint account during the years 2000 through
2007.
31. The funds in the joint account were used
primarily for household expenses, i.e. food and
household utilities.
. . . .
47. On the date of the legal marriage on January 19,
2005, Ms. Collins was owed a debt by Mr. Wassell
in the amount of $4,239.59, which had been
incurred when Ms. Collins used her funds to pay
off the balance of Mr. Wassell’s mortgage in
December, 2001.
. . . .
67. On the [date of marriage (DOM)], [Collins] was
owed a debt with a [net market value (NMV)] of
$4,239.59 by [Wassell] (for the mortgage payoff
on the HPP property). On the [date of the
conclusion of the evidentiary part of trial
(DOCOEPOT)], this debt remained unpaid, and thus
unchanged in value. The DOM NMV of this debt is
[Collins’s] Category 1 asset.
. . . .
As relevant here, in its third conclusion of law, the
family court stated that “[b]etween the dates of June 18, 2000,
and January 19, 2005, the parties did not participate in an
‘economic partnership’ within the meaning of Helbush[], and the
division of their marital assets by the court must therefore be
based upon the date of their legal marriage.” In summary, the
family court analyzed this issue as follows.
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The family court explained that, under Helbush,
cohabitation alone is insufficient to establish an economic
partnership. Specifically, the family court explained that
“there must be a commingling of finances, assets, and energies
sufficiently comprehensive to establish a ‘partnership.’” The
family court stated that “there is no such thing, for these
purposes, as a ‘partial partnership.’” In this regard, the
family court explained that “[p]arties who are emotionally
involved with one another and who are cohabiting must inevitably
[commingle] their energies and finances to some extent — the
exigencies of normal life and collective activity could scarcely
allow it to be otherwise.” Thus, the family court observed,
“some measure of such commingling is to be expected in every
instance of cohabitation, and does not by its mere existence rise
to the level necessary to establish a Helbush ‘economic
partnership.’”
The family court then evaluated whether Collins and
Wassell had “committed their energies and their assets to one
another’s purposes to the extent necessary to warrant a
conclusion that they were engaged in a relationship akin to that
found in a business partnership.” The family court stated that
although Collins and Wassell “quite explicitly commingled a
portion of their funds for housekeeping purposes,” they also
“simultaneously maintained distinct separate financial
identities.”
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The family court explained that the most obvious
example of Collins’s and Wassell’s separate financial identities
was the couple’s conscious decision not to make their first
marriage legal “for the express purpose of maintaining separate
financial identities.” The family court noted that Collins and
Wassell had two motives in agreeing not to be married. First,
Collins sought to take full advantage of the financial aid
available to her, and, second, Wassell “could refrain from
shouldering any share of that not insignificant burden.” The
family court stated that “[f]ar from reflecting the parties’
intention to ‘apply their financial resources to and for the
benefit of each other’s persons, assets, and liabilities,’” these
facts reflected “the parties’ express intention not to do so.”
(Citation and ellipsis omitted).
The family court specifically noted that Collins
represented in her financial aid applications that she was
single, and that Collins and Wassell signed a letter to the State
Department of Health representing that they had decided not to be
married. The family court further noted that both Collins and
Wassell maintained separate individual checking, savings, and
retirement accounts, and life insurance policies, and that
Collins and Wassell each appeared to hold title to their own
vehicle.
With respect to the joint account, the family court
observed that Collins was the primary, if not the exclusive,
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contributor to the account, and that Collins’s monthly deposits
were “obviously insufficient to pay the living expenses of two
adults.” The family court concluded that the “joint account no
doubt reflected a measure of financial cooperation by the
parties, but it seems wholly inadequate to carry the weight of
establishing an economic partnership between them.”
Based on its findings and conclusions, the family court
divided the marital estate and concluded that under a strict
application of marital partnership principles, Collins would owe
Wassell an equalization payment of $11,807.85. However, because
Wassell had wasted assets after the family court’s express order
to the contrary, the court concluded that Collins was entitled to
a deviation in the amount of $17,238.05. Accordingly, the family
court ordered Wassell to pay a final equalization payment of
$5,430.20, the difference between the deviation and Collins’s
equalization payment.
The family court filed its divorce decree, and Collins
appealed.
B. ICA Appeal
On appeal, Collins argued that the family court
incorrectly valued the parties’ financial contributions on the
date of marriage.2 Instead, Collins argued, the family court
2
Collins challenged Findings of Fact Nos. 17, 18, and 67, which are
set forth above, as well as several Findings of Fact (Nos. 68, 70, 71, 73-76,
78-80, and 82) that valued various assets as of the date of marriage. She
also challenged Conclusion of Law No. 3, and the family court’s decision. The
(continued...)
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should have concluded that Collins and Wassell formed a
premarital economic partnership on the date of their wedding
ceremony, and should have calculated the value of the parties’
assets and any equalization payments based on that date. Collins
asserted that the majority of the family court’s findings
supported a conclusion that the parties had formed a premarital
economic partnership. Collins argued that the family court’s
finding that the parties initially agreed not to become legally
married in order to avoid negative financial aid consequences for
Collins’s daughters did not void this premarital economic
partnership.
A majority of the ICA affirmed the family court’s
divorce decree. The ICA “decline[d] to overturn” the family
court’s determination that Collins and Wassell had not formed a
premarital economic partnership, noting that the factors the
family court cited in support of its decision “were relevant to
evaluating the parties’ intent and the degree to which they
applied their resources and efforts ‘to and for the benefit of
each other’s person, assets, and liabilities.’” In addition, the
ICA concluded that the family court’s decision was based on
2
(...continued)
ICA concluded that Findings of Fact 17, 18, and 67 were not clearly erroneous,
and that the remaining challenged factual findings were not erroneous because
the family court determined that Collins and Wassell had not entered into a
premarital economic partnership. The ICA therefore concluded that the date of
marriage was the relevant date for valuing Wassell’s assets, dividing the
couple’s assets, and equalizing the parties’ obligations. Collins’s
application does not separately address these findings of fact.
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factual findings supported by substantial evidence. The ICA
further concluded that because no premarital economic partnership
was formed, it did not need to address Collins’s argument that
the family court erred in using the date of marriage in valuing
Wassell’s assets, dividing the parties’ assets, and equalizing
the parties’ obligations.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Reifurth stated that the
family court erred in failing to utilize the analysis required by
Helbush in determining that Collins and Wassell had not formed a
premarital economic partnership. Judge Reifurth noted that the
family court’s analysis focused on Collins’s and Wassell’s
attempt to maintain separate “financial identities,” which he
argued was not solely determinative of whether a premarital
economic partnership was formed. Specifically, Judge Reifurth
explained that:
The ultimate issues are whether, and the extent to
which, prior to the [date of marriage], the parties
applied their financial resources and individual
energies for each other’s person, assets, and
liabilities, not whether, and the extent to which, the
parties created joint bank accounts or added both of
their names to their cars’ titles. Thus, the thrust
of the Family Court’s inquiry must be to consider the
nature and degree of such application, and it must do
so adequately.
. . . .
I would vacate the Family Court’s conclusion of law
no. 3 [] that no premarital economic partnership was
formed because the court took into consideration
multiple irrelevant factors without considering
multiple relevant factors that focus less on the form
of the relationship and more on the day-to-day reality
of how it worked, when making its decision.
(Footnote omitted).
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II. Standard of Review
A. Family Court Decisions
The family court’s [findings of fact] are reviewed on
appeal under the “clearly erroneous” standard. A
[finding of fact] is clearly erroneous when (1) the
record lacks substantial evidence to support the
finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in
support of the finding, the appellate court is
nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. “Substantial evidence”
is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality
and probative value to enable a person of reasonable
caution to support a conclusion.
On the other hand, the family court’s [conclusions of
law] are reviewed on appeal de novo, under the
right/wrong standard. [Conclusions of law],
consequently, are []not binding upon an appellate
court and are freely reviewable for their correctness.
Kakinami v. Kakinami, 127 Hawai#i 126, 136, 276 P.3d 695, 705
(2012) (citations omitted).
IV. Discussion
In her application, Collins raises the following
question: whether the family court misapplied the premarital
cohabitation rule set out in Helbush in concluding that Collins
and Wassell had not entered into a premarital economic
partnership. We now affirm the rule set forth in Helbush, that,
in dividing and distributing property pursuant to HRS § 580-47,
premarital contributions are a relevant consideration where the
parties cohabited and formed a premarital economic partnership.
We further hold that the family court erred in concluding that
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Collins and Wassell did not form a premarital economic
partnership.3
A. An overview of Hawai#i’s property division scheme
In Hawai#i, “[t]here is no fixed rule for determining
the amount of property to be awarded each spouse in a divorce
action other than as set forth [in] HRS § 580-47.” Kakinami, 127
Hawai#i at 136-37, 276 P.3d at 705-06 (citing Tougas v. Tougas,
76 Hawai#i 19, 26, 868 P.2d 437, 444 (1994)). Under HRS § 580-
47, the family court has wide discretion to divide marital
property according to what is “just and equitable.” Tougas, 76
Hawai#i at 26, 868 P.2d at 444 (citing Gussin v. Gussin, 73 Haw.
470, 479, 836 P.2d 484, 489 (1992)).
As this court has explained, when the directive of the
court is to do what is just and equitable, each case must be
decided upon its own facts and circumstances. Gussin, 73 Haw. at
479, 836 P.2d at 489 (citing Carson v. Carson, 50 Haw. 182, 183,
436 P.2d 7, 9 (1967)). Of course, this discretion is not without
limitation. A grant of discretion means that “the court has a
range of choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as
long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any
3
In her application, Collins also raises two additional questions:
(1) whether the rule set forth in Helbush precludes the family court from
considering premarital contributions in the absence of a premarital economic
partnership; and (2) assuming that the parties did not enter into a premarital
economic partnership, did the ICA gravely err in not considering whether
Collins’s premarital contributions were a valid and relevant consideration
warranting deviation from the marital partnership categories. Insomuch as we
conclude that the family court erred in finding that Collins and Wassell did
not form a premarital economic partnership, we do not consider these
additional arguments.
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mistake of law.” Gussin, 73 Haw. at 479, 836 P.2d at 489(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To the extent
that a certain degree of uniformity, stability, clarity or
predictability of family court decisions can be attained, while
at the same time preserving the wide discretion mandated by HRS
§ 580–47, judges are compelled to apply the appropriate law to
the facts of each case and be guided by reason and conscience to
attain a just result.” Id. at 486, 836 P.2d at 492 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Consistent with the wide discretion bestowed on the
family court, HRS § 580-47 provides that upon granting a divorce,
the family court may “make any further orders as shall appear
just and equitable . . . finally dividing and distributing the
estate of the parties, real, personal, or mixed, whether
community, joint, or separate[.]” HRS § 580-47(a). Section 580-
47 further provides that in making these orders, the family court
shall consider the respective merits of the parties, the relative
abilities of the parties, the condition in which each party will
be left by the divorce, the burdens imposed upon either party for
the benefit of the children of the parties, the concealment of or
failure to disclose income or an asset, any violation of a
restraining order by either party, and all other circumstances of
the case. HRS § 580-47(a).
Cases in this jurisdiction have “created a framework
based on partnership principles that provides further guidance
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for family courts to use in dividing property upon divorce.”
Kakinami, 127 Hawai#i at 137, 276 P.3d at 706. In Gussin, this
court rejected the notion that the division and distribution of
the estates of parties must commence at uniform starting points.
73 Haw. at 486, 836 P.2d at 492. This court held that the
concept of uniform starting points “restrict[ed] the family
courts’ discretion in the equitable division and distribution of
parties’ estates.” Id. The court specifically rejected the
ICA’s “rebuttable presumptions” that bound a judge to presume
specific percentage splits in the division of each category of
property. Id. at 481, 836 P.2d at 490. This court instead
determined that “the ‘partnership model of marriage’ provides the
necessary guidance to the family courts in exercising their
discretion and to facilitate appellate review.” Id. at 486, 836
P.2d at 492. Specifically, the court noted:
This court has accepted the “time honored proposition
that marriage is a partnership to which both partners
bring their financial resources as well as their
individual energies and efforts.” The ICA has also
acknowledged that, in divorce proceedings regarding
division and distribution of the parties’ estate,
“partnership principles guide and limit the range of
the family court’s choices.”
Under general partnership law, “each partner is
entitled to be repaid his contributions to the
partnership property, whether made by way of capital
or advances.” Absent a legally permissible and
binding partnership agreement to the contrary,
“partners share equally in the profits of their
partnership, even though they may have contributed
unequally to capital or services.” Hawaii partnership
law provides in relevant part as follows:
Rules determining rights and duties of partners. The
rights and duties of the partners in relation to the
partnership shall be determined, subject to any
agreement between them, by the following rules:
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(a) Each partner shall be repaid the partner’s
contributions, whether by way of capital or advances
to the partnership property and share equally in the
profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities,
including those to partners, are satisfied; and must
contribute towards the losses, whether of capital or
otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to
the partner’s share in the profits.
Id. at 483-84, 836 P.2d at 491 (citations omitted).
In Tougas, this court again endorsed the “partnership
model” and noted that the family court can utilize the following
five categories of net market values as guidance in divorce
cases:
Category 1. The net market value (NMV), plus or
minus, of all property separately owned by one spouse
on the date of marriage (DOM) but excluding the NMV
attributable to property that is subsequently legally
gifted by the owner to the other spouse, to both
spouses, or to a third party.
Category 2. The increase in the NMV of all property
whose NMV on the DOM is included in category 1 and
that the owner separately owns continuously from the
DOM to the DOCOEPOT [date of the conclusion of the
evidentiary part of the trial].
Category 3. The date-of-acquisition NMV, plus or
minus, of property separately acquired by gift or
inheritance during the marriage but excluding the NMV
attributable to property that is subsequently legally
gifted by the owner to the other spouse, to both
spouses, or to a third party.
Category 4. The increase in the NMV of all property
whose NMV on the date of acquisition during the
marriage is included in category 3 and that the owner
separately owns continuously from the date of
acquisition to the DOCOEPOT.
Category 5. The difference between the NMVs, plus or
minus, of all property owned by one or both of the
spouses on the DOCOEPOT minus the NMVs, plus or minus,
includable in categories 1, 2, 3, and 4.
76 Hawai#i at 27, 868 P.2d at 445 (citation omitted).
The court in Tougas further noted that the NMVs in
Categories 1 and 3 are the parties’ “capital contributions” that
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are, pursuant to general partnership law, returned to each
spouse. Id. (citations omitted). Categories 2 and 4 are the
“during-the-marriage increase in NMVs of the Categories 1 and 3
Properties owned at DOCOEPOT[,]” which similar to partnership
profits, are generally to be shared equally. Id. Thus, these
cases establish that the “partnership model is the appropriate
law for the family courts to apply when exercising their
discretion in the adjudication of property division in divorce
proceedings.” Id. at 28, 868 P.2d at 446.
B. Premarital contributions are a relevant consideration in
dividing the marital estate
This case presents an issue of first impression for
this court, i.e., whether premarital contributions made during a
period of cohabitation are a relevant consideration in dividing
property pursuant to HRS § 580-47. A long line of ICA cases has
concluded that premarital contributions are relevant in dividing
the marital estate. For the reasons set forth below, we also
hold that premarital contributions may be considered by the
family court in dividing the martial estate when the parties
entered into a premarital economic partnership and cohabited
prior to marriage.
The proposition that parties may enter into an economic
partnership prior to marriage first appears to have been
recognized in Raupp v. Raupp, 3 Haw. App. 602, 609 n.7, 658 P.2d
329, 335 n.7 (1983). In Raupp, the ICA noted that “[w]here the
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parties first commenced an economic partnership and later
married, it may be appropriate to obtain [an itemized description
and value of all property owned by each party] as of the time
they commenced their economic partnership,” in dividing the
martial estate upon divorce. Id.; see also Higashi v. Higashi,
106 Hawai#i 228, 241, 103 P.3d 388, 401 (App. 2004) (noting that
the economic partnership begins on the earlier of the date of
marriage or the date the parties first commenced their economic
partnership that continued when they married). Raupp and Higashi
therefore stand for the general proposition that premarital
circumstances may be relevant in distributing property upon
divorce if the couple formed an economic partnership prior to
marriage.
In Malek v. Malek, 7 Haw. App. 377, 379, 768 P.2d 243,
246 (1989), the ICA held that the family court properly
considered contributions made by one spouse to the other spouse’s
separate property during the couple’s premarital cohabitation and
subsequent marriage. In Malek, the only major asset involved in
the divorce was the husband’s lease of a two-acre parcel of land
with a house on it. Id. at 378, 768 P.2d at 246. During a
sixteen-month period of premarital cohabitation, the couple lived
together on this property. Id. at 379, 768 P.2d at 245.
Although the husband provided all of the financial support for
the couple, and the wife was unemployed, the wife assisted in
upgrading the house. Id. at 379, 768 P.2d at 246. The family
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court valued the husband’s lease at $92,000 when the couple began
living together, $113,000 when the couple married, and $115,000
when the couple separated in contemplation of divorce. Id. at
378, 768 P.2d at 245. As part of its property division, the
family court awarded the wife five percent (i.e., $6,650) of the
property’s value on the date of marriage. Id.On appeal, the husband argued that the family court
could not consider anything that happened before the couple was
legally married in distributing property pursuant to HRS § 580-
47. Id. at 380, 768 P.2d at 246. The ICA rejected this
argument, concluding that the “family court’s discretion when
dividing and distributing property and debts in divorce cases is
not so restricted.” Id. The ICA held that “[w]hen the parties
thereafter divorced, the family court, in the exercise of its
duty to divide and distribute property in divorce cases,
allowably considered their respective contributions to [the]
separate property during both their premarital cohabitation and
subsequent marriage.” Id.; see also Hussey v. Hussey, 77 Hawai#i
202, 206, 881 P.2d 1270, 1274 (App. 1994) (defining premarital
separate property as “property owned by each spouse immediately
prior to their marriage or cohabitation that was concluded by
their marriage”) (emphasis added)), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Gonsales, 91 Hawai#i 446, 984 P.2d 1272 (App. 1999).
Thus, pursuant to Malek, in making an equitable distribution of
property pursuant to HRS § 580-47, the family court may consider
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contributions made to specific assets during a period of
premarital cohabitation. 7 Haw. App. at 379-80, 768 P.2d at 246.
Relying on Malek, 7 Haw. App. at 380, 768 P.2d at 246,
the Helbush court concluded that where premarital cohabitation
matures into marriage, the family court is generally allowed to
consider the respective contributions of each spouse during both
the premarital economic partnership and subsequent marriage in
dividing and distributing property pursuant to a divorce. 108
Hawai#i at 515, 122 P.3d at 295. The Helbush court explained
that “a ‘premarital economic partnership’ occurs when, prior to
their subsequent marriage, [two people] cohabit and apply their
financial resources as well as their individual energies and
efforts to and for the benefit of each other’s person, assets,
and liabilities.” Id. The Helbush court therefore concluded
that the family court is allowed to consider premarital
contributions of each spouse in dividing the marital estate when
the couple formed an economic partnership and lived together
prior to marriage.4
We now affirm the holding of Helbush that premarital
contributions are a relevant consideration when the parties
entered into a premarital economic partnership during a period of
4
To be clear, the rule set forth in Helbush applies only to
situations in which a relationship ultimately culminates in marriage, and does
not address circumstances where cohabitation does not result in marriage. See
Maria v. Freitas, 73 Haw. 266, 274, 832 P.2d 259, 264 (1992) (holding that
“[a] person who is not legally married does not qualify for the positive legal
consequences of marriage” (citation omitted)).
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cohabitation. See Helbush, 108 Hawai#i at 514-15, 122 P.3d at
294-95.
Our conclusion in this regard is consistent with HRS
§ 580-47 and our adoption of partnership principles, which, as
noted above, provide guidance for family courts in dividing
property upon divorce. The family court is vested with wide
discretion in “finally dividing and distributing the estate of
the parties, real, personal, or mixed, whether community, joint,
or separate.” HRS § 580-47(a). In making a division and
distribution of property, HRS § 580-47(a) identifies certain
enumerated factors which the family court shall consider,
including the respective merits of the parties, the relative
abilities of the parties, the condition in which each party will
be left by the divorce, and “all other circumstances of the
case.” HRS § 580-47(a) (emphasis added). Contributions made by
either spouse after the couple entered into a premarital economic
partnership are therefore included within “all [the] other
circumstances of the case” which the family court is required to
consider in determining an equitable distribution of the marital
estate.5 HRS § 580-47(a).
5
The dissent argues that applying the test set forth above “may
lead to challenges of otherwise valid prenuptial agreements.” Dissenting
opinion at 17. As the dissent points out, however, Collins and Wassell did
not enter into a premarital agreement. Dissenting opinion at 19. Moreover,
where a couple has formed a premarital economic partnership, they are fully
able to control the disposition of property acquired during the premarital
period by executing a valid premarital or postmarital agreement. See HRS
§ 572D-3 (2006) (“Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect
to . . . [t]he rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the
(continued...)
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C. The family court erred in determining that a premarital
economic partnership was not formed
The family court determined that Collins and Wassell
did not form a premarital economic partnership because they
maintained “distinct separate financial identities,” and were
therefore not “engaged in a relationship akin to that found in a
business partnership.” Collins argues that, in evaluating
whether she and Wassell entered into a premarital economic
partnership, the family court did not adequately consider the
nature and degree to which she and Wassell applied their
resources, energies, and efforts for each other’s benefit, and
that the family court relied on irrelevant factors, such as the
parties’ admitted use of separate financial accounts, Collins’s
filing financial aid applications as a single parent, and the
parties’ letter to the Department of Health stating their
intention not to be legally married. For the reasons set forth
below, the family court erred in determining that Collins and
Wassell did not enter into a premarital economic partnership.
As stated above, a premarital economic partnership is
formed when, “prior to their subsequent marriage, [two people]
cohabit and apply their financial resources as well as their
individual energies to and for the benefit of each other’s
5
(...continued)
property of either or both of them whenever and wherever acquired or
located[.]”); HRS § 572-22 (2006) (“All contracts made between spouses . . .
not otherwise invalid because of any other law, shall be valid.”). A valid
premarital or postmarital agreement must be enforced by the family court. See
Epp v. Epp, 80 Hawai#i 79, 86, 905 P.2d 54, 61 (App. 1995).
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person, assets, and liabilities.” Helbush, 108 Hawai#i at 515,
122 P.3d at 295. Whether a premarital economic partnership has
been formed depends upon the intention of the parties. See,
e.g., Stanford Carr Dev. Corp. v. Unity House, Inc., 111 Hawai#i
286, 302, 141 P.3d 459, 475 (2006) (“[W]hether an agreement
creates a partnership or not depends upon the intention of the
parties.” (Brackets in original and citation omitted)). Absent
an express agreement, in evaluating whether the parties intended
to form a premarital economic partnership, the family court must
consider the totality of the circumstances, including both the
economic and non-economic contributions of the parties. See
Cassiday v. Cassiday, 68 Haw. 383, 387, 716 P.2d 1133, 1136
(1986) (“[M]arriage is a partnership to which both partners bring
their financial resources as well as their individual energies
and efforts.”); see also LeMere v. LeMere, 663 N.W.2d 789, 797
(Wis. 2003) (noting that marriage is “an equal partnership, in
which the contributions of the spouse who is primarily engaged in
child-rearing and homemaking are presumptively valued equally
with those of the income-earning spouse”). In making this
determination, relevant considerations may include, but are not
limited to, joint acts of a financial nature, the duration of
cohabitation, whether — and the extent to which — finances were
commingled, economic and non-economic contributions to the
household for the couple’s mutual benefit, and how the couple
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treated finances before and after marriage.6 See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Clark, 71 P.3d 1228, 1230 (Mont. 2003) (concluding
that trial court did not err in considering premarital
contributions where one spouse made improvements to the home and
surrounding property of the other spouse); Floyd v. Floyd, 436
S.E.2d 457, 459 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (“[A] trial court may
properly consider the parties’ premarital contributions, both
monetary and nonmonetary, insofar as those contributions affected
the value of the marital property but that cohabitation alone —
absent a showing of its impact on marital property values — is
not an appropriate consideration.”); Wall v. Moore, 704 A.2d 775,
777 (Vt. 1997) (affirming the family court’s determination that
it could consider the non-monetary and monetary contributions of
the parties during their 11-year premarital relationship when
dividing the couple’s assets upon divorce); Hendricks v.
Hendricks, 784 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding
that trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering
premarital contributions where spouse worked part-time, paid rent
on couple’s home, and started business with other spouse).
ICA cases applying the rule enunciated in Helbush have
therefore properly focused on both the financial and non-
financial aspects of the parties’ premarital relationship. See,
6
The dissent argues that this test is “nearly unlimited” and
provides “no guidance” to the family court. Dissenting opinion at 13.
Respectfully, the test to be used in evaluating whether a premarital economic
partnership has been formed must be flexible in order to accommodate the range
of factual circumstances presented to the family court.
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e.g., Chen v. Hoeflinger, 127 Hawai#i 346, 279 P.3d 11 (App.
2012); Aiona-Agra v. Agra, No. 30685, 2012 WL 593105 (App. Feb.
23, 2012) (SDO); Doe v. Roe, No. 28596, 2010 WL 2535138 (App.
June 23, 2010) (mem. op.); Gordon v. Gordon, Nos. CAAP-12-
0000806, CAAP-12-0001096, 2013 WL 6231721 (App. Nov. 29, 2013)
(mem. op.) (upholding family court’s determination that a couple
entered into a premarital economic partnership by jointly
contributing capital and labor to real estate investments, and
living in a relationship which culminated in marriage).
For example, in Chen, Hui Z. Chen married Thomas J.
Hoeflinger in 1995. 127 Hawai#i at 350, 352, 279 P.3d at 15, 17.
Chen began living with Hoeflinger in 1992. Id. at 352, 279 P.3d
at 17. The family court concluded that the couple entered into a
premarital economic partnership when Chen “was employed at a
hospital and she utilized her income to pay for the household
expenses such as food and supplies to which [Hoeflinger] also
contributed when [Chen’s] income was insufficient.” Id. at 359,
279 P.3d at 24 (brackets in original). The family court further
noted that Chen and Hoeflinger also enjoyed “all of the conjugal
benefits as if they were husband and wife.” Id. On appeal,
Hoeflinger contended that the family court erred in finding that
he and Chen formed a premarital economic partnership. Id. at
358, 279 P.3d at 23. Specifically, Hoeflinger argued that there
was no premarital economic partnership because Chen did not
contribute to or enhance the parties’ assets. Id. at 359 n.11,
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279 P.3d at 24 n.11. The ICA rejected these arguments, noting
that “[w]hen Chen paid for food and supplies for the benefit of
Hoeflinger, it enhanced and supported Hoeflinger.” Id.
In Aiona-Agra, the family court also determined that
Heather Aiona-Agra (Wife) and Jayson Javier Agra (Husband) formed
a premarital economic partnership. 2012 WL 593105, at *3. On
appeal, Husband argued that the record “fail[ed] to evidence a
single ‘financial resource’ from [Wife] prior to their
marriage[.]” Id. The ICA rejected this argument and concluded
that Husband’s position “ignore[d] the fact that the partnership
model considers more than just monetary contributions to the
partnership.” Id. The ICA determined that “the unchallenged
findings of fact establish that Wife contributed some ‘individual
energies and efforts’ to the construction of the home and Husband
lived rent-free with Wife and with Wife’s family, as a direct
benefit of his relationship with Wife.” Id. Accordingly, the
ICA concluded that the family court did not err in finding that
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Husband and Wife had formed a premarital economic partnership.7
Id.In sum, these cases properly recognize that the family
court, in determining whether a premarital economic partnership
was entered into, must consider both the financial and non-
financial contributions of the parties during the premarital
relationship.
Here, the undisputed facts establish that Collins and
Wassell formed a premarital economic partnership in 2000. In
this regard, it is undisputed that following the wedding ceremony
in 2000, the couple began living together. The couple continued
to live together until they were legally married in 2005.
Collins testified that, as of 2004, all of her friends thought
that she was married. During this time, Collins and Wassell
applied “their financial resources as well as their energies and
efforts to and for the benefit of each other’s person, assets,
and liabilities.” Helbush, 108 Hawai#i at 515, 122 P.3d at 295.
7
In contrast, in Doe, 2010 WL 2535138, at *7, the ICA affirmed the
family court’s determination that no premarital economic partnership was
formed. There, the couple had cohabited for approximately one year before
they married. Id. at *1. Two days prior to their date of marriage, the
husband purchased property in Kamuela. Id. at *7. Upon divorce, the family
court awarded the husband a capital contribution credit for the property. Id.
at *1. The family court concluded that “[s]imply cohabitating together does
not automatically transform a relationship into a premarital economic
partnership[.]” Id. at *7. The family court further made unchallenged
findings that there was no credible evidence that the wife had contributed
financially toward the purchase of the property, had worked to enhance its
value prior to the date of marriage, or had participated in its upkeep prior
to the date of marriage. Id. The ICA therefore affirmed the family court’s
determination and noted that there was “no clear error in the family court’s
ruling.” Id.
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Specifically, upon returning from their honeymoon, the
couple first lived in Collins’s townhouse. Collins thereby
applied her resources to the partnership by allowing Wassell to
live in her townhouse rent-free. See Aiona-Agra, 2012 WL 593105,
at *3 (noting that it was relevant to the inquiry as to whether a
premarital economic partnership was formed that one spouse lived
rent-free with the other spouse’s family). Wassell, in turn,
applied his energies and efforts to and for the benefit of the
partnership by helping to make improvements to the townhouse,
including installing a new water heater, painting some rooms, and
making other small repairs. In addition to receiving the benefit
of living in Collins’s townhouse rent-free, Wassell further
benefitted from Collins’s contributions because he was able to
rent out his separately owned house.
The parties’ utilization of the joint bank account
further demonstrates the existence of a premarital economic
partnership. Wassell created the joint account by adding
Collins’s name to what had been his separate account. Following
the 2000 wedding ceremony, the couple deposited cash gifts
totaling more than $1,100 into the joint account. Collins also
deposited proceeds from the sale of her townhouse totaling more
than $23,000 into the joint account, and later deposited a tax
refund of more than $1,000 into the account. The couple agreed
that they would each deposit funds into the account, and that the
funds would be used for household expenses. Collins made regular
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monthly deposits to the account, and the funds were used to pay
off the mortgage on Wassell’s house, and to pay for household
expenses, including groceries and household utilities.8
See Chen, 127 Hawai#i at 352, 359, 279 P.3d at 17, 24 (noting
that a premarital economic partnership was formed when one spouse
purchased food and supplies for the benefit of the other spouse
during their premarital cohabitation).
To the extent the family court noted that Collins’s
monthly contribution into the joint account was insufficient to
cover the parties’ monthly expenses, the family court failed to
recognize that the remainder of Collins’s and Wassell’s joint
living expenses were presumably covered by one or both of the
parties. Indeed, in addition to using funds from the joint
account to pay for groceries and the utilities for Wassell’s
house, evidence offered at trial indicated that Wassell
occasionally bought groceries, and that, when the couple ate out,
Wassell paid the bill between ninety and ninety-five percent of
the time.
After nearly five years of living together, the couple
legally married. Notably, nothing appears to have materially
8
The dissent argues that we place “undue reliance” on the joint
bank account. Dissenting opinion at 15. As explained above, in addition to
the joint account, the manner in which Collins and Wassell handled their real
property and covered their mutual expenses further demonstrated that they had
formed a premarital economic partnership. Moreover, in determining whether a
premarital economic partnership has been formed, the relevant inquiry is
whether the parties have applied “their financial resources as well as their
individual energies and efforts to and for the benefit of each other’s person,
assets, and liabilities.” Helbush, 108 Hawai#i at 515, 122 P.3d at 295. For
all the reasons set forth above, that standard was plainly satisfied here.
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changed in the couple’s day-to-day relationship or how they
managed their financial affairs. Indeed, Collins expressly
testified that she and Wassell maintained separate bank accounts
both before and after their legal marriage in 2005. It therefore
appears that, even after they were legally married, the couple
cohabited in Wassell’s house and continued to use the joint
account as they had during their premarital relationship, i.e.,
as a common fund into which both made deposits and from which
withdrawals were made to pay for communal expenses. Because
Collins and Wassell applied “their financial resources as well as
their energies and efforts to and for the benefit of each other’s
person, assets, and liabilities,” Helbush, 108 Hawai#i at 515,
122 P.3d at 295, the family court erred in determining that
Collins and Wassell had not entered into a premarital economic
partnership.
The family court further erred in relying on its
finding that Collins and Wassell “maintained distinct separate
financial identities.” Specifically, the family court noted that
the couple maintained separate checking and savings accounts.
However, the fact that Collins and Wassell each maintained
separate financial accounts does not, in and of itself, support
the family court’s ultimate determination that no premarital
economic partnership was formed. See, e.g., Epp, 80 Hawai#i at
93, 905 P.2d at 68 (noting that marital partners’ pattern or
practice of conducting some or all of their property and
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financial affairs as if they were not marital partners is not a
basis for deviating from the partnership model). In focusing on
“separate financial identities,” the family court failed to
address whether the parties’ individual financial accounts were
used to pay collective expenses. Put another way, the holding of
funds in separate accounts is not dispositive when the parties’
respective financial resources, energies, and efforts are
otherwise applied for each other’s mutual benefit. See Helbush,
108 Hawai#i at 515, 122 P.3d at 295.
Finally, the family court erroneously focused on
Collins’s representation on her daughters’ financial aid
applications that she was single and the letter to the Department
of Health signed by Collins and Wassell that indicated that they
decided not to be married. Specifically, the family court
appeared to suggest that it was inconsistent for Collins to
assert that she and Wassell had entered into a premarital
economic partnership after she stated on financial aid
applications that she was single.
First, it should be noted that Collins’s
representations on financial aid applications and to the
Department of Health that she was unmarried were factually
accurate, because Collins and Wassell were not, in fact, married
until January 19, 2005. Indeed, it would have been inaccurate
for Collins or Wassell to represent to financial aid
representatives that they were married. Thus, Collins did not
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misrepresent her legal status on the financial aid applications
and the couple did not misrepresent their legal status in the
letter to the Department of Health.
Second, these representations are not necessarily
inconsistent with an intent to form a premarital economic
partnership. Although Collins and Wassell agreed not to become
legally married in 2000, that does not mean that they agreed they
would not be economic partners. To the contrary, they
immediately began behaving like the legally married couple that
they eventually became. Again, the relevant inquiry is whether
the parties intended to apply their resources, efforts, and
energies for each other’s benefit before ultimately marrying.
The funding source for Collins’s daughters’ college tuition is
but one aspect of the couple’s financial circumstances, and
Collins’s interest in receiving financial aid as a single parent
is not sufficient to override the parties’ apparent intent to
engage in a premarital economic partnership in all other aspects
of their financial lives. Furthermore, it appears that both
parties benefitted financially from these representations —
Collins was able to send her daughters to the colleges of their
choice, and Wassell presumably benefitted from funds that
otherwise would have paid for college expenses.
The family court’s valuation and division of Wassell’s
house illustrates why the court’s application of the principles
set forth in Helbush failed to ensure a fair and equitable
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property distribution in this case. Collins argued that Wassell
should be awarded the house, which he separately owned, but that
she was entitled to an equalization payment for that property.
As noted above, during the period of premarital cohabitation,
Wassell lived rent-free in Collins’s townhouse, Wassell collected
rent from his house, Collins used the proceeds from the sale of
her separately owned townhouse to pay off the mortgage on
Wassell’s house, and the couple eventually cohabited in Wassell’s
house prior to their legal marriage. According to Collins, the
value of the house more than doubled during that period. The
family court nevertheless valued the property on the date of
marriage and awarded it solely to Wassell. Under the principles
set forth above, Wassell’s house should have been valued at the
time that the premarital economic partnership began. Otherwise,
Wassell is allowed to retain all of the appreciation attributable
to Collins’s and Wassell’s joint efforts prior to marriage.
See Helbush, 108 Hawai#i at 515, 122 P.3d at 295.
While the family court is given broad deference to
weigh the evidence and to determine credibility, see Booth v.
Booth, 90 Hawai#i 413, 417, 978 P.2d 851, 855 (1999) (holding
that “the family court assesses and weighs all valid and relevant
considerations to exercise its equitable discretion in
distributing marital property”), the family court here applied
incorrect legal principles when considering the nature and degree
to which the parties applied their financial resources, energies,
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and efforts for each other’s benefit. See Helbush, 108 Hawai#i
at 515, 122 P.3d at 295. Under the circumstances of this case —
particularly where the family court relied solely on the parties’
financial identities, failed to adequately consider the nature
and degree to which the parties applied their financial
resources, energies, and efforts for the benefit of each other,
and weighed against the parties that they truthfully stated their
marital status to third parties — the family court erred in
determining that Collins and Wassell did not form a premarital
economic partnership.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the ICA’s
judgment, the family court’s Conclusion of Law No. 3, Findings of
Fact No. 47, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73-76, 78-80, and 82, and the
Decision, and the property-division and equalization provisions
in the Divorce Decree. We remand to the family court to make a
division and distribution of property in light of Collins’s and
Wassell’s premarital economic partnership.
Joy A. San Buenaventura /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Andrew S. Iwashita
for respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
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