Nitta v. Department of Human Services. ( 2022 )


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  •  ** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER   **
    Electronically Filed
    Supreme Court
    SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
    04-NOV-2022
    08:06 AM
    Dkt. 22 OP
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
    ---o0o---
    ________________________________________________________________
    FREDERICK NITTA, M.D.,
    Respondent/Appellant-Appellant,
    vs.
    DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, STATE OF HAWAI‘I,
    Petitioner/Appellee-Appellee,
    and
    CATHY BETTS, DIRECTOR,
    Respondent/Appellee-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
    CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CIVIL NO. 3CC16-1-0000297)
    NOVEMBER 4, 2022
    RECKTENWALD, C.J., McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS JJ., AND
    CIRCUIT JUDGE KAWAMURA, IN PLACE OF NAKAYAMA, J., RECUSED
    OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.
    ** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER   **
    I. Introduction
    This case arises out of the State of Hawai‘i Department of
    Human Services’ (“DHS”) attempt to recover payments made to
    Frederick Nitta, M.D. (“Dr. Nitta”) from its Medicaid Primary
    Care Physician Program (“the Program”).         The Program was
    established by a federal statute within the Affordable Care Act
    (“ACA”), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(C)(“the
    Statute”).   The Statute enabled physicians “with a primary
    specialty designation of family medicine, general internal
    medicine, or pediatric medicine” to temporarily receive
    increased payments for primary care services provided to
    Medicaid patients in 2013 and 2014.        DHS, through its Med-QUEST
    division, administers the Program in the State of Hawai‘i.
    Dr. Nitta, who has been board-certified in obstetrics and
    gynecology (“OB/GYN”) since the early 1990’s, but who has been
    serving as a primary care physician (“PCP”) to Medicare and
    Medicaid patients in East Hawaiʻi for many years, became a
    participant in the Program when a staff member signed him up on-
    line at the suggestion of an AlohaCare representative.            In 2015,
    however, DHS told Dr. Nitta he was ineligible because he did not
    meet specialty requirements for Program participants as set
    forth in a federal administrative rule, 
    42 C.F.R. § 447.400
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    (“the Rule”).    DHS then demanded repayment of more than $200,000
    in enhanced payments received by Dr. Nitta through the Program.
    Dr. Nitta requested an administrative hearing and an
    administrative appeal at DHS.       He later filed for a judicial
    appeal by the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit (“circuit
    court”).     All deemed Dr. Nitta ineligible.       Dr. Nitta then
    brought a secondary appeal to the Intermediate Court of Appeals
    (“ICA”).
    While the ICA appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals for
    the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion invalidating the Rule.
    Averett v. United States Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 
    943 F.3d 313
    , 319 (6th Cir. 2019).      In a published opinion, the ICA
    adopted the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Averett.           Nitta v. Dep’t
    of Hum. Servs., 151 Hawaiʻi 123, 128, 
    508 P.3d 1209
    , 1214 (App.
    2022).     Because DHS and the circuit court had relied on the
    invalidated Rule to order repayment by Dr. Nitta, the ICA
    ordered a remand to DHS for further proceedings as may be
    necessary.    Nitta, 151 Hawaiʻi at 129, 508 P.3d at 1215.
    On certiorari, DHS does not contest the Sixth Circuit and
    ICA’s invalidation of the Rule.        Instead, DHS argues the ICA
    erred because (1) Dr. Nitta was still ineligible for the Program
    under the Statute; (2) the circuit court had also relied on the
    Statute in deeming Dr. Nitta ineligible; and (3) DHS is required
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    to recoup the overpayment because there was never money
    appropriated to pay Dr. Nitta.
    With respect to the first issue, the ICA did not address
    whether Dr. Nitta would in any event be precluded from enhanced
    payments based on the Statute.       In Averett, the Sixth Circuit
    held the Statute’s phrase, “physician with a primary specialty
    designation,” to mean “a physician who has himself designated,
    as his primary specialty, one of the specialties recited in [the
    Statute].”   Averett, 943 F.3d at 319.        The ICA adopted this
    holding, Nitta, 151 Hawaiʻi at 128, 508 P.3d at 1214, but did not
    address whether Dr. Nitta qualified.
    We agree with DHS that Dr. Nitta’s eligibility for the
    Program under the Statute can and should be addressed.            We also
    agree with the Sixth Circuit and the ICA that the Rule is
    invalid as it contravenes the Statute.         Contrary to DHS’s
    position, however, we hold Dr. Nitta was entitled to enhanced
    payments under the Statute based on the reasoning below.
    This holding resolves DHS’s second issue on certiorari,
    that the circuit court had also relied on the Statute to hold
    Dr. Nitta ineligible.      If the circuit court had so held, it
    would have been wrong.      But, in any event, the circuit court
    (and DHS) relied solely on the invalidated Rule in deeming Dr.
    Nitta ineligible and did not rely on the Statute.
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    Finally, we also reject DHS’s third issue on certiorari,
    that DHS is required to recoup the overpayment because there was
    never money appropriated to pay Dr. Nitta.             This is a new
    argument never raised below and is therefore waived.
    Hence, we vacate the ICA’s March 23, 2022 judgment on
    appeal to the extent it remanded the case “to the DHS
    Administrative Appeals Office for further proceedings as may be
    necessary.”         We otherwise affirm the ICA’s judgment on appeal.
    II. Background
    A.      Factual Background
    1.    The Program
    As explained by the ICA, Medicaid provides medical
    assistance to qualifying individuals and families, and is
    jointly funded and administered by the federal and state
    governments.        Nitta, 151 Hawaiʻi at 124, 508 P.3d at 1210.             In
    2010, Congress enacted the ACA and also temporarily increased
    payments in 2013 and 2014 to certain physicians who provided
    primary-care services to Medicaid patients.              Id.     Specifically,
    the Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(C), allowed for such
    increased payments provided “by a physician with a primary
    specialty designation of family medicine, general internal
    medicine, or pediatric medicine.”            The Statute provides:
    (a)    A State plan for medical assistance must—
    . . . .
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    (13) provide—
    . . . .
    (C) payment for primary care services (as
    defined in subsection (jj)) furnished in 2013
    and 2014 by a physician with a primary
    specialty designation of family medicine,
    general internal medicine, or pediatric
    medicine at a rate not less than 100 percent of
    the payment rate that applies to such services
    and physician under part B of subchapter XVIII
    (or, if greater, the payment rate that would be
    applicable under such part if the conversion
    factor under section 1395w-4(d) of this title
    for the year involved were the conversion
    factor under such section for 2009)[.]1
    As further explained by the ICA, the Centers for Medicare
    and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) administers Medicaid, and
    promulgated the Rule, 
    42 C.F.R. § 447.400
    , further delineating
    physician eligibility for the Program.            Nitta, 151 Hawaiʻi at
    125, 508 P.3d at 1211.        The Rule set out a board certification
    1      42 U.S.C. § 1396a(jj) then provides:
    (jj) Primary care services defined
    For purposes of subsection (a)(13)(C), the term
    “primary care services” means—
    (1) evaluation and management services that are
    procedure codes (for services covered under
    subchapter XVIII) for services in the category
    designated Evaluation and Management in the
    Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System
    (established by the Secretary under section 1395w-
    4(c)(5) of this title as of December 31, 2009, and as
    subsequently modified); and
    (2) services related to immunization administration
    for vaccines and toxoids for which CPT codes 90465,
    90466, 90467, 90468, 90471, 90472, 90473, or 90474
    (as subsequently modified) apply under such System.
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    or a sixty-percent billing threshold requirement, requiring
    that:
    (a) [s]tates pay for services furnished by a physician as
    defined in § 440.50 of this chapter, or under the personal
    supervision of a physician who self-attests to a specialty
    designation of family medicine, general internal medicine
    or pediatric medicine or a subspecialty recognized by the
    American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS), the American
    Board of Physician Specialties (ABPS) or the American
    Osteopathic Association (AOA). Such physician then attests
    that [they]:
    (1) [Are] Board Certified with such a specialty or
    subspecialty and/or
    (2) Has furnished evaluation and management services
    and vaccine administration services under codes
    described in paragraph (b) of this section that equal
    at least 60 percent of the Medicaid codes he or she
    has billed during the most recently completed CY or,
    for newly eligible physicians, the prior month.
    
    42 C.F.R. § 447.400
    (a).        Nitta, 151 Hawaiʻi at 125, 508 P. 3d at
    1211.
    Thus, the Statute allowed for enhanced payments to “a
    physician with a primary specialty designation of family
    medicine, general internal medicine, or pediatric medicine.”
    The Rule, however, further required physicians to self-attest to
    a specialty designation of family medicine, general internal
    medicine or pediatric medicine and then also attest that they
    are board-certified in one of those designations (or a
    recognized subspecialty2) or show that at least sixty percent of
    their billings were for the provision of PCP services.
    2     According to the American Board of Medical Specialties, the
    subspecialties of family medicine are adolescent medicine, geriatric
    (continued. . .)
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    In Hawai‘i, pursuant to the Rule, DHS required physicians
    seeking enhanced payments to complete a form on its website
    self-attesting to those requirements (“self-attestation form”).
    The form tracked Rule requirements and also said it could not be
    completed by anyone on the provider’s behalf.              Nitta, 151 Hawaiʻi
    at 125, 508 P.3d at 1211.
    2.    Dr. Nitta’s involvement with the Program
    Dr. Nitta was board-certified as an OB/GYN in the early
    1990’s and has practiced medicine in Hilo, Hawai‘i for many
    years.     When Dr. Nitta began practicing in 1993, he submitted an
    application to DHS to participate as a Medicaid provider,
    listing OB/GYN as his specialty.            In 2006, Dr. Nitta received
    (continued. . .)
    medicine, hospice and palliative medicine, pain medicine, sleep medicine,
    sports medicine; the subspecialties of internal medicine are adolescent
    medicine, adult congenital heart disease, advanced heart failure and
    transplant cardiology, cardiovascular disease, clinical cardiac
    electrophysiology, critical care medicine, endocrinology, diabetes, and
    metabolism, gastroenterology, geriatric medicine, hematology, hospice and
    palliative medicine, infectious disease, interventional cardiology, medical
    oncology, nephrology, neurocritical care, pulmonary disease, rheumatology,
    sleep medicine, sports medicine, and transplant hepatology; and the
    subspecialties of pediatric medicine are adolescent medicine, child abuse
    pediatrics, development-behavioral pediatrics, hospice and palliative
    medicine, medical toxicology, neonatal-perinatal medicine, pediatric
    cardiology, pediatric critical care medicine, pediatric emergency medicine,
    pediatric endocrinology, pediatric gastroenterology, pediatric hematology-
    oncology, pediatric hospital medicine, pediatric infectious diseases,
    pediatric nephrology, pediatric pulmonology, pediatric rheumatology,
    pediatric transplant hepatology, sleep medicine, and sports medicine. See
    Specialty and Subspecialty Certificates, AMERICAN BOARD OF MEDICAL SPECIALTIES,
    https://www.abms.org/member-boards/specialty-subspecialty-certificates/
    [perma.cc/D666-JDHK] (last visited November 1, 2022).
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    his National Provider Identifier, which also indicated a
    specialty of OB/GYN.3
    More than ninety percent of Dr. Nitta’s patients, however,
    are eligible for Medicaid or Medicare and do not have other
    doctors.       Thus, although he is a board-certified OB/GYN
    physician, Dr. Nitta provides PCP services for his patients, is
    recognized in the community as a PCP, and provides a broad range
    of services to his patients.
    Hence, in 2013, at the suggestion of an AlohaCare
    representative, a staff member from Dr. Nitta’s office enrolled
    him in the Program via the DHS website.             The parties do not
    dispute that Dr. Nitta was attested to have a specialty
    designation of family medicine, general internal medicine, or
    pediatric medicine.
    It appears Dr. Nitta first learned he was participating in
    the Program when he received a letter from DHS dated July 7,
    2015 telling him he was ineligible because he did not satisfy
    Rule requirements.         Then, in a letter dated November 6, 2015,
    DHS demanded repayment of $205,940.13 in payments made to him
    via the Program.
    3        The National Provider Identifier program is discussed in Section IV.A.2
    below.
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    B.      Procedural background
    1.    At DHS
    a.    DHS administrative hearing decision
    On December 4, 2015, Dr. Nitta submitted an administrative
    hearing request with DHS contesting the repayment demand.                On
    March 18, 2016, the parties participated in a hearing before a
    DHS hearing officer.4        On June 16, 2016, the hearing officer
    issued his decision in DHS’s favor and against Dr. Nitta.                In
    summary, the hearing officer ruled DHS was entitled to repayment
    because Dr. Nitta was board certified in OB/GYN, not in family
    medicine, general internal medicine, or pediatric medicine, and
    because Dr. Nitta had not met the sixty percent billing
    requirement under the Rule.
    b.    DHS final decision
    Dr. Nitta then sought an administrative appeal with DHS.
    On July 25, 2016, then-DHS Deputy Director Pankaj Bhanot issued
    DHS’s final decision, basically adopting the hearing officer’s
    decision.
    This final decision, however, also included findings that
    HMSA, UnitedHealthcare, AlohaCare, and Hilo Medical Center all
    4
    The testifiers were Kurt Kresta, the DHS Financial Integrity Staff
    investigator in charge of Dr. Nitta’s case; Dr. Nitta; Dr. Lori Kanemoto, an
    OB/GYN familiar with Dr. Nitta and his practice; and Della Marie Shirota, a
    coding auditor for Hilo Medical Center, who opined Dr. Nitta was eligible for
    the enhanced payments.
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    identified Dr. Nitta as a PCP (with an OB/GYN specialization),
    and that Hilo Medical Center listed Dr. Nitta as a PCP.               In
    addition, the final decision noted that community medical
    professionals identified Dr. Nitta as a PCP who practices in the
    areas of OB/GYN and primary care.           The DHS final decision
    ordered repayment from Dr. Nitta, however, based on his
    inability to meet Rule requirements for the Program.
    2.    Circuit court appeal (Civil No. 16-1-0297)
    Dr. Nitta then filed an appeal with the circuit court.               On
    April 12, 2017, the circuit court5 issued its decision and order.
    The circuit court noted that, under CMS guidance, physicians had
    to (1) self-attest to a specialty in one of the enumerated areas
    or in a recognized subspecialty; and (2) be board certified in
    that specialty or subspecialty or meet the sixty percent billing
    threshold.     The circuit court ruled that (1) Dr. Nitta failed to
    meet the self-attestation requirement of the Program because his
    staff member had completed the attestation; (2) Dr. Nitta did
    not have a specialty or subspecialty designation in one of the
    requisite areas; (3) because Dr. Nitta was ineligible, there was
    no need to address DHS’s calculations regarding the sixty
    percent billing threshold; and (4) a review of the DHS
    overpayment calculations showed Dr. Nitta owed $205,338.88, not
    5      The Honorable Greg K. Nakamura presiding.
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    $205,220.886.      The circuit court affirmed the DHS final decision
    and entered its judgment on May 9, 2017.
    3.     ICA appeal
    a.    The appeal
    On May 19, 2017, Dr. Nitta filed an appeal with the ICA.
    The parties basically repeated their arguments below.
    b.    Amicus brief (HMA & AMA)
    The Hawaiʻi Medical Association (“HMA”) and the American
    Medical Association (“AMA”) (“amici”) filed an amicus brief.
    Amici highlighted the critical and worsening physician shortage
    in Hawaiʻi, noting that primary care has the greatest shortage,
    especially for Medicaid patients in East Hawaiʻi.6             Amici posited
    6     Citing articles and other reports, the amici explained that, on
    neighbor islands in particular, patients often wait four to five months for a
    doctor’s appointment. On Hawaiʻi Island, it is sometimes two to three times
    more difficult to find a PCP. Consequently, many residents seek care at the
    nearest hospital emergency room, costing them “upward of $600-$800 for an
    emergency room visit, as opposed to an average co-pay of $15-$50 for a visit
    to a primary care physician.”
    The amici attributed Hawaiʻi’s physician shortage to a number of issues:
    (1) having one of the oldest physician workforces in the nation, meaning an
    exacerbated shortage as physicians retire; (2) Hawaiʻi’s high cost of living
    in conjunction with the costs of attending medical school; and (3) the lack
    of funding for physicians at hospitals and in private practice. The last
    issue, in particular, limits the number of physicians a hospital is able to
    hire and forces physicians in private practice to adopt business models that
    exclude Medicaid patients. In rural areas, the effect on Medicaid patients
    is even greater.
    Also, according to the federal Health Resources and Services
    Administration, East Hawaiʻi, where Dr. Nitta practices, is a “Health
    Professional Shortage Area.” Thus, Dr. Nitta is a physician who provides
    “vital services to vulnerable populations with limited access to medical
    care.” Amici asserted DHS’s recoupment efforts against Dr. Nitta jeopardizes
    (continued. . .)
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    that DHS’s continued recoupment efforts against physicians
    providing primary care services to Medicaid beneficiaries only
    worsens the shortage.        Amici also urged that the payments to Dr.
    Nitta were consistent with the ACA’s purpose to “benefit
    physicians that provide primary care services to the Medicaid
    population.”7
    (continued. . .)
    his ability to continue his practice, threatening to further reduce the
    already limited number of PCPs in the area.
    7     According to amici, DHS “arbitrarily determined that medical directory
    listings were the deciding factor of a physician’s practice
    characteristics[.]” Amici also argued that DHS arbitrarily and capriciously
    interpreted and applied the Rule by providing DHS with “unfettered discretion
    to determine physician eligibility.” They pointed to Questions and Answers
    (“Q&As”) published by CMS regarding how states might review physician
    eligibility for the Program. There, the CMS provided a non-exhaustive list
    of ways a state could verify a physician’s practice characteristics (i.e.,
    how the physician represented himself in the community, medical directory
    listings, billings to other insurers, advertisements, etc.). Amici contended
    other evidence demonstrated Dr. Nitta’s PCP status: (1) recognition by other
    doctors and medical providers in the East Hawaiʻi community as a PCP; (2)
    acceptance and payment by medical insurers as a PCP; and (3) hundreds of
    written and oral testimony by people in support of a finding that he is a
    PCP.
    Amici also argued that DHS’s “formula to determine the sixty-percent-
    threshold requirement [was] in complete disregard for actual medical
    practice.” To determine whether a physician met the threshold, DHS used
    “paid billing codes,” which do not take into account the “percentage of total
    services provided in a managed care environment by that physician.” The CMS
    interpretation of the Medicaid Enhanced Payment Statute, however, stated that
    physicians could also self-attest that, as an alternative, sixty percent of
    all Medicaid services they “provide[] in a managed care environment” are PCP
    services.
    Amici noted that, in actual practice, PCPs sometimes bill under their
    provider number for ancillary services (i.e., urine testing, blood work, X-
    rays) furnished by other professions under the physician’s supervision. In
    group practices, physicians sometimes also bill for ancillary services under
    the group provider number. By including these ancillary services in the
    denominator (i.e., the total services provided by the physician) of its
    formula, according to amici, DHS unfairly skews the actual ratio of PCP
    services to total services provided by a physician.
    (continued. . .)
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    c.     Averett
    While the ICA appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit issued
    its Averett opinion invalidating the Rule that set forth
    additional eligibility requirements for the Program.                943 F.3d
    at 319.     In Averett, Tennessee’s Medicaid agency, TennCare, had
    sought to recoup an average of more than $100,000.00 per
    physician from twenty-one physicians practicing in family
    medicine in rural Tennessee.          Averett, 943 F.3d at 316.
    TennCare alleged that the physicians had not met the sixty
    percent billing requirement of the Rule.8            Id.   In turn, the
    (continued. . .)
    According to amici, in Dr. Nitta’s case, a medical billing and coding
    expert had testified that a full audit of his patient records, not just his
    billing records, showed that well over sixty percent of his time and work
    went toward providing PCP services to Medicaid beneficiaries. Amici
    concluded that DHS’s “use of ‘paid billing codes’ rather than a full audit of
    a physician’s patient records in consideration of services provided in a
    managed care environment is a manipulation that produces absurd results
    contrary to the intent of the Medicaid Enhanced Payment Statute.” Thus,
    amici requested that the ICA vacate and remand the DHS and lower court’s
    decisions.
    8     Recall that the CMS Final Medicaid Payment Rule defined “primary
    specialty designation” by requiring either board certification in one of the
    listed specialties (or a recognized subspecialty) or the satisfaction of a
    sixty percent billing threshold:
    (a) States pay for services furnished by a physician as
    defined in § 440.50 of this chapter, or under the personal
    supervision of a physician who self-attests to a specialty
    designation of family medicine, general internal medicine
    or pediatric medicine or a subspecialty recognized by the
    American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS), the American
    Board of Physician Specialties (ABPS) or the American
    Osteopathic Association (AOA). Such physician then attests
    that he/she:
    (1) Is Board Certified with such a specialty or
    subspecialty and/or
    (continued. . .)
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    physicians challenged the requirement, arguing that it
    contravened the Statute.       Id.
    After the district court declared the rule invalid and
    TennCare appealed, the Sixth Circuit addressed
    whether, in the [Rule], [CMS] correctly interpreted the
    phrase “primary specialty designation” as used in [the
    Statute], to mandate not only that the physician have the
    requisite designation of primary specialty, but also that
    the physician either be board-certified in that specialty
    or satisfy the 60-percent-of-billings requirement.
    Averett, 943 F.3d at 317.       The Sixth Circuit opined that the
    term “primary specialty designation” in the Statute was
    unambiguous.    Id.   Neither party disputed the meanings of
    “primary specialty” as the physician’s principal area of
    practice or expertise, or the meaning of the word “designate,”
    as in “[t]o indicate or specify; point out.”            Id. (citing The
    American Heritage Dictionary 506 (3d ed. 1992)).
    The Sixth Circuit discussed CMS’s interpretation of the
    term “primary specialty designation” under a parallel Medicare
    provision.    Averett, 943 F.3d at 317.       Although Congress used
    the same term in the same context for both the Medicare and
    Medicaid programs, CMS interpreted the term differently from the
    (continued. . .)
    (2) Has furnished evaluation and management services and
    vaccine administration services under codes described in
    paragraph (b) of this section that equal at least 60
    percent of the Medicaid codes he or she has billed
    during the most recently completed CY or, for newly
    eligible physicians, the prior month.
    
    42 C.F.R. § 447.400
    (a).
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    Medicaid and Medicare counterpart rules.           Averett, 943 F.3d at
    318.    For Medicaid, CMS added board certification and sixty
    percent billing threshold requirements to the Rule.              Id.   For
    Medicare, however, CMS interpreted the term to simply mean “the
    physician’s own designation, as her primary specialty, of one of
    the specialties recited in that Medicare provision.”              Averett,
    943 F.3d at 317 (citing 
    42 C.F.R. § 414.80
    (a)(i)(A)).
    The Sixth Circuit determined that the latter was the proper
    interpretation because, unlike the Rule,9 it did not conflict
    with the language of the Statute.           Averett, 943 F.3d at 318-19.
    It indicated this interpretation made “perfect sense, given the
    apparently uniform practice of physician self-designation under
    Medicare and Medicaid.”        Averett, 943 F.3d at 317.        Thus, the
    Sixth Circuit held that the phrase “a physician with a primary
    specialty designation” for purposes of the Statute meant “a
    physician who has himself designated, as his primary specialty,
    one of the specialties recited in those provisions.”              Averett,
    9     The Sixth Circuit also noted that CMS did not offer any actual
    interpretation of the Statute in support of its construction; it offered only
    policy arguments. Averett, 943 F.3d at 318. CMS had argued that, because
    Congress did not limit the definition of “primary specialty designation,” CMS
    was required and had authority to do so itself. Id. The Sixth Circuit
    disagreed, stating that the “specific limitations” were the words themselves,
    and that no one seemed to be confused about what they meant. Id.
    Additionally, Congress had included a sixty percent billing threshold in its
    Medicare provision but specifically left it out of its Medicaid provision.
    Averett, 943 F.3d at 318-19.
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    943 F.3d at 319.     The Sixth Circuit invalidated the Rule as
    inconsistent with the Statute.       Id.
    d.    Supplemental briefing
    On December 23, 2021, the ICA ordered the parties to submit
    supplemental briefing “addressing whether and how Averett
    applied to the issues on appeal, and the relief sought, in light
    of Averett.”
    On January 4, 2022, Dr. Nitta filed his supplemental brief,
    arguing that, like the physicians in Averett, he was entitled to
    enhanced payments under the Program.         On January 5, 2022, DHS
    filed its supplemental brief, arguing that Averett invalidated
    the Rule only and not the Statute.         DHS argued the plain
    language of the Statute still required Dr. Nitta to have a
    primary specialty designation of “family medicine, general
    internal medicine, or pediatric medicine.”
    DHS also argued Averett also defined “primary specialty
    designation” and had discussed two sources that would indicate a
    physician’s primary specialty:       the physician’s Medicaid
    application and the National Provider Identifier (“NPI”).             DHS
    argued that both Dr. Nitta’s 1993 Medicaid application and 2006
    NPI form listed his primary specialty designation as OB/GYN.
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    e. ICA opinion
    On February 11, 2022, the ICA published an opinion holding
    that (1) the Rule was invalid; and (2) the DHS self-attestation
    form modelled on the Rule was therefore also invalid.            Nitta,
    151 Hawaiʻi at 128-29, 508 P.3d at 1214-15.          The ICA adopted the
    Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Averett and held the circuit court
    wrongly concluded that Dr. Nitta was ineligible by relying on
    the Rule.   Id.   Based on Averett, the ICA also held that DHS’s
    self-attestation form conflicted with the Statute because it
    included the Rule’s additional requirements.          Nitta, 151 Hawaiʻi
    at 129, 508 P.3d at 1215.
    The ICA (1) vacated DHS’s final decision and the circuit
    court’s decision and order; and (2) remanded the case to the DHS
    Administrative Appeals Office “for further proceedings as may be
    necessary.”    Id.
    4.     Certiorari application
    On May 23, 2022, DHS filed its application for writ of
    certiorari, arguing (1) Dr. Nitta was still ineligible for
    enhanced payments based on the Statute; (2) the circuit court’s
    conclusions relied on the Statute; and (3) DHS is required to
    recoup the overpayment because there was never money
    appropriated to pay Dr. Nitta.
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    III. Standards of Review
    For judicial review of contested administrative cases, HRS
    § 91-14(g) (2012) provides:
    (g) Upon review of the record the court may affirm the
    decision of the agency or remand the case with instructions
    for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the
    decision and order if the substantial rights of the
    petitioners may have been prejudiced because the
    administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders
    are:
    (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory
    provisions;
    (2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction
    of the agency;
    (3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
    (4) Affected by other error of law;
    (5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
    probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record;
    or
    (6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by abuse
    of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
    discretion.
    IV. Discussion
    A.      Dr. Nitta is eligible for the Program under the Statute
    1.    DHS’s position
    DHS does not contest the ICA’s adoption of the Averett
    holding invalidating the Rule.          DHS instead argues that the ICA
    should have addressed Dr. Nitta’s eligibility under the Statute,
    and that he was still ineligible.            DHS contends that Dr. Nitta
    was ineligible because his “primary specialty designation” was
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    OB/GYN, not family medicine, general internal medicine, or
    pediatric medicine.
    We agree that Dr. Nitta’s eligibility under the Statute
    should be addressed, and we now do so.            We disagree with DHS,
    however, that Dr. Nitta was not eligible for the Program under
    the Statute.       For the reasons below, he was.
    2.    A physician can have more than one specialty
    At the outset, it is important to note that the term
    “primary specialty designation” appears in 42 U.S.C., which
    concerns “The Public Health and Welfare,” only twice: in the
    Medicaid Statute at issue here, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(C), and
    in the parallel Medicare statute discussed in Averett, 42 U.S.C.
    § 1395l(x).
    DHS asserts Dr. Nitta’s 1993 Medicaid application and 2006
    NPI specialty designation control what constitutes his “primary
    specialty designation” for purposes of the Program.               DHS posits
    that because Dr. Nitta had previously designated a “specialty”
    of OB/GYN, he was precluded from later self-designating a
    different “primary specialty” under the Statute.10              Thus, DHS
    assumes that a physician cannot have more than one specialty.
    10    The NPI program replaced previous provider identifiers. See NPI Fact
    Sheet: For Healthcare Providers Who Are Individuals, CMS (Jan. 2006),
    https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Administrative-
    Simplification/NationalProvIdentStand/Downloads/NPIFactSheet012606.pdf
    (continued. . .)
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    Just as the Rule at issue here could not contravene the
    Statute, however, NPI designations required pursuant to
    administrative guidance cannot violate the statutes on which
    they are based.
    In this regard, the Sixth Circuit discussed the NPI in the
    following introductory passage:
    The Medicare program is funded and administered by the
    federal government; the Medicaid program is funded largely
    by the federal government but administered primarily by the
    states. In 1996, Congress directed the Secretary of Health
    and Human Services to create a “standard unique health
    identifier” for each “health care provider” participating
    in the Medicare and Medicaid programs and to “take into
    account” each provider's “specialty classifications.” 42
    U.S.C. § 1320d-2(b). Accordingly, at the time relevant
    here, the Secretary required Medicare and Medicaid
    providers to complete a “National Provider Identifier” form
    that required providers to designate their “primary
    specialty.” See Form CMS-10114 (11/08) at 1–2. Medicare
    providers also completed a form that required them to
    “designate [their] primary specialty[.]” See CMS-855I
    (02/08) at 8. Medicaid providers likewise designated their
    primary specialties through “self-attestation” during most
    if not all states’ enrollment processes. See 
    77 Fed. Reg. 66,673
    –75 (Nov. 6, 2012).
    Averett, 943 F.3d at 315 (emphasis added).
    As indicated in Averett, NPI designations are based on
    administrative guidance promulgated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
    1320d-2(b).    This statute is part of 42 U.S.C. Chapter 7 (Social
    Security), Subchapter XI (General Provisions, Peer Review, and
    Administrative Simplification), Part C (Administrative
    (continued. . .)
    [perma.cc/EWL2-EWK2] (last visited November 1, 2022).   We therefore address
    the effect of Dr. Nitta’s 2006 NPI identifier.
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    Simplication); in other words, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et. seq. is
    concerned with “administrative simplification.”11
    Within this Part C, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 is titled
    “Standards for information transactions and data elements.”
    Subsection (b) provides:
    (b) Unique health identifiers
    (1) In general
    The Secretary shall adopt standards providing for a
    standard unique health identifier for each individual,
    employer, health plan, and health care provider for use in
    the health care system. In carrying out the preceding
    sentence for each health plan and health care provider, the
    Secretary shall take into account multiple uses for
    identifiers and multiple locations and specialty
    classifications for health care providers.
    (2) Use of identifiers
    The standards adopted under paragraph (1) shall specify the
    purposes for which a unique health identifier may be used.
    (Emphasis added.)        Hence, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 created NPIs
    11    The NPI system was actually established for billing and payment
    purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(r):
    (r) Establishment of physician identification system
    The Secretary shall establish a system which provides for a
    unique identifier for each physician who furnishes services
    for which payment may be made under this subchapter. Under
    such system, the Secretary may impose appropriate fees on
    such physicians to cover the costs of investigation and
    recertification activities with respect to the issuance of
    the identifiers.
    See also National Provider Identifier Standard (NPI), CMS (Dec. 1, 2021),
    https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Administrative-
    Simplification/NationalProvIdentStand [perma.cc/DR7S-V7Q9] (last visited
    November 1, 2022).
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    for informational and data purposes.12           This statute requires a
    “standard unique health identifier for each individual . . .
    health care provider for use in the health care system.”                But,
    pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(b)(1), the NPI system clearly
    allows for “multiple . . . specialty classifications for health
    care providers.”
    This raises the question of whether an individual physician
    can be a “health care provider” with “multiple specialty
    classifications.”        In this regard, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d provides
    definitions for all terms under Part C. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(3)
    then defines “health care provider” as follows:
    (3) Health care provider
    The term “health care provider” includes a provider of
    services (as defined in section 1395x(u)13 of this title), a
    provider of medical or other health services
    (as defined in section 1395x(s) of this title), and any
    other person furnishing health care services or supplies.
    (Emphasis added.)        Thus, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(3), a
    “provider of medical or other health services (as defined in
    section 1395x(s)” can be a “health care provider” with “multiple
    specialty classifications” under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(b)(1).                  The
    12    Again, the NPI system was actually created for billing and payment
    purposes. See supra note 11.
    13    “Provider of services” is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) as “a
    hospital, critical access hospital, rural emergency hospital, skilled nursing
    facility, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility, home health
    agency, hospice program”; thus, an individual physician cannot be a “provider
    of services” under this definition.
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    additional question then is whether an individual physician can
    be a “provider of medical or other health care services” “as
    defined in section 1395x(s).”
    42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s) provides as follows:
    (s) Medical and other health services
    The term “medical and other health services” means any of the
    following items or services:
    (1) physicians' services;
    . . . .
    (2)
    (L) certified nurse-midwife services;
    (M) qualified psychologist services;
    (N) clinical social worker services (as defined in subsection
    (hh)(2))[.]
    (Emphasis added.)     42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s) makes clear that an
    individual physician (like an individual nurse-midwife,
    psychologist, or clinical social worker), as a provider of
    “medical and other health services,” is a “health care
    provider.”
    Therefore, under governing federal law, individual
    physicians can have multiple specialty classifications under the
    NPI system.    Thus, the fact that Dr. Nitta’s initial NPI
    designation listed a specialty of OB/GYN did not prevent him
    from having another “specialty” that was his “primary specialty”
    during the time period at issue.
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    3.     Dr. Nitta self-designated as having one of the
    requisite specialties as his “primary specialty”
    Accordingly, Dr. Nitta was authorized to have more than one
    medical specialty.     In order to qualify for the Program under
    the Statute, however, Dr. Nitta was required to have a “primary
    specialty designation” of “family medicine, general internal
    medicine, or pediatric medicine” for the relevant time period.
    The issue then is how that designation was to occur.
    In this respect, we agree with the Sixth Circuit and the
    ICA that the Rule, which contained requirements inconsistent
    with Statute, was invalid.       We also agree with the Sixth Circuit
    and ICA that “a physician with a primary specialty designation”
    for purposes of the eligibility under the Statute means “a
    physician who has himself designated, as his primary specialty,
    one of the specialties recited in those provisions[,]”            which
    are family, general internal, or pediatric medicine.
    DHS and the circuit court ruled Dr. Nitta ineligible based
    on invalidated Rule requirements.         The parties do not actually
    dispute that Dr. Nitta did designate, as his primary specialty,
    either family medicine, general internal medicine, or pediatric
    medicine.
    As the Rule and self-attestation form have been
    invalidated, the fact that Dr. Nitta did not personally submit
    the on-line application is immaterial.         To the extent a staff
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    member had enrolled Dr. Nitta in the Program based on the
    recommendation of AlohaCare, Dr. Nitta ratified the action of
    his office staff regarding the “self-designation” and indicated
    that because he practices in internal medicine “all day,” he was
    self-attesting to being a PCP who works in general internal
    medicine.    Thus, Dr. Nitta did self-designate internal medical
    as his principal area of practice, or primary specialty, for the
    time period of the Program.       This self-designation was
    consistent with the findings in DHS’s final decision that HMSA,
    UnitedHealthcare, AlohaCare, and Hilo Medical Center, as well as
    Hilo community medical professionals in general, recognized Dr.
    Nitta as a PCP.
    Accordingly, we hold that Dr. Nitta was eligible for
    enhanced payments under the Statute.
    Our holding is consistent with the purposes of the Program.
    Congress clearly intended the enhanced payments as incentives
    for the provision of primary care services, regardless of a
    physician’s other practice areas.         We agree with amici that
    [t]he legislative history accompanying the [Statute]
    indicates that the enhanced payments were meant to address
    Medicaid reimbursement rates for primary care services that
    were substantially lower than the Medicare rates for the
    same services. [See H.R. Rep. No. 111-299, pt. 1, at 617-
    19 (2009).] Congress stated that the enhancements were
    necessary because:
    These low Medicaid payment rates do not provide
    adequate incentives for physicians to participate in
    Medicaid, limiting access to physicians’ services by
    Medicaid beneficiaries. In addition, low Medicaid
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    payment rates discourage young physicians and other
    health professionals from entering careers in primary
    care, undermining efforts to address the shortage of
    primary care practitioners in many areas of the
    country. [Id.]
    The legislative history further indicates that Congress
    intended the enhanced payments to apply broadly to “primary
    care services furnished by any participating physician or
    health professional, not just a primary care physician or
    professional[.]” [Id. at 618 (emphasis added).]
    For all of these reasons, Dr. Nitta was eligible for
    enhanced payments pursuant to the Statute.
    B.      DHS’s other points on certiorari lack merit
    1.    The circuit court relied solely on the invalid Rule
    when it deemed Dr. Nitta ineligible for the Program
    DHS also asserts on certiorari that the circuit court did
    not solely rely on the Rule, but also relied on the Statute when
    it deemed Dr. Nitta ineligible for the Program.
    Our holding above resolves this issue.          If the circuit
    court had determined Dr. Nitta ineligible based on the Statute,
    it would have been wrong.         But the record reflects the circuit
    court (and DHS) relied solely on the invalidated Rule in deeming
    Dr. Nitta ineligible and not did not rely on the Statute.
    2.    DHS waived its appropriation argument
    Finally, we reject DHS’s third issue on certiorari, that
    DHS is required to recoup the overpayment because there was
    never money appropriated to pay Dr. Nitta.             This is a new
    argument never raised below and is therefore waived.               See Ass’n
    of Apt. Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea Resort Co., 100 Hawaiʻi
    27
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    97, 107, 
    58 P.3d 608
    , 618 (2002) (“Legal issues not raised in
    the trial court are ordinarily deemed waived on appeal.”)
    V. Conclusion
    Having determined Dr. Nitta eligible for enhanced payments
    under the Statute, we vacate the ICA’s March 23, 2022 judgment
    on appeal to the extent it remanded the case “to the DHS
    Administrative Appeals Office for further proceedings as may be
    necessary.”    The ICA’s judgment on appeal is otherwise affirmed.
    Erin N. Lau                        /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
    for petitioner
    /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
    Eric A. Seitz
    for respondent                     /s/ Michael D. Wilson
    Frederick Nitta, M.D.
    /s/ Todd W. Eddins
    /s/ Shirley M. Kawamura
    28
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SCWC-17-0000432

Filed Date: 11/4/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/4/2022